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
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
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be the actual effect upon the impulse of the enemy 'compromised'

The answer was - 'It will retreat.'

Was it time for the English General to take the battle into his own hands?

So long as Bosquet with infantry regiments remained isolated upon the cliff and Telegraph Heights; and while Napoleon's Division remained lying low in the vineyards and the French General below the Telegraph Heights, an advance of the French would certainly distort the  Allied line in a dangerous way and Lord Raglan had waited for the moment when the development of the expected French attack in the Telegraph Heights would enable him to enable the infantry to go forward.

But he had little time to lose in the end of the day knowing how long the mass of the French army might continue to operate in the vicinity of the Telegraph Heights and the scheme of active war which the English General had himself devised for him, and to precipitate the advance of the English forces. It is true that while Bosquet stood fast on the cliff, whilst Calverley remained in possession of the Telegraph Heights and while Prince Napoleon's Division was still low down in the valley the advance of the English forces against the enemy and the Kourganè Hill would run the risk of the plan which the French had conceived; and if Bosquet should be obliged to retreat at a time when the English were hotly engaged in an attack upon the enemy's heights, the whole array of the Allies

\* 'Batta en retraite.'



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THE  
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:  
ITS ORIGIN,  
AND  
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS  
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF  
LORD RAGLAN.

By ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE.


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1st Plan of the Battle of the Alma, } at the end of Vol. II.  
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# INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

## CHAPTER I.

WHEN it had been resolved that the French and the English forces already despatched to the East should be raised to a strength which might enable them to be more than auxiliary to the defence of the Turkish dominions, the French Emperor named an officer to the command of his army in the field, and the General who was to have charge of the Queen's land-forces had already been chosen. It seems right for me now to say something of these two commanders; and, the better to make each of them known, I am willing to speak of some of the transactions which brought them together between the time of their meeting in Paris and the day when they received their instructions for the invasion of the Crimea.

CHAP.  
I.

The commanders of the French and the English armies.

The officer intrusted with the command of the French army in the East was a Marshal of France, and was the person before spoken of who had changed his name from Le Roy to 'St Arnaud,' and from James to 'Achilles.' He impersonated with

Marshal  
St Arnaud.

**C H A P.** singular exactness the idea which our forefathers had  
I. in their minds when they spoke of what they called  
‘ a Frenchman ;’ for although (by cowing the rich, and by filling the poor with envy) the great French Revolution had thrown a lasting gloom on the national character, it left this one man untouched. He was bold, gay, reckless, and vain ; but beneath the mere glitter of the surface there was a great capacity for administrative business, and a more than common willingness to take away human life. In Algerine warfare he had proved himself from the first an active, enterprising officer, and in later years a brisk commander. He was skilled in the duties of a military governor, knowing how to hold tight under martial law a conquered or a half-conquered province. The empire of his mind over his actions was so often interrupted by bodily pain and weakness, that it is hard to say whether, if he had been gifted with health, he would have been a firm, steadfast man ; but he had violent energies, and a spirit so elastic that, when for any interval the pressure of misery or of bodily pain was lifted off, he seemed as strong and as joyous as though he had never been crushed. He chose to subordinate the lives and the rights of other men to his own advancement ; therefore he was ruthless, but not in any other sense cruel. No one, as he himself said, could be more good-natured. In the intervals between the grave deeds that he did, he danced and sung. To men in authority, no less than to women, he paid court with flattering stanzas and songs. He had extraordinary activity of body, and was highly

skilled in the performance of gymnastic feats ; he played the violin ; and, as though he were resolved in all things to be the Frenchman of the old time, there was once at least in his life a time of depression, when (to the astonishment of the good priest, who fell on his knees and thanked God as for a miracle wrought) he knelt down and confessed himself, seeking comfort and absolution from his Church. C H A P.  
I.

He thrice went through a career in the army. First he entered it in 1816 as a sub-lieutenant of the Royal Guard. He soon plunged into a course of life which was of such a kind as to cause him to cease from being an officer. He kept away from France for many years, and became acquainted with several languages. For a long time he was in England, and he spoke our language very well ; but in later years he was accustomed to be silent in regard to the time of his exile, and there is no need to lift the veil which he threw over this part of his life.

When the Revolution of 1830 broke out, he returned to France, and being then thirty-three years of age, he again entered the French army as a sub-lieutenant. He wrote some stanzas to Meunier, and gained a step by it. ‘Tell me, after that,’ said he, ‘that songs are good for nothing!’ His next enterprise was in prose. It chanced that Bugeaud, then the General in command of the district, had printed a small military work on the camping of troops. St Arnaud or Le Roy (for the time of the change of name is not certain) translated the book into several languages, and presented the fruit of his labour, with,



C H A P. I. no doubt, an appropriate letter of dedication, to the General. Bugeaud was pleased ; and from that time until his death he never lost sight of the judicious translator. St Arnaud was immediately put upon the General's staff, and soon became one of his aides-de-camp. When the Duchess of Berri fell a prisoner into the hands of the Government, M. St Arnaud, whose regiment was on duty at the place of her detention, found means to make himself useful to the Government without incurring the dislike of his captive ; and he seemed to be in a fair road to promotion. But again the clouds passed over him.

In 1836, for the third and last time, being then near forty years of age, he entered the military profession.\* He began this his third career as a lieutenant in the 'Foreign Legion,' and joined the corps in Algeria.

\* That is, in an active way, as an officer serving with troops. It must not be inferred from the words in the text, that in the interval between September 1835 and November 1836 his name was (for the second time) out of the Army List. He seems to have been employed at that time in the 'Gymnase Militaire' ('Lettres du Maréchal de St Arnaud,' vol. i. p. 92). Considering that he had attained to the rank of a full lieutenant in a French regiment, that he had been on General Bugeaud's Staff and in high favour, and that he had been intrusted with duties of an important and delicate nature, it is obvious that his removal to such a corps as the 'Foreign Legion,' under orders for Africa, with no higher rank than that which he had previously held in a French regiment, was a descent—a descent and a change so abrupt and decisive as to warrant me in speaking of it as the commencement of a fresh career. The editor of the Letters speaks of the death of M. St Arnaud's first wife in terms implying that that was the event which caused him to seek for service in Africa (*ibid.*) It may be easily imagined that the grief caused by this event was one of the motives which made him long to change his career ; but it would seem that other circumstances must have contributed to reconcile him to a step which placed him in the 'Foreign Legion' with the mere rank of a lieutenant.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

Every man of the corps, St Arnaud said, had passed through a wild youth ;\* but with comrades of that quality a man might entertain better hopes of gaining renown than with a mere French regiment of the line ; and St Arnaud at this time made a strong resolve. He said, ‘I will be remarkable, or die.’ And he remained so faithful to this his covenant with himself, that even by acute illness he could not be kept out of action. When he lay upon the sick-bed, if it chanced that the Arabs or the Kabyles were offering any prospect of a fight upon ground within reach of the hospital, he almost always managed to drag his helpless, tortured body towards the scene of the conflict ; and this he would do, not with an idea of being able to take an active part, but simply in order that the list of officers present might not fail to comprise his name. At the storming of Constantine, however, he really helped to govern the event ; for when a great explosion took place, and many were blown into the air, the French soldiers ran back with a cry that all was ruined ; but Bedeau and Combes, withstanding the madness of the common terror, strove hard to rally the crowd ; and St Arnaud having with him in his company of the Legion some bold reckless outcasts of the North, he bethought him of the shout, very strange to the ears of Frenchmen, which he had heard in other climes. Skilled in the art of imitation, he uttered the warlike cry. Instantly

C H A P.  
I.

\* ‘Jeunesse orageuse.’ I translate this by the words, ‘wild youth ;’ but I believe the phrase, in the mouths of Frenchmen, generally implies that the things done by the person spoken of are of a less venial kind than my translation would imply.

CHAP.  
I. from the Northmen around him, whether Germans, or Swedes, or English, Scots, Irish, or Danes, there sprang their native 'Hurrah!' and with it came the thronging of men who must and would go forward. It was mainly the torrent of this new onslaught by St Arnaud and his men of the 'stormy youth' which carried the breach, and brought about the fall of the city.

Even if, for the recruiting of his health, he were passing a few weeks of holiday in France, he would still seek personal distinction with a singular strength of will. If, for instance, there chanced to be a fire at night, he would fly to the spot, would scale the ladders, mount the roof, and contrive to appear aloft in seeming peril, displayed to a wondering crowd by the lurid glare of the flames. Then he would disappear, and then suddenly he would be seen again suspended in the air, and passing athwart the sky that divided one roof from another by the help of a rope or a pole. In the early part of his service in Algeria, his old patron, General Bugeaud, was in command there, and was still a warm friend to him. Of course this circumstance helped to open a path for him; and the result was that, first by acts of bravery and vigour, and then by a display of administrative ability, the all but desperate lieutenant of the Foreign Legion rose in eight years to be intrusted with a General's command.\* In 1845 he commanded in the valley of the Chelif; and he was so dire a scourge to the neighbouring tribes, that the force which obeyed his orders was called the 'Infernal Column.'

\* But up to that time with the rank of Colonel only.

When first I saw him in that year he was moving with his force to wreak vengeance on a revolted tribe, and he was to march five weeks deep into the desert. He spoke with luminous force, and with a charming animation; and it seemed to me, as we rode along by the side of the heavy-laden soldiery, that the clear incisive words in which he described to me the mechanism of the 'movable column,' were a model of military diction; but his keen, handsome, eager features so kindled with the mere stir and pomp of war—he seemed so to love the swift going and coming of his aides-de-camp, and the rolling drums, and the joyful appeal of the bugles—he was so content with the gleam of his epaulettes, half-hidden and half-revealed by the graceful white cabaan—so happy in the bounding pride of his Arab charger—that he did not seem like a man destined to be chosen from out of all others as the instrument of a scheme requiring grave care and secrecy. Yet of secrecy he was most capable; and at that very time he had upon his mind,\* and was concealing, not from me only (for that would be only natural), but from every officer and man around him, a deed of such a kind that few men perhaps have ever done the like of it in secret.

We saw that, before the December of 1851, the enterprising and resolute Fleury was in Algeria, seeking out a fit African officer, who would take the post of Minister of War, with a view of joining the President in his plans for the overthrow of

\* The act here alluded to is spoken of further on. It took place about six weeks before the time when I first saw Colonel St Arnaud.

CHAP. the Republic. Monsieur St Arnaud formerly Le  
 I. Roy had not so lived as to occasion any difficulty in approaching him with dishonouring proposals ; and there was ground for inferring that he might prove equal to the task which was to be set before him. The able administrator of a great district in Algeria might be competent to head a department. The commander of the 'Infernal Column' was not likely to be wanting in the ruthlessness which was needed ; and if his vanity made it seem doubtful whether he was a man who could keep a secret, there was a confidential paper in existence which might tend to allay the fear.

St Arnaud had warmly approved the destruction of life which had been effected in 1844 by filling with smoke the crowded caves of the Dahra ; but he had sagaciously observed that the popularity of the measure in Europe was not co-extensive with the approbation which seems to have been bestowed upon its author by the military authorities. These counter-views guided M. St Arnaud. In the summer of 1845 he received private information that a body of Arabs had taken refuge in the cave of Shelas. Thither he marched a body of troops. Eleven of the fugitives came out and surrendered ; but it was known to St Arnaud, though not to any other Frenchman, that five hundred men remained in the cave. All these people Colonel St Arnaud determined to kill, and so far he perhaps felt that he was only an imitator of Pelissier ;\* but the resolve which accom-

\* It is believed, however, that Pelissier left open some of the en-

panied the formation of this scheme was original. He determined to keep the deed secret even from the troops engaged in the operation. Except his brother, and Marshal Bugeaud, whose approval was the prize he sought for, no one was to know what he did. He contrived to execute both his purposes. 'Then,' he writes to his brother, 'I had all the apertures hermetically stopped up. I made one vast sepulchre. No one went into the caverns; no one but myself knew that under there, there are five hundred brigands who will never again slaughter Frenchmen. A confidential report has told all to the Marshal, without terrible poetry or imagery. Brother, no one is so good as I am by taste and by nature. From the 8th to the 12th I have been ill, but my conscience does not reproach me. I have done my duty as a commander, and to-morrow I would do the same over again; but I have taken a disgust to Africa.'\*

The officer who could cause French soldiery to be the unconscious instruments for putting to death five hundred fugitive men, and who could afterwards keep concealed from the whole force all knowledge of what it had done, was likely to be the very person for whom Fleury was seeking. He was brought back to Paris, and made Minister of War, with a view to the great plot of the 2d of December. France knows how well, sooner or later, he answered to Fleury's

trances to the cave, and that he only resorted to the smoke as a means of compelling the fugitives to come out and surrender.

\* St Arnaud's Letters, published by his relatives after his death.

C H A P.  
I.

best hopes. He kept his counsel close until the appointed night, and then (whatever faltering there may have been between midnight and three in the morning) he was out in time for the deed ; and before the daylight came he had stabbed France through in her sleep.

Amongst men who make a great capture, there will often spring up questions concerning the division of the spoil. When he helped to make prize of France, St Arnaud of course got much ; but his wants were vast, and he had earned a clear right to extort from his chief accomplice, and to go back again, and again, and yet again, with the terrible demand for 'more !' He was in such a condition of health as to be unfit to command an army in the field ; for although, during intervals, he was free from pain and glowing with energy, he was from time to time utterly cast down by his recurring malady. It is possible that, notwithstanding his bodily state, he may have sincerely longed to have the command of an army in a European campaign ; but whether he thus longed or not, he unquestionably said that he did ; and the French Emperor took him at his word, consenting, as was very natural, that his dangerous, insatiate friend should have a command which would take him into the country of the Lower Danube. Apparently it was not believed that, in point of warlike skill, M. St Arnaud was well fitted to the command ; for the French Emperor, as will be seen, resorted to the plan of surrounding him with men who were virtually empowered to guide him with their overruling counsels.

To try to understand the relations between the allied Generals of France and England, without knowing something of the repute in which Marshal St Arnaud was held by his fellow-countrymen, would be to go blindfold ; and a narrator keeping silence on this subject would be hiding a fact which belongs to history, and a fact, too, which is one of deep moment, and fruitful of lessons. Paris stripped of the weapons which kill the body, and robbed of her appeal to honest print, was more than ever pitiless with the tongue ; and M. St Arnaud being laid open by the tenor of the life that he had led, his reputation fell a prey to cruel speech. The people of the capital knew of no crime too vile to be imputed to the new Marshal of France now intrusted with the command of her army in the field. Yet, so far as I know, they failed to make out that he had ever been convicted, or even arrested, on a criminal charge ; and when I look at the affectionate correspondence which almost through his life M. St Arnaud seems to have maintained with his near relatives, I am led to imagine that they at least—and they would have been likely to know something of the truth—could have hardly believed his worst errors to be errors of the more dishonouring sort. Therefore there is ground for surmising that the Marshal was a man slandered. But in these times the chief defence against slanders upon public men is to be found in the award that results from free printing ; and the right of free printing in France, Marshal St Arnaud, with his own midnight hand, had stealthily helped to destroy. Whether



C H A P. I. he was a man bitterly wronged by his fellow-countrymen, or whether what he suffered was mere justice, the state of his repute in the spring of 1854 is a thing lying within the reach of historical certainty. He had an ill name.

But State policy is a shameless leveller—is a leveller of even that difficult steep which seems to divide the man of high honour from those of mean repute. The plotters of the 2d of December had overturned the social structure of France. They had stifled men's minds, and had made their eloquence mute. They had forced those who were of high estate by character, or by intellect, or by birth, or by honourable wealth, to endure to see France handled at will by persons of no account, and to submit to be governed by them, and to pay taxes into their hands, and to maintain them in luxury, and in all so much of pomp as can be copied from the splendour of kings. The new Emperor could not but know that he was breaking down yet another of the world's barriers, and was carrying subversion across the Channel, when he contrived that all Europe should see him presenting his fellow-venturer of the December night to the appointed commander of an English army.

But when he knew who the English General was to be, he might well give the rein to his cynic joy. He could have been sure that the General placed in command of our army would be an officer of unsullied name ; but he who had been chosen was one whose life was mixed with history—the friend, the companion of Wellington. It is true this Englishman was

known to be very simple, very careless of self—a man hardly capable of imagining that he could be humbled by obeying the orders of his sovereign ; and it is true also that the mass of the English people, being eager in the war, and little used to lay stress, as the French do, on the impersonation of a principle, were blind to the moral import of what their Government was doing. But the French Emperor understood England ; and he remembered that his coming guest was one of a great and powerful body of nobles, who were proud on behalf of this favourite member of their class, and fenced him round with honour. For the levelling of these heights, and for the bringing down of those in Europe who were tall with the pride which sustains man's old strife between good and evil, no dreamer could dream of a solemnisation more signal than the coming together of Marshal Le Roy St Arnaud, and him whom old friends still called Lord Fitzroy Somerset. The French Emperor knew that the mind of Germany and France would be swift to interpret this public contact, and would see in it the terms of a great surrender.


I conceive that in these latter times the scale upon which we measure warlike prowess has been brought down too low by the custom of awarding wild violent praise to the common performance of duty, and even now and then to actual misfeasance ; so, if I keep from this path, it is not because I think coldly of our army or our navy, but because I desire—as I am very sure our best officers do—that we should return to our ancient and more severe standard of excellence.

C H A P.  
I.

Lord  
Raglan.

C H A P. <sup>I.</sup> There is another reason which moves me in the same direction. Not only is the utterance of mere praise a lazy and futile method of attempting to do justice to worthy deeds, but it even intercepts the honest growth of a man's renown by serving as a contrivance for avoiding that labour of narration upon which, for the most part, all lasting fame must rest.

Too often the repute of a soldier who has done some heroic act is dealt with by a formal report declaring that he has been 'brave,' or 'gallant,' or 'has conducted himself to the perfect satisfaction of his commanding officer.' The cheap sugared words are quickly forgotten, and nothing remains ; whereas, if his countrymen were told, not of the mere conclusion that a man had done bravely, but of the very deed from which the inference was drawn, the story, however simple, might dwell perhaps in their minds, and they might tell it to their children, and the soldier would have his fame. Now, this history will virtually embrace the whole of the short period in which Lord Raglan's quality as a General was tried : and it seems to me, therefore, that if in narrating what happened I can reach to near the truth ; if I give honest samples of what our General said, and of what he wrote—of his manner of commanding men, and his way of maintaining an alliance ; if I show how he dealt with armies in the hour of battle, and how he comported himself in times of heavy trial,—his true nature, with its strength and with its human failings, will be so far brought to light that I may be dispensed from the need of striving to portray it ; and, contenting myself



with speaking of some of the mere outward and visible signs which showed upon the surface, may leave it to his countrymen to ascend, by the knowledge of what he did, to the knowledge of what he was. Where I think Lord Raglan's measures were right, I suppose I shall allow my belief to appear ; and where I think they were wrong, I shall be likely to speak with an equal freedom : but it is not for me, who am no soldier, to undertake to compute the great account between the English people and a General who commanded their Queen's army in the field. Still, it must be remembered that the less I take upon myself in this regard, the graver will be the task of those who read. When the countrymen of Lord Raglan shall believe that they have in their hands sufficing means of knowledge, they will pass judgment,—not, as I should, with the slender authority of a single bystander, but with the weight of an honest nation, in time of calm, judging firmly, yet not ungenerously, the career of a public servant.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan, was a younger son of the fifth Duke of Beaufort, and of a daughter of Admiral Boscawen. He was born in 1788. He entered the army in 1804. In 1807, Sir Arthur Wellesley, being about to depart for the expedition against Copenhagen,\* attached the young Lord Fitzroy Somerset to his staff ; and during his career in the Peninsula he kept him close to his side,

\* Lord Fitzroy Somerset was not introduced to Sir Arthur Wellesley until just as he was starting for the Peninsula. Sir Arthur Wellesley and Lord Fitzroy Somerset sailed in the same ship, and they worked together at the Spanish language.—*Note to 2d Edition.*

C H A P. first as his aide-de-camp, and then as military secretary.

I. Between the time of the first restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, and the flight of Louis XVIII. in the spring of the following year, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was secretary of the Embassy at Paris. It was during this interval of peace that he married Emily Wellesley, a daughter of the third Earl of Mornington, and a niece of the Duke of Wellington. When the war was renewed, he again became military secretary and aide-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington, and served with him in his last campaign. At Waterloo—he was riding at the time near the farm of La Haie Sainte—he lost his right arm from a shot. But he quickly gained a great facility of writing with his left hand; and, the war being ended, he resumed his function as secretary of Embassy at Paris. There he remained until 1819. He then returned to England, and became secretary to the Master-General of the Ordnance. In 1825 he went with the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg as secretary of Embassy. In 1827 he was appointed military secretary to the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, and there he remained until the death of the Duke of Wellington in 1852. After that event he was made Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed a Privy Councillor, and raised to the peerage. In February 1854 he became a full General.

Thus, from his very boyhood until the autumn of 1852, Lord Fitzroy Somerset had passed his life under the immediate guidance of the Duke of Wellington. The gain was not without its drawback; for in proportion as the great Duke's comprehensive grasp and

prodigious power of work made him independent and self-sufficing, his subordinates were of course relieved from the necessity, and even shut out from the opportunity, of thinking for themselves ; but still, to have been in the close presence and intimacy of Wellington from the very rising of his fame in Europe—to have toiled at the desk where the immortal despatches were penned—to have ridden at his side and carried his orders in all the great campaigns—and then, when peace returned, to have engaged in the labours of diplomacy and military administration under the auspices of the same commanding mind,—all this was to have a wealth of experience which common times cannot give.

C H A P.  
I.

But for more than thirty years of his life Lord Raglan had been administering the current business of military offices in peace-time, and this is a kind of experience which, if it be very long protracted, is far from being a good preparative for the command of an army in the field ; because a military office in time of peace is impelled by its very constitution to aim at uniformity ; and, on the other hand, the genius of war abhors uniformity, and tramples upon forms and regulations.

An armed force is a means to an end—the end is victory over enemies ; and this is to be achieved, partly indeed by a due use of discipline and method, but partly also by keeping alive, in those who may come to have command, a knowledge and love of war, and by cherishing that unlabelled, undocketed state of mind which shall enable a man to encounter the unknown. In England, however, and in all the great

**C H A P.** <sup>L</sup> States of Europe except France, the end had been so much forgotten in pursuit of the means, and the industry exerted in the regulation of troops in peacetime had become so foreign to the business of war, that the more a man was military in the narrowed sense of the term, the less he was likely to be fitted for the perturbing exigencies of a campaign. In one country this singular perversity of busy, 'cold, formal man,' had been carried so far, that an army and a war had been actually treated as things antagonistic the one to the other; for the late Grand Duke Constantine of Russia once declared that he dreaded a war, because he was sure it would spoil the troops, which, with ceaseless care and labour, he had striven to bring to perfection.

It is to be observed also, that partly from the way in which our military system was framed, and partly from political causes, the sympathy which England ought ever to have with her troops had been materially lessened after the first few years of the peace. The Duke of Wellington, dreading lest our forces should be dangerously reduced by the House of Commons, made it his policy to withdraw the army as much as possible from public observation. This method had tended still further to dissociate the country from its armed defenders: but naturally the Duke of Wellington's view was law; and it became the duty of those who were employed in the military administration, not to cause the country to practise itself heartily for the eventuality of another war, but simply to maintain, as far as they could, a monoton-

ous quiet in the army. For half a lifetime Lord Fitzroy Somerset was engaged in preventing and allaying discussion, and making the wheels of office run smooth. Against the baneful effect of this sort of experience, and against the habit of mind which it tended to generate, Lord Raglan had to combat with all the fire and strength of his nature.

When Lord Raglan was appointed to the command he was sixty-six years old. But although there were intervals when a sudden relaxation of the muscles of the face used to show the impress of time, those moments were few; and, in general, his well-braced features, his wakeful attention, his uncommon swiftness of thought, his upright, manly carriage, and his easy seat on horseback, made him look the same as a man in the strong mid-season of life.

He had one peculiarity which, although it went near to being a foible, was likely to give smoothness to his relations with the French. Beyond and apart from a just contempt for mere display, he had a strange hatred of the outward signs and tokens of military energy. Versed of old in real war, he knew that the clatter of a General briskly galloping hither and thither with staff and orderlies did not of necessity imply any momentous resolve,—that the aides-de-camp, swiftly shot off by a word like arrows from a bow, were no sure signs of despatch or decisive action; and because such outward signs might mean little, he shrank from them more than was right. He would have liked, if it had been possible, that he and his army should have glided unnoticed from the banks of



CHAP. I. the Thames to their position in the battle-field. It was certain, therefore, that although a French General would be sure to find himself checked in any really hurtful attempt to encroach upon the just station of the British army, yet that if, as was not unnatural, he should evince a desire for personal prominence, he would find no rival in Lord Raglan until he reached the enemy's presence.

He was gifted with a diction very apt for public business, and of a kind rarely found in Englishmen ; for though it was so easy as to be just what men like in the intercourse of private friendship, it was still so constructed as to be fit for the ear of all the world ; and whether he spoke or whether he wrote—whether he used the French tongue or his own clear, graceful English—it seemed that there had come from him the very words which were the best and no more. It was so natural to him to be prudent in speech, that he avoided dangerous utterance without seeming cautious or reserved.

He had the subtle power to draw men along with him. To say that he was persuasive might mean that he could adduce reasons which tended to bring men to his views. His was a power of another sort, for without pressure of argument, his mind by its mere impact broke down resistance for the moment ; and although the easy graciousness of his manner quickly set people free from all awkward constraint, it did not so liberate men's minds that, whilst they were still in his presence, they at all liked the duty of trying to uphold their own opinions against him.

This dominion, however, was in a great degree dependent upon his actual personal presence ; for, with all the power and grace of his pen, he could not, at a distance, work effects proportioned to those which he wrought when he dealt with men face to face. C H A P.  
I.

It is plain that, in one respect, his empire over those who were in his presence was of a kind likely to become dangerous to him in the command of an army, because it prevented men from differing from him, and even made them shrink from conveying to him an unwelcome truth. Indeed, after the death of the Duke of Wellington, the proudest Englishman, if only he had intellect and a little knowledge of his country's latter history, had generally the grace to understand that, unless he too were a soldier who had taken his orders from the lips of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he could hardly be the equal of one whose mere presence was a record of England's great days. Thence it followed that, without pretension on the one side or servility on the other, men who were with him had a tendency to become courtiers. It was in vain that, so far as it had to do with their personal contentment, his manner placed men at their ease ; there was some quality in him, or else some outward circumstance—it was partly, perhaps, the historic appeal of his maimed sword-arm—which was always enforcing remembrance, and preventing his fusion with other men.

In truth, Lord Raglan's manner was of such a kind as to be, not simply ornament, but a real engine of power. It swayed events. There was no mere gloss

**C H A P.** <sup>**I.**</sup> in it. By some gift of imagination he divined the feelings of all sorts and conditions of men ; and whether he talked to a statesman or a schoolboy, his hearer went away captive. I knew a shy, thoughtful, sensitive youth, just gazetted to a regiment of the Guards, who had to render his visit of thanks to the military secretary at the Horse Guards. He went in trepidation ; he came back radiant with joy and wholesome confidence. Lord Fitzroy, instead of receiving him in solemn form and ceremony, had walked forward to meet him, had put his hand kindly on the boy's shoulder, and had said a few words so cheering, so interesting, and so free from the vice of being commonplace, that the impression clung to the lad, shaping his career for years, and helped to make him the man he was when he was out with his battalion in the winter of the first campaign. From the same presence the foremost statesman of the time once came away saying, that the man in England most fitted by nature to be at the head of the Government was Lord Fitzroy Somerset ; and he who so judged was himself a Prime Minister.

Marshal  
St Arnaud  
and Lord  
Raglan  
brought  
together  
at the  
Tuileries.

The enemies of the Imperial Government in France had long made it a reproach against the English that they were joining in close alliance with the midnight destroyers of law and freedom ; but when Lord Raglan came to Paris—when he went to the Tuileries—when he was presented by the Emperor to Marshal St Arnaud,—the notion that such things could be was a very torment to those of the Parisian malcontents who chanced to know something of the English

General :—‘ You English are a robust, stirring people, C H A P. <sup>L</sup>  
‘ and perhaps every man of you imagines that he             
‘ covers himself with dignity and grandeur by tramp-  
‘ ling upon the feelings of the rest of mankind ; but  
‘ surely those men wrong you who call you a proud  
‘ people. Pride causes men to stand aloof, as we  
‘ do, from that which is base ; and if ever again we  
‘ call you haughty islanders, you may silence the  
‘ calumny by reminding us of this 13th day of April  
‘ in the year of grace 1854. It was not enough that,  
‘ for the sake of this silly war, you should ally your-  
‘ selves body and soul to “ Monsieur de Morny’s  
‘ “ Lawgiver,” and that you should suffer him to  
‘ drag you down into close intercourse with persons  
‘ whom the humblest of us here decline to know ;  
‘ but now, as though you really wished that your  
‘ dishonour should be made signal in Europe, you  
‘ send hither your General . to be presented by  
‘ this “ French Emperor,” as you call him, to his  
‘ henchman, Mr Le Roy St Arnaud, and the man  
‘ whom you choose out for this great public sacrifice  
‘ is Fitzroy Somerset, the friend and the companion-  
‘ in-arms of your Wellington. You say that Lord  
‘ Raglan cares not with whom he associates, so that  
‘ he is under the orders of the Queen whom he serves,  
‘ and in the performance of a public duty ; but because  
‘ he, in the loyalty, in the high-bred simplicity of his  
‘ nature, is careless and forgetful of self—is that a  
‘ reason why you should fail to be proud for him—why  
‘ you should forget to be careful on his behalf ? If  
‘ the modesty of his nature hindered him from seeing

C H A P. <sup>I.</sup> ‘ the momentous significance of his contact with the  
‘ people who have got into our palaces, ought you not  
‘ to have interposed to prevent him from incurring  
‘ the scene of to-day ? We imagined that you knew  
‘ how to honour the memory of your Wellington, and  
‘ that, after his death, when you looked towards Fitzroy  
‘ Somerset, or spoke to him, or listened to his words,  
‘ you looked and spoke and listened like men who  
‘ remembered. Him, nevertheless, you now offer up.  
‘ To have brought you down to this is a great achieve-  
‘ ment—the realisation of what they call here a  
‘ “Napoleonic idea !” The prisoner of St Helena is  
‘ avenged at last. We are classic here, and we strike  
‘ commemorative medals. You will soon see the  
‘ honoured image of your Fitzroy Somerset under-  
‘ going presentation at the Tuileries. Already our  
‘ artists have caught some glimpses of him, and they  
‘ declare it is the colouring, the glow of the complexion,  
‘ which makes him look so English, and that in bronze  
‘ he will be grandly Roman. Those noble lineaments  
‘ of his, that upright manly form—nay, even the empty  
‘ sleeve which speaks to you of your day of glory—will  
‘ worthily signify what England was ; and then the  
‘ effigy of our counterfeit Cæsar receiving the homage  
‘ of a stainless Englishman, and joining him hand to  
‘ hand with Mr Le Roy St Arnaud, this will show  
‘ what England is. We hear that you are well  
‘ pleased with the prospect of all this, and that,  
‘ far from shrinking, your “ virtuous middle class,”  
‘ as you call it, is going into a state of coarse rapture.  
‘ For shame !’

Lord Raglan, all unconscious of exciting this kind of sympathy in the heart of the angry Faubourg, had left England on the 10th of April 1854; and on the following day both he and His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge were received in state at the Tuileries. The presence of a member of our Royal Family was welcome to the new Emperor: he understood its significance. The Parisians love to see a momentous idea so impersonated as to be visible to the eyes of the body; and when their monarch attained to be seen riding between the near kinsman of the English Queen and the appointed commander of her army in the field—when on a bright spring day he showed his guests some thirty thousand of his best troops in the Champ de Mars, and the scarlet of the ancient enemy sparkled gaily by the side of the blue and the gold—the people seemed to accept the scene as a fitting picture of the great alliance of the West. Almost for the first time in the history of France, the accustomed cheers given to the Head of the State were mingled with cheers for England.

But now the time for concerted action had come; and though France and England were already allied by such bonds as are made with parchment and wax, it remained to be seen whether the great rivals could act together in arms. The conjuncture, indeed, drew them towards each other; but it was certain that the coherence of the union would greatly depend on one man. It might seem that he who had first sworn to maintain the French Republic, and had afterwards

CHAP.  
I. destroyed it by stealth in the night-time, would not be much trusted again by his fellow-creatures ; but the alliance rested upon ground more firm than the trust which one Prince puts in another. It rested—not, indeed, upon the common interests of France and England, for France, as we have seen, was suppressed—but upon the prospect of personal advantage which was offered to the new French Emperor by an armed and warlike alliance with England. It being clear that the alliance was for his good, and that, for the time, he had really the control of France, the only remaining question was, whether he would pursue what was plainly for his own advantage with steadiness and good sense. Upon the whole, it seemed likely that he would ; for though he was not a man to be stopped by scruples, he did not discard the use of loyalty and faithfulness, where loyalty and faithfulness seemed likely to answer his purpose ; and there was a persistency in his nature which gave ground for hoping that, unless he should be induced to change by some really cogent reason, his steadfastness would endure. Moreover, as we have seen, he had the faculty—very easy to apply to geometry, but harder to use in politics—the faculty of keeping himself awake to the distinction between the Greater and the Less ; and he did not forget that, for the time, the alliance with England was the greater thing, and that most other objects belonged to the category of the Less. These qualities, supported by good-humour, and often by generous impulses, went far to make him an ally with whom (so

long as he might find it advantageous to remain in accord with us) it would be possible, nay easy, and not unpleasant to act. C H A P.  
I.

Lord Raglan submitted to the publicity and ceremonial visits forced upon him during the days of the 11th and 12th of April, and at one o'clock on the 13th he had a private interview with the French Emperor at the Tuileries. The Emperor and the English General were not strangers to one another. They had been frequently brought together in London ; and, indeed, it was by Lord Fitzroy Somerset that the heir of the First Napoleon, deeply moved by the historic significance of the incident, had been brought to Apsley House and presented to the Duke of Wellington. The Emperor showed Lord Raglan the draft of the instructions which he proposed to address to Marshal St Arnaud. Confer-  
ence at the  
Tuileries.

It may be said that at this hour Lord Raglan began to have upon him the weight of that anxious charge which was never again to be thrown off so long as life and consciousness should endure. He had charge on behalf of England of the great alliance of the West; and since it happened that, in this the outset of his undertaking, he followed a method which characterised his relations with the French from first to last, there is a reason for now pointing it out. It seemed to him that in the intercourse of two proud and sensitive nations undertaking to act in concert, one of the chief dangers lay in that kind of mental activity which is generated by the process of arguing. He made it a rule to avoid and avert all needless discussion ; and he



C H A P.  
I. regarded as needless, not only those discussions which spring out of abstract questions, but many also of those which are generated by men's anxiety to provide for hypothetical conjunctures. He was very English in this respect, and he was no less English in the simple contrivance by which he sought to ward off the evil. Whenever there seemed to be impending a question which he regarded as avoidable, he prevented or obstructed its discussion by interposing for consideration some practical matter which was more or less important in its way, but not unsafe. And now, when there was perhaps some fear that questions of an embarrassing and delicate kind might be raised by the pondering Emperor, Lord Raglan kept them aloof by engaging attention to the choice of the camping-ground best suited for the two armies. He seems to have succeeded in confining all discussion to this one safe and practical subject.

When the Emperor at length brought his guest back into the outer room, there were there assembled Prince Jerome, the Duke of Cambridge, Marshal Vaillant the Minister of War, Marshal St Arnaud, and Lord De Ros. The vital business of making arrangements best fitted to prevent collision between the armies was anxiously weighed. Marshal Vaillant, laborious, well instructed, precise, and rather, perhaps, fatiguing in his tendency to probe deep every question, strove hard to anticipate the eventualities likely to occasion difficulty in the relations of the two armies, and to force a clear understanding beforehand as to the way in which each question should be dealt

with. This he endeavoured to do by putting it to St Arnaud in a categorical way\* to say what solution he proposed for each of the imagined problems; but St Arnaud, it then appeared, was hardly more fond than Lord Raglan was of hypothetical questions, for after a little while his endurance of Vaillant's interrogatories came to an end; and he answered impatiently, and in a general way, that when the conjunctures arose, they would be met, as best they might, by the concerted action of the Generals.

The period of the great French Revolution has gathered so much of the mellowness of age from later events, that it seems like a disturbance of chronology to be bringing into the joint council of France and England, in the year 1854, a brother of the first Napoleon. Yet Prince Jerome was one of the speakers, and he spoke with sound judgment upon the great problem of how France and England should act together in arms. He spoke, as might be expected, with less sagacity when the subject of 'The Turks' floated up into notice. The whole French people, and many even of the people of this country, imagine that the wisdom and power of man are tested by his proximity to the newest stage of civilisation: and from those whose minds are in that state, the true worth of the Osmanli, whether in policy or in arms, must always be hidden. If he sustains reverses, their minds are satisfied, because in that case the sum of their knowledge seems to have come

\* The French verb 'poser' would describe Marshal Vaillant's labours; the English verb active 'to pose' would describe the effect upon the patient.

CHAP. I. right ; but his success disturbs their most deep-set notions of logical sequence ; and now, after all Omar Pasha's achievements on the Danube, it seemed to be the impression of Prince Jerome and the French Marshals that the Turkish General would be a source of trouble and anxiety to the alliance. They looked upon the events which had been occurring as accidental and anomalous, and tending to produce a wrong conclusion. The Russians, as they well knew, had carried the industry of military preparation to the utmost verge of human endurance. The Turks had provided themselves with a powerful field-artillery, had kept their old yatagans bright, and had cherished their ancient love of war ; but, for the rest, they had trusted much in Heaven. Yet during some six or seven months these pious, improvident, warlike men had been getting the better of drilled masses. Their success seemed to carry a dangerous lesson ; and the French Councillors thought it so important for the Turks to be broken in to the yoke of a newer civilisation, that they even said it might be advantageous for Omar Pasha to undergo the discipline of a few wholesome reverses.\*

From all he observed in the course of these interviews, Lord Raglan was led to believe in the stability of the Emperor's character, and the value he set upon the alliance.

After a few days, the arrangements detaining Lord

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\* Some might imagine that this hope must have been expressed in jest, but that is not the case. Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless certain that this view was gravely put forward.

Raglan in Paris were complete, and he took his departure for the East. C H A P. I.

The joint occupation by French and English troops of the ground on the shores of the Dardanelles had yielded the first experience of the relations likely to subsist between the armies of the two nations when quartered near to each other. It quickly appeared that the troops of each force could be cordially good-humoured in their intercourse with those of the other. Canrobert, Bosquet, and Sir George Brown, all destined to take prominent share in the coming events, made a kindly beginning of acquaintanceship amid the early difficulties and discomforts of Gallipoli; and upon the departure of Sir George Brown from the Dardanelles, there occurred one of those opportunities for the display of good feeling on which the French are accustomed to seize with a quickness, tact, and grace belonging to no other nation. Sir George Brown was to bring up with him to headquarters two of the English regiments; and the French—spontaneously, as it appeared, and from a simple impulse of goodwill—came down to aid in the embarkation. They set themselves to the work with all that briskness and gay energy by which the French soldiery convert an operation of mere labour and industry into a cheerful and animating scene. The incident in itself was a small one; but, viewed as a sign of things to come, it had greater proportions. It was accepted at the time by Lord Raglan as a happy omen—an omen which seemed to promise that the alliance of the West would hold good.

Lord Raglan's departure for the East.

The French and the English troops on the shores of the Dardanelles.

Cordial intercourse between the two armies.

C H A P.

I.

St Ar-  
naud's  
scheme for  
obtaining  
the com-  
mand of  
the Turk-  
ish army.

But whilst the soldier was giving the best of sanctions to the great Alliance, the Marshal of France was putting it in jeopardy. M. St Arnaud had not been long on the shores of the Bosphorus when he entered upon a tempting scheme of ambition. General Bosquet, despatched to the headquarters at Shumla, had brought back accounts, which the Marshal at first could hardly credit, of the good state and apparent effectiveness of the Turkish troops; and it was then, perhaps, that St Arnaud first thought of the step which he afterwards took. He conceived the idea of obtaining the command of the whole Turkish army. The effect which this united command would have upon the relations between the French and the English General was obvious. The English General, with his force of some twenty-five thousand men, had always foreseen that he was likely to be somewhat embarrassed in having to claim due consideration for a force which was less by one-half than the army sent out by the French; but if Marshal St Arnaud should be at the head, not only of his fifty thousand French, but of the whole force of Turkey, it would obviously become very hard, nay, even unfitting, for the English General to maintain an equality in council with one who, in this case, would command altogether nearly two hundred thousand men. Marshal St Arnaud pressed his demand with the Ministers of the Porte at Constantinople, and he seems to have imagined that he had obtained their assent to his demand. If, indeed, they did really give a seeming assent to the proposed en-

croachment, they could hardly have meant it to take effect. They perhaps put their trust then where they had put their trust before. They knew that Lord Stratford was at Therapia, and they might well believe that he would make the elaborate world go back into chaos before he would suffer the armies of the Caliph to pass, like the contingent of some mere petty Christian State, under the orders of a French Commander.

On the 11th of May, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord Raglan, and stated, in the course of conversation, that the Turkish Government had determined to place Omar Pasha's army under his (the Marshal's) command ; and that he was then going to Reshid Pasha in order to have the matter finally settled. Lord Raglan merely said he believed the British Ambassador was not aware of the arrangement. On the 13th, Marshal St Arnaud sent to propose that Lord Raglan would meet him at Lord Stratford's, and intimated that he had an important communication to make. It was arranged that the English Ambassador should receive the Marshal alone, 'in order,' as Lord Stratford almost cruelly expressed it—'in order to make his acquaintance,' and that afterwards Lord Raglan should join them.

It jars upon one's love of fair strife to see Marshal St Arnaud brought in cold blood into the presence of the two men whom he ventured to encounter ; into the presence of Lord Stratford prepared and calmed by his foreknowledge of the intrigue—and of Lord Raglan, roused by his sense of the danger which

St Arnaud  
in the pre-  
sence of  
Lord  
Stratford  
and Lord  
Raglan.

CHAP.  
I. threatened the alliance. But the interview took place. The Marshal went to the English Embassy, and the operation of 'making his acquaintance' was carried into full effect. Imagination may see the process—may see the light, agile Frenchman coming gaily into the room, content with himself, content with all the world, and charmed at first with the sea-blue depth of the eyes that lightened upon him from under the shadow of the Canning brow, but presently beginning to understand the thin, tight, merciless lips of his host, and then finding himself cowed and pressed down by the majesty and the graciousness of the welcome; for the welcome was such as the great Eltchi would be sure to give to one who (for imperative reasons of State) was to be treated as his honoured guest, but who was also a vain mortal, pretending to the command of the Ottoman army, and daring to come with his plot avowed into the very presence of an English Ambassador. Afterwards Lord Raglan came into the room, and then the Marshal began upon the business in hand. He said he had required, and the Turkish Government had consented, that Omar Pasha should be placed under his orders; that a brigade of Turkish infantry and a battery of artillery should be incorporated into each of the French divisions; that fifteen hundred of the Bashi-Bazouks should be dismounted, that their horses should be turned over to the French troopers, and that the Bashi-Bazouks should be paid (it was not said by whom), and then be sent back to their homes.

If this proposal had been then for the first time made known to Lord Stratford, his fiery nature would scarcely perhaps have suffered him to hear with temper; but he had been prepared by Lord Raglan for what was coming, and he seemed all calm and gentleness. After hearing the proposal with benign attention, he quietly asked the Marshal whether he had cognisance of the tripartite treaty; and then, turning to a copy of the treaty which happened—not at all by chance—to be lying within his reach, he read aloud the fourth article: an article which proceeds upon the assumption that the three armies would be under the orders of distinct commanders. The Marshal—ready perhaps to encounter the more obvious arguments against the expediency of the plan—was scarcely prepared for this quiet reference to the terms of the treaty. Lord Raglan then said that he thought a good deal of inconvenience might result from the adoption of the Marshal's plan; that Omar Pasha was the ablest of the Turkish generals; that his services had been recognised by the grant of the rank of Generalissimo and the title of Highness; and that to deprive him of the superior command, and to dismember his army, at a moment when it was in presence of the enemy, would not only lower him in the estimation of those who looked up to him with confidence, but would probably induce him to throw up his charge in disgust, and declare that he would not suffer himself to be degraded.

But both Lord Raglan and the English Ambassador were gifted with the power which is one of the



C H A P. <sup>I.</sup> most keen and graceful of all the accomplishments of the diplomatist—the power of affecting the hearer with an apprehension of what remains unsaid. It is a power which exerts great sway over human actions; for men are more cogently governed by what they are forced to imagine than by what they are allowed to know. ‘The Marshal,’ Lord Raglan wrote, ‘saw ‘that our opinions were stronger than our expression ‘of them.’ He gave way. He immediately declared that, far from wishing to diminish the consequence of Omar Pasha, he was anxious to add to it, to uphold him to the utmost, and to increase his importance; and he added that he saw the propriety of deciding nothing until after a conference with Omar Pasha. By the time that St Arnaud passed out of the Embassy gate his enterprise was virtually abandoned.

His  
scheme  
defeated.

Some good perhaps resulted from the attempt to bring the Ottoman army under French command. Of all the faults tending to impair the value of Lord Raglan’s advice to the Home Government, there was none more grave than his want of power to appreciate warlike people belonging to an earlier state of civilisation than that to which he had been accustomed in his latter years; and although nothing could ever soften his antipathy towards Turkish Irregulars of all kinds, and especially to the Bashi-Bazouks, he was by this incident drawn more than ever towards the Turkish Generalissimo, and he always thenceforth did his best to defeat any plan which tended to narrow the sphere of the Pasha’s authority.

So great was the elasticity of Marshal St Arnaud’s

mind, that, far from remaining cast down under the discomfiture which he had undergone, he very soon entered upon a scheme yet more ambitious than the first. It seems he had become possessed with the idea that great achievements were within his reach, if only he could add to the powers which he already wielded the occasional command of English troops. He proposed that, when French and English troops were acting together, the senior officer, whether he chanced to be French or English, should take the command of the joint force ; and although this proposal was so expressed that it might be regarded as applying only to the command of detachments, it was surmised that (M. St Arnaud's military rank being higher than that of Lord Raglan) the control of the whole British force was the object really in view.

C H A P.  
I.

His  
scheme for  
obtaining  
the com-  
mand of  
English  
troops.

The experience of the conference at the British Embassy had proved the good sedative effect of a dry document ; and as the instructions addressed to the English General chanced to contain some words directing him to take no orders except from the Secretary of State,\* the clause was happily put forward by Lord Raglan as an impediment to the proposed plan. Marshal St Arnaud gave way, and thenceforth desisted from all further prosecution of his scheme.

This also  
defeated.

So skilful was the resistance opposed to these enterprises of M. St Arnaud, and the character of the

\* The clause, I imagine, had been introduced in order to negative the supposition that the Ambassador at Constantinople was to have the control of the military operations.

C H A P. I. Marshal was so free from all admixture of spite and bitterness, that their frustration did not create ill-feeling. It was plain, however, that recurrence to projects of this sort would be dangerous to the alliance; and when the French Emperor knew that these schemes had been tried and defeated, he forbade all attempts to revive them.

Attempts  
of this  
kind  
checked  
by the  
French  
Emperor.

St Arnaud  
suddenly  
declines to  
move his  
army to-  
wards the  
seat of  
war.

Hitherto the cause which had been threatening the cohesion of the alliance was M. St Arnaud's ambition. The next obstruction which Lord Raglan had to deal with was one of a very different kind. Checked, as is supposed, by the authoritative counsels sent out to him from Paris, Marshal St Arnaud suddenly announced that, for some time to come, the French army could not be suffered to move towards the seat of the war.

The measures for sending up the British forces to Varna were in progress, and the Light Division had been already despatched, when, at eleven o'clock at night, Colonel Trochu presented himself at the British headquarters, and requested an immediate interview with Lord Raglan. The name of Colonel Trochu will recur in this narrative, for he was an officer of great weight in the councils of the French army. He had come from France so lately as the 10th of May, and although his nominal office was simply that of first aide-de-camp to Marshal St Arnaud, it was known that he came out fully charged with the notions and the wishes of the French Emperor. Colonel Trochu was a cautious, thinking man, well versed in strategic science, and it was surmised that

it was part of his mission to check anything like wildness in the movements of the French Marshal.\* C H A P.  
I.

He stated that he had been sent by Marshal St Arnaud to request that Lord Raglan would postpone any further movement towards Varna, until the Marshal should have an opportunity of satisfying himself that any considerable portion of the French army was in a condition to take the field.

Up to this moment no doubt had been entertained of the forwardness of the French preparations ; and Lord Raglan, much astonished, expressed strong objection to the proposed delay.

Colonel Trochu replied that, upon his arrival in the Levant, he had gone to Gallipoli in order to see what degree of forwardness the preparations of the French army had really attained ; and he had come, he said, to the conclusion that the French army was not as yet so equipped and provided as to render it practicable, with anything like common prudence, to attempt operations against the enemy. He went on to justify his conclusion by details, showing the deficiencies under which the French army laboured : he said that he had communicated the result of his inspection and the opinion which he had formed to Marshal St Arnaud, and that Marshal St Arnaud, entirely adopting that opinion, had sent him to the English headquarters in order that he might prevail upon Lord Raglan to suspend the intended movement.

Lord Raglan observed that great inconvenience would result from the proposed suspension of the Lord Raglan's dis-approval

\* Modérer la fougue de M. le Maréchal.

C H A P.  
I.  
 of the  
 proposed  
 delay.

movement ; that the movement was one actually proposed by the French and English commanders to Omar Pasha, and by him, as well as by the Turkish Ministers, entirely approved ; and that thus the French and the English commanders stood pledged to Omar Pasha, and to the Porte, at a moment, too, when much anxiety existed for the fate of Silistria. Colonel Trochu admitted all this ; but he again urged the necessity for delay.

The interview lasted till an hour after midnight, and Colonel Trochu's request was followed up on the ensuing day by written communications from the French Marshal. But the importance of these discussions was superseded by a further and more perilous change in the French counsels.

St Ar-  
 naud's  
 sudden de-  
 termina-  
 tion to  
 take up a  
 defensive  
 position in  
 rear of the  
 Balkan.

At seven o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 4th of June, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord Raglan, and announced that he had determined upon an entirely new plan of operations for his army. Instead of moving his force to Varna, as had been agreed, he had resolved, he said, to send there only one division, and to place all the rest of his army in position—not in advance, but in rear of the Balkan range. He was to have his right resting on the sea at Bourgas ; his headquarters were to be at Aidos ; and he hoped, he said, to be able to establish himself there by the third week of June. He invited Lord Raglan to conform to this plan, and to take up a position at Bournabat, a part of the proposed position which was the most remote from the sea.

Thus, at a time when the eyes of all Europe were upon Silistria and the campaign on the Danube, it

was proposed that the armies of the Western Powers should take up a mere defensive—a timidly defensive—position, placing all Bulgaria, a part of Roumelia, and the whole range of the Balkan, between them and the scene of conflict! What made the matter still more grave was this, that Marshal St Arnaud did not come to consult. He had already adopted this almost incredible plan, and his troops were then actually in march for the new position.

It might now, indeed, seem that those were right who had deemed the great alliance of the West to be impracticable. For all the purposes of the campaign the proposed plan would have caused the armies of the two Western Powers to become simply null. Lord Raglan at once declared his entire disapproval of it.

C H A P.  
I.  
Lord Raglan's determined resistance to this plan.

Tied, perhaps, to this singular plan by the counsels which Trochu had brought him, Marshal St Arnaud, for the time, did not yield. But the English General, as I have already said, had a quality which made it difficult and painful for men to maintain a difference with him whilst they were in his presence. St Arnaud was under this stress; and as though he shrank from the ascendancy of Lord Raglan, and sought a respite from the effort of having to oppose him in oral discussion, he imagined the idea of bending over a table and writing down what he had to say. This he did; and when the writing was finished, he left it with Lord Raglan. But the Marshal seems to have inwardly determined that Colonel Trochu, who had probably suggested this new plan of campaign, should himself be made to bear the pain of further


C H A P. <sup>I.</sup> sustaining it ; for he took his leave, saying that the Colonel should be sent to Lord Raglan on the following day.

In this curious paper, written by St Arnaud in Lord Raglan's presence, the Marshal said the great advantage of the French and English having only one division each at Varna would be, that they would not get entangled prematurely in hostile operations ; for with such a small force, no one could taunt the Western Powers for not marching to relieve Silistria, or for not giving battle to the Russians ; whereas, argued the Marshal, if the Allies were present in greater strength, it was to be feared that they might suffer themselves to be carried away by the Turks. ' It is important,' said the Marshal, ' not to give battle ' to the Russians, except with all possible chances of ' success, and the certainty of obtaining great results.' Then, after describing the supposed advantages of his intended position in rear of the Balkan, the Marshal reverted to his dread of being carried forward by the warlike Turks. ' We must not,' said he, ' lose sight ' of this ; that we are ' here to aid the Turks — to ' succour them, to save them—but not by following ' their plans and their ideas. It is evident that Omar ' Pasha has no other idea but that of drawing on the ' allied army to give battle to the Russians, and to ' relieve Silistria. The safety of Turkey is not in ' Silistria ; and it is necessary to aid and succour the ' Turks in our own way.'

No one perhaps will now defend a plan of campaign which was to place the allied armies of the

Western Powers in a position some hundreds of miles from the scene of any conflict, and to withdraw them from the very proximity of the Turk because of his warlike counsels. Still, such justice as is due must be rendered to the French strategists. France and England had sent to the East that portion of the two armies which consists of combatants ; but neither of the Western Powers had hitherto constituted on the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus that vast accumulation of stores, of munitions of war, and means of transport which would enable it to live, to move freely, and to fight. Both of the two armies had the most of what for the moment they needed, but neither of them had hitherto any sufficing base of operations to rest upon. Both of the armies had means of subsistence for the next few days, and were so equipped as to be able to fight a battle on the beach ; but neither army had, nor could have for many months, those vast warehouses of stores and those immense means of land-transport which could alone sustain regular and extended operations in the field. Therefore, if purely military views were to govern, and if Russia were really the formidable invader of Turkey which the world had believed her to be, there would have been some rashness in pushing forward the combatants of the two armies towards the scene of conflict, with a knowledge that for some time to come they would be unable to move freely in the field.

The true ground for overruling the hesitation of the French strategists lay in the now obvious fact that (to say nothing of the armies of France and England





C H A P. assembled on the Bosphorus, with vast means of sea-  
I. transport at their command) Russia, ill-prepared for a great war in the South, driven out of the Euxine, threatened by Austria, and fiercely encountered and hitherto repulsed by the Ottoman forces, was not so formidable an invader of European Turkey as to deserve that her despairing struggles in the country of the Lower Danube should be encountered with all the resources of strategic prudence. Besides, the question was not purely a military one. It was certain that the mere presence of the French and the English forces in the neighbourhood of the conflict would have a moral weight more than proportioned to their actual readiness for offensive operations. Finally, the question had been settled. The allied Generals, in their conference with Omar Pasha, had engaged to move their troops to Varna ; and the honour of France and England stood pledged.

But if there was a semblance of military wisdom in the hesitation of the French to move up to Varna, there was none in their plan for the defensive line behind the Balkan at Aidos ; for if the want of means of land-transport threatened to hamper the activity of the force even in the advanced position of Varna, it is obvious that the same cause would have reduced the French and English forces to sheer uselessness if they had taken up a position at so vast a distance as Aidos is from the scene of the conflict. If the plan had been followed, no French nor English troops in that year would have seen the shape of a Russian battalion. Yet Marshal St Arnaud,

so far as concerned France, had determined thus to forfeit all military significance in the pending campaign, and had done so, and had begun to carry the plan into execution, without consulting his English colleague.

C H A P.  
I.

How France was saved from this humiliation, and how the great alliance was preserved, will now be seen.

On the day following the interview with Marshal St Arnaud, Colonel Trochu came, as had been agreed, to Lord Raglan's quarters. After repeating what Marshal St Arnaud had stated the day before—namely, that Bosquet's Division was already in march for Adrianople—the Colonel pressed the advantages of the position which Marshal St Arnaud had proposed to take up in rear of the Balkan.

Lord Raglan heard all, and then simply requested Colonel Trochu to inform Marshal St Arnaud that he, Lord Raglan, objected to place any portion of Her Majesty's army in Roumelia.

Lord Raglan refuses to place any part of his army behind the Balkan.

Lord Raglan added, that the movement which seemed to him the best was an advance to the front with a view to join Omar Pasha in an effort to relieve Silistria; and he said that if the Marshal were not prepared for such a movement, he (Lord Raglan) would keep his divisions on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and hold them ready to embark at any moment for Varna.

Firmness conquered. On the morning of the 10th of June, Colonel Rose came to the English headquarters and announced that Marshal St Arnaud

St Arnaud gives way, abandons his plan of a position

C H A P. now consented to abandon his plan of taking up a  
 I. defensive position behind the Balkan, and that, re-  
 verting to the original determination of the Allies,  
 he would assemble his army at Varna.

behind the  
Balkan,  
and con-  
sents to  
move his  
army to  
Varna.

Thus the danger passed. Secrecy, it would appear, had been well maintained; and the world did not know that, for all purposes of concerted military operations, the alliance of the Western Powers had lain in abeyance for five days.

The  
armies  
moved ac-  
cordingly.

Leaving small detachments at Gallipoli, the French and the English armies were now moved up to Varna. General Bosquet's Division, however, was made to feel the consequences of the resolution adopted by the French strategists; for this division having actually commenced its march towards Adrianople, in furtherance of the then intended plan of taking up a position behind the Balkan, Marshal St Arnaud, it seems, did not like to issue a countermand which would have disclosed to a sagacious soldiery his double change of counsels—nay, perhaps might have given them a glimpse of the almost ridiculous destiny from which they had been saved by Lord Raglan. So, whilst all the rest of the allied forces were gliding up to Varna by water, Bosquet's Division continued to follow the direction first given it, and was brought into Bulgaria by long, painful marches. If the war-like Zouaves composing part of the division had known that their long, toilsome movement in the midst of the great summer-heats was the result of a plan for placing the French army in position at a distance of several hundreds of miles from the enemy,

Bosquet's  
overland  
march.

they would have solaced the labours of the march by CHAP.  
tearing the repute of the schemer who contrived it, I.  
and making him the butt for their wit.

It is obvious that the premature disclosure, either of Marshal St Arnaud's ambitious schemes or of his faltering counsels, would have been fraught with danger to the alliance; and since it used to happen in those days that tidings freshly intrusted to the English Cabinet were often disclosed to the world, it seems useful to show how it was that Lord Raglan was able to screen these transactions of Marshal St Arnaud from the inquiring eye of the public. Apparently he did this by being careful in the choice of the time for making disclosures to the authorities at home. Except when there was a good reason for taking a contrary course, he liked to delay the communication of affairs involving danger until the danger was past. Thus, for instance, he would describe the beginning of an intrigue, and also its final defeat, at the same time; and the result was, that the end of the despatch not only made the disclosure of the earlier part of it comparatively harmless, but even destroyed its value as an article of 'news;' for in proportion as people were greedy for fresh tidings, they were careless of things which ranged with the past, and the time was so stirring that the tale of an abandoned plan of campaign, or an intrigue already baffled and extinct, was hardly a rich enough gift for a Minister to carry to a newsman.

The way  
in which  
St Ar-  
naud's  
schemes  
escaped  
publicity.

Thus were averted the early dangers which threatened the alliance; and thus, after resolving to take



C H A P. <sup>I.</sup> up a position some hundreds of miles distant from the nearest Russian outpost, the French Marshal gave way at last to Lord Raglan's ascendant, and was soon pushed forward to a camping-ground within hearing of the enemy's guns.

## CHAPTER II.

THE closing events of the summer campaign in Bulgaria did so much to kindle that zeal which forced on the invasion of the Crimea, that it seems right to speak of them here, not with any notion of putting into the set form of 'History' things which all Europe knew at the time in the most authentic way, but rather for the purpose of showing how the armies at Varna, and the statesmen and the people in England, were touched, were stirred, nay, were governed, by the tidings which came from the Danube. Prince Paskievitch stood charged to execute with his own hand the plan of campaign which his Sovereign had persuaded him to design;\* and accordingly, in the summer of the year 1854, he found himself marching on the Danube at the head of the Russian army then engaged in attempting an invasion of the Ottoman Empire. He had insisted, as we have seen, that, as the needful condition of a prosperous campaign, Silistria must fall by the first of May.† It was not before the middle of the month that he was able to appear before the place; but

C H A P.  
II.Tidings  
which  
kindled in  
England a  
zeal for  
the inva-  
sion of the  
Crimea.Siege of  
Silistria.

\* See vol. i. p. 403.

† Ibid. p. 406.

CHAP. thenceforth he lost no time, and on the 19th he  
II. opened his first parallel.

The new defences of the fortress had been planned by Colonel Grach, a Prussian officer in the service of the Porte. He had brought to the work a great deal of knowledge and judgment. He was still in the place, and he continued to lend the aid of his science to the garrison whenever he could do so without going out of his dwelling-house ; but, adhering, it seems, to the bare terms on which he had engaged his services, he stiffly abstained from taking any other than a scientific part in the struggle. .

Prince Paskievitch pressed the siege with a vehemence which seemed to disdain all economy of the lives of his soldiery ; and the place being weakly garrisoned, and seemingly abandoned to its fate, its fall was supposed to be nigh. To uphold the Sultan's cause three armies were at hand, but no one of them was moved forward with a view to relieve the place. Omar Pasha, shrewd and wary, was gathering the strength of the Ottoman Empire at Shumla, and it did not enter into his plan of campaign to smooth the path of the Russian General by going forward in strength to give him a meeting under the guns of the beleaguered fortress. On the other hand, France and England were rapidly assembling their forces in the neighbourhood of Varna, but, for want of sufficing means of land-transport, they were not yet in a condition to take the field.

Day by day the two armies at Varna were moved by fitful tidings of a conflict in which, though it

CHAP.  
II.  
raged within earshot, they were suffered to take no part. At first, few men harboured the thought that, without deliverance brought by a relieving force, a humble Turkish fortress would be able to hold out against the collected strength of Russia and the most renowned of her Generals. Soon it was known that, of their own free will and humour, two young Englishmen—Captain Butler of the Ceylon Rifles, and Lieutenant Nasmyth of the East India Company's Service—had thrown themselves into the place, and were exercising a strange mastery over the garrison. On one of the hills overlooking the town there was a seam of earth which, as though it were a kind of low fence designed and thrown up by a peasant, passed along three sides of the slope in a doubtful meandering course. This was the earthwork which soon became famous in Europe. It was called the Arab Tabia. The work was one of a slight and rude sort; but the ground it stood on was judged to be needful to the besiegers, and, at almost any cost of life to his people, Prince Paskievitch resolved to seize it. By diligent fighting on the hill-side—by sapping close up to the ditch—by springing mines which more than once blew in the counterscarp and levelled the parapet—by storming it in the day-time—by storming it at night—the Russians strove hard to carry the work; but when they sprang a mine, they ever found that behind the ruins the Turks stood retrenched; and whether they stormed it by day or by night, their masses of columns were always met fiercely—were always driven back



**C H A P.** with a cruel slaughter. Prince Paskievitch, the  
**II.** General commanding in chief, and General Schilders, who commanded the siege-works, were both struck down by shot and disabled. On the side of the Turks, Mussa Pasha, who commanded the garrison, was killed; but Butler and Nasmyth, now obeyed with a touching affection and trustfulness by the Ottoman soldiery, were equal to the historic occasion which they had had the fortune and the spirit to seize. At one time they were laying down some new work of defence; at another, the two firm lads were governing the judgment of the Turkish commanders in a council of war. Sometimes, with ear pressed to the earth, they were listening for the dull blows of the enemy's underground pickaxes. Now and then they were engaged in dragging to his place under fire some unworthy Turkish commander; and once, in their sportive and English way, they were busy in getting together a sweepstakes, to be won by him who should name the day when Silistria would be relieved; but always when danger gathered in the Arab Tabia, the grateful Turks looked and saw that their young English guests were amongst them, ever ready with counsel for the new emergency, forbidding all thought of surrender, and even, it seems, determined to lay rough hands on the General who sought to withdraw with his troops from the famous earth-work.\* It seemed that the presence of these youths

\* I take it that this is what was meant by Nasmyth's expression, 'peculiar inducement.' The man upon whom the 'peculiar inducement'

was all that was needed for making of the Moslem hordes a faithful, heroic, and devoted soldiery. Upon ground known to be mined they stood as tranquilly as upon any other hill-side. ‘It was impossible,’ said Nasmyth’s successor in the Arab Tabia—‘it was impossible not to admire the cool indifference of the Turks to danger. Three men were shot in the space of five minutes while throwing up earth for the new parapet, at which only two men could work at a time so as to be at all protected; and they were succeeded by the nearest bystander, who took the spade from the dying man’s hands and set to work as calmly as if he were going to cut a ditch by the road-side.’ Indeed, the childlike trust which these men were able to put in their young English leaders, so freed them from all doubt and question concerning the wisdom of the orders given, that they joyfully abandoned themselves to the rapture of fighting for religion, and grew so enamoured of death—so enamoured of the very blackness of the grave—that sometimes in the pauses of the fight a pious Mussulman, intent on close fighting and blissful thoughts of Paradise, would come up with a pickaxe in hand, would speak some touching words of devotion and gratitude to Butler and Nasmyth, and then proudly fall to work and dig for himself the last home, where he charged his comrades to lay him as soon as he attained to die.

was brought to bear was one whom Butler had dragged out bodily from his hiding-place.

C H A P.  
II

Omar Pasha not choosing to march to the relief of Silistria, but being unwilling to leave its defenders to sheer despair, sent General Cannon\* (Behram Pasha he was called in the Turkish army) with a brigade of irregular light infantry, and instructed him to occupy some of the wooded ground in the neighbourhood of the place, with a view to trouble the enemy and to encourage the garrison. General Cannon, however, learnt, on reaching the neighbourhood of Silistria, that the hopes of the garrison had already ebbed very low; and therefore, though without the warrant of orders, he resolved to throw himself into the place with his whole brigade. This, by means of a stratagem and a long circuitous night-march, he was able to do. His achievement, as was natural, gave joy to the garrison; and, turning to account the enthusiasm of the moment, he administered, as is said, a direful oath to the Pasha in command—an oath whereby the Turk swore that, happen what might, he would never surrender the place.

It was whilst General Cannon was in Silistria that Captain Butler received the wound of which he afterwards died. The Russians had sapped up so close to the ditch that, if a man behind the parapet spoke much above a whisper, the sound of his voice used to draw the enemy's fire towards the nearest loophole or embrasure. Captain Butler, it seems,

\* General Cannon was an officer of our Indian army who had served with distinction in India, and in the force (the British Legion) which operated in Spain under the orders of General Evans.

with a view to throw up a new work of defence, was reconnoitring the enemy's approaches through an aperture made in the parapet, and in consulting about his plan with General Cannon, he spoke loud enough to be heard by a Russian marksman,\* for the sound of his voice brought a rifle-ball in through the loophole and struck him the blow from which (being weakened by toil and privation) he died before the end of the siege.

For some reason which he deemed to be imperative—stringent orders, perhaps, from Shumla—General Cannon marched out of the place with his brigade on the 17th† of June, and at his request Nasmyth also went away for a time in order to confer with Omar Pasha at the Turkish headquarters; but meanwhile Lieutenant Ballard of the Indian army, coming thither of his own free will, had thrown himself into the besieged town; and whenever the enemy stirred, there was always, at the least, one English lad in the Arab Tabia, directing the counsels of the garrison, repressing the thought of surrender, and keeping the men in good heart. ‡

\* General Cannon informs me that the voice which drew the fire was not the voice of Captain Butler, but of Hinde, who was one of the General's aides-de-camp.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Or, according to General Cannon (who is likely to be accurate as to the date of his march), the 18th.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ The narratives of the siege of Silistria which appeared in the 'Times' were given, as is well known, by Nasmyth himself, and by the officer who succeeded to him and to Butler in governing the counsels of the garrison and helping to defend the Arab Tabia. Therefore any other account of the siege which I might have founded upon the official materials in my possession would have been obviously inferior to the newspaper in point of authenticity. Accordingly, with the exception of two

C H A P.  
II.

There was a part of the allied camp where the French and the English soldiery could hear in a quiet hour the distant guns of Silistria. Day after day they listened for the continuing of the sound ; and they listened keenly, for they were expecting the end, and there was nothing but the booming of the cannon to assure them that the fortress held out. On the 22d of June, and during a great part of the night which followed it, they heard the low thunder of the siege more continuously than ever before ; but on the dawn of the following day they listened, and listened in vain. The cannonade had ceased, and it was believed in camp that the place had been taken. The opposite of this was the truth. The siege had been raised. The event was one upon which the course of history was destined to hinge ; for this miscarriage at Silistria put an end at once to all schemes for the invasion of the Sultan's dominions in Europe.

Whilst Europe was still in wonder at the deliverance of Silistria, the French and the English armies at Varna were greeted with tidings of yet another victory won by the Turks.

Hassan Pasha was at Rustchuk with a large body of Turkish troops ; and at Giurgevo, on the opposite bank of the river, General Soimonoff commanded twelve battalions of Russian infantry, with several

or three minor facts drawn from the correspondence which is in my possession, all I have said of the siege is taken from those journals of Nasmyth and his successor which were printed in the 'Times' during the summer of 1854.

squadrons of horse and some guns. Both the Russian and the Turkish commanders desired that at this time there should be no conflict; and it might be thought that in this respect they would have their way; for although the forces at Rustchuk and at Giurgevo were near to each other, the broad Danube rolled between them. But the Ottoman soldiery are of so warlike a nature that, when their enemy is at hand, they are oftentimes seized with a raging desire for the fight; and the one check which tends to keep down this passion is a sense of the incoherency which results from the want of good officers. But so ready and so deep is their trust in any of our countrymen who will take the trouble to lead them, that, if Turkish soldiers be camped within reach of the enemy, the coming amongst them of a few English youths supplies the one thing needed, completes the electric circle, and in general brings on a fight. Now it happened that, besides General Cannon, who was on duty, and in command of a Turkish brigade, seven young English officers had found their way to the camp of Hassan Pasha. Two of these, Captain Bent and Lieutenant Burke, were officers of the Royal Engineers; Meynell was a Lieutenant in the 75th Regiment; Hinde, Arnold, and Ballard (the last of them fresh come from Silistria), were officers of our Indian army; Colonel Ogilvy was General Cannon's aide-de-camp, but he gave his services freely; and, indeed, it may be said that, so far as concerns the part they took in the battle, every

C H A P.

II.

The battle  
of Giur-  
gevo.

CHAP. one of these seven young Englishmen was there of  
II. his own mere will.\*

On the morning of the 7th of July it was observed that the Russians had struck their tents; and they were so posted that their numbers could not be descried from the right bank of the river. It was believed in the Turkish camp that Soimonoff had withdrawn the main part of his force; and it seems that what Hassan Pasha really meant to do was to execute a reconnaissance, and assure himself of the enemy's retreat. Be this as it may, he ordered, or consented, that the river should be crossed at two points; and General Cannon, embarking in boats with 300 riflemen, and speedily followed by a battalion of infantry under Ferik Bekir Pasha, succeeded in reaching the left bank of the river without encountering resistance. As soon as they had landed, the Turks tried to gain a lodgment upon a strip of ground where their front was covered by a long narrow mere or pool of water. Soon, however, they were attacked on their left flank by a body of Russian infantry, which issued from an earthwork placed above the western extremity of the mere. Cannon and Bent, with their riflemen, not only withstood this attack, but drove their assailants back into the fosse from which they had issued, and there, it seems, a good deal of slaughter took place. After-

\* The two Engineer officers, Captain Bent and Lieutenant Burke, had been sent to the Turkish camp with instructions to advise and aid in the construction of military works; but of course they had not been ordered to lead the Turks into battle; and therefore I include them with the rest of the seven as men taking part in the battle without professional sanction.

wards the riflemen were forced to give way, and fall back upon the main body of the troops, which had effected their landing; but young Ballard led forward another body of skirmishers, and kept the enemy back. What was needed was, that the troops which had landed should intrench themselves; but they had come without gabions or sand-bags, and nothing as yet could be done towards gaining a firm lodgment. There was a good deal of confusion amongst the troops, and the enterprise seemed likely to fail, when Ali Pasha, who was a brave and an able officer, came over with fresh troops. He soon restored order, and the men began to throw up intrenchments.

Meanwhile two battalions, led on by Ogilvy, Hinde, Arnold, Meynell, and Burke, had crossed the river higher up, in detached bodies; and although these small bands were left from first to last without reinforcements—although they had to move flankwise close under the guns of a Russian battery, which killed very many—and although they were sharply attacked and at one time hard pressed by the enemy's infantry, as well as by four squadrons of cavalry—the remnant of these venturesome men fought their way down along the river's bank, and at last made good their junction with the main body, then intrenching itself behind the mere. But before they attained to this they had lost a great proportion of their comrades, and of their five youthful leaders they had lost three, for Burke, Arnold, and Meynell were killed.



C H A P.  
II.

Meanwhile fresh troops had been crossing the river at the point opposite to the landing-place first seized ; and at length there was established on the ground behind the mere a force of some five thousand men.

Upon either flank of this body the Russian infantry came down in strong columns. Four times the attack was made, and four times the Turks, commanded or led on by Ali Pasha and General Cannon, by Bent, Hinde, Ogilvy, and Ballard, drove back their assailants with great slaughter. With pious and warlike cries, the Turks sallied over their new-made parapets, brought their bayonets down to the charge, forced mass after mass to give way, and fiercely pressed the retreat.

At sunset the action ceased. All night the Turks were intrenching themselves on the ground which they had gained ; but when the morning dawned there was no sign that the enemy would hasten to renew the battle.

To keep a safe hold of the ground which had been won, it was necessary for the Turks to advance in the direction of their left front, and occupy a ridge which went by the name of the Slobenzie Heights ; but Hassan Pasha dreaded the blame which might fall upon him if the movement should prove to be a wrong one. General Cannon pressed him hard—for some time in vain ; but at length the Pasha yielded, upon condition that the English General would give him a written warranty certifying the wisdom of the step.

On the third day after the battle, Prince Gortschakoff came up with a force which was said to number some sixty or seventy thousand men. He had been set free by the raising of the siege of Silistria, and he now appeared upon one of the ranges of hills looking down upon Giurgevo from the north-west. It seemed that he meant to cover over the stain of the defeat sustained at Giurgevo by driving the Turks back into the river; but before he camped for the night the British flag was already in the waters beneath him.

Lieutenant Glyn and the young Prince Leiningen, both serving on board the *Britannia*, had come up from the sea, with some gunboats\* and thirty seamen, together with a like number of sappers. Glyn quickly carried his gunboats into the narrow loop-stream which escapes from the main of the river above Giurgevo and meets it again lower down. By this movement Glyn thrust his gunboats into the interval which divided the Russian army from the Turks.† Gortschakoff perhaps overrated the force which had come with the British flag. At all events,

\* The gunboats were lying in this part of the river before Lieutenant Glyn and Prince Leiningen came up, but were placed at the disposition of Lieutenant Glyn. It was by land that Glyn and the Prince, with their seamen and sappers, travelled to the Turkish camp.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† In stating, and stating truly, that no gunboats came up the Danube, one of the commentators used language which might seem to throw doubt on the above narrative of Lieutenant Glyn's operations. So proof may be useful. In a letter now before me, Lieutenant (now Captain) Glyn writes :—‘ He [Omar Pasha] immediately threw across a large force, ‘ and ordered me to hold the creek between Slobenzie and the town of ‘ Giurgevo with gunboats, which was done; otherwise the Russians ‘ would have turned the position of Slobenzie.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P.  
 II.  
 ———

he did not instantly move down to the attack ; and whilst he seemed to hesitate, the Turks and the English worked hard. Captain Bent and his sappers, with the aid of our seamen and the Turks, threw a bridge of boats across the main stream of the Danube. This done, it was plain that, if Gortschakoff were to attack, he would have to do, not merely with the five thousand Turks already established on the left bank, but with the whole of the force which lay at Rustchuk. He resolved to avoid the encounter. Retreating upon Bucharest, he no longer disputed with the Turks for the mastery of the Lower Danube.

In this campaign on the Danube, those who fought for the cause of the Sultan were helped, it is true, by Fortune, by the anger and unskilfulness of the Czar, by the assured support of Austria, and by the impending power of England and France ; but still there is one point of view in which their achievement was a great one. Military ascendancy is so closely connected with military reputation, that to be the first to bring down the warlike fame of a great empire is to do a mighty work, and a work, too, which hardly can fail to change the career of nations. By the time that Prince Gortschakoff retreated upon Bucharest, people no longer thought of the Czar as they thought of him eight months before ; and the glory of thus breaking down the military reputation of Russia is due of right, not to the Governments nor the armies of France or England, but to the warlike prowess of the Ottoman soldiery, and the ten or

Effect  
 of the  
 campaign  
 of the  
 Danube  
 on the  
 military  
 ascend-  
 anc-y of  
 Russia.

twelve resolute Englishmen who cheered and helped and led them. C H A P.  
II.

The failure of the attempted invasion was almost instantly followed by the relinquishment of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Emperor Nicholas, as we saw, had been placed by Austria under the stress of a peremptory summons requiring him to withdraw from the Principalities ; and the demand being supported by powerful bodies of troops, which threatened the flank of the intruding army, the Czar was schooled at last, and compelled to see that he must surrender his hold of the provinces which he had chosen to call his ' material guarantee.'

Thus, by the course of the events which followed it, the Czar's last defeat on the Danube was made to appear more signal than it really was. Of course, men versed in war and in politics knew that causes of a larger kind than a few hours' fight at Giurgevo were bringing about the abandonment of the Principalities ; but people who drew their conclusions from the mere advance and retreat of armies, and from the issue of battles, were left to infer that the once-dreaded Emperor of the Russias was chased from the country of the Danube by the sheer prowess of the victorious Turks.

It is therefore very easy to believe that this discomfiture at Giurgevo was more bitter to the Czar than any of the disasters which had hitherto tried his fortitude. People knew, or affected to know, what the troubled man uttered in torment, and the words they put in his mouth ran somewhat to this effect :—

The agony  
of the  
Czar.

C H A P.  
II.

‘ I can understand Oltenitza—I can even under-  
 ‘ stand that Omar Pasha should have been able to  
 ‘ hold against me his lines at Kalafat—I can partly  
 ‘ account for the result of those fights at Citate—I  
 ‘ can understand Silistria—the strongest may fail in  
 ‘ a siege—and it chanced that both Paskievitch and  
 ‘ Schilders were struck down and disabled by shot—  
 ‘ but—but—but—that Turks—mere Turks—led on  
 ‘ by a General of Sepoys and six or seven English  
 ‘ boys—that they should dare to cross the Danube  
 ‘ in the face of my troops—that, daring to attempt  
 ‘ this, they should do it, and hold fast their ground  
 ‘ —that my troops should give way before them ;  
 ‘ and that this—that this should be the last act  
 ‘ of the campaign which is ending in the retreat  
 ‘ of my whole army, and the abandonment of the  
 ‘ Principalities. Heaven lays upon me more than I  
 ‘ can bear !’

Lord Rag-  
 lan's dis-  
 like of un-  
 disciplin-  
 ed com-  
 batants.

Many men in the Anglo-French camp were fretted by the tidings of this last Turkish victory ; for, besides that, with their natural and healthy impatience of delay, they were stung by the example of their Moslem ally, there was in the staff of the French and the English armies a pedantic dislike of wild troops. In this respect Lord Raglan had no breadth of view. Far from understanding that the hardy, the fierce, the devout, the temperate Moslems of the Ottoman provinces were the rough yet sound material with which superb troops could be made, he always looked upon these brave men, but especially upon the genus which people called ‘ Bashi-Bazouks,

with an almost superstitious horror. He was so constituted, or rather he was so schooled down by long years of flat office labour, that it shocked him to see a man bearing no uniform, yet warlike, and armed to the teeth. Indeed, from Bulgaria he once wrote and complained quite gravely that every Turk he saw had the appearance of being a 'bandit;' and the prejudice clung to him; for long after the period now spoken of, and even in the very hour when the fatal storm of the 14th of November was roaring through his port and his camp, he found time to sit at a desk and write down the Bashi-Bazouks.

C H A P.  
II.

This hatred of undrilled warriors was the more perverse, since England above all other nations was rich in men (men like Hodson, for instance, or Jacob) who knew how to make themselves the adored chiefs of Asiatic soldiers.

Besides, it must be borne in mind, that when an English Government undertakes to wage war in a country beyond the seas without doing all it can to get soldierly aid from the natives, it does not merely neglect a slight or collateral advantage; on the contrary, it throws away its power of acting with efficient numbers, and is in danger of frittering away the nation's strength upon those (often ill-fated) schemes which go by the name of 'expeditions.' Without our Portuguese auxiliaries there would have been no great Peninsular War, no successful invasion of France; without the native soldiery of Hindostan there would have been no British India; without the German auxiliaries who served under Wellington in

Import-  
ance to  
England  
of native  
auxilia-  
ries.

CHAP. his last campaign, he could not have given battle to  
II. Napoleon in the Netherlands, and the course of English history would not have run as it did. The truth is, that (especially at the beginning of a war) any body of troops which England brings together at one time and one place is in general so costly, and of so high a quality, but also so scant in numbers, that to use it, and use it singly, for all the work of the campaign, is to consume and squander the precious essence of the nation's strength without making it the means of attaining any worthy result.

Therefore, whenever it is possible, a British force serving abroad and engaged in an arduous campaign, ought to have on its side, not mere allies—for that is but a doubtful, and often a poor support to have to lean upon—but auxiliaries obeying the English commander, and capable of being trusted with a large share of the duties required from an army in the field. Nor is this an advantage which commonly lies out of our reach; for in most of the countries of the Old World the cost of labour is much lower than in England; and it is one of the prerogatives of the English, as indeed of all conquering nations, to be able to lead other races of men, and to impart to them its warlike fire. By beginning its preparations at the right time, and by bringing under the orders of some of our Indian officers a fitting number of the brave men who came flocking to the war from every province of the Ottoman Empire, our Government might have enabled their General to take the field with an army of great strength—with an army more

fit for warlike enterprises than two armies, French and English, instructed to work side by side, and C H A P.  
II  
⏟ baffled by divided command.\*

\* The opinions which the Duke of Newcastle entertained on this subject were sound, and his efforts to give effect to them were vigorous; but he was thwarted by the curious antagonism which commonly shows itself at the beginning of a war—the antagonism between views really warlike and views which are only ‘military.’



## CHAPTER III.

C H A P.  
III.

The events  
on the  
Danube re-  
moved the  
grounds of  
the war.

By their own prowess, with the aid only of a moral support from their great allies and the actual presence of a few young English officers, the Ottoman soldiery had repelled the invasion; and the defence of Turkey being accomplished in a way very glorious to the Sultan, and the deliverance of the Principalities being secured, it suddenly became apparent that the objects for which the Western Powers undertook the war had been already attained. And since (by the mere act of declaring war against the Czar) the Porte had freed itself from the obnoxious treaties which heretofore entangled its freedom, the condition of affairs was such that a prudent statesman of France or of England or of the Ottoman Empire might have well enough rested content. And in that condition of affairs the Emperor of Russia must have acquiesced; for having now learnt that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey, and being driven from the seas, he was cut off from all means of waging an offensive war against the Sultan except upon the desolate frontiers of Armenia; and the pressure of the naval blockade enforced against

him by the Allies, together with the torture of seeing the Baltic and the Euxine placed under the dominion of their fleets, would have more than sufficed to make him sign a peace. C H A P.  
III.

If France had been mistress of herself, or if England had been free from passion and craving for adventure, the war would have been virtually at an end on the day when the Russian army completed its retreat from the country of the Danube and re-entered the Czar's dominions.

How came it to happen that, rejecting the peace which seemed to be thus prepared by the mere course of events, the Western Powers determined to undertake the invasion of a Russian province?

France was still lying under the men who had got her down on the night of the 2d of December; and it was in vain that her people at that time chanced to love peace better than war, for they had no longer a voice in State affairs. The French Emperor still wielded the whole strength of the nation; and, labouring to turn away men's thoughts from the origin of his power, he was very willing to try to earn for the restored Empire that kind of station and title which the newest of dynasties may acquire by signal achievements in war. It was still of great moment to him to remain in close friendship with England, and to use the alliance as an engine of war; but he observed that there was a spirit on this side of the Channel which, springing from motives very unlike his own, was nevertheless tending in the same direction; and therefore, to draw England

Helplessness of the French people.

Course taken by the French Emperor.

C H A P.  
III.

in, he no longer needed to resort to those ingenious contrivances which he had employed against her in the foregoing year. All that he had to do was to encourage her desire to go on with the war, and, if necessary, to make his own plans yield to those of his ally. To do all this he was very able ; for he had, as we have seen, at that time, the power of keeping his mind alive to the difference between the greater and the less ; and after he had once resolved to engage in alliance with England, he did not allow his main purpose to be baffled by differences on minor questions. Therefore, now when it became known that the Russian army was in full retreat, he was so willing to defer to English counsels, that virtually, though not in terms, he left it to the Queen's Government to determine what next step the Western Powers should take in the conduct of the war.

Desire of  
the Eng-  
lish for an  
offensive  
war.

England had become so eager for conflict that the idea of desisting from the war merely because the war had ceased to be necessary was not tolerable to the people. In the Baltic their hopes had been bitterly disappointed ; and as soon as it became clear that the defence of Turkey was a thing already accomplished, men longed to try the prowess of our land and sea forces in some enterprise against the Russian dominions. Already they had cast their eyes upon Sebastopol.

Sebasto-  
pol.

With a view to the conquest of empire on the Bosphorus, the ambition of Russia had taken advantage of the spacious port on the south-west coast of the Crimea—had made there a great arsenal, and

furnished it with an enormous supply of warlike stores. And having been warned a quarter of a century ago\* that, if he thus gathered his strength in Sebastopol, he might have to count some day with the English, the Czar Nicholas had caused the place to be defended towards the sea by forts of great power. In the harbour, barred by these forts, his Black Sea fleet lay at anchor. Plainly it would be a natural and fitting consummation of a war in defence of the Sultan to destroy those very resources which the labours of years had gathered together against him. Moreover, the English, who hate the mechanic contrivances which prevent fair, open fighting, could hardly now bear that the vast sea-forts of Sebastopol should continue to shelter the Russian fleet from the guns of our men-of-war. Those who thought more warily than the multitude foresaw that the enterprise might take time; but they also perceived that even this result would not be one of unmixed evil; for if Russia should commit herself to a lengthened conflict in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, she would be put to a great trial, and would see her wealth and strength ruinously consumed by the mere stress of the distance between the military centre of the Empire and the southwesternmost angle of the Crimea.

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III.

The long-  
ing of the  
English to  
attack it.

\* Despatch from Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated the 28th of November 1828. 'Although,' writes the Count, 'it may not be probable that we shall see an English fleet in the Black Sea, it will be prudent to make Sebastopol very secure against attacks from the sea. If ever England were to come to a rupture with us, this is the point to which she would direct her attacks, if only she believed them possible.'

C H A P.  
III.

The more the English people thought of the enterprise, the more eager they became to attempt it; and it chanced that their feelings and opinions were shared and represented with great exactness by the Minister of War.

The Duke  
of New-  
castle.

The Duke of Newcastle was a man of a sanguine, eager nature, very prone to action.\* He had a good clear intellect, with more of strength than keenness, unwearied industry, and an astonishing facility of writing. In the assumption of responsibility he was generous and bold even to rashness. Indeed, he was so eager to see his views carried into effect, and so willing to take all the risk upon his own head, that there was danger of his withdrawing from other men their wholesome share of discretion. He threw his whole heart into the project of the invasion; and if the Prime Minister and Mr Gladstone were men driven forward by the feeling of the country, in spite of their opinions and their scruples, it was not so with the Duke of Newcastle. The character of his mind was such as to make him essentially one with the public. Far from being propelled by others against his will, he himself was one of the very foremost members of the warlike throng which was pressing upon the Cabinet and craving for adventure and glory. He easily received new impressions, and had nevertheless a quick good sense, which generally

\* I, of course, know that this view will not be assented to by those who found their opinion upon observation made in later years; but I am speaking of the summer of 1854, and I am very sure that the sentence to which this note has been appended is true.

enabled him to distinguish what was useful from what was worthless. He seemed to understand the great truth that, without being military, the English are a warlike people, and that it is one of the great prerogatives of a nation gifted with this higher quality to be able to command other races of men, and to impart to them the fire of martial virtue. He also knew that when England undertakes war against a great European Power, she must engage the energies of the people at large, and must not presume to rely altogether upon the merely professional exertions of her small Peace Establishment. It was not from his default, but in spite of his endeavours, that for several months people lingered in the notion that our military system was an apparatus sufficing for war.

But the Duke had not an authority proportioned to the merits which a reader of his despatches and letters would be inclined to attribute to him. Perhaps the very zeal with which he seized and adopted the ideas of the outer public was one of the causes which tended to lessen his weight; for he who comes into council with common and popular views, however likely it may be that he will get them assented to, can scarcely hope to kindle men's minds with the fire that springs from a man's own thought and from his own strong will. Moreover, it was by a kind of chance rather than by intentional selection that the Duke of Newcastle had become intrusted with the momentous business of the war; and seemingly it was only from this circum-

CHAP. III. stance that the propriety of his continuing to hold the office was afterwards brought into question by one of his principal colleagues.\* But whatever may have been the cause, it seems clear that there was a languor, not to say hollowness, in the support which the Duke got from his colleagues. They did not perversely thwart him in the business of the war;† but, on the other hand, they did not at all fasten themselves to his measures like men who would stand or fall with him. The Duke of Newcastle had not the gift of knowing how to surround himself with able assistants; and it was his misfortune to be without that precious aid which a Minister

\* So Lord John Russell himself declared. What I have above called ‘a kind of chance’ was brought about in this way:—According to the practice which was in force up to the summer of 1854, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was also the ‘Secretary of War.’ Before the war, however, the public hardly observed, and in fact hardly knew this, because in peace-time (thanks to the labours of the ‘Horse Guards,’ the office of the Secretary *at War*, the Ordnance, and several other offices) the duties of the Colonial Secretary, in his character as Secretary of War, were very slight; and there being no prospect of war when Lord Aberdeen’s Ministry was formed, the Duke of Newcastle was of course selected with a view to his qualifications for the administration of the Colonies, and not with any consideration, either one way or the other, as to his aptitude for the business of the War Department. When the rupture with Russia occurred, it became apparent that, unless a change were made, the Minister who happened to be the Colonial Secretary would stand charged with the business of the war.

† The rejection by the Cabinet of the Duke’s proposal to ask for a vote adding 25,000 men to the army, does not in reality displace the above statement; because the addition to which the Cabinet agreed, though falling far short of the Duke’s demand, was large enough to warrant the reception of all the recruits who could be obtained in the course of the year, and therefore the proposed vote for a number larger than what could be really obtained was a measure of general policy not tending in any direct way to increase the strength of the army.

commonly finds in the permanent staff of his office. C H A P.  
III.  
 At the outbreak of hostilities, the little bevy of distinct public offices on which the military administration depended was in a condition unfit to meet the exigencies of war. The first Army Surgeon who applied for certain of the medical stores required on foreign service was met with no less than five official theories as to the functionary upon whom the demand should be made ; and when, in the month of June, the scattered departments connected with the land service were gathered at last into one, the office thus newly formed was, after all, so ill constituted as to be wanting in some of the simplest appliances required for the transaction of business.

From the first, the Duke of Newcastle, resisting all proposals for operating against Russia on the side of Poland, had warmly shared the popular desire to invade the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol. The Emperor of the French, steadily following his main policy, had long ago consented to look to this enterprise as next in importance to the defence of the Sultan's territory ; and in the early part of April instructions to this effect had been given to the French and the English Generals.

His zeal  
for the  
destruction of Se-  
bastopol.

It would seem, however, that at first the Duke of Newcastle was the only member of the Government who was fired with a great eagerness for the destruction of Sebastopol ; and of himself he had not the ascendancy which sometimes enables a Minister to bend other men to his purpose. Unless by the help of a mighty force pressing from without, he could



C H A P. not have brought the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen to  
 III. partake his zeal for the enterprise.

But—impending over the counsels of all the ostensible rulers—there was an authority, not deriving from the Queen or the Parliament, which was destined to have a great sway over events. It would be possible to elude the task ; but it seems to me that a history would be wanting in fulness of truth if it failed to impart some conception of this other power.

Command-  
ing power  
of the  
people  
when of  
one mind.

England was free ; and although, whilst there was indifference or divided opinion in the country, the Government had very full latitude of action, yet, whenever it chanced that the feelings of the people were roused, and that they were known to be nearly of one mind, they spoke with a voice so commanding that no Administration could safely try to withstand it.

But the will of the nation being thus puissant, who was charged to declare it ?

Means of  
forming  
and de-  
claring the  
opinion of  
the nation.

In former times almost everybody who could was accustomed to contribute in an active way to the formation of opinion. Men evolved their own political ideas and drew forth the ideas of their friends by keen oral discussion, and in later times by long elaborate letters. But gradually, and following somewhat slowly upon the invention of printing, there came to be introduced a new division of labour. It was found that if a small number of competent men would make it their calling to transact the business of thinking upon political questions, the work might be more handily performed by them than by the

casual efforts of people who were commonly busied in other sorts of toil; and as soon as this change took effect, the weighing of State questions and the judging of public men lapsed away from the direct cognisance of the nation at large, and passed into the hands of those who knew how to utter in print. What had been an intellectual exercise, practised in a random way by thousands, was turned into a branch of industry and pursued with great skill by a few. People soon found out that an essay in print—an essay strong and terse, but, above all, opportune—seemed to clear their minds more effectually than the sayings which they heard in conversation, or the letters they received from their friends; and at length the principle of divided labour became so complete in its application to the forming of political opinions, that by glancing at a newspaper, and giving swift assent to its assertions and arguments, many an Englishman was saved the labour of further examining his political conscience, and dispensed from the necessity of having to work his own way to a conclusion.

But to spare a man from a healthy toil is not always an unmixed good. To save a free-born citizen from the trouble of thinking upon questions of State is to take from him his share of dominion; and although it be true that he who follows printed advice is under a guidance more skilful and dexterous than any he could have got from his own untutored mind, he is less of a man—and, upon the whole, is less fair, less righteous—than one who in a ruder fashion

C H A P.  
III.

Effect of  
political  
writings  
in saving  
men from  
the trouble  
of think-  
ing.

C H A P. III. contrives to think for himself. Just as a man's quality may in some respects be lowered by his habitual reliance on the policeman and the soldier who relieve him from the trouble and the anxiety of self-defence, so his intellectual strength, and his means of knowing how to be just, may easily become impaired if he suffers himself to walk too obediently under the leading of a political writer.

Want of proportion between the skill of the public writer and the judicial competence of his readers.

But the ability of men engaged in political writing grew even more rapidly than the power to which they were attaining, and after a while they so gained upon the ostensible statesmen that Parliament no longer stood alone as the exponent of opinion, and was obliged to share its privilege with a number of gifted men whose names it could hardly ever find out. Still, Parliament had valour and strength of its own, and, except in the matter of mere celebrity, it was a gainer rather than a loser from the wholesome rivalry forced upon it by its new and mysterious associate. It was the public which lagged. Men commonly take a long time to adapt themselves to the successive advances of civilisation ; and the people were backward in fitting themselves to deal with the increasing ability and the increasing knowledge of the public writer. They indeed hardly knew the true scope of the change which had been taking place ; for whilst the writer was a personage chosen for his skill, and acting with the force which belongs to discipline and organisation, the readers were men straying loose ; and for their means of acting in anything like concert with one another, they were

dependent in a great degree upon that very engine of publicity which was fast usurping their power. Moreover, these readers of public prints were slow to understand the new kind of duty which had come upon them. They were slow to see that it became them to look in a very critical spirit upon the writings of a stranger, unseen and unknown, who was not only proposing to guide them, but even to speak in their name ; and they did not yet understand that they ought to read print, not, perhaps, in a captious spirit, but, to say the least, with something of the measured confidence which their forefathers had been accustomed to place in the words of princes and statesmen. The blessing conferred by print will perhaps be complete when the diligence, the wariness, and, above all, the courageous justice of those who read, shall be brought into fair proportion with the skill and the power of those who address them in print. Already a wholesome change has been wrought ; and if in these days a man goes chanting and chanting in servile response to a newspaper, he misses the voices of the tens of thousands of fellow-choristers who sang with him five years ago. But certainly, at the time of the Russian war, the common discourse of an Englishman was too often a mere 'Amen' to something he had seen in print.

C H A P.  
III.

For a long time there had remained to the general public a vestige of their old custom of thinking for themselves, because in last resort they were privileged to determine between the rival counsels pressed upon them by contending journalists ; but several years

C H A P.  
 III.

before the outbreak of the war there had come yet another change. The apparatus provided by the constitution for collecting the opinions of the people was far from being complete ; and notwithstanding the indications afforded by Parliament and by public writings, the direction which the nation's opinion had taken was a matter which could often be called in question. Some could say that the people desired one thing, and some, with equal boldness, that the people desired the contrary. Thence it came that the task of finding out the will of the nation, and giving to it a full voice and expression, was undertaken by private citizens.

The task of ascertaining and declaring the opinion of the country falls into the hands of a company.

Long before the outbreak of the war, there were living in some of the English counties certain widows and gentlemen who were the depositories of a power destined to exercise a great sway over the conduct of the war. Their ways were peaceful, and they were not perhaps more turned towards politics than other widows and country gentlemen ; but by force of deeds and testaments, by force of births, deaths, and marriages, they had become the members of an ancient firm or Company which made it its business to collect and disseminate news. They had so much good sense of the worldly sort, that, instead of struggling with one another for the control of their powerful engine, they remained quietly at their homes, and engaged some active and gifted men to manage the concern for them in London. The practice of the Company was to issue a paper daily, containing an account of what was going on in the world, together with

letters from men of all sorts and conditions who were seeking to bring their favourite subjects under the eye of the public, and also a few short essays upon the topics of the day. Likewise, upon paying the sum required by the Company, any person could cause whatever he chose to be inserted in the paper as an 'advertisement;' and the sheet containing these four descriptions of matter was sold to the public at a low rate.

C H A P.  
III.

Extraordinary enterprise was shown by the Company in the gathering of intelligence; and during the wars following the French Revolution they caused their despatches from the Continent to reach them so early that they were able to forestall the Government of the day. In other countries the spectacle of a Government outdone in this way by private enterprise would have seemed a scandal; but the Englishman liked the thought that he could buy and bring to his own home as much knowledge as was in the hands of a Minister of State, and he enjoyed the success of his fellow-countrymen in their rivalry with the Government. From this time the paper gathered strength. It became the foremost journal of the world; and this was no sooner the case, than the mere fact of its being thus foremost gave a great acceleration to its rise; for, simply because it was recognised as the most public of prints, it became the clue with which anxious man went seeking in the maze of the busy world for the lost and the unknown, and all that was beyond his own reach. The prince who was claiming a king-

C H A P.  
III.

dom, the servant who wanted a place, the mother who had lost her boy, they all went thither; thither Folly ran hurrying, and was brought to a wholesome parley with Wisdom; thither went righteous anger; thither also went hatred and malice. And not in vain was all this concourse; for either the troubled and angry men got the discipline of finding that the world would not listen to their cries, or else they gained a vent for their passions, and brought all their theories to a test by calling a whole nation—nay, by calling the civilised world—to hearken and be their witness. Over all this throng of appellants men unknown sat in judgment, and—violently, perhaps, but never corruptly—a rough sort of justice was done. The style which Oriental hyperbole used to give to the Sultan might be claimed with more colour of truth by the journal. In a sense it was the ‘asylum of the world.’

Still up to this point the Company occupied ground in common with many other speculators; and if they had gone no further, it would not have been my province to notice the result of their labours; but many years ago it had occurred to the managers of this Company that there was one important article of news which had not been effectually supplied. It seemed likely that, without moving from his fire-side, an Englishman would be glad to know what the bulk of his fellow-countrymen thought upon the uppermost questions of the day. The letters received from correspondents furnished some means of acquiring this knowledge; and it seemed to the

managers of the Company, that at some pains, and at a moderate cost, it would be possible to ascertain the opinions which were coming into vogue, and see the direction in which the current would flow. It is said that, with this intent, they many years ago employed a shrewd, idle clergyman, who made it his duty to loiter about in places of common resort, and find out what people thought upon the principal subjects of the time. He was not to listen very much to extreme foolishness, and still less was he to hearken to clever people. His duty was to wait and wait until he observed that some common and obvious thought was repeated in many places, and by numbers of men who had probably never seen one another. That one common thought was the prize he sought for, and he carried it home to his employers. He became so skilled in his peculiar calling that, as long as he served them, the Company was rarely misled; and although in later times they were frequently baffled in their pursuit of this kind of knowledge, they never neglected to do what they could to search the heart of the nation.

When the managers had armed themselves with the knowledge thus gathered, they prepared to disseminate it, but they did not state baldly what they had ascertained to be the opinion of the country. Their method was as follows: they employed able writers to argue in support of the opinion which, as they believed, the country was already adopting; and, supposing that they had been well informed, their arguments of course fell upon willing ears.



C H A P.  
III.

Those who had already formed a judgment saw their own notions stated and pressed with an ability greater than they could themselves command; and those who had not yet come to an opinion were strongly moved to do so when they saw the path taken by a Company which notoriously strove to follow the changes of the public mind. The report which the paper gave of the opinion formed by the public was so closely blended with arguments in support of that same opinion, that he who looked at the paper merely to know what other people thought, was seized, as he read, by the cogency of the reasoning; and, on the other hand, he who imagined that he was being governed by the force of sheer logic, was merely obeying a guide who, by telling him that the world was already agreed, made him go and flock along with his fellows: for as the utterance of a prophecy is sometimes a main step towards its fulfilment, so a rumour asserting that multitudes have already adopted a given opinion will often generate that very concurrence of thought which was prematurely declared to exist. From the operation of this double process it resulted, of course, that the opinion of the English public was generally in accord with the writings of the Company; and the more the paper came to be regarded as a true exponent of the national mind, the more vast was the publicity which it obtained.

Plainly, then, this printing Company wielded a great power; and if I have written with sufficient clearness, I have made it apparent that this was a

power of more vast dimensions than that which men describe when they speak of 'the power of the Press.' It is one thing, for instance, to denounce a public man by printed arguments and invectives which are believed to utter nothing more than the opinion of the writers, and it is another and a graver thing to denounce him in writings which, though having the form of arguments, are (rightly or wrongly) regarded as manifestoes—as manifestoes declaring the judgment of the English people. In the one case the man is only accused; in the other he seems to stand already condemned.

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But though the Company held all this power, their tenure of it was of such a kind that they could not exercise it perversely or whimsically without doing a great harm to their singular trade; for the whole scheme of their existence went to make them, not autocratic, but representative, in their character; and they were obliged, by the law of their being, to keep themselves as closely as they could in accord with the nation at large.

This, then, was the great English journal; and whether men spoke of the mere printed sheet which lay upon their table, or of the mysterious organisation which produced it, they habitually called either one or the other 'The Times.' Moreover, they often prefixed to the word such adjectives and participles as showed that they regarded the subject of their comments in the light of a sentient, active being, having a life beyond the span of mortal men, gifted with reason, armed with a cruel strength, endued

C H A P. with some of the darkest of the human passions, but  
 III. clearly liable hereafter to the direst penalty of sin.\*

On the Sabbath, England had rest; but in the early morning of all other days the irrevocable words were poured forth and scattered abroad to the corners of the earth, measuring out honour to some, and upon others bringing scorn and disgrace. Where and with whom the real power lay, and what was its true source, and how it was to be propitiated,—these were questions wrapped in more or less obscurity; for some had a theory that one man ruled, and some another, and some were sure that the Great Newspaper governed all England, and others that England governed the Newspaper. Philosophic politicians traced events to what they called ‘Public opinion.’ With almost the same meaning, women and practical men simply spoke of ‘The Times.’ But whether the power of the great journal was a power all its own, or whether it was only the vast shadow of the public mind, it was almost equally to be dreaded and revered by worldly men; for plainly, in that summer of 1854, it was one with England. Its words might be wrong, but it was certain that to tens of thousands of men they would seem to be

\* The form of speech which thus impersonates a manufactory and its wares has now so obtained in our language that, discarding the forcible epithets, one may venture to adopt it in writing, and to give ‘The Times’ the same place in grammatical construction as though it were the proper name of an angel or a hero, a devil or a saint, or a sinner already condemned. Custom makes it good English to say: ‘The Times’ will protect him;’ ‘The “Times” is savage;’ ‘The “Times” is punishing him;’ ‘The blessed “Times” has put the thing right;’ ‘The “Times” has done all the mischief.’

right. They might be the collected voice of all these isles, or the mere utterance of some one unknown man sitting pale by a midnight lamp,—but there they were. They were the handwriting on the wall. C H A P.  
III.

Of the temper and spirit in which this strange power had been wielded, up to the time of the outbreak of the war, it is not very hard to speak. In general, 'The Times' had been more willing to lead the nation in its tendencies to improvement than to follow it in its errors: what it mainly sought was—not to be much better or wiser than the English people, but to be the very same as they were—to go along with them in all their adventures, whether prudent or rash—to be one with them in their hopes and their despair, in their joy and in their sorrow, in their gratitude and in their anger. So, although in general it was willing enough to repress the growth of any new popular error which seemed to be weakly rooted, still the whole scheme and purpose of the Company forbade it all thought of trying to make a stand against any great and general delusion. Upon the whole, the potentate dealt with England in a bluff, kingly, Tudor-like way, but also with a Tudor-like policy; for though he treated all adversaries as 'brute folk' until they became formidable, he had always been careful to mark the growth of a public sentiment or opinion; and as soon as he was able to make out that a cause was waxing strong, he went up and offered to lead it, and so reigned.

I have said that, partly by guiding, but more by

C H A P.  
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ascertaining and following, the current of men's opinion, 'The Times' always sought to be one with the great body of the people; and since it happened that there was at this period a rare concurrence of feeling, and that the journal, after a good deal of experiment, had now at length thoroughly seized and embodied the soul of the nation, its utterance came with increasing force; and in proportion as the growing concord of the people enabled it to speak with more and more authority, power lapsed, and continued to lapse, from out of the hands of the Government, until at length public opinion, no longer content to direct the general policy of the State, was preparing to undertake the almost scientific, the almost technical duty of planning a campaign.

The  
opinion  
of the  
nation, as  
declared  
by the  
Company,  
demands  
the de-  
struction  
of Sebas-  
topol.

On the morning of the 15th of June, the great newspaper declared and said that 'The grand political  
' and military objects of the war could not be attained  
' as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in  
' existence; but that, if that central position of the  
' Russian power in the south of the empire were anni-  
' hilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars  
' of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground:'  
and, moreover, it declared, 'that the taking of Sebas-  
' topol and the occupation of the Crimea were objects  
' which would repay all the costs of the war, and  
' would permanently settle in our favour the principal  
' questions in dispute; and that it was equally clear  
' that those objects were to be accomplished by no  
' other means—because a peace which should leave  
' Russia in possession of the same means of aggression

‘ would only enable her to recommence the war at  
‘ her pleasure.’

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It was natural that some of the members of the Government should have qualms. They knew that Austria (supported for defensive purposes by Prussia) was at that time on the point of joining her arms to those of the Western Powers; and they could not but know that if the French and English armies were to be withdrawn from the mainland of Europe in order to invade the Crimea, the wholesome union of the Four Powers would of necessity be weakened. The Prime Minister was he who loved peace so fondly that, though peace was no more, he had hardly yet been torn from her cold embrace; and though he lived under a belief that the military strength of the Czar was beyond measure vast, yet of the twelve months which Russia gave him for preparation he had only used three.\* Having the heaviness of these thoughts on his mind, he saw it declared aloud, that the country of which he happened to be the Prime Minister could not well do otherwise than invade the Russian dominions. To a prudent man the measure might seem to be rash—to a good man impressed with horror of war, it might even seem to be very wicked; for it was a violent revival of a war which, unless this new torch were thrown,

\* Computing from the time when the Czar's determination to seize the Principalities was known to our Government. If the computations are to be made from the time when the hostile character of Prince Mentschikoff's mission became known, several months more would have to be added. See Lord Aberdeen's evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.

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would expire of its own accord. But the print was clear; like stern Anangkie, it pressed upon feeble man's volition, for it was not to be construed away; and if an anxious Minister went back and looked again to see whether by chance he could find some loop in the wording, and whether possibly he might be able to fulfil his duty without besieging Sebastopol, he was met by the careful negation which taught him in four plain words that he could fulfil it 'by no other means.'

Before the seventh day from the manifesto of the 15th, the country had made loud answer to the appeal; and on the 22d of June the great newspaper, informed with the deep will of the people, and taking little account of the fears of the prudent and the scruples of the good, laid it down that 'Sebastopol was the keystone of the arch which spanned the Euxine from the mouths of the Danube to the confines of Mingrelia,' and that 'a successful enterprise against the place was the essential condition of permanent peace.' And although this appeal was founded in part upon a false belief—a belief that the siege of Silistria had been raised—it seemed as though all mankind were making haste to adjust the world to the newspaper; for within twenty hours from the publication of the 22d of June, truth obeyed the voice of false rumours, and followed in the wake of 'The Times.'\*

Of course there were those who saw great obstacles in the way of the proposed invasion; and they said

\* The siege, as we saw above, was raised early on the morning of the 23d.

that, since Russia was a first-rate military Power, it must be rash to invade her territory and to besiege her proudest fortress, without first gaining some safe knowledge of the enemy's strength. But the narrative, then coming home in fragments from the valley of the Danube, was heating the minds of the people in England.

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When first England learnt that the Turks were to be besieged in their fortress of Silistria by a great Russian army under the renowned Paskievitch, few believed that the issue was doubtful, or even that the contest could be long sustained. But as soon as it became known that, day after day, the military strength of the Czar was exerted against the place with a violent energy, and that every attack was fiercely resisted, and always, as yet, with success, our people began to give their heart to the struggle; and their eagerness rose into zeal when they heard that two young English travellers had thrown themselves into the fortress—were heading the Turkish soldiery, and were maintaining the conflict by day and by night.

The English were not of such a mettle as to be able to hear of tidings like these without growing more and more eager for warlike adventure. And in their hearts they liked the fact, that the few young English travellers who helped to save Silistria, and to turn away the war from the Danube, were men who did these things of their own free will and pleasure, without the sanction of the public authorities; for our people are accustomed to think more



CHAP. highly of their fellow-countrymen individually than  
 III. they do of our State machinery ; and they can easily bear to see their Government in default, and can even smile at its awkwardness, if all the shortcomings of office are effectually compensated by the vigour of private enterprise. Nasmyth has passed away from us. I knew him in the Crimea. He was a man of quiet and gentle manners, and so free from vanity—so free from all idea of self-gratulation—that he always seemed as though he were unconscious of having stood as he did in the path of the Czar, and had really omitted to think of the share which he had had in changing the course of events ; but it chanced that he had gone to the seat of war in the service of ‘The Times,’ and naturally the lustre of his achievement was in some degree shed upon the keen, watchful Company which had had the foresight to send him at the right moment into the midst of events on which the fate of Russia was hanging ; for whilst the State armies of France and England were as yet only gathering their strength, ‘The Times’ was able to say that its own officer had confronted the enemy upon the very ground he most needed to win, and helped to drive him back from the Danube in great discomfiture.

The Gov-  
ernment  
yields.

Thus, day after day in that month of June, the authority of the Newspaper kept gaining and gaining upon the Queen’s Government ; and if Lord Aberdeen had any remaining unwillingness to renew the war by undertaking an invasion of Russia, his power of controlling the course of the Government

seems to have come to its end in the interval between the 23d and the 28th of June. He continued to be the Prime Minister. His personal honour stood so high that no man attributed his continuance in office to other than worthy and unselfish motives ; but for those who lay stress upon the principle that office and power ought not to be put asunder, it was irksome to have to mark the difference between what the Prime Minister was believed to desire, and what he was now consenting to do.

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Parliament was sitting, and it might be imagined that there was something to say against the plan for invading a province of Russia at a moment when all the main causes of the dispute were vanishing ; but the same causes which I have spoken of as paralysing all resistance to the beginning of the war now hindered every attempt to withstand its renewal ; for the orators who were believed to be tainted with the doctrines of the Peace Party were still lying under the ban which they had brought upon themselves by their former excesses of language. So now again in June, as before at the opening of the session, the counsels of these eloquent men were lost to the world. They became as powerless as the Prime Minister ; and the cause which they represented was so utterly brought to ruin, that the popular demand for an invasion, which carried with it the virtual renewal of an otherwise expiring war, had the sound of that voice with which a nation speaks when the people are of one mind.

No good  
stand  
made in  
Parlia-  
ment  
against the  
invasion.

So now, in presenting to his colleagues this his

C H A P. III. favourite scheme of an enterprise against Sebastopol, the Duke of Newcastle was upheld—nay, was urged and driven forward—by forces so overwhelming, that scruples and objections and fears were carried away as by a flood ; and when it was proposed in the Cabinet to go and fetch, as it were, a new war, by undertaking this bold adventure, there was not one Minister present who refused to give his consent.

Prepara-  
tion of the  
instruc-  
tions ad-  
dressed  
to Lord  
Raglan.

Forthwith the Duke of Newcastle announced the decision of the Government to the General commanding the English army in Bulgaria. He did this by a private letter written on the 28th of June,\* and nearly at the same time he prepared the draft of a Despatch,\* which was to convey to the English headquarters, in full detail and in official form, the deliberate instructions of the Queen's Government. This paper was to be the instrument for meting out to the General in command the allowance of discretion with which he was to be intrusted. A Despatch recommending the expedition, but leaving to the General in command the duty of determining whether it could be prudently undertaken, would not have been followed by any invasion of the Crimea ; and that which brought about the event was, not the decision of the Cabinet already mentioned, but the peculiar stringency of the language which was to convey it to the English headquarters.† It there-

\* The contents of this will be given in another chapter.

† The truth of this statement will be shown, as I think, in a future chapter, and, indeed, it is well enough proved by the tenor of Lord Raglan's reply to the despatch.

fore seems right to speak of what passed when the terms of this cogent Despatch were adopted by Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet. C H A P.  
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The Duke of Newcastle so framed the draft as to make it the means of narrowing very closely the discretion left to Lord Raglan; and it was to be expected that the Duke might wish his Despatch to stand in this shape, because he was eager for the undertaking, and very willing to bear upon his own shoulders a large share of the responsibility which it entailed; but it is difficult to believe that all the other members of the Government could have intended to place the English General under that degree of compulsion which is implied by the tenor of the instructions. It is certain, however, that the paper was well fitted to elicit at once the objections of those who might be inclined to disapprove it on account of its cogency; for it confined the discretion to be left to the General with a precision scarcely short of harshness.

The Duke of Newcastle took the Despatch to Richmond, for there was to be a meeting of the members of the Cabinet at Pembroke Lodge, and he intended to make this the occasion for submitting the proposed instructions to the judgment of his colleagues. It was evening—a summer evening—and all the members of the Cabinet were present, when the Duke took out the draft of his proposed despatch and began to read it. Then there occurred an incident, very trifling in itself, but yet so momentous in its consequences, that, if it had happened in old

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times, it would have been attributed to the direct intervention of the immortal gods. In these days, perhaps, the physiologist will speak of the condition into which the human brain is naturally brought when it rests after anxious labours, and the analytical chemist may regret that he had not an opportunity of testing the food of which the Ministers had partaken, with a view to detect the presence of some narcotic poison ; but no well-informed person will look upon the accident as characteristic of the men whom it befell ; for the very faults, no less than the high qualities of the statesmen composing Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, were of such a kind as to secure them against the imputation of being careless and torpid. However, it is very certain that, before the reading of the paper had long continued, all the members of the Cabinet, except a small minority, were overcome with sleep.\* For a moment the noise of a tumbling chair disturbed the repose of the Government ; but presently the Duke of Newcastle resumed the reading of his draft, and then again the fated sleep descended upon the eyelids of Ministers. Later in the evening, and in another room, the Duke of Newcastle made another and a last effort to win attention to the contents of the draft, but again a blissful rest (not this time actual sleep) interposed between Ministers and cares of State ; and all, even those who from the first had remained awake, were in a quiet assenting frame of mind. Upon the whole, the Despatch, though it bristled with sentences tending

\* See Note in the Appendix.

to provoke objection, received from the Cabinet the kind of approval which is often awarded to an unobjectionable sermon. Not a letter of it was altered ; and it will be seen by-and-by that that cogency in the wording of the Despatch, which could hardly have failed to provoke objection from an awakened Cabinet, was the very cause which governed events.

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The instructions addressed from Paris to the French commander did not urge him to propose the invasion of the Crimea, nor even to lend the weight of his opinion to the proposed enterprise ; but they forbade him from advancing towards the Danube. If it should be clear that the English were willing to undertake the expedition to the Crimea, then the French commander was not to be at liberty to hold back.\*

Instruc-  
tions sent  
to the  
French  
com-  
mander.

\* I deduce this conclusion, in an inferential way, from the general tenor of the materials at my command, and not from any one document distinctly warranting the statement.

## CHAPTER IV.

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IV.

The Allies  
at Varna.  
Their state  
of prepara-  
tion in the  
middle of  
July.

AT the time when the instructions from the Home Governments reached the camp of the Allies, the Generals were preparing for an active campaign in Bulgaria, and Marshal St Arnaud had around him, in the neighbourhood of Varna or moving thither, four strong divisions of infantry, with cavalry and field-artillery. He had no siege-train.

Lord Raglan had around him four divisions of infantry, the greater part of a division of cavalry, and of his field-artillery seven batteries. He had also on board ship off Varna the half of a battering-train, and the other half of it was nearly ready to be despatched from England.

The French Marshal was receiving and expecting constant additions to his force; and Lord Raglan had been apprised that a reserve division of infantry under Sir George Cathcart would speedily reach the Bosphorus.

So long as the French and English forces remained camped in the neighbourhood of Varna, their command of the sea-communication insured to them the arrival of the supplies which were sent to them; but

the means of land-transport were not yet within their reach. It was estimated that, in order to move effectively in the interior, the English army alone would require packhorses or mules to the number of 14,000. To obtain these was difficult, but not impossible; and at the time to which we point, about 5000 had been collected. By a continuance of these exertions in Bulgaria, and by due activity in forwarding munitions and stores from England, it is probable that the English force, after a further interval of about six weeks or two months, might have been prepared to move as an army carrying on regular operations; but of course this would only be true upon the supposition that the army should always march through countries yielding sufficient forage.

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The preparations of the French were not, perhaps, quite so far advanced as our own; but it is probable that the two armies would have been found ready at about the same time for an active campaign in Bulgaria.

The ships of the Allied Powers were at hand, and their fleets had dominion over all the Euxine home to the Straits of Kertch. They had the command of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean, of the whole ocean; and of all the lesser seas, bays, gulfs, and straits, from the Gut of Gibraltar to within sight of St Petersburg. The Czar's Black Sea fleet existed, but existed in close durance, shut up under the guns of Sebastopol.

Their com-  
mand of  
the sea.

In the matter of gaining information respecting the



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IV.

Information obtained by the Foreign Office as to the defences of the Crimea.

enemy's resources, our Foreign Office had not been idle ; and a great deal of material, bearing upon this vital business, had been carefully got together and collated. It resulted from these data, that, spread over vast space, Russia might nominally have under arms forces approaching to a million of men ; but that the force in the Crim Chersonese, including the 17,000 men who formed the crews of the ships, did not, at the highest estimate, amount to more than 45,000 ; and that, although there were a few battalions which Russia might draw towards Sebastopol from her army of the Caucasus, she had no more speedy method of largely reinforcing the Crimea than by availing herself of the troops then in retreat from the country of the Danube, and marching them round to Perekop by the northern shores of the Euxine.

No information obtained in the Levant.

Neither the ambassadors of France and England at Constantinople, nor any of their generals or admirals, had succeeded in obtaining for themselves any trustworthy information upon this vitally momentous business. For their failure in this respect more blame attaches upon the ambassadors than upon the military and naval commanders ; because the ambassadors had been in the Levant during a period of many months, in which (since the war was impending, but not declared) they might have bought knowledge from Russian subjects without involving their informers in the perils of treason. The duty of gathering knowledge by clandestine means is one so repulsive to the feelings of an English gentleman, that there is always a danger of his neglecting it,

or performing it ill. Perhaps no two men could be less fit for the business of employing spies than Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan. More diligence might have been expected from the French, but they also had failed. Marshal St Arnaud had heard a rumour that the force of the enemy in the Crimea was 70,000, and Vice-Admiral Dundas had even received a statement that it amounted to 120,000; but these accounts were fables. In point of fact, the information obtained by our Foreign Office approached to near the truth, and the Duke of Newcastle had the firmness—it was a daring thing to do, but it turned out that he was right—he had the firmness to press Lord Raglan to rely upon it. It was natural, however, that a General who was within a few hours' sail of the country which he was to invade, and was yet unable to obtain from it any, even slight, glimmer of knowledge, should distrust information which had travelled round to him (through the aid of the Home Government) along the circumference of a vast circle; and Lord Raglan certainly considered that, in regard to the strength of the enemy in the Crimea and the land defences of Sebastopol, he was simply without knowledge.

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Lord Raglan conceived that he was absolutely without any trustworthy information.

## CHAPTER V.

**CHAP.** **V.** **ON** the evening of the 13th of July Marshal St Arnaud received a telegraphic despatch from his Government. The despatch had been forwarded by way of Belgrade, and was in cipher. The message came in an imperfect state. Part of it was intelligible, but the rest was beyond all the power of the decipherer; yet the interpreted symbols showed plainly that the whole message, if only it could be read, would prove to be one of deep import. It forbade Marshal St Arnaud from making any advance towards the Danube, and told him to look to the event of his army being conveyed from Varna by the fleet. This was all that could be deciphered. There were the mystic letters and figures which laid down, as was surmised, the destiny of the Allied armies, and no one could read. At night Colonel Trochu came to Lord Raglan's quarters, and communicated all that could be gathered from the telegraphic despatch. The English General had just received the Duke of Newcastle's letter of the 28th, but had not yet broken the seal of it. Now, however, Lord Raglan opened the letter, and in a few

The instructions for the invasion of the Crimea reach the Allied camp.

moments he was able to give M. Trochu the means of inferring the matter contained in the illegible part of his despatch. Apparently it was the desire of both the Home Governments that the Allied commanders should prepare to make a descent upon the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol.

C H A P.  
V.  
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On the 16th of July the despatch of the 29th of June was received at the English headquarters; and a despatch forwarded from Paris at nearly the same time reached the hands of Marshal St Arnaud.

Since the proposed expedition involved the employment of both land and sea forces, the duty of determining upon the effect to be given to the instructions from home devolved upon those who had the command of the Anglo-French armies and fleets. These were three: Marshal St Arnaud (having Admiral Hamelin under his orders), Lord Raglan, and Vice-Admiral Dundas.

The men who had to determine upon the effect to be given to the instructions.

Marshal St Arnaud had not weight proportioned to the magnitude of his command. Reputed at first to be daring even to the verge of rashness, we have seen him so cautioned and schooled into strategic prudence as to have determined to place hundreds of miles of territory, and even the great range of the Balkan, between the French and the Russians; and now, within the last week, he had been almost reproved by his Government for want of enterprise. Colonel Trochu, admitted into consultation upon the most momentous affairs, seemed to wield great authority. At Constantinople and at Varna, no less than in Paris, the Marshal had been made the victim of

Marshal St Arnaud.

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V. unsparing tongues. Indeed at this time two of his divisional generals openly indulged in merciless invectives against their chief: and soldiers all know that a general officer thus setting himself against the commander-in-chief is never without a great following. Perhaps, as had been at first supposed, it may have been true that boldness and craving for adventure were the true lines of the Marshal's character; but if that were so, his native ideas had been overlaid by much counsel, and bent into unwonted shapes. After a while, as will be seen, his mind, fatigued by advice, and now and then broken down by bodily illness, began to lapse into a state which rendered him almost passive in very critical moments. Naturally, he had been cowed by the result of his endeavours to have his own way against Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan. He was without ascendancy in the camp of the Allies.

Colonel Trochu was a student of the principles applicable to formal inland warfare, and it was to be expected that, the more the obstacles to the proposed undertaking were canvassed, the more likely it would be that he would throw the weight of his scientific advice into the negative scale.

Upon the whole, it resulted, from the composition of the various forces acting upon the mind of M. St Arnaud, that, whatever opinion he might lean to, he was not strong enough to be able to act upon events. If the English should decide against the project, he would be well content, and perhaps much relieved. If, on the other hand, the English

should press for its adoption, then the French Marshal would do his best to carry it to a good conclusion. C H A P.  
V.  
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The French fleet was commanded by Admiral Hamelin. It was understood that he disapproved the expedition, but he was under the orders of the chief who commanded the land-forces. Admiral  
Hamelin.

It was not at that time a part of the project to move any very large proportion of the Turkish army to the coast of the Crimea, and therefore the opinion of Omar Pasha would hardly become a governing ingredient in the counsels of the Allies. It was known, however, that he deprecated the proposed invasion. Omar  
Pasha.

The English fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Dundas. Most of the Vice-Admiral's latter years had been passed in political and official life, and it was by force of politics that he had now become troubled with the business of war ; for his seat at the Admiralty Board, and his subsequent appointment in peace-time to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, were things which stood in the relation of cause and effect. He had not sought to return to scenes of naval strife, but the war overtook him in his marine retirement, converting his expected repose into anxious toil. He was an able, a steadfast, a genial man, and his square Scottish head, and his rough, shrewd, good-humoured eyebrows, had grown grey in the faithful service of a political party. By nature, he was so stout-hearted that he could afford to give free, manly counsel without the least dread lest men should say he was too Admiral  
Dundas.

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V. cautious. His habits as a working subordinate member of Government, and perhaps, also, his natural temperament, inclined him to take a homely view of questions—a view recommended by what men term ‘common sense.’ I am sure, though I never heard him say so, that he believed the war to be extremely foolish, and that the less there was of it the better it would be for the Whigs and for all the rest of mankind. He spoke and went straight forward. He thoroughly disapproved the project of invasion, and he said so in plain words. His opinion sprang, not from dread of peril to the forces which he himself commanded, but from anxiety—anxiety in every way honourable to him—for the safety of the English army. That that anxiety was altogether vain, or even that it was weakly founded, few men, speaking with the light of the past, will be ready to say. Still less will it be thought that the Vice-Admiral was wrong in giving bold expression to his views.

Admiral Dundas’s command was of course independent of the General in command of the English army ; but the feasibility of the sea-transit was not at all in question,\* and it was plain, therefore, that the decision would properly rest with those who were responsible for the direction of the land-forces. So, although he held stoutly to his own opinion, the Vice-Admiral did not fail to give assurance that, if the deci-

\* Dundas, I think, said fairly and bluntly, that he could undertake to land the army on the coast of the Crimea, but not to supply it, nor to bring it back.

sion of the Generals should be in favour of undertaking the expedition, they might rely upon the aid of the English fleet. C H A P.  
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There remained Lord Raglan : and now it is time to give the words of the instructions which had been addressed to him, as we have already seen, by the Secretary of State. Lord  
Raglan.

The private letter which was the forerunner of the detailed despatch ran thus :—

‘ Since I last wrote to you, events unknown to you at the date of these letters have been brought to us by the telegraph, and the raising the siege of Silistria, and the retreat of the Russian army across the Danube (preparatory, probably, to a retreat across the Pruth), give an entirely new aspect to the war, and render it necessary at once to consider what shall be our next move. The in-  
structions  
addressed  
to him by  
the Home  
Govern-  
ment.

‘ The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, unless you and Marshal St Arnaud feel that you are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay siege to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever convinced that, without the reduction of this fortress and the capture of the Russian fleet, it will be impossible to conclude an honourable and safe peace. The Emperor of the French has expressed his entire concurrence in this opinion, and, *I believe*,\* has written privately to the Marshal to that effect. I shall submit to the Cabinet a despatch to you on this subject, and if it is approved you may expect it by the next

\* I need hardly say that the underscoring represented by these *Italics* appears in the original note.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



CHAP. <sup>V.</sup> ‘ mail. In the mean time I hope you will be turning  
 ‘ over in your own mind, and considering with your  
 ‘ French colleague, what it will be safe and advisable  
 ‘ to do.’\*

So far as it related to the expedition which the Allies undertook,† the promised despatch was in these words :—

‘ *Secret.*

‘ War Department, 29th June 1854.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ In my despatch of the 10th April, marked  
 ‘ “Secret,” I directed your Lordship to make careful  
 ‘ inquiry into the amount and condition of the Russian  
 ‘ force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress  
 ‘ of Sebastopol.

‘ At the same time I pointed out to your Lordship  
 ‘ that, whilst it was your first duty to prevent, by  
 ‘ every means in your power, the advance of the  
 ‘ Russian army on Constantinople, supposing any  
 ‘ such intention to exist, it might become essential for  
 ‘ the attainment of the objects of the war to under-  
 ‘ take operations of an offensive character, and that  
 ‘ the heaviest blow which could be struck at the  
 ‘ southern extremities of the Russian empire would be  
 ‘ the taking or destruction of Sebastopol. The events

\* Private letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, dated 28th June 1854.

† It is only for the sake of leaving the text altogether unaltered that these twelve qualifying words are allowed to remain, for the Despatch is now given entire. See Advertisement to the 3d Edition.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‘ which have recently occurred, and which have be- C H A P.  
‘ come known to Her Majesty’s Government by means V.  
‘ of the telegraph from Belgrade,—the gallant and suc-  
‘ cessful resistance of the Turkish army—the raising  
‘ of the siege of Silistria—the retreat of the Russian  
‘ army across the Danube, and the anticipated evacu-  
‘ ation of the Principalities,—have given a new char-  
‘ acter to the war, and will render it necessary for you  
‘ without delay to concert measures with Marshal St  
‘ Arnaud, and with Admirals Dundas and Hamelin,  
‘ suited to the circumstances in which these events  
‘ have placed the Allied forces.

‘ The safety of Constantinople from any invasion of  
‘ the Russian army is now, for a time at least, secured ;  
‘ and the advance of the English and French armies  
‘ to Varna and Pravadi has succeeded in its object,  
‘ without their being called upon to meet the enemy  
‘ in action.

‘ Any further advance of the Allied armies should  
‘ on no account be contemplated. To occupy the  
‘ Dobrutscha would be productive of no beneficial re-  
‘ sults, and would be fatally prejudicial to the health  
‘ of the troops ; and even if the Russian army should  
‘ not recross the Pruth, but continue in the occupa-  
‘ tion of the Principalities, it is the decided opinion  
‘ of Her Majesty’s Government that, for the present  
‘ at least, no measures should be taken by you to  
‘ dislodge them.

‘ The circumstances anticipated in my despatch  
‘ before referred to have, therefore, now arrived ; and  
‘ I have, on the part of Her Majesty’s Government,

CHAP. V. ' to instruct your Lordship to concert measures for  
' the siege of Sebastopol, unless, with the information  
' in your possession but at present unknown in this  
' country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it  
' could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect  
' of success. The confidence with which Her Majesty  
' placed under your command the gallant army now  
' in Turkey is unabated ; and if, upon mature reflection,  
' you should consider that the united strength  
' of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking,  
' you are not to be precluded from the exercise of  
' the discretion originally vested in you, though Her  
' Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an  
' attack, from which such important consequences are  
' anticipated, must be any longer delayed.

' The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear  
' to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to  
' increase than diminish by delay ; and as there is no  
' prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the  
' fortress is reduced and the fleet taken or destroyed,  
' it is, on all accounts, most important that nothing  
' but insuperable impediments—such as the want of  
' ample preparations by either army, or the possession  
' by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering  
' that which can be brought against it—  
' should be allowed to prevent the early decision to  
' undertake these operations.

' This decision should be taken solely with reference  
' to the means at your disposal, as compared with the  
' difficulties to be overcome.

' It is probable that a large part of the Russian

‘ army now retreating from the Turkish territory may  
‘ be poured into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. C H A P. V.  
‘ If orders to this effect have not already been given,  
‘ it is further probable that such a measure would be  
‘ adopted as soon as it is known that the Allied  
‘ armies are in motion to commence active hostilities.  
‘ As all communications by sea are now in the hands  
‘ of the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to  
‘ endeavour to cut off all communication by land  
‘ between the Crimea and the other parts of the  
‘ Russian dominions. This would be effectually done  
‘ by the occupation of the Isthmus of Perekop ; and I  
‘ would suggest to you that, if a sufficient number of  
‘ the Turkish army can now be spared for this pur-  
‘ pose, it would be highly important that measures  
‘ should be taken without delay for sending an ade-  
‘ quate force to that point, and associating with the  
‘ troops of the Sultan such English and French officers  
‘ as would assist, by their advice, in holding perma-  
‘ nently the position. With the same object, important  
‘ assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas,  
‘ if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a  
‘ light draught which would prevent the passage of  
‘ Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of  
‘ Azov.

‘ It is unnecessary to express any opinion, at this  
‘ distance from the scene, as to the mode in which  
‘ these operations should be conducted, or the place  
‘ at which a disembarkation should be effected ; and  
‘ as the latter will, of course, be decided with the  
‘ advice and assistance of the French and English

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CHAP.  
V.

‘ Admirals, it is equally unnecessary to impress upon  
‘ your Lordship the importance of selecting favourable  
‘ weather for the purpose, and avoiding all risks of  
‘ being obliged by storms to withdraw from the shore  
‘ the vessels of war and transports when only a  
‘ partial landing of the troops has been effected.

‘ I will not, in this despatch, enter into any con-  
‘ sideration of the operations which it would be  
‘ desirable to undertake in Circassia or the coast of  
‘ Abasia. The reduction of the two remaining for-  
‘ tresses of Anapa and Sujak Kaleh would be, next to  
‘ the taking of Sebastopol, of the greatest importance,  
‘ as bearing upon the fortunes of the war ; but not  
‘ only is their fall of far less moment than that of  
‘ Sebastopol, but the capture of the latter might pos-  
‘ sibly secure the surrender of the Circassian fortresses.

‘ In the event, however, of delay in undertaking  
‘ these operations being inevitable, and the transports  
‘ being in consequence available for any other service,  
‘ I wish you to consider, with his Highness Omar  
‘ Pasha and Marshal St Arnaud, whether some part  
‘ of the Turkish army might not be conveyed by  
‘ steam from Varna, and, by a combined movement  
‘ with the forces of General Guyon and Schamyl, so  
‘ entrap the Russian army in and around Tiflis as to  
‘ compel its surrender to superior numbers.

‘ I have only further to express to you, on the part  
‘ of Her Majesty’s Government, their entire reliance  
‘ in your judgment, zeal, and discretion ; and their  
‘ conviction that, whilst you will not expose the army  
‘ under your command to unnecessary risk, you will

‘ not forget that to the gallantry and conduct of your  
 ‘ troops their countrymen are now looking to secure,  
 ‘ by the blessing of Providence, the great object of a  
 ‘ just war, the vindication of national rights, and the  
 ‘ future security of the peace of Europe.

C H A P.  
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‘ I have the honour to be,

‘ My Lord,

‘ Your Lordship’s obedient humble servant,

‘ NEWCASTLE.’

‘ General the Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,

‘ &c.      &c.      &c.’

In common circumstances, and especially where the whole of the troops to be engaged are under one commander, it cannot be right for any Sovereign or any Minister to address such instructions as these to a General on a distant shore ; for the General who is to be intrusted with the sole command of a great expedition must be, of all mankind, the best able to judge of its military prudence, and to give him orders thus cogent is to dispense with his counsel.

Extreme  
 stringency  
 of the in-  
 structions.

But in this war the united forces of France and England were under two commanders ; and, besides, since the expedition was dependent upon naval co-operation, the Admirals of the two fleets would necessarily be taken into council. It is true that the French Admiral was under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, but there was no corresponding arrangement in regard to the English services, and our Admiral’s command was independent of the General commanding the land-forces.

Considera-  
 tions tend-  
 ing to  
 justify  
 this strin-  
 gency.

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Thus it seemed to the Home Government that the question, if left to be decided on the shores of the Black Sea, would have to be weighed, not by one commander, but by a council of at least four, and to be actually decided by a council of not less than three ; and it could scarcely be expected that such a body, deliberating freely, would come to that vigorous decision which might easily perhaps be attained by any one of them singly. On the other hand, the two Governments were perfectly agreed. Upon the whole, therefore, there was some ground for resolving to transmit to the camps at Varna the benefit of that concord which reigned between Paris and London, and to subject the Generals and Admirals to the overruling judgment of the authorities at home.

Again, the chief reason which makes it unwise to fetter the discretion of Generals—namely, the superior knowledge which they are supposed to have of the enemy's strength and of the field of operations—was in this instance wanting ; for the Generals in the camp at Varna had absolutely no trustworthy information except what came to them from Paris or London ; and in their power of testing the statements which reached them in this way they were below the Home Governments, for they did not so well know the sources from which the accounts were drawn.

Justice requires that these considerations should have their weight, for they tend in some measure to explain the extreme stringency of the instructions. The Minister who framed them had determined, with

a boldness very rare in modern times, to take upon himself an immense weight of responsibility ; and, having brought himself to this strong resolve, he rightly and generously did all he could to simplify the task of the General whom he ventured to direct, and to make the path of duty seem clear.

But Lord Raglan had a station in the Allied camp which made it very difficult for the Home Government to take his burthen upon themselves by any mere bold form of words. He commanded the land-forces, but he was clothed with a power of older date than the Queen's commission. He had been privy to the business of the wars which England waged in the great days ; and if he had seen how Wellington ordered affairs in the field, he had witnessed too his endurance, and helped him in the patient, unapplauded toil by which he prepared the end. Men serving under Lord Raglan were none of them blind to the distance which History herself interposed betwixt their General and themselves. There were none near the chief who would not feel bitter pain if they imagined that words or acts of theirs had thrown upon his face a shadow of displeasure. There were no men near him who would not fly with alacrity to execute his slightest wish. The ascendancy of the English General over his own people could not but reach into the French camp. Upon the whole, Lord Raglan had so great an authority in the camp of the Allies, and amongst public men in England, that if he had taken upon himself to resist the pressure of the Secretary of State, he would not have been left without support. On the other

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V.

The power of deciding for or against the expedition becomes practically vested in Lord Raglan alone.



C H A P. V. hand, if he should determine to follow the will of the Home Government, he would carry the French Marshal with him. So, in effect, the power of deciding for or against the expedition had passed from Paris and from London, and was all concentrated in the English General.

Lord Raglan's deliberations.

Of the general officers in the English camp there was one whom Lord Raglan had always been anxious to have near at hand: this was Sir George Brown. He was a Scotsman, sixty-six\* years old, and had served, with a great repute for his daring forwardness, in some of the most bloody scenes of the Peninsular War. He was of an eager fiery nature, and devoted to the calling of a soldier. After the peace of 1815 he began to hold office in the general staff of the army at the Horse Guards, and in time he became Adjutant-General. He now commanded the Light Division. His zeal, and his lengthened toils in the Adjutant-General's office, had drawn him too far in a narrow path, and he overplied the idea of discipline; but he abounded in energy, and he was in many respects an accomplished soldier. He wrote on military subjects with clearness, with grace, and seemingly with a good deal of ease.

He requests the opinion of Sir George Brown.

After receiving the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, Lord Raglan sent for Sir George Brown, and expressed to him a wish to have his opinion about it. He handed the paper to Sir George across the table, and then went on with his writing, leaving Sir

\* No; only sixty-four, I am told, at that time.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

George to consider its contents at his leisure. When he had read it, Lord Raglan asked him to give him his opinion. Before giving it, Sir George naturally inquired what information Lord Raglan had obtained in regard to the strength of Sebastopol, and what force he expected might be opposed to him in the Crimea.

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Lord Raglan's answer was, that he had no information whatever; that neither he nor Marshal St Arnaud knew what amount of force the enemy had there; that they believed and hoped there might not be more than 70,000 men in the peninsula; but that, in fact, it had not been blockaded, and that no means had been taken to procure information, and that, therefore, they did not in reality know they might not be opposed by 100,000 men, or even more.

Then Sir George Brown said: 'You and I are accustomed, when in any great difficulty, or when any important question is proposed to us, to ask ourselves how the Great Duke would have acted and decided under similar circumstances. Now, I tell your Lordship that, without more certain information than you appear to have obtained in regard to this matter, that great man would not have accepted the responsibility of undertaking such an enterprise as that which is now proposed to you! But, notwithstanding that consideration, I am of opinion that you had better accede to the proposal and come in to the views of the Government, for this reason, that it is clear to me, from the tenor of the

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C H A P. V. ‘ Duke of Newcastle’s letter, that they have made up  
 ‘ their minds to it at home, and that, if you decline  
 ‘ to accept the responsibility, they will send some one  
 ‘ else out to command the army who will be less  
 ‘ scrupulous and more ready to come in to their  
 ‘ plans.’\*

Lord  
 Raglan’s  
 determi-  
 nation.

This suggestion did not at all govern Lord Raglan’s decision.† At the time, he disclosed no opinion of his own ; but he soon made up his mind. His decision was governed by views which must be explained. He believed that the enterprise was one of a very hazardous kind, and was not warranted by any safe information concerning the state of the enemy’s forces. Having that conviction, why did he not feel bound to assert it, notwithstanding the urgency of the Home Government ? Lord Raglan was,

\* One of the commentators—a commentator in the ‘Times’ newspaper—imagined that this piece of counsel was the work of the Author’s ‘ingenious’ fancy, and remonstrated with him for carrying his love of ridicule to the extreme length of putting ‘unmitigated nonsense’ in the mouth of a ‘gallant and sensible’ old soldier like Sir George Brown.—‘Times’ newspaper, 9th Feb. 1863. I have only to say that the words attributed to Sir George Brown in the text are copied, without the change of a word, from a written narrative of the conference, which was handed to me by one of the two conferring Generals.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† All who were acquainted with Lord Raglan’s nature will acknowledge, I think, that his mind would have refused to harbour, for one instant, the notion submitted to him by Sir George Brown—the notion of engaging his army in an imprudent undertaking from an apprehension of finding himself superseded in the command by some one less scrupulous and more ready to come in to the plans of the Government.

Lord Raglan’s inclination to single out Sir George Brown as a one man to consult with upon affairs of the highest grade of importance did not, I think, increase after this conference ; and it will be seen (in Vol. III.) that, very soon after the battle of the Alma, the desire to take close counsel with Sir George Brown had lost its force.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

as might be supposed, deeply imbued with reverence for the authority of the Duke of Wellington ; and, rightly interpreted, that authority is surely the safest guide that an English general can follow. But there is a certain danger in the precepts of the Great Duke, unless when they are construed down to their right degree of significance by applying to them the splendid context of his deeds—for he was accustomed to use sayings founded on quaint and very literal readings of our English law ; and the loyalty of his nature rose so high above the reach of all cavil, that the maxims which he uttered seemed to give a noble simplicity to the tenor of his public life, though in reality he rarely or never permitted them to derange his policy, still less to confuse him in the management of war. Naturally, therefore, men were in danger of being misled by a too narrow reading of his precepts. Now, one of the Duke's theories was, that an officer commanding an army on foreign service owed obedience to the Secretary of State—obedience close akin to that which a military subordinate owes to his military chief. If this precept were to be narrowly construed, a Secretary of State who conveyed the wishes of the Government to a general commanding forces abroad would be in danger of finding that he had shut out from his counsels the one man in all the world who could best advise him ; and the relations of the Austrian generals with the old Aulic Council at Vienna would have to be adopted as a guide, instead of being valued as a warning. Against this doctrine, understood in

C H A P.

V.

The  
grounds  
on which  
it rested.

CHAP. <sup>V.</sup> its narrow sense, the Duke of Wellington's whole military career in Europe was an almost unceasing rebellion ; and it would be hard to find an instance in which he suffered his designs to be bent awry by the military opinions of the Home Government. During the Peninsular War he did not surely pass his time in obeying the Home Government, but rather in setting it right, and in educating it, if so one may speak, for the business of carrying on war.\*

It is known, however, that Lord Raglan accepted the Great Duke's precept without much qualification ; and when he applied it to the despatch which had come to him from the Secretary of State, he saw, as he believed, where the path of duty lay ; for now, in all its potency, the strange sleep which had come upon the Cabinet on the 28th of June began to tell upon events. But for this, or some like physical cause, it could hardly have chanced that fifteen men, all gifted with keen intellect, and all alike charged with a grave, nay, an almost solemn duty, would

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\* The fierce, wilful, and contemptuous way in which the Duke of Wellington dealt with a Secretary of State who ventured to think he might take him at his word, and make him obey his wish, must be familiar to every reader of the Despatches ; but I may refer to the specimen which will be found in Sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 5th of September 1808. I mean the passage beginning, ' In respect ' to your wish that I should go into the Asturias, to examine the country ' and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I ' am not a draughtsman.' It happened that, just six days before—namely, on the 30th of August—Sir Arthur had addressed to the same Secretary of State his customary professions of obedience : ' I shall do whatever the ' Government may wish ;' but he never thought of suffering himself to be hindered from penning an angry refusal on the 5th of September merely because he had used a submissive phrase on the 30th of August.

have knowingly assented to the draft of a long and momentous despatch, without seeking to wedge into it some of those qualifying words which usually correct the imprudence and derange the grammatical structure of writings framed in Council. A few qualifying words of this sort would have enabled Lord Raglan to act upon his own opinion. But the tranquil mood of the Cabinet on the evening of the 28th of June had prevented the mutilation of the despatch; and it retained so perfectly all that bold singleness of purpose which characterised the mind of the framer, that it virtually directed the English General to undertake the invasion, unless it should happen that he had obtained fresh knowledge of the enemy's strength—fresh knowledge of such a kind as would enable him to controvert the statements sent out to him by the Home Government, and say distinctly that the Russian forces in the Crimea were too numerous to be encountered with common prudence by the Allied armies. Now, Lord Raglan had not succeeded in obtaining any information at all on the subject, and, therefore, the one circumstance which might have relaxed the stringency of the despatch was entirely wanting. In the state of things which actually existed, the Duke of Newcastle's communication was little short of an absolute order from the Secretary of State. The English General determined to obey it.

It was thus that Lord Raglan persuaded himself into the belief that he would be justified in foregoing his own opinion, and acceding to the will of the

**C H A P.** Home Government ; but perhaps, though he knew it  
**V.**  
not, he was under the power of a motive more heating than this bare process of the reason. There were sentences in the despatch which seemed as though they were meant for the guidance of one not sufficiently prone to action. The writer seemed to have busied himself in closing the loops by which a general might seek to escape from the obligation of having to make the venture. In reality, as we have seen, the despatch had been framed with a view of giving unanimity to a council of generals and admirals, but it reached its destination at a time when (for the purpose of this decision) the whole power of the camp at Varna was centred in the English General. Whether meant for the guidance of a council or not, the despatch was addressed to one man—and that man was Lord Raglan. Some may deem it wrong, and may call it a plan of life too closely deriving from times of chivalry ; but it is still the habit of the English gentleman to think that his personal honour is no part of the property of the State, and that even, for what may seem the public good, he ought not to do a violence to his self-respect. He has his code formed in the time of his boyish conflicts or of his early manhood ; and if there be fire and strength in his nature, he will not depart from it merely because he has become responsible and mature in years. Lord Raglan was of the bodily nature of those whose blood flushes hot to the face under the sting of an indignant thought ; and if mortal eyes could have looked upon him when

he revolved the contents of the despatch, they would have seen him turn crimson in posing the question whether he ought to resist the pressure of the Queen's Government,—and to resist because of mere danger. What the Duke of Newcastle meant was to do all he reasonably could to enforce the invasion ; and, so intending, he did honestly in making his order as peremptory as possible ; but if, in any times to come, it shall be intended that an English general commanding on a foreign service is to exercise his judgment freely and without passion, the Secretary of State must not challenge him as Lord Raglan was challenged by the despatch of the 29th of June.

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V.

Lord Raglan's decision governed the counsels of the Allied camp ; for although the Staff of the French army\* (including, as I believe, M. St Arnaud himself) were adverse to the undertaking, the Marshal's instructions were so framed that, if the English should be ready to go forward, he was virtually ordered to concur in the enterprise ;† and we have seen that he had not such a weight in the French camp as would have enabled him to oppose any valid resistance to the wishes of his own Government and the determination of the English General.

His decision governed the counsels of the Allies.

In announcing his decision to the Home Government, Lord Raglan thus wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :—

He announces it to the Home Government.

‘ It becomes my duty to acquaint you that it was

\* This will be shown by the narrative in cap. 9, *post*.

† Lord Raglan had the advantage of knowing (by means of a communication from Lord Cowley) that the ‘ Emperor quite concurred in the views of the British Cabinet.’



CHAP. V.   
 ‘ more in deference to the views of the British  
 ‘ Government as conveyed to me in your Grace’s  
 ‘ despatch, and to the known acquiescence of the  
 ‘ Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to  
 ‘ any information in the possession of the naval and  
 ‘ military authorities, either as to the extent of the  
 ‘ enemy’s forces, or their state of preparation, that  
 ‘ the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea  
 ‘ was adopted.

‘ The fact must not be concealed that neither the  
 ‘ English nor the French Admirals have been able to  
 ‘ obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with  
 ‘ respect to the army which the Russians may destine  
 ‘ for operations in the field, or to the number of men  
 ‘ allotted for the defence of Sebastopol ; and Marshal  
 ‘ St Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in in-  
 ‘ formation upon these all-important questions, and  
 ‘ there would seem to be no chance of our acquiring  
 ‘ it.’ \*

The Duke  
 of New-  
 castle’s  
 reply.

The Duke of Newcastle’s reply to this despatch was in full consistency with that fearless and unshrinking assumption of responsibility which had marked his instructions of the 29th of June.

‘ I wish,’ he writes,† ‘ that circumstances which  
 ‘ are engrossing my attention this afternoon per-  
 ‘ mitted my expressing to you the feelings of intense  
 ‘ anxiety and interest which your reply of the 19th  
 ‘ of July to mine of the 29th of June have created in  
 ‘ my mind. I cannot help seeing, through the calm

\* 19th July.

† Private letter to Lord Raglan, 3d August 1854.

‘ and noble tone of your announcement of the deci- C H A P.  
 ‘ sion to attack Sebastopol, that it has been taken in V.  
 ‘ order to meet the views and desires of the Govern-  
 ‘ ment, and not in entire accordance with your own  
 ‘ opinions. God grant that success may reward you,  
 ‘ and justify us !

‘ I wrote to the Queen the moment I received your  
 ‘ despatch, and in answer she said: “The very impor- The  
 ‘ tant news which he conveyed to her in it, of the Queen’s  
 ‘ “decision of the Generals and Admirals to attack expression  
 ‘ “Sebastopol, have filled the Queen with mixed of feeling.  
 ‘ “feelings of satisfaction and anxiety. May the  
 ‘ “Almighty protect her army and her fleet, and  
 ‘ “bless this great undertaking with success !”

‘ Let me add my humble aspirations and prayers  
 ‘ to those of our good Queen. The cause is a just  
 ‘ one, if any war is just ; and I will not believe that  
 ‘ in any case British arms can fail. May honour,  
 ‘ victory, and the thanks of a grateful world attend  
 ‘ your efforts ! God bless you and those who fight  
 ‘ under you !’

## CHAPTER VI.

CHAP. VI. ON the 18th of July a conference took place at Marshal St Arnaud's headquarters. It was attended by the Marshal, by Lord Raglan, and by Admiral Hamelin, by Admiral Bruat (who was the second in command of the French fleet), by Vice-Admiral Dundas, and by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was the second in command of the English fleet. It lasted four hours.

Confer-  
ence at  
the French  
head-  
quarters.

Perhaps most of the members of the conference imagined that they were met for the purpose of determining upon the expediency of undertaking the invasion; but Lord Raglan had already made up his mind, not merely to support the wish of his Government in the Allied camp, but to cause its actual adoption; and he was so constituted that he could bring the resources of his mind to bear upon the object in view with as much abundance and strength as if he had himself approved or even devised it. Clearly a discussion upon the expediency of undertaking the enterprise would have been fatal to it; for no member of the conference, except Lyons and (possibly) Bruat, could have conscientiously argued

that the scheme was wise or even moderately prudent. CHAP.  
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How was it to be contrived that a council of war, disapproving the enterprise, should be prevented from strangling it?

As almost always happened in conferences where Lord Raglan had the ascendant, the grand question was quietly passed over, as though it were either decided or conceded for the purpose of the discussion, and it was made to seem that the duty which remained to the council was that of determining the time and the means. The French had studied the means of disembarking in the face of a powerful enemy. Sir Ralph Abercromby's descent upon the coast of Egypt in the face of the French army was an enterprise too brilliant and too daring to allow its being held a safe example, for he had simply led his infantry upon the beach in boats, without attempting, in the first instance, to bring artillery into action. It seems that hardly any stress of circumstances will induce a French general to bring his army into action upon open ground without providing for it the support of artillery. Naturally, then, the French authorities at Varna were well provided with the necessity of being able to land their guns in such a way as to admit of their being brought into action simultaneously with the rest of their battalions; and, having anticipated before that a disembarkation in the face of the enemy might be one of the operations of the war, they had already begun to make the boats required for the purpose. These were flat-bottomed lighters,

Lord Raglan's way of eluding objections.

C H A P.

VI.

somewhat in the form of punts, but of great size, and so constructed that they would receive the gun-carriages with the guns upon them, and allow of the guns being run out straight from the boat to the beach. It was understood that the building of these flat lighters would take about ten days; and it was determined that, in the mean time, a survey of the coast near Sebastopol should be made from on board ship, in order to determine the spot best suited for a descent.

Recon-  
naissance  
of the  
coast.

With a view to cover the reconnaissance and draw off the enemy's attention, the Allied Admirals cruised with powerful fleets in front of the harbour of Sebastopol; and meanwhile the officers chosen for the service went northward along the coast in the *Fury*, seeking out the best place for a landing. The officers who performed this duty were, on the part of the French, General Canrobert and Colonel Trochu, with one engineer and one artillery officer; and on the part of the English, Sir George Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, R. H. A., Captain Lovell, R. E., and Captain Wetherall, of the Quartermaster-General's department. The *Fury* was steered by no common hand.

In the moment when Lord Raglan determined to treat the instructions of the Government as imperative, and to put them in course for execution, he came to another determination (a determination which is not so mere a corollary from the first as men unversed in business may think): he resolved to carry the enterprise through. He knew that, though

work of an accustomed sort can be ably done by official persons acting under a bare sense of duty, yet that the engine for conquering obstacles of a kind not known beforehand, when they are many and big and unforeseen, must be nothing less than the strong, passionate will of a man. If every one were to perform his mere duty, there would be no invasion of the Crimea, for a rank growth of hindrances, springing up in the way of the undertaking, would be sure to gather fast round it, and bring it in time to a stop.

Amongst the English Generals there was no one who had given his mind to the enigma which went by the name of the 'Eastern Question;' but Sir Edmund Lyons had been for many years engaged in the animating diplomacy of the Levant. In Greece, the activity of the Czar's agents, or, perhaps, of his mere admirers, had been so constant, and had generated so strong a spirit of antagonism in the minds of the few contentious Britons who chanced to observe it, that the institutions called 'The Russian Party' and 'The English Party' had long ago flourished at Athens; and since Sir Edmund Lyons had been accredited there for several years as British Minister, he did not miss being drawn into the game of combating against what was supposed to be the ever-impending danger of Russian encroachment. Long ago, therefore, he had been whetted for this strife; and now that the 'Eastern Question' was to be brought to the issue of a war in which he had part, he was inflamed with a passionate zeal. Resuming

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Sir Ed-  
mund  
Lyons.

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VI. at once the uniform and the bearing of his old profession, he cast aside, if ever he had it, all semblance of diplomatic reserve and composure, and threw himself, with all his seaman's heart, into the business of the war.

Lord Raglan drew Sir Edmund Lyons into his intimate counsels. I know not whether this concord of theirs was ever put into words; but I imagine that, at the least, I can infer from their actions, and from the tenor of their intercourse, a silent understanding between them—an understanding that no lukewarmness of others, no shortcomings, no evasions, no tardy prudence, no overgrown respect for difficulty or peril, should hinder the landing of the Queen's troops on the coast of the Crimea. From the time that Lord Raglan thus joined Lyons to the undertaking he gave it a great momentum. To those within the grasp of the Rear-Admiral's energy it seemed that thenceforth, and until the troops should be landed on the enemy's shore, there could be no rest for man, no rest for engines. The *Agamemnon* was never still. In the painful, consuming passion with which Lyons toiled, and even, as some imagined, in the anxious, craving expression of his features, there was something which reminded men of a greater name.

This was the officer who steered the *Fury*. He carried her in so close to the shore that the coast could be reconnoitred with great completeness. The officers came to the conclusion (a conclusion afterwards overruled, as we shall see, by Lord Raglan)

that the valley of the Katcha was the best spot for a landing. C H A P.  
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We saw that the Czar's withdrawal from the Principalities would deprive the German Powers of their main ground of quarrel with Russia, and that our plan of engaging in a great marine expedition against Crim Tartary would cause Austria and Prussia to despair of all effective support from the West, thus driving or tending to drive them into better relations with Nicholas. Before the 28th of July there were signs that this change was beginning to set Russia free from the straits in which she had been placed by the unanimity of the Four Great Powers; and tidings which reached the camp at Varna made it appear (though not with truth) that the Russian commander had not only suspended his retreat, but was commencing a fresh movement in advance. To deliberate upon this supposed change in the character of the war, a conference was held at the French headquarters, and was attended by Marshal St Arnaud, Lord Raglan, General Canrobert, Sir Edmund Lyons, General Martimprey, Sir George Brown, and Colonel Trochu. The French Generals grasped this as an occasion for bringing about the relinquishment of an enterprise which they always had held to be rash. They submitted that the general instructions addressed to both of the Allied commanders made it their duty to provide, in the first instance, for the safety of the Ottoman territory, and that, until that object was secured, they were not warranted in attempting an invasion

Rumoured  
change in  
the plans  
of the  
Czar.

Second  
confer-  
ence.



C H A P. VI. of a Russian province far distant from the threatened frontier of European Turkey ; that the order to invade the coast of the Crimea had been framed by the Home Governments, and acceded to by the Allied Generals, upon the assumption that the armed intervention of Austria, then believed to be imminent, or, at the very least, a continuance of her menacing attitude on the flank of the Russian army, would preclude any attempt by the Czar to resume his war on the Danube ; that that assumption now unfortunately turned out to be unfounded ; and that the abandonment by Austria of the common cause made it the bounden duty of the Allied commanders to return to their defensive measures ; because it was now plain that, if they quitted Bulgaria, Omar Pasha, without aid from any quarter, would have upon his hands the whole weight of the Russian army. Now then, supposing the premises to be conceded, the French counsellors had made out good grounds for abandoning a resolution which, only a week ago, had been adopted by the Allied commanders.

The French urge the abandonment of the expedition against the Crimea.

Lord Raglan's way of bending the French to the plans of the English Government.

Lord Raglan, however, was resolved that the enterprise should go on. From the moment he knew that the siege of Silistria had been raised, he never doubted that, for that year at least, the invasion of European Turkey was at an end. But he knew that clever men who have taken the pains to build up a neat logical structure, do not easily allow it to be treated as unsound merely because it rests upon a sliding foundation. Without, therefore, combating the French arguments, he quietly suggested that the

time which must needs elapse before the embarkation might throw new light on the probability of a renewed attack upon Turkey ; and he proposed that, in the mean time, the preparations for the descent on the Crimea should be carried on with all speed. This opinion was adopted by every member of the conference. The preparations were carried on with increasing energy ; and the theory that it was the duty of the Allied commanders to abandon the enterprise was never put down by argument, but left to die away uncontested.

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Lord Raglan had been struck with the value of the French plan for landing artillery on flat lighters, and Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown were despatched to Constantinople, with instructions to do all they could towards supplying the British army with means which would answer the same purpose. They discovered that a platform resting upon two boats might be made to serve nearly as well as one of the French lighters.\* How they toiled, the world will never know, for History cannot pause to see them ransacking Constantinople and the villages of the Bosphorus in their search after carpenters and planks ; but before the appointed time the whole work was done. This was not all. Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown propelled the arrangements for

Prepara-  
tions.

\* I believe that the merit of making this discovery, and of the irresistible energy by which it was carried into effect, belonged to Mr Roberts, late a Master in the Navy. See the forcible exposition of Mr Roberts's services, and of his cruelly frustrated hopes, in the little work called 'The Service and the Reward,' by Mr George John Cayley.—  
*Note to 2d Edition.*

CHAP. VI. buying and chartering steamers, trampling down with firmness, perhaps one might say with violence, all obstacles which stood in the way. Of those obstacles one of the most formidable was what was called in those days the ‘official fear of incurring responsibility.’ Lyons and Sir George Brown taught men that, in emergencies of this sort, they should be pursued with the fear of not doing enough, rather than with the dread of doing too much. ‘I cannot venture,’ said a cautious official—‘I cannot venture to give the price.’ ‘Then I can,’ said Sir George Brown; ‘I buy it in my own name!’ It is thus that difficulties are conquered. When the restless Agamemnon came back into the Bay of Varna with Lyons and Sir George Brown on board, Lord Raglan was at the head of a truly British armament. He had the means, by steam-power, and at one trip, to descend upon the enemy’s coast, with all his divisions of infantry, with his brigade of light cavalry, and with the whole of his field-artillery; and he would be enabled, if he landed in face of an enemy, to bring his guns into action whilst his infantry formed upon the beach.

Ineffec-  
tual at-  
tempts of  
the Allies  
to deceive  
the enemy.

When the Allied commanders determined to execute the orders addressed to them, they saw the importance of endeavouring to veil their project from the enemy. With this view they tried to induce a belief that Odessa was to be the object of attack; but the measures which they took for this purpose were very slight and weak. To deceive the enemy by the mere spreading of a report, the first step for a general

to take would be that of uttering the false word to some of his own people. That would be a difficult service for Lord Raglan to perform ; and I do not believe that he ever could or ever did perform it. C H A P.  
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Another contrivance for diverting the enemy's attention from the Crimea was that of endeavouring to alarm him for his Bessarabian frontier. Partly to attain this end, and partly, as was surmised, with the more ambitious object of striking a blow at some of the Czar's retiring columns, Marshal St Arnaud moved no less than three divisions into the Dobrudja. But, in truth, all secrecy was forbidden to the Allies. The same power which dictated the expedition precluded its concealment. It was in a council of the whole people that England had resolved upon the enterprise ; and what advantage there is in knowledge of an enemy's plans, that she freely gave to Russia. It might seem that for the Emperor of the French, who had shown that he was capable of the darkest secrecy in his own designs, it must have been trying to have to act with a Power which propounded her schemes in print. But, happily, he understood England, and knew something of the conditions under which she moves into action.

On the 10th of August a fire broke out in the British magazines at Varna, and a large quantity of military stores was consumed. Fire at  
Varna.

But another and more dreadful enemy had now entered the camp of the Allies. From the period of its arrival in the Levant, the French army had been suffering much from sickness. In the British Cholera.

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army, on the contrary, though slight complaints were not unfrequent, the bodily condition of the men had been upon the whole very good ; and so it continued up to the 19th of July. On that day, out of the whole Light Division, there were only 110 in hospital. But it seems that one of the omens which portend the visitation of a great epidemic is a more than common flush of health. With the French, the cholera first showed itself on board their troop-ships whilst passing from Marseilles to the Dardanelles. It then appeared among the French quartered at Gallipoli, and followed their battalions into Bulgaria. There its ravages increased, and before the beginning of the last week in July it reached the British army. By the 19th of August our regiments in Bulgaria had lost 532 men. But it was amongst the three French divisions marched into the Dobrudja, and especially in General Canrobert's Division, that the disease raged with the most deadly virulence. In the day's march, and sometimes within the space of only a few hours, hundreds of men dropped down in the sudden agonies of cholera ; and out of one battalion alone, it was said that, besides those already dead, no less than 500 sufferers were carried alive in the waggons. On the 8th of August it was computed, by an officer of their Staff, that out of the three French divisions which marched into the Dobrudja, no less than 10,000 lay dead or struck down by sickness.

If the cholera had been confined to the land-forces, the Generals would not, perhaps, have allowed it to

delay their embarkation ; but it now reached the fleets. In a few days the crews were in such a state that all idea of attempting to embark the troops was, for the moment, quite out of the question ; and on the 11th and 12th of August the Admirals put out from their anchorage, in the hope of driving away the disease with the pure breezes of the sea. But they had scarcely done this when, on board some of the ships, the mysterious pest began to rage with a violence rare in Europe. The *Britannia* alone lost 105 men. The number of those stricken, and of those attending upon them, was so great, that it was impracticable to carry on the common duties of the ship in the usual way ; and if the disease had continued to rage with undiminished violence for three days more, there would have been the spectacle of a majestic three-decker floating helpless upon the waves for want of hands to work her. This time of trial proved the quality of those who remained unstricken. There was a waywardness in the course of the disease on board British ships, for which it is difficult to account,—it spared the officers. On board British ships of war the seaman is accustomed to look to those who command him with a strong affectionate reliance ; and now the poor sufferers, in their childlike simplicity, were calling upon their officers for help and comfort. An officer thus appealed to would go and lie down by the side of the sufferer, and soothe him as though he were an infant. And this trust and this devotion were not always in vain. Even against malignant cholera the officer seemed to be not alto-

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gether powerless ; for, partly by holding the tortured sufferer in his kind hands, partly by cheering words, and partly by wild remedies, invented in despair of all regular medical treatment, he was often enabled to fight the disease, or to make the men think that he did.

Almost suddenly the pestilence ceased on board the British ships of war. The dead were overboard, and the survivors returned to their accustomed duties with an alacrity quickened by the delight of looking forward to active operations against the enemy. Instinctively, or else with wise design, both officers and men dropped all mention of the tragedy through which they had passed.\*

In a few days from the time when the cholera had been raging with its utmost fury, the crews of the fleet were ready to undertake the great business of embarking the troops and landing them on the coast of the Crimea.

Weakly  
condition  
of the  
English  
soldiery.

In the camps of the Allied armies, at this time, the cholera had abated, but had not ceased. There were fevers, too, and other complaints. Grievous sickness fell upon that part of our camp which had been pitched in the midst of the beauteous scenery of the lake of Devna, but the whole English army at this time began to show signs of failing health. It appeared that, even of the men out of hospital and actually present under arms, hardly any were in the enjoyment of

\* I was for several days on board the Britannia without once, I think, hearing the least allusion to the pestilence which just four weeks before had slain 105 of the ship's crew.

sound health—hardly any were capable of their usual amount of exertion.

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This weakly condition of the men was destined to act, with other causes, in bringing upon the army cruel sufferings ; and it may be asked whether, with the soldiers in this condition of body, it was right to undertake an invasion. The answer would be this : the medical authorities thought, and with apparently good reason, that, for troops sickening under the fierce summer heats of Bulgaria, the sea voyage, the descent upon another and more healthy shore, and, above all, the animating presence of the enemy, would work a good effect upon the health of the men ; and although these hopes proved vain, they seemed at the time to rest upon fair grounds. And, after all, it is hard to say what other disposition of the troops would have united the advantages of being better and possible. To remain in Bulgaria, or to attempt to operate in the neighbourhood of the Danube, was to linger in the midst of those very atmospheric poisons which had brought the health of the army to its then state ; and, on the other hand, our people at home would hardly have borne to see the army sent back to Malta, and forced to recede from the conflict, for the bare reason that some of the men were in hospital, and that the rest, without being ill, were said to be in a weakly condition.



## CHAPTER VII.

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Arrange-  
ments first  
made for  
the start-  
ing of the  
expedi-  
tion.

OUR Admiral had at his command the means for conveying the British force to the enemy's shore either in steam-vessels or in sailing-ships towed by steam-power; and, until the eve of the embarkation, the French believed that their resources would enable them to achieve a like result. So, at a conference of the four Admirals held on the 20th of August, it was arranged that the whole of the French and English armament should move from the coast at the same time under steam-power; and the 2d of September was looked forward to as the day when the armament might perhaps go to sea, but the exact time would of course depend upon weather and other circumstances beyond the reach of exact calculation.

The em-  
barka-  
tions.

On the 24th of August the huge operation of embarking the armies had already begun. The French embarked 24,000 infantry and 70 pieces of field-artillery; but since they were straitened in their means of sea-transport, the number of horses they allotted to each gun was reduced from six to four. The French embarked no cavalry.\* A large portion of the

\* They took with them from 80 to 100 horsemen to perform escort duty; but of course I do not regard this as an exception to the statement that 'no cavalry was embarked.'

French troops were put on board ships of war,\* and other portions were distributed among a great number of sailing-vessels. Some of these were very small craft. C H A P.  
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Attached to the French army, and placed under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, there was a force of between 5000 and 6000 Turkish infantry. These men were embarked mainly or entirely on board Turkish vessels of war.

Sir Edmund Lyons was charged with the duty of embarking the English forces ; and having first got on board our 60 pieces of field-artillery, completely equipped, with the full complement of horses belonging to every gun, he proceeded with the embarkation of the 22,000 infantry and the full thousand of cavalry which Lord Raglan intended to move from Bulgaria to the coast of the Crimea. To put on board ship a body of foot-soldiers is comparatively a simple process ; but the shipping of horses involves so heavy a cost, so great an exertion of human energy, that he who undertakes such a task upon anything like a large scale must needs be a man in earnest. On the other hand, it was clear that, for an invasion of the Crimea, a body of cavalry was strictly needed ; therefore a sagacious interpreter of warlike signs,

\* Our naval officers are strongly opposed to the practice of putting troops on board ships of war. They are not the men to set their personal convenience against the exigencies of the public service, but they cannot endure that the efficiency of a man-of-war should be for one moment suspended. It is well ascertained, too, that the presence of a great number of soldiers—men who, for the time of the voyage, are almost necessarily idlers—is injurious to the discipline of a ship.

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who saw that the English General was embarking a thousand cavalry horses, and that the French were embarking none, would be led to conjecture that the English were resolved to make the descent, and that the French were not. It will be seen, by-and-by, that such a conjecture would have been sound.

The time necessary for embarking a given number of foot-soldiers is small in proportion to that required for getting on board an equal number of troopers with their chargers. Nor is this all. The embarkation of infantry is not necessarily stopped by a moderate swell: the embarkation of cavalry is rendered very slow and difficult by even a slight movement of the sea, and is stopped altogether by a little increase of surf. The business of embarking the British cavalry was checked during some days by a wind from the north-east, and its consequent swell; but afterwards the weather changed, and the whole force was got on board without the loss of a man.\*

Lord Raglan could not repress the feeling with which he looked upon the exertions of our naval officers and seamen. 'The embarkation,' he wrote on the 29th of August—'the embarkation is proceeding rapidly and successfully, thanks to the able arrangements of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and the unceasing exertions of the officers and men under his orders. It is impossible for me to express

\* The French were not so fortunate, for a painful accident occurred in the course of their embarkation. One of their steam-vessels ran down a boat laden with Zouaves. The men, encumbered by their packs, could do little to save themselves, and more than twenty were drowned.

‘ in adequate terms, my sense of the value of the  
 ‘ assistance the army under my command derives  
 ‘ from the Royal Navy. The same feeling prevails  
 ‘ from the highest to the lowest—from Vice-Admiral  
 ‘ Dundas to the youngest sailor : an ardent desire to  
 ‘ co-operate, by every possible means, is manifest  
 ‘ throughout ; and I am proud of being associated  
 ‘ with men who are animated by such a spirit, and  
 ‘ who are so entirely devoted to the service of their  
 ‘ country.’

Of course, the French, unencumbered with cavalry, were on board before the English embarkation was complete ; but the steam-power at the command of the French fell short, and the necessity of a variation from the plan determined upon by the four Admirals was now announced. On the 4th of September, Admiral Hamelin, and an officer on the staff of the French army, informed Vice-Admiral Dundas that their resources would not, as they had expected, enable them to have their sailing transports towed by steamers.


Failure of  
the French  
calcula-  
tions in  
regard to  
their com-  
mand of  
steam-  
power.

No explanation was given of the failure which had thus suddenly crippled the French armament. The result was distressing at the time ; for it was seen that the whole flotilla would be clogged by the slowness of the sailing-vessels in which the French troops were embarked, and the fate of the enterprise was rendered more than ever dependent upon the accidents of weather. Marshal St Arnaud grew restless.

## CHAPTER VIII.

**CHAP.** WE have seen that the 2d of September had been  
**VIII.** looked forward to as the time for the departure of the  
**Excite-ment and impa-tience of St Arnaud.** united armaments, and on that day, with military punctuality, Marshal St Arnaud went to Baljik ; but the wind and the waves are still undisciplined forces, and the French embarkations were not destined to be completed until the evening of the 4th. The Marshal, therefore, was kept waiting at Baljik ; and meanwhile sickness began to make havoc with his troops, for they were densely crowded on board the transports.

The Marshal was much tortured by the anxiety which he had had to bear during these three painful days, and (possibly to calm his mind) Vice-Admiral Dundas seems to have suggested to him that, his sailing-vessels not being provided with steam-power to tow them, he might as well cause them at once to weigh anchor. By these causes, joined to his irritation at what he thought the backwardness of the English embarkations, the Marshal was induced to determine, not merely that he would act upon Dundas's suggestion, but that he himself would



wait no longer, and would put to sea on the 5th of September with his sailing fleet ; so when, on the same morning, Lord Raglan reached Baljik, he was surprised by the intelligence that the Marshal had already sailed out on board the *Ville de Paris*.

On the evening of the 6th the British armament was ready, and the arrangements for the voyage of the whole flotilla complete. The French fleet already at sea consisted of fifteen sail of the line, with ten or twelve war-steamers, and the Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, with three war-steamers ; but the French and the Turkish vessels were doing service as transports, and were so encumbered with troops that they could not have been brought into action with common prudence. It was upon the English fleet, therefore, that the duty of protecting the whole armada really devolved ; and, supposing that the enemy were aware of the helpless state of the French and Turkish vessels laden with troops, and of the enormous convoy of transports which had to be protected, he might be expected to judge that it was incumbent upon him to come out of the harbour and assail the vast flotilla of transports ; for under the guns of Sebastopol the Russians had fifteen sailing ships of the line,\* with some frigates and brigs, and also twelve war-steamers, though of these the *Vladimir* was the only powerful vessel.† To encounter this force, and to defend from its enterprises the rest of the armada, the English had ten sail of

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He is induced to set sail without the English, taking with him all his sailing fleet and the troops on board them.

The naval forces of the Allies.

Duty devolving on the English fleet.

\* Some say sixteen.

† Unless the *Bessarabia* be counted as a powerful steamer.

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the line (including two screw-steamers), two fifty-gun frigates, and thirteen lesser steamers of war heavily armed.

Arrange-  
ments in  
regard to  
the Eng-  
lish con-  
voy.

The anxious duty of disposing and guiding the convoy was intrusted by Admiral Dundas to Sir Edmund Lyons ; and, under Sir Edmund's directions, Captain Mends of the *Agamemnon* framed the programme of the voyage. On the evening of the 6th the captains of transports were called by signal on board the *Emperor*, and there Mends read to them the instructions which he asked them to obey. The captains thus addressed were not in the Queen's service, but they were English seamen, and their answer was characteristic. They were not flighty men. They respectfully asked for an assurance that, in the event of death, their widows would be held entitled to pensions ; and as to the question whether, of their own free will, they would encounter the chances of a naval action, they answered it with three cheers. It is not by the mere muster-roll of the army or the navy that England counts her forces.

The forces  
and sup-  
plies now  
on board.

With his force of horse, foot, and artillery, Lord Raglan had on board the transports (now all collected at Baljik)\* the full number of ammunition-carts required for the first reserve of ammunition, the beasts required for drawing them, and sixty other carts, also provided with draught-power. But, in order to move so large a force at one trip, it was

\* At the time here spoken of there were two artillery transports lagging, but they were up in sufficient time.

found necessary to dispense with the bāt-horses of the army, and the force was not provided with means of land-transport either for the tents of the men or for the baggage of the officers. There were also on board large supplies of field-ammunition, of food for the troops, and of barley and hay for the horses. In some of the horse-transports there was an insufficiency of the forage required for the voyage. With that grave exception, all the arrangements seem to have been good. Due means had been taken for insuring, so far as was possible, the simultaneous transit, not only of our ships of war, but of the whole force which Lord Raglan had embarked, together with its vast appendage of warlike stores and provisions ; for every sailing-vessel, whether she were a ship of war or a transport, was towed by a sufficiently powerful steamer. None of our ships of war carried troops on board ; they were all, therefore, ready for action.

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In addition to the forces and the means of land-transport which were actually on board, Lord Raglan had in readiness for embarkation the whole brigade of heavy cavalry, another division of infantry, a siege-train,\* and some five or six thousand pack-horses. The sick remained in Bulgaria, and such of the men out of hospital as seemed to be in a very weakly state were left at Varna and employed in garrison duty.

Troops  
and sup-  
plies left  
at Varna.

\* The additional division of infantry (the 4th Division) was at Varna ; the Scots Greys were on the Bosphorus ; and the rest of the heavy cavalry in Bulgaria, where also the bāt-horses were left. The siege-train was on board off Varna.



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Vice-Admiral Dundas, commanding the whole British fleet, had his flag on board the *Britannia*; Lyons, in the *Agamemnon*, had charge of the convoy. Each vessel had assigned to her the place she was to take when the signal for moving should be given.

Before night the whole of the English flotilla, together with that part of the French and the Turkish flotilla which had the command of steam-power, was assembled in Baljik Bay, and in readiness to sail on the morrow.

Departure  
of the  
English  
Armada  
and of the  
French  
steam-  
vessels.

Men remember the beauteous morning of the 7th of September. The moonlight was still floating on the waters, when men, looking from numberless decks towards the east, were able to hail the dawn. There was a summer breeze blowing fair from the land. At a quarter before five a gun from the *Britannia* gave the signal to weigh. The air was obscured by the busy smoke of the engines, and it was hard to see how and whence due order would come; but presently the *Agamemnon* moved through, and with signals at all her masts—for Lyons was on board her, and was governing and ordering the convoy. The French steamers of war went out with their transports in tow, and their great vessels formed line. The French went out more quickly than the English, and in better order. Many of their transports were vessels of very small size; and of necessity, therefore, they were a swarm. Our transports went out in five columns of only thirty each. Then—guard over all—the English

war-fleet, in single column, moved slowly out of the bay.\*

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Here, then, and apart from the bodies of foot and artillery embarked by the French and the Turks, there was an armament not unworthy of England. Without combat, and by the mere stress of its presence, our fleet drove the enemy's flag from the seas which flowed upon his shores,† and a small but superb land-force, complete in all arms, was clothed with the power of a great army by the ease with which it could be thrown upon any part of the enemy's coast.‡

Lord Raglan had not suffered himself to be disconcerted by the departure of Monsieur St Arnaud, and the consequent severance of the Allied forces. No steamer was sent to re-knit his communications with the errant French Marshal.

\* I did not reach the fleet till some three days afterwards, when it was anchored at the rendezvous; and my impression of the scene in the Bay of Baljik is derived partly from some MSS. which have been furnished to me, but partly also from what struck me as a very good account of it, which I saw in a printed book, by Mr Wood, a spectator.

† I am justified in speaking of the English fleet as the force which kept the enemy's ships in duress, because, as we have seen, the French men-of-war were doing duty as transports, and were not, therefore, in a state for going into action.

‡ I of course speak here of the inherent power of such an armament, without reference to the fact that strictly-defined instructions had been addressed to Lord Raglan, and that the purport of these had become known to the enemy. The fixedness of the plan of campaign, and the publicity which it had obtained, reduced the power of the force to the level of its actual numbers and its intrinsic strength.

## CHAPTER IX.

CHAP.  
IX. WE have seen that Marshal St Arnaud, under feelings of some vexation, put to sea on the morning of the 5th of September. He could not but know that, by his abrupt separation from the British fleet and army, he had offended against the English General. Upon reflection, he could not but grieve that he had done this. But he had put to sea, and had since heard no tidings from the shore. No swift steamer had followed him with entreaties to stay his course. He was left free to pursue his voyage ; and the voyage was growing more and more dismal.

‘The Black Sea’ is a truer name than the ‘Euxine.’ Now, as in old times (if the summer be hardly past), the voyager leaves a coast smiling bright beneath skies of blue and glowing with sunny splendour ; yet, perhaps, and in less than an hour, the heavens above and the waters around him are dark with the gloom and threatening aspect belonging to the Northern Ocean.\* Monsieur St Arnaud

\* The contrast between the climate of the Black Sea and that of the countries which surround it is one of the enigmas to which scientific men have applied their minds ; but whether, as yet, with success, I cannot say.

encountered this change. The wind blew from its dark quarter. Every hour was carrying the Marshal farther and farther into the centre of the inhospitable sea, farther and farther from the English fleet, farther and farther from Lord Raglan. If he went on, there was no junction to look for except at an imaginary point marked with a pencil on the charts, but having no existence in the material world ; and from the wind and the angry waves, no less than from his own fast-cooling thoughts, he began to receive a distressing sense of his isolation. The struggle in his mind was painful, but it came to an end. ‘ I am nearly ‘ twenty leagues,’ writes the Marshal, on the evening of the 6th, to Lord Raglan—‘ I am nearly twenty ‘ leagues north-east of Baljik, separated from the ‘ English fleet, and from the part of my own convoy ‘ which was to sail with the convoy of the English ‘ fleet. Admiral Dundas’s last letter being worded ‘ conditionally, so far as concerns his sailing this ‘ morning, I am not sure of not seeing increased, in ‘ great proportions, the distance which separates me ‘ from you, and then there is reason to fear circum- ‘ stances of wind or sea which would render our ‘ junction difficult, and might compromise everything ‘ definitively. In this painful situation I decide to ‘ invite Admiral Hamelin (on his declaration that he ‘ cannot wait where he is) to return to meet the fleet ‘ and the convoy.’ So the Marshal sailed back. Thus, happily, ceased the impulse which had threatened to sunder the fleets.

C H A P.  
IX.Marshal  
St Arnaud  
at sea  
without  
the Eng-  
lish.His  
anxiety.He sails  
back.

Lord Raglan’s answer was stern. He removed the

C H A P.  
IX.

Lord  
Raglan's  
reproof.

grounds which the Marshal had assigned for his departure, and then pointed gravely to the true line of duty for the future. 'Thanks be to God,' he wrote, 'everything now favours our enterprise. Very soon 'we shall reach the appointed rendezvous, and then 'we shall have an opportunity of showing that our 'manner of acting together remains unaltered, and 'that the sincerity of which you speak will continue, 'as at present, to be our guide and our mutual satisfaction.' \*

Its good  
effect.

Coming from Lord Raglan, this language was a reproof; but the result tends to show that it was happily adjusted to the object in view. Thenceforth there was no longer any tendency on the part of Marshal St Arnaud to break away from his colleague. From the hour of the first conference at the Tuileries, in the spring of the year, Lord Raglan's authority in the Allied councils had been always increasing; and now, as we shall presently see, it gained a complete ascendant.

Lord  
Raglan's  
increasing  
ascend-  
ancy.

The whole  
Allied  
Armada  
comes  
together  
at sea.

On the 8th the great flotilla, moving under steam, came up with the French and the Turkish sailing fleets which had left Baljik on the 5th of September. The French fleet was in double column, and tacking to eastward across the bows of the steam flotilla; but upon being approached, the French ships backed topsails and lay-to. Every one of the French vessels had kept its position beautifully; and the moment the signal to lie-to was given, it was obeyed with a

\* Translated from the French, in which the letter was written.

quickness which was honestly admired by our sea-  
men. The Turkish fleet also lay-to, and for a  
while the whole armada of the Allies was gathered  
together. But the English fleet, being moved by  
steam, kept on to windward ; and presently the  
French and the Turks began to sail off on opposite  
tacks. Between the fleets thus disparting, the Eng-  
lish flotilla of transports passed through in five  
columns.

C H A P.  
IX.

But the  
fleets are  
again  
parted.

The rendezvous was to be at a point forty miles due west of Cape Tarkan, and thither moved the three fleets with all their convoy.

There were in the French army several officers holding high command, and being otherwise men of great weight, who had become very thoughtful on the subject of the contemplated descent upon the enemy's coast. Personally, they were men quite as dauntless as those who gave no care to the business in hand ; but being versed in the study, if not in the practice, of the great art of war, they had become strongly impressed with the hazardous character of the intended enterprise. It seems probable that, up to this time, they had relied upon the mature judgment and the supposed discreteness of Lord Raglan to prevent what they regarded as a rash attempt. It might well seem natural to them that two Governments in the West of Europe, attempting to dictate an invasion of a Russian province at a distance of 3000 miles, would, sooner or later, be checked in their project by the generals commanding the forces ; and, of course, they would have liked that the disfavour

Step taken  
by French  
officers  
with a  
view to  
stop the  
expedition  
against  
Sebasto-  
pol.

C H A P.  
IX.

which unjustly attaches to military prudence should fall upon the English General rather than upon themselves or their own commander. But in the course of the 7th of September it became known to them that Lord Raglan was already at sea. They then knew, or rather they then recognised the fact, that the whole armada was really gliding on towards the enemy's coast, and the ferment their minds underwent now brought them to take a strange step.

Lord Raglan was on board the *Caradoc*; and on the 8th of September, whilst the fleets lay near to one another, this vessel was boarded by Vice-Admiral Dundas. He came to say that a French steamer had conveyed to him the desire of the Marshal St Arnaud to see Lord Raglan and the Vice-Admiral Dundas, and to see them on board the *Ville de Paris*, because the Marshal himself was too ill to be able to move. It happened that the sea at this time was rough, and the naval men thought that it would be difficult for Lord Raglan, with his one arm, to get up the side of the three-decker in which the Marshal was sailing; Lord Raglan, therefore, deputed his military Secretary, Colonel Steele, to accompany Vice-Admiral Dundas on board the *Ville de Paris*.

Confer-  
ence on  
board the  
*Ville de*  
*Paris*.

St Arnaud  
disabled  
by illness.

The Vice-Admiral and Colonel Steele found the Marshal sitting up, but in a state of much suffering, and they were informed that he was very ill. He, however, sat at the conference; and the other persons present were—Admiral Hamelin, Admiral Bruat, Admiral Count Buat Wiliaumez, Colonel Trochu, General Rose, Vice-Admiral Dundas, and Colonel Steele. The

Marshal took no part in the discussion which ensued. It seems he could hardly speak. C H A P.  
IX.

It was stated that the meeting had been summoned in order that a paper might be read to it. The document bore no signature, and Marshal St Arnaud was no party to it ; but it was stated that it emanated from General Canrobert, General Martimprey, and the principal officers of the French artillery and engineers ; and it was said, too, that General Rose\* had furnished some of the materials from which it was composed. Unsigned  
papers  
read to  
the con-  
ference.

The document took it for granted that there were three places for landing which merited discussion—the Katcha, the Yetsa, and Kaffa ; and it then went on to show the advantages and the drawbacks which would attend an attempt to land at each of those three spots. The objections to the landing at the Katcha were stated with so much force as to show that the framers of the document entirely disapproved it ; and indeed they urged that any landing north of Sebastopol would be surely followed by disastrous results. The document also raised weighty objections to a descent upon the coast near the Yetsa. The only plan which was made to appear at all justifiable was that of a landing at

\* Now Sir Hugh Rose, the officer spoken of as Colonel Rose in Vol. I. He was at this time accredited as British Commissioner at the French headquarters. I have no reason for supposing that he intended to give any sanction to the step taken by the French remonstrants ; and I imagine that any materials which he may have put in their hands must have been confined to maps or statements showing the physical character of the country about to be invaded.



CHAP. Kaffa ; and although the difficulties attending even  
IX. that operation were placed in a strong light, it was orally stated that the framers of the document considered that plan to be one nearly free from objection.

Now Kaffa was a seaport in the eastern part of the Crimean peninsula, and divided from Sebastopol by many long marches over mountain-roads. The autumn had already come. The landing at Kaffa implied an abandonment, for that year at least, of all attempts against Sebastopol. It was to attack Sebastopol forthwith, and in the year 1854, that the great flotilla with all its precious freight had been gathered together ; and now, whilst the vast armada was moving towards the enemy's coast, there came from the men of weight and science in the French army this singular protest—for that is what it really was—against an enterprise already begun.

St Arnaud  
 leaves all  
 to Lord  
 Raglan.

Marshal St Arnaud was in a painful strait. Being, as he knew, without ascendancy in the French army, he apparently thought that the weight attaching to the combined opinion of all the protesting officers was too great to warrant him in meeting their interposition with reproof or inattention ; yet, suffering as he did at the time under bodily anguish, he was ill able to go into the discussions thus strangely forced on by the remonstrants. He found a solution. He desired Colonel Trochu to say that he would concur in any decision to which Lord Raglan might come.

The conference, therefore, was adjourned to the



Caradoc ; and Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were then present at it, together with all those who had met on board the *Ville de Paris*, except only Marshal St Arnaud.

C H A P.  
IX.

Confer-  
ence ad-  
joined  
to the  
Caradoc.

Thus, then, the ebullition of prudence which had broken out amongst the officers of the French army came under the arbitrament of the English General ; and with him, and with him only, it rested to determine the movements of the whole Allied force.

The business of the conference was opened by Colonel Trochu. This officer, as we have already seen, was supposed to be better acquainted than any one else with the mind of the French Emperor ; and his counsels, no longer bending in the direction of extreme caution, were now rather in favour of enterprise. The Colonel had possession of the document. He read it aloud ; and, as he went on with the perusal, he commented upon every point ; but he declared that he was no party to the contents of the paper, and that he did not share the anxieties\* either of the army or the navy as to the disasters which might be expected to follow from a landing on the coast to the north of Sebastopol.

Thereupon Admiral Bruat repudiated the supposition of his being a party to the apprehensions attributed to the Admirals. Lyons also repudiated it. Neither he nor Vice-Admiral Dundas had known before the conference that any such step as that of framing and presenting the remonstrance had been imagined by the French officers, and, as might be

\* 'Préoccupations.'

CHAP. IX. expected, they were both very sure that nothing of the kind had sprung from the British navy.

The inference which Lord Raglan drew from the document was, that it evinced ‘an indisposition to the expedition amongst the officers who are supposed to be looked up to and to exercise influence in the French army ;’ and, ‘in fact,’ said he, ‘we were told as much at the meeting here on Friday.’

These, then, were the ‘timid counsels’\* of which the French Emperor afterwards spoke when he ascribed the glory of overruling them to Marshal St Arnaud. If it was right, as most men will think it was, that these counsels should be overruled, there was merit due to St Arnaud ; but his merit lay, not in any personal resistance which he was able to oppose to his counsellors (for he was helpless, as we have seen, from bodily illness), but in the sagacity and good sense which had led him to intrust the decision to his English colleague.

Lord Raglan's way of dealing with the French remonstrants.

Lord Raglan's method of dealing with the protest of the French authorities was characteristic of himself and of the English nature. He did not much combat the objections set down in the paper, but he passed them by, and quietly lowered the debate from the high region of strategy to a question of humbler sort

\* ‘Timides avis.’ When this letter of the French Emperor first appeared, it was imagined that the imputation of giving ‘timid’ counsels was intended to be cast upon some of our Generals or Admirals ; but the Duke of Newcastle, with a becoming spirit, determined instantly that this should not be suffered to pass ; and the ‘Moniteur’ was afterwards made to explain officially that the ‘timides avis’ were attributed by the Emperor, not to any Englishman, but to some unnamed officers in the French service.

—a question as to what four steamers could be most conveniently employed for a reconnaissance on the enemy's coast. C H A P.  
IX.

So the conference which had been summoned to judge whether the enterprise against Sebastopol should not be brought to a stop, now found itself only deciding that the vessels sent on the reconnaissance should consist of one French steamer, together with the *Agamemnon*, the *Caradoc*, and the *Sampson*.

But, in truth, the powers of the conference had silently passed into the hands of one man. Thenceforth the protest was dropped ; for if its framers had risen up against the notion of being drawn on into what they thought a rash venture by the mere effect of M. St Arnaud's acquiescence, they were calmed when they came to know that the whole force at last had a leader. If still they held to their opinions, they did so in a spirit of cheerful deference, which prevented them from throwing any further obstacle in the way of the enterprise. The armada moved on. His now  
complete  
ascendant.

Again and again it has happened that mighty armaments, including the forces of several States and people of diverse races, have been gathered and drawn into scenes of conflict by the will of one man ; but, in general, when such things have been done, the compelling mind has been brought to its resolve by the cogency of satisfied reason or by force of selfish desire. What was new in this enterprise was, that he who inexorably forced it on did not of him- The use  
he makes  
of his  
power.

C H A P.  
LX.

self desire it, nor deem it to be wise, nor even in a high degree prudent; and the power which had strength to bend the whole armada to the purpose of the invasion was, not ambition inflamed, nor reason convinced, but the mere loyalty of an English officer refusing to stint the obedience which he owed to the Minister of his Queen.

The Eng-  
 lish fleet  
 at the  
 point of  
 rendez-  
 vous.

On the 9th, the whole of the English fleet with all its convoy was anchored in deep water at the appointed rendezvous, a spot forty miles west of Cape Tarkand.

Lord  
 Raglan in  
 person un-  
 dertakes a  
 reconnais-  
 sance of  
 the coast.

Lord Raglan made haste to use the great powers with which he was now invested, and he determined to reconnoitre the coast with his own eyes. At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, General Canrobert and the other French officers who were to attend the reconnaissance came on board the *Caradoc*. Lord Raglan had with him Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir John Burgoyne, and Sir George Brown. Not long after daybreak the *Caradoc* neared Fort Constantine, and then approached the entrance of the harbour. It was a fair, bright morning, and the Sunday bells were ringing in the churches when Lord Raglan first saw the great forts, and the ships, and the glittering, cupola'd town. Afterwards, the vessel being steered round off Cape Chersonesus, he could see two old Genoese forts, and ridges of hills dividing the great harbour from the southern coast of the peninsula. What he looked on was for him fated ground, for the Genoese forts marked the inlet of Balaclava, and the ridges he saw were the 'heights before

‘ Sebastopol.’ But the future lay hidden from his gaze. CHAP.  
IX.

The Caradoc was now steered towards the north, and the officers on board her surveyed the mouths of the Belbek, the Katcha, the Alma, and the Bulganak, and the coast stretching thence to Eupatoria. Of the sites thus reconnoitred, General Canrobert thought the Katcha the one best fitted for a landing. Lord Raglan entirely disapproved of the Katcha, and he did not at all like the ground at the mouths of the other rivers; but when, moving on in the Caradoc, he was off the part of the coast which lies six miles north of the Bulganak, he observed an extended tract of beach, which seemed to him to be the ground for which the Allies were seeking. Without generating a debate upon the subject, he nevertheless elicited so much of the opinion of those around him as he deemed to be useful. Then he declared his resolve. He said that the Allied armies should land at Old Fort.

He chooses  
the land-  
ing-place.

There are times when, to anxious, doubting mortals, no boon from Heaven is so welcome as the final resolve which is to govern their actions. It was so now. Debating ceased, and a happy alacrity came in its stead. That day our fleet and the swarming convoy close gathered around had been still lying anchored in deep water at the point of rendezvous. To many those long, peaceful Sabbath hours seemed to token a wanton delay, or worse than delay—some faltering in the great purpose of the Allies: but at night the Caradoc came in; and soon, though few could tell whence came the change, nor what had

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IX.

been passing, there flew from deck to deck a joyful belief—a belief that in some way—in some way not yet understood, the enterprise had gathered new force.

The French and Turkish fleets, less amply provided with steam-power than the English, had fallen to leeward; but on the evening of the 11th they were anchored within thirty miles of the British fleet, and the communication was of course kept up by steam-vessels.

The whole  
armada  
converging  
on  
the coast  
of the  
Crimea.

During the whole of Tuesday the 12th, the French, Turkish, and English fleets were slowly drawing together and converging upon the enemy's coast. Before sunset the armed navies were all near together, and from their decks men could make out with glasses the low cliff to the north of Eupatoria. The English fleet anchored for the night. The French Admiral sent to intimate that he would not anchor, but go on all night, in the hope of being ready for the landing the next morning. Vice-Admiral Dundas saw that that hope was vain, because large portions of the French convoy were still so distant that there could be no landing on the following day. The French, it will be remembered, were without steam-power for their transports, and the breezes were light. So, although every hour saw fresh clusters of vessels slowly closing with the fleet, the sea, towards the west, was always strewn with distant sails, and, before the hulls of those hove well in sight, the horizon got speckled again with sails more distant still. So the English Admiral anchored his fleet for the night.

The next morning, the 13th, the Ville de Paris,

under tow of the Napoleon steamer, had come up ; and although, so late as noon, some of the French ships of war, and very many of their transports, were still distant, they were under such breezes as promised to enable them to close before long with the fleets. So, virtually, the momentous voyage was over. The weather—and upon that, in such undertakings, the hopes of nations must rest—the weather had favoured the enterprise ; but the pest of modern armies had not relented. The cholera had followed the men into the transports, many sickened on board the troop-ships whilst they were still off Varna or Baljik, and were carried back to die on shore. During the voyage many more fell ill, and many died.

But Marshal St Arnaud, whose illness scarce three days before seemed bringing him fast to his end, was now almost suddenly restored, and on the morning of the 13th he was like a man in health. During the interval of five days, in which the Marshal's illness had invested his English colleague with a supreme control, Lord Raglan had used to the full the occasion which Fortune thus gave him. In that time he had repressed the efforts of the French Generals who strove to bring the enterprise to a stop ; he had committed the Allies to a descent upon the enemy's shores—on his shores to the north of Sebastopol ; he had reconnoitred the coast ; he had chosen the place for a landing ; and meanwhile he had drawn the fleets on, so that now, when men looked from the decks, they could see the thin strip of beach where the soldiery of the Allies were to land.

St Arnaud's sudden recovery.

The progress made by Lord Raglan during the Marshal's illness.



## CHAPTER X.

CHAP.  
X.

Our ignorance of  
the country and  
of the enemy's  
strength.

CONCERNING the country which they were going to invade the Allies were poorly informed. Of Sebastopol, the goal of the enterprise, they knew little, except that it was a great military port and arsenal, and was deemed impregnable towards the sea. Respecting the province generally, it was known, by means of books and maps, that Crim Tartary, or 'the Crimea,' as people now called it, was a peninsula situate between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof; and there was a theory—not perfectly coinciding with the truth—that the only dry communication with the mainland was by the Isthmus of Perekop. It was understood that the north of the peninsula had the character of an elevated steppe—that towards the south it was rocky and mountainous—and that the undulating downs which connected the steppe with the mountainous region of the south were seamed with small rivers flowing westward from the summits of the highland district.\* It was believed that the

\* A great body of most valuable information respecting the Crimea had been imparted to the English public by General (then Colonel) Mackintosh, and the Colonel had also addressed important reports on

main of the inhabitants were Tartars, men holding to the Moslem faith. Of the enemy's forces in this country, the Allies, in a sense, were ignorant; for although the information which had come round to them by the aid of the Foreign Office was in reality well founded, they did not believe at the time that they could at all rely upon it, and therefore they were nearly as much at fault as if they had had no clue. They knew, however, that the peninsula was a province of Russia—that Russia was a great military power—that, so long as three months ago, the invasion had been counselled in print—and that afterwards the determination to undertake it had been given out aloud to the world. From these rudiments, and from what could be seen from the decks of the ships, they inferred that, either upon their landing, or on some part of the road between the landing-ground and Sebastopol, they would find the enemy in strength.

But beyond this little was known; and the imagination of men was left to range so free that, although they were in the midst of their 'nineteenth century,' with all its prim facts and statistics, the enterprise took something of the character of adventure belonging to earlier ages. Common, sensible, fanciless men—men wise with the cynic wisdom of London clubs—were now by force turned into venturers, intent, as Argonauts of old, in gazing upon the shores of

C H A P.  
X.

This gives to the expedition the character of an adventure.

the same subject to the military authorities. What I intend to indicate in the text is, not that the means of knowledge were wanting, but that they had not been extensively taken advantage of.—*Note to 2d Edition.*

**C H A P.** X. a strange land to which they were committing their lives. From many a crowded deck they strained their eyes to pierce the unknown. They could not see troops. They saw a road along the shore: now and then there appeared a peasant with a cart; now and then a horseman riding at full speed. Neither peasant nor horseman seemed ever to pause in his duty that he might cast a glance of wonder at the countless armada which was gathering in upon his country. At the northern end of the bay there was a bright little town: maps showed that this was Eupatoria.

Occupation of  
Eupatoria.

At noon on the 13th the English fleet had drawn near to this port of Eupatoria. There were no Russian forces there except a few convalescent soldiers; and the place being defenceless, Colonel Trochu and Colonel Steele, accompanied by Mr Calvert the interpreter, were despatched to summon it. The governor or head man of the place was an official personage in a high state of discipline. He had before his eyes the armed navies of the Allies, with the countless sails of their convoys; and to all that vast armament he had nothing to oppose except the forms of office. But to him the forms of office seemed all-sufficing, and on these he still calmly relied; so, when the summons was delivered, he insisted upon fumigating it according to the health regulations of the little port. When he understood that the Western Powers intended to land, he said that decidedly they might do so; but he explained that it would be necessary for them to land at the


Lazzaretto, and consider themselves in strict quarantine. C H A P.  
X

On the following day the place was occupied by a small body of English troops. The few Russian inhabitants of the place, being mainly or entirely official personages, had all gone away, but the Tartar inhabitants remained ; and although these men did not exhibit, as some might have expected, any eager or zealous affection for the allies of the Caliph, they seemed inclined to be friendly. Thoughtful men cared deeply to know whether between these natives and the Allies the relation of buyer and seller could be established—for it was of vital moment to the success of the expedition that the Allies should be able to obtain supplies of cattle and forage in the invaded country ; and it was probable that much would turn upon the success of the first attempt to make purchases from the people of the country. The first experiment which was made in this direction elicited a curious proof of the difficulty which there is in causing mighty nations to act with the forethought of a single traveller. It was to be expected that, at the commencement of any attempted intercourse, the willingness of the natives to sell would depend upon their being tempted by the coins to which they were accustomed ; because just at first they would not only be ignorant of the value of foreign money, but would also dread the consequence of being found in possession of coin plainly received from the invaders. Yet the precaution of bringing Russian money had been forgotten by the public authorities ; and when

**C H A P.** **X.** Mr Hamilton of the *Britannia* was preparing to land, with a view of endeavouring to begin a buying-and-selling intercourse with the natives, he had nothing to offer except English sovereigns. It chanced, however, that there were two or three English travellers on board the flag-ship, and that these men (foreseeing the likelihood of their having to buy horses or make other purchases from the natives of the invaded country) had supplied themselves with some of the gold Russian coins called 'half-imperials,' which were to be obtained without difficulty at Constantinople. The travellers — Sir Edward Colebrooke, I think, was one of them — advanced as many of these as they could spare to the public authorities ; and Mr Hamilton being thus enabled to land with a small supply of the magic half-imperials, and being, besides, a good-tempered, humorous man, with a tendency to make cordial speeches in English to all his fellow-creatures alike, whether Russian, or Tartar, or Greek, he was able to make a merry beginning of that intercourse with the natives which was destined to become a fruitful source of strength to the Allied armies. The gains made by the first sellers soon drew fresh supplies into the place from the surrounding country ; the commissariat afterwards began its operations in the town, and in time a good lasting market was opened to the invaders.

The whole  
armada  
gathers  
towards

After receiving the surrender of Eupatoria on the afternoon of the 13th, the assembled armada moved down towards the south. All day there were sailing-



vessels approaching from a distance, and closing at last with the French fleet; but before night (with the exception, it is believed, of two or three small lagging transports) the three fleets, and the host of vessels which they convoyed, were anchored near Old Fort in Kalamita Bay. The united armada extended in a line parallel with the coast, and in a direction, therefore, not far from north and south. The French and the Turkish fleets were on the south or right-hand side; the British fleet took the north, and formed the left of the Allied line.

C H A P.  
X.  
the chosen  
landing-  
place.

## CHAPTER XI.

**C H A P.** **XI.** **The land-  
ing-place.** THE ground chosen by Lord Raglan for the landing of all the Allied forces is five or six miles north of the Bulganak River. It gained its name of 'Old Fort' from an indication appearing on the maps, rather than from any slight traces of the structure then remaining. Along this part of the coast the cliffs rise to a height of from 60 to 100 feet, and for the most part they impend too closely over the sea to allow much room for the beach. Near 'Old Fort,' however, the high grounds so recede that at first sight they appear to embrace a small bay or inlet of the sea, but upon a nearer approach it is perceived that the inner part of the seeming bay is a salt-water lake, and that this lake is divided from the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach. A little further north the same disposition of land and water recurs; for there, also, another salt lake, called the Lake of Kamishlu, is divided from the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach a mile and a half in length. The first-mentioned strip of beach—namely, the strip opposite to Old Fort—was the one which Lord Raglan had chosen for the landing of all the Allied armies.


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- A. B. The ground chosen for the landing place of the allied armies
- C. The spot where the buoy was to be
- D. The spot where during the night the French placed the buoy
- E. F. The ground where the English landed.

The landing places  
of the Allies



It was arranged that a buoy should be placed off the centre of the chosen ground to mark the boundary between the French and the English flotilla.\* The French and the Turkish vessels were to be on the south of the buoy, the British on the north; and in the evening and night of the 13th the ships and transports of the three nations drew in as near as they could to their appointed landing-places.

But in the night of the 13th there occurred a transaction which threatened to ruin the whole plan for the landing, and even to bring the harmony between the French and the English forces into grievous jeopardy. During the darkness, the French placed the buoy opposite, not to the centre, but to the extreme north of the chosen landing-ground;† and when morning dawned, it appeared that the English ships and transports, though really in their proper places, were on the wrong side of the buoy—or rather, that the buoy was on the wrong side of them. Whether the act which created this embarrassment was one resulting from sheer mistake on the part of our allies, or from their over-greediness for space, or from a scheme more profoundly designed, it plainly went straight towards the end desired by

Step taken  
by the  
French in  
the night.

\* Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain, thought proper to write a letter to a newspaper on the 18th of March 1863, saying, 'It might suffice for me simply to say that I remember nothing about 'a buoy;' but on the 5th of the following April he did me the honour to address a letter to me, in which he said, 'It would seem there was a buoy.' See the correspondence on the subject in the Appendix.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† See the extract from Lord Raglan's private letter on this subject, which is given in the next foot-note.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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This de-  
 destroys the  
 whole plan  
 of the  
 landing.

those French officers who had been labouring to bring the enterprise to a stop. For what was to be done? If the English, disregarding the altered position of the buoy, were to persist in keeping to their assigned landing-ground, their whole flotilla, their boats and their troops, when landed, would be hopelessly mixed up with the French; and what might be expected to follow would be ruinous confusion—nay even, perhaps, angry and violent conflict between the forces of the Allies. To propose to move the buoy, or to get into controversy with the French at such a time, would be to delay and imperil the whole undertaking; and yet the boundary, as it stood, extruded the English from all share in the chosen landing-ground. It might seem that the whole enterprise was again in danger of failure, but again a strong will interposed.

Sir Ed-  
 mund  
 Lyons.

From the moment when Lord Raglan consented to undertake the invasion, he seems to have acted as though he felt that the belief which he entertained of its hazardousness was a reason why he should be the more steadfast in his determination to force it on. Nor was he without the very counsel that was needed for overcoming this last obstacle. Lyons, commanding the in-shore squadron of the British fleet, was intrusted with the direction of our transports and the whole management of the landing. Moving long before dawn in the sleepless *Agamemnon*, he saw where the buoy had been placed by the French in the night-time, and gathered in an instant all the perilous import of the change. He was more than a

His way  
 of dealing  
 with the  
 emer-  
 gency.

mere performer of duty, for he was a man driving under a passionate force of purpose. Without stopping to indulge his anger, he darted upon the means of dealing with the evil. He had observed that about a mile to the north of 'Old Fort' there was that strip of beach, before spoken of, which divided the Lake of Kamishlu from the sea. There Lord Raglan and he now determined that the landing of the British forces should take place.\* It was true that this plan

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New landing-place found for the English at Kamishlu.

\* The conductors of the 'Times' newspaper took upon themselves to deny the truth of my statement about the buoy, and this so confidently, that they permitted their print to sum up and say, 'In short, the whole story is a sick man's dream.' Since this denial was uttered so confidently by a respectable newspaper, and was supported (during a period of more than a fortnight) by the testimony of Captain Mends, it seems right to give an extract from the private letter in which Lord Raglan narrates the facts to the Duke of Newcastle:—

Extract from Lord Raglan's Narrative of the Landing, addressed as a Private Communication to the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of War, and dated 'Camp above Old Fort Bay, September 18, '1854.'

'The disembarkation of both armies commenced on the morning of the 14th.

'It had been settled that the landing should be effected in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed in the centre of it to mark the left of the French and the right of the English; but when the Agamemnon came upon the buoy at daylight, Sir Edmund Lyons found that the French naval officer had deposited it on the extreme northern end, and had thus engrossed the whole of the bay for the operation of his own army. This occasioned considerable confusion and delay, the English convoy having followed closely upon the steps of their leader, and got mixed with the French transports; but Sir Edmund Lyons wisely resolved to make the best of it, and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next to the northward.'

I may add that all the many accounts which I have seen of the movements and counter-movements of the ships and the transports on the early morning of the 14th of September tally perfectly with the above statement by Lord Raglan. In saying this, I include Captain Mends's letter to the newspaper. See the Appendix. It will be seen that the

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would sever the French from the British forces during the operation of landing, but the evil thus encountered was a hundred-fold less grave than the evil avoided—for, even in the face of an enemy, the separation of the French from the English would have been better than dispute or confusion; and, moreover, the observations of the previous day had led the Allies to conjecture that the enemy did not intend to resist the landing. The morning showed that this conjecture was sound: therefore, great as was the danger from which the Alliance had been delivered, it turned out in the result that the immense advantage of having two extended landing-places instead of one, was not counterbalanced by any evil resulting from the severance of the two armies.

In point of security from molestation on the part of the enemy, both of the two landing-places were happily chosen. Both of them were on shores which allowed the near approach of the fleets, and placed the whole operation under cover of their guns. Also both landing-places were protected on the inland side by the salt lakes, which interposed a physical obstacle in the way of any front attack by the enemy; and

facts which he describes in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that letter are exactly those which would naturally result from the discovery and the change of plan which Lord Raglan communicates to the Minister of War.

I may add that Sir George Brown was on board the *Agamemnon*; that he was personally cognisant of the change which Lord Raglan described; that many years ago he recorded what occurred in language tallying perfectly with Lord Raglan's account; and, finally, that he (Sir George Brown) is still alive.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

the access to the flanks of the disembarking armies was by strips of land so narrow that they could be easily defended against any force of infantry or cavalry. It is true that the line of disembarkation of either army could have been enfiladed by artillery placed on the heights ; but then those heights could be more or less searched by a fire from the ships ; and the enemy had not attempted to prepare for himself any kind of defence on the high ground.

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The necessity of having to carry the English flotilla to a new landing-place occasioned, of course, a painful dislocation of the arrangements which had already been acted upon by the commanders of the transports ; but after much less delay and much less confusion than might have been expected to result from a derangement so great and so sudden, the position of the English vessels was adapted to the change.

Position  
of the  
English  
flotilla  
adapted  
to the  
change.

Meanwhile, few of the thousands on board understood the change which had been effected,\* or even saw that they were brought to a new landing-ground. They imagined that it was the better method or greater quickness of the French which was giving them the triumph of being the first to land. Both Lord Raglan and Lyons were too steadfast in the maintenance of the alliance to think of accounting for the seeming tardiness of the English by causing the truth to be known ; and even to this day it is com-

The cause  
and the  
nature of  
the change  
kept  
secret.

\* In this number was Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain. See his letter to the newspaper in the Appendix.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P. monly believed that the English army effected its  
XL landing at Old Fort.

Position  
 of the  
 in-shore  
 squadrons.

Of the  
 main Eng-  
 lish fleet.

The bend of the coast-line at Kalamita Bay is of such a character that a spectator on board a vessel close in-shore is bounded in his view of the sea towards the south by the headland near the Alma ; but if he stands a little way out to sea, the coast opens, and he then commands an unobstructed view home to the entrance of the Sebastopol harbour. So, whilst the in-shore squadrons approached the beach so closely as to be able to cover the landing, the bulk of the English fleet, commanded by Dundas in person, lay far enough out to be able to command the whole of the vast bay from Eupatoria to Sebastopol, keeping up an unbroken chain of communication from cape to cape, and always held ready to engage the Russian fleet if by chance it should come out and give battle.\* Detached vessels reconnoitred the coast, and practised their gunners upon every encampment or gathering of troops which seemed to be within range. As though in the arrogant yet quiet assertion of an ascendant beyond dispute, one solitary English ship, watching off the Sebastopol harbour, stood sentry over the enemy's fleet. Men had heard of the dominion of the seas—now they saw it.

\* It has been already explained that the French men-of-war were doing duty as transports, and were not therefore in a condition to engage the enemy. There were people who thoughtlessly blamed Dundas for not taking part with the in-shore squadron in the bustle of the landing. Of course his duty was to hold his off-shore squadron in readiness for an engagement with the Sebastopol fleet ; and this he took care to do.

The plan of the English disembarkation was imitated from the one adopted by Sir Ralph Abercromby when he made his famous descent upon the coast of Egypt; and it was based upon the principle of so ranging the transports and the boats as that the relative position of each company, whilst it was being rowed towards the shore, should correspond with that which it would have to take when formed upon the beach.\*

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Plan  
of the  
landing.

All the naval arrangements for the landing were undertaken by Sir Edmund Lyons; but to dispose the troops on the beach—to gain a lodgment—to take up a position, and, if necessary, to intrench it—these were duties which specially devolved upon the Quartermaster-General. The officer who held this post was General Airey; and since it was his fate to take a grave part in the business of the war, and to share with Lord Raglan his closest counsels, it seems useful to speak here at once, not of the quality of his mind (for that will best be judged by looking to what he did, and what he omitted to do), but rather to speak of those circumstances of his life, and those outer signs and marks of his nature, which any bystander in the camp would be likely to hear of or see.

General  
Airey.

A strictly military career in peace-time is a poor schooling for the business of war; and the rough change which had once broken in upon Airey's professional life helped to make him more able in war than

\* The plans and the papers of instructions for the landing will perhaps be given in the Appendix; but I abstain from giving a detailed account of the operation, because it was not resisted by the enemy.



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XL men who had passed all their lives in going round and round with the wheels. Airey was holding one of the offices at the Horse Guards when he was suddenly called upon by his relative Colonel Talbot, the then almost famous recluse of Upper Canada, to choose whether he and his young wife would accept a great territorial inheritance, with the condition of dwelling deep in the forest, far away from all cities and towns. Airey loved his profession, and what made it the more difficult for him to quit it was the favour with which he was looked upon by the Duke of Wellington. It chanced that he had once been called upon to lay before the Duke the maps and statements required for showing the progress of a campaign then going on against the Caffres ; and the Duke was so delighted with the perfect clearness of the view which Airey was able to impart to him, that he instantly formed a high opinion of an officer who could look with so keen a glance upon a distant campaign and convey a lucid idea of it to his chief. Airey communicated to the Duke of Wellington Colonel Talbot's proposal, and explained the dilemma in which he was placed. 'You must go,' said the Duke ; 'of course you must go—it is your duty to go ; but we will manage so that whenever you choose you shall be able to come back to us.' Airey went to Canada. It had been no part of Colonel Talbot's plan to smooth the path of his chosen inheritor. He gave him a vast territory—he gave him no home.

Isolated in the midst of the forest, and with no

better shelter than a log-hut half-built, the staff-officer, hitherto expert in the prim traditions of the Horse Guards, now found himself so circumstanced that the health, nay, the very life of those most dear to him, was made to depend upon his power to become a good labourer. He could not have hoped to keep his English servants a day if he had begun by sitting still himself and ordering them to do the rough work to which they were unaccustomed ; so he worked with his own hands, in the faith that his example would make every kind of hard work seem honourable to his people ; and being endued with an almost violent love of bodily exertion, he was not only equal to this new life, but came to delight in it. Clad coarsely during the day, he was only to be distinguished from the other workmen by his greater activity and greater power of endurance. Many English gentlemen have done the like of this, but commonly they have ended by becoming altogether just that which they seemed in their working hours—by becoming, in short, mere husbandmen. It was not so with Airey. When his people came to speak to him in the evening, they always found him transformed. Partly by the subtle change which they were able to see in his manner, partly even by so outward a thing as the rigorous change in his dress, but most of all perhaps by his natural ascendant, they were prevented from forgetting that their fellow-labourer of the morning was their master—a master to whom they were every day growing more and more attached, but still their mas-

CHAPTER XI. ter. He therefore maintained his station. He did more: he gained great authority over the people about him; and when he bade farewell to the wilderness, he had become like a chief of old times—a man working hard with his own hands, yet ruling others with a firm command.

It was during a period of some years\* that Airey had thus wrestled with the hardships of forest life. At the end of that time Colonel Talbot died; and Airey, then† coming home to England, resumed his military career. Those who know anything of the real business of war will easily believe that this episode in the life of General Airey was more likely to fit him for the exigencies of a campaign and for the command of men than thrice the same length of time consumed in the revolving labours of a military department; nay, perhaps they will think that, next to a campaign, this manful struggle with the wilderness was the very work which would be the most sure to set a mind free from the habits, the bylaws, and the petty regulations of office.

Before the expedition left England, Lord Raglan had asked Airey to be his Quartermaster-General. Airey, preferring field duty with the divisions, had begged that some other might be appointed, and Lord Raglan acceded to his wish; but when, on the eve of the departure of the expedition from Varna, Lord De Ros returned to England,‡ the Quartermaster-

\* From 1847 to 1851, I believe.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† No; some months before.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ Lord De Ros went home on account of ill-health. He was so ill that he had to be carried on board.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

Generalship was again pressed upon Airey in terms which made it unbecoming for him to refuse the burthen. His loyalty and affectionate devotion to Lord Raglan were without bounds ; and he imagined that he was always acting with a strict deference to the wishes of his chief. But then Airey was a man of great ardour, of a strong will : and having also a rapid, decisive judgment, he certainly accustomed himself to put very swift constructions upon Lord Raglan's words. No one ever used to see him in the pain of suspense between two opinions. Either he really knew with minuteness Lord Raglan's views, or else he was so prone to take a great deal upon himself, that in his zeal for the public service he might almost be called unscrupulous. Men who were hesitating and trying to make out what was the path of their duty, soon came to know that Airey was the officer who would thrust away their doubts for them ; because, rightly or wrongly, whether with or without due authority, he used to speak in such a way as to untie or to cut every knot.\* He was himself, it would seem, unconscious of exercising so much power as he really did ; but it is certain enough that those who complained of his ascendancy were not very wrong in believing that he held a great sway ; for though, being guileless and single-hearted, he always liked to receive his first impulsions from the chief, yet, when once he was thus set moving, his strong will used to

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\* An illustration of this way of his (which was supplied to me after the publication of the 3d Edition) will be found in the note at the foot of p. 196.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P. burst into action with all its own proper force, and  
XI. very much, too, in its own direction.

Notwithstanding this proneness to action, his manner had all the repose which is thought to be a sign of power. He did not, in general, speak at all until he could speak decisively ; and he was more accustomed than most other Englishmen are to use that degree of precision and completeness of language which makes men content to act on it. Officers hesitating in the pain of suspense used to long to hear the tramp of his coming—used to long to catch sight of his eager, swooping crest (it was always strained forward and intent)—his keen, salient, sharp-edged features—his firm, steady eye—for they knew that he was the man who would release them from their doubts. He was gifted by nature with the kind of eloquence that it is good for a soldier to have. His oral directions to those in authority under him were models of imperative diction ; but when he spoke of what he had seen, the vivid pictures he drew were marked with a sharpness of outline hardly consistent with a perfect freedom from exaggeration—they wanted the true English haze. He was too eager for action to be able to stand still weighing phrases ; and I imagine that he did not even know how to try the exact strength and import of words in the way that a lettered man does. Upon the whole, his qualities were of such a kind as to make it impossible for him to be without great weight in the army. His friends would call him a man plainly fitted for high command—his adversaries

would say that power in his hands was likely to be used dangerously ; but all would alike agree that, whether for good or whether for evil, he had from nature the means of impressing his own will on troops.

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XL

The arrangements of the French were like those of the English ; and at half-past eight o'clock on the morning of the 14th of September 1854, their first boat touched the shore. The English had made such good haste to retrieve the time spent in moving to their new landing-place, that very soon afterwards their disembarkation began.

The first  
day's  
landing.

The morning was fine ; the sea nearly smooth. The troops of the Light Division were in the boats, and the seamen were at their oars, expecting the signal. The signal was given, and instantly, from along the whole of the first line of transports, an array of boats freighted with troops—boats ranged upon a front of more than a mile—darted swiftly towards the shore. It was said that the boat commanded by Vesey of the *Britannia* was the first to touch the beach.\* He was an officer who would do all man could to be foremost.

\* The question as to which of the English boats was the first to land has excited more interest than it apparently deserves ; for the landing did not take place in face of the enemy. Perhaps one of the causes which led men to look at the question with something more than mere curiosity, was the surprise of finding that, notwithstanding all the charges of want of zeal which had been brought against Admiral Dundas, a boat from his flag-ship (the *Britannia*) was said, after all, to have been the first to land.

According to one opinion, Captain Dacres, with the gig of the *Semipareil*, was the first to reach the shore ; and there are antecedent reasons for supposing that this would be likely to be the case ; for,

C H A P.  
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As soon as the boats had landed, the soldiers stepped ashore, and began to form line upon the beach ; but presently afterwards they piled arms. There were some Tartar peasants passing along the coast-road with small bullock-waggon. The waggoners showed little or no alarm, and, knowing that they could not move off quickly with bullocks, they did not attempt to get away. Apparently they were not struck with any sense of unfairness when they saw that the English took possession of the waggons ; and yet it could scarcely have been explained to them at that moment (as it afterwards would be) that everything taken by the English from private owners would be

besides that Captain Dacres was (as the work of that and the four following days showed) an officer of great zeal and ability, he had been intrusted with the naval command on the beach (he was beach-master), and would of course be anxious to reach the shore as soon as possible. It seems that there got to be, as it were, a kind of race between the Britannia boat and the gig of the Sanspareil, and a race, too, which was a very close one ; for although the Britannia boat, laden with troops, could not match its speed with the gig, it had a start just long enough to make up for the superior swiftness of its rival. Captain Dacres never doubted that he, with the gig of the Sanspareil, was the first to land ; but among those who were on board the Britannia boat (and I speak now of soldiers as well as sailors) the belief was that that was the boat which won.

On both sides the statements are positive, and on one side they are also circumstantial. They are also rather interesting ; and I would have given them here, if it were not that I am unwilling to place men in an attitude of direct conflict with one another upon an unimportant matter of fact.

If Vesey, with the Britannia boat, was the first to land, Colonel Lysons of the 23d Fusiliers must have been the first man of the land service who touched the shore. If, on the other hand, Dacres, with the gig of the Sanspareil, landed first, Sir George Brown, I think, must have been the first English officer of the land service who reached the shore of the Crimea.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

paid for at a just price. One of the waggons was laden with small pears, and the soldiers amused themselves with the fruit whilst the natives stood and scanned their invaders. C H A P.  
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After a while, many of the battalions which had landed were ordered forward to occupy the hill on our right; and thenceforth, during all the day, the acclivity was sparkling with the bayonets of the columns successively ascending it. But what were those long strings of soldiery now beginning to come down from the hill-side and to wind their way back towards the beach; and what were the long white burthens horizontally carried by the men? Already? already, on this same day? Yes; sickness still clung to the army. Of those who only this morning ascended the hill with seeming alacrity, many now came down thus sadly borne by their comrades. They were carried on ambulance-stretchers, and a blanket was over them. Those whose faces remained uncovered were still alive. Those whose faces had been covered over by their blanket were dead. Near the foot of the hill the men began to dig graves.

But meanwhile the landing went merrily on. It might be computed that, if every man in the navy had only performed his strict duty, the landing would have taken some weeks. It was the supererogation, the zeal, the abounding zeal, which seemed to achieve the work. No sailor seemed to work like a man who was merely obeying—no officer stood looking on as if he were merely commanding; and though

Zeal and  
energy  
of the  
sailors.





CHAP  
 XI.

all was concert and discipline, yet every man was labouring with the whole strength of his own separate will.\* And all this great toil went on with strange good-humour—nay, even with thoughtful kindness towards the soldiers. The seamen knew that it concerned the comfort and the health of the soldiers to be landed dry, so they lifted or handed the men ashore with an almost tender care: yet not without mirth—nay, not without laughter far heard—when, as though they were giant maidens, the tall Highlanders of the 42d placed their hands in the hands of the sailor and sprang by his aid to the shore, their kilts floating out wide while they leapt.

After mid-day the sea began to lose its calmness, and before sunset the surf was strong enough to make the disembarkation difficult, and in some degree hazardous. Yet, by the time the day closed, the French had landed their 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry, together with eighteen guns; and the English had got on shore all their infantry divisions, and some part of their field-artillery.

\* When it is seen that I conceive myself warranted in applying this language to the exertions of the navy at the time of the landing, it may be asked whether there was not some one man who had the merit of giving a right direction to the zeal and energy of the seamen thus toiling on the beach? There was. The officer who commanded on the beach was Captain Dacres; and I believe one might safely echo the words of him who once said to Captain Dacres, ‘The 14th of September *was your day.*’ Both Dundas and Lyons were doing all that was right; but, so far as concerns the vast operation going on upon the beach, their wisdom lay in the wise trustfulness with which they committed the business to a fit man, and then left him alone, undisturbed and unfretted by orders. I believe that during the four days and four nights which followed the commencement of the landing, Captain Dacres never received any orders from Sir Edmund Lyons.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

Some few of the English regiments remained on the beach, but the rest of them had been marched up to the high grounds towards the south, and they there bivouacked. At night there fell heavy rain, and it lasted many hours. The men were without their tents.\* Lying in wet pools or in mud, their blankets clinging heavy with water, our young soldiers began the campaign. The French soldiery were provided with what they call dog-tents—tents not a yard high, but easily carried, and yielding shelter to soldiers creeping into them. It was always a question in the French army whether these tents gave the men more health and comfort than they could find in the open air.

C H A P.  
XI.Wet  
night's  
bivouac.

The next morning was fine, but the surf had so much increased that for several hours the landing was suspended. After the middle of the day it became practicable, though still somewhat difficult, to go on with the work ; and great efforts were made to land the English cavalry and the rest of the artillery, with the appertaining horses and equipages.

Continu-  
ance of the  
landing ;

Unless a man has stood in the admiring crowd which gathers to see the process of landing one horse upon an open sea-shore ; and unless, whilst he carries in his mind the labour and energy brought to bear upon this single object, he can imagine the same toil gone through again and again and yet again, till it has been repeated many hundreds of times, upon a

\* This was because there were no sufficing means of land-transport for conveying the camp equipage towards Sebastopol. After the 14th the tents were landed, but they were afterwards reshipped.

C H A P.  
 XI.

mile and a half of beach, he will hardly know what work must be done before a general can report to his Government that he has landed upon an open coast, with a thousand cavalry and sixty guns ready for the field. By labour never once intermitted (except when darkness or the state of the sea forbade it), and continued from the morning of the 14th until the evening of the 18th, the whole of the English land-force, which had been embarked at Varna (together now with Cathcart's Division), was safely landed upon the enemy's coast.

Its com-  
 pletion ;

The result then was, that under circumstances of weather which were, upon the whole, favourable, and with the advantage of encountering no opposition from the enemy, an English force of some 26,000 infantry and artillerymen, with more than a thousand mounted cavalry, and sixty guns, had been landed in the course of five September days ; and although the force thus put ashore was without those vast means of land-transport which would be needed for regular operations in the interior, and was obliged to rely upon the attendant fleet for the continuance of its supplies, it was nevertheless so provided as to be able to move along the coast carrying with it its first reserve of ammunition, and food enough for three days.

by the  
 English ;

The operation was conducted with an almost faultless skill, and (until a firm lodgment had been gained) it proceeded in the way that was thought to be the right one for landing in the face of the enemy. Though the surf was at times somewhat heavy, not a man was lost.

With the French, who had no cavalry, and a scanty supply of artillery-horses, the disembarkation was a comparatively easy task ; and if they had so desired it, the French might have been ready to march long before the English ; but, knowing that their allies, having cavalry, would necessarily take a good deal of time, they were without a motive for hurrying ; and during the whole of the five days which the English took for their disembarkation, a like work was seen going on at the French landing-place.

C H A P.  
XI.by the  
French ;

The Turks did the work of landing very well ; and, indeed, they quickly showed that they had an advantage over the French and the English in their more familiar acquaintance with the mode of life proper to warfare. They landed their camp equipage ; for, with them, the carriage of tents is a very simple business. Two soldiers, one at each end, bear the pole of a tent between them, and the canvass is carried by others in turns. So early as the 15th, the first day after that on which the landing began, the Turks were comfortably encamped on the ground assigned to them ; and whilst the young troops of France and England were still sitting wretched and chilled by the wet of their night's bivouac, the warlike Osmanlies seemed to be in their natural home. Soliman, who commanded them, was able to welcome and honour the guests who went to visit him in his tent as hospitably as though he were in the audience-hall of his own pashalic. He had all his tents well pitched ; and his men, one could see, were still a true Moslem soldiery—men with arms and accoutrements

by the  
Turks.

**C H A P.**  
**XI.**  
bright, yet not forgetful of prayer. He had a supply of biscuit and of cartridges, and a good stock of horses, some feeding, some saddled and ready for instant use. He was not without coffee and tobacco. His whole camp gave signs of a race which gathers from a great tradition, going on from father to son, the duties and the simple arts of a pious and warfaring life.

## CHAPTER XII.

WHEN the people of the neighbouring district came to see the strength of the armies descending upon their coast, the head men of villages began to present themselves at the quarters of the Allies. The first of these deputations was received by Lord Raglan in the open air. The men were going up to headquarters when they passed near a group of officers on foot in blue frock-coats, and they learned that the one whose maimed arm spoke of other wars was the English General. They approached him respectfully, but without submissiveness of an abject kind. Neither in manner, dress, appearance, nor language, would these men seem very strange to a traveller acquainted with Constantinople or any of the other cities of the Levant. They wore the pelisse or long robe, and although their head-gear was of black lamb-skin, it was much of the same shape as the Turkish fez. They spoke with truthfulness and dignity, allowing it to appear that the invasion was not distasteful to them, but abstaining from all affectation of enthusiastic sympathy. They seemed to understand war and its exigencies ; for they asked the interpreters to say

C H A P.  
XII.

Deputations from the Tartar villages to the English headquarters.

**C H A P.** that such of their possessions as might be wanted by  
**XII.** the English army were at Lord Raglan's disposal. Pleased with the demeanour of the men, as well as with the purport of their speech, Lord Raglan told them that he would avail himself of some of their possessions, more especially their waggons and draught animals, but that everything taken for the use of the English army would be paid for at a proper rate. Much to Lord Raglan's surprise (for he was not accustomed to the people of the East), the head man of the village resisted the idea of the people being paid, and anxiously pressed the interpreter to say that their possessions were yielded up as free gifts.

Result of  
exploring  
expedi-  
tions.

Pure ignorance of the invaded country gave charm to every discovery tending to throw light upon the character and pursuits of the inhabitants ; and if our soldiery had found in the villages high altars set up for human sacrifices, they would scarcely have been more surprised than they were when, prying into the mysteries of this obscure Crim Tartary, they came upon traces of modern refinement and cultivated taste. In some of the houses at Kentugan there were pianos ; and in one of them a music-book, lying open and spread upon the frame, seemed to show that the owner had been hurried in her flight. But the owners of these dwellings must have been official personages. The mass of the country people were Tartars.

In the villages there was abundance of agricultural wealth. The main want of the country was water ; but Airey caused wells to be sunk.

The English system of payment for supplies rapidly began to bear its usual fruit, and the districts from which the people came in to barter with us were every day extending.

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In their passage across the Euxine our battalions had not yet been followed by that evil horde who are accustomed to cling to an army, selling strong, noxious drinks to the men. Therefore our army was without crime.\* It was with something more than mercy, it was with kindness and gentle courtesy, that the people of the villages were treated by our soldiery; and the interpreters had to strain the resources of the English tongue in order to convey a faint apprehension of the figures of speech in which the women were expressing their gratitude. Their chief favourites, it seems, were the men of the Rifle Brigade. Quartered for a day or two in one of the villages, these soldiers made up for the want of a common tongue by acts of kindness. They helped the women in their household work; and the women, pleased and proud, made signs to the stately 'Rifles' to do this and do that, exulting in the obedience which they were able to win from men so grand and comely. When the interpreter came, and was asked to construe what the women were saying so fast and so eagerly, it appeared that they were busy with similes and metaphors, and that the Rifles were made out to be heroes more strong than lions, more gentle than young lambs.

The English army  
—its absolute freedom from crime.

Kindly intercourse between our soldiery and the villagers.

A dreadful change came over that village: the

\* This statement, broad as it looks, is meant to be taken literally, and to be regarded as a statement taken from the right official source.



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Outrages  
perpe-  
trated  
by the  
Zouaves.

The duty  
of sweep-  
ing the  
country  
for sup-  
plies.

Rifles were withdrawn — the Zouaves marched in. There followed spoliation, outrage, horrible cruelty. When those tidings came to Lord Raglan, he was standing on the shore with several of his people about him. He turned scarlet with shame and anger. The yoke of the alliance had wrung him.

In general, it would fall within the duty of light horse to sweep the face of the invaded territory and bring in supplies ; but the French were without cavalry ; and although the body of horse which we had landed was called ‘the Light Brigade,’ the Lancers, the Hussars, and the Light Dragoons of which it consisted, were not of such a weight and quality, and were not so practised in foraging, as to be all at once well fitted for this kind of service. Besides, it was plain that, in advancing through the enemy’s country, the power of the invaders would have to be measured by the arm in which they were weakest, and a material loss in our small, brilliant force of cavalry might bring ruin upon the whole expedition. There was the Commissariat. The officers of that department were gentlemen taken from a branch of the Treasury ; and although they could make requisitions on the military authorities with more or less hope of a result, they had no force of their own with which to act. The regimental officers were of course busied with their respective corps. Yet it was certain that the power of operating effectively with the English army would depend upon its obtaining a large addition to its existing means of land-transport. In the result, it was the chief of one

of the business departments of our Headquarter Staff who pressed forward into the gap, and succeeded in achieving the work upon which, in a great degree, the fate of the campaign seemed likely to hinge.

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From the first General Airey had seen that the mere inert presence of armies in an invaded province is a thing very short of conquest. Conquest, he knew, must generally rest upon the success with which supplies can be drawn from the invaded province; and he never forgot that, unless the country could be made to yield means of land-carriage, the Allies would have to creep timidly along the shore, tethered fast by the short string of carts with which they had come provided; therefore, even within a few minutes from the time when the landing began, he was already striving to gain—not the mere occupation of the soil—not the mere licence for the troops to stand or lie down on the ground—but that hold, that military grasp of the country which would make it help to sustain the invasion. When only a few battalions of the Light Division had landed, and were beginning to form on the beach, he rode\* up to the high ground on our right, and there, at some distance, he caught sight of a long string of waggons, escorted by a body of Cossacks. Instantly, he rode\* back to the beach,†

Airey's quick perception of the need to get means of land-transport.

His seizure of a convoy.

\* General Airey's duties as Quartermaster-General made it necessary that his charger should be landed at the earliest possible moment, but I am not quite certain whether he was on horseback when this incident occurred. My impression was that he was already in his saddle, but, according to Colonel Lysons's recollection, he was on foot.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Or rather to the ridge which overlooked it, for it was there that

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got Colonel Lysons to give him two companies\* of the 23d Fusiliers, and with these advanced quickly in skirmishing order. The Cossacks tried hard to save the convoy by using the points of their lances against the bullocks, and even against the drivers ; but, the Fusiliers advancing and beginning to open fire, the Cossacks at length retreated, leaving Airey in possession of just that kind of prize which the army most needed—a prize of some seventy or eighty waggons, with their oxen and drivers complete.†

Colonel (then Major) Lysons was standing with a company of the 23d Fusiliers in extended order.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* Only one company, it seems.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† After the publication of the 3d Edition, I received from Colonel Lysons a more detailed narrative of this incident than is given in the text. He says: ‘ Shortly after landing, Sir George Brown ordered me to extend the company that was with me along the top of the ridge which overlooked the landing-place. While there, General Airey came up to me, and, pointing to a line of arabas which was moving across the plain some way off, asked if I could take them. I answered, “ Yes, “ but Sir George had ordered me to stay where I was.” The General (Airey) then began to write on a piece of paper to ask leave to send me from my post ; but on looking up, and seeing that the waggons were already far off, he exclaimed, “ We shall lose them if you don’t “ go at once. I will take the responsibility on myself.” So away I went in skirmishing order. On approaching a hillock, which screened the arabas from our view, I saw the long lances of some Cossacks waving in the air. Fearing they might attack us, I closed my men to the centre on the march ; but as we cleared the top of the rising ground, these gentlemen (the Cossacks) galloped off to the arabas, on which we had gained considerably. A few minutes after, I saw the Cossacks making the drivers unyoke their bullocks, that they might drive them away from us. Knowing they would beat me at that game, I desired three old soldiers to fall out of the ranks and fire at the Cossacks. The first shot fell short. On the second being fired, I saw one of the Russians jump up from his saddle as though he was hit, . . . and forthwith the whole party scampered away over the plain. The drivers then came running to us, and kneeling down and embracing our knees. I made them yoke their bullocks again, and took the train

Never ceasing to think it was vital to have more and more means of transport, Airey afterwards despatched the officers of his department in all directions to bring in supplies. Sending Captain Sankey to Tuzla and Sak, he thence got 105 waggons. Sending Captain Hamilton to Bujuk Aktash, to Beshi Aktash, to Tenish, and Sak, he got 67 camels, 253 horses, 45 cartloads of poultry, barley, and other supplies, with more than a thousand head of cattle and sheep.\* At a later date, and when the army was moving, he took 25 waggons from a village near the line of march. One day, moreover, it happened that Airey sent his aide-de-camp Nolan to explore for water, and, though he was without a cavalry escort, Nolan boldly cut in upon a convoy of 80 government waggons laden with flour, and seized the whole of it. In all some 350 waggons were obtained, with all their teams and with their Tartar drivers.

C H A P.  
XII.His con-  
tinued  
exertions.Their  
result.

In general, the appropriation of the resources of the country is a business which ranges among mere commissariat annals; but in order to this invasion,

‘back, and handed them over to General Airey. On our way back we ‘passed Sir George Brown.’

We saw that (supposing the Britannia boat to have been the first to touch the beach) Colonel Lysons was the first English soldier who landed in the Crimea, and the above incident enabled him also to say not only that the first shot fired by our soldiery was fired under his orders, but that the first prize taken from the enemy was taken by him—was taken by him in derogation of the standstill commands which had been given him by Sir George Brown, but in obedience to the boldly-ventured order by which General Airey unleashed him.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* In some, but not all of these expeditions, Sankey and Hamilton had cavalry escorts.

**C H A P.** the seizing of means of land-transport was a busi-  
**XII.** ness hardly otherwise than vital. Even as it was,  
the army was brought to hard straits for want of  
sufficing draught-power ; and without the cattle and  
waggons which were seized whilst the troops were  
landing, the course of events must have been other  
than what it was.

**The Tar-  
tar drivers.**

Those Tartar drivers of whom I have spoken were  
a wild people, little fit, as it seemed, for the obedience  
and patient toil exacted from camp-followers ; but  
the descent of the Allies upon the coast was the  
first military operation that they had witnessed, and  
before their amazedness ceased, they found them-  
selves unaccountably marshalled and governed, and  
involuntarily taking their humble part in the enter-  
prise of the Western Powers. Many of them wore  
the same expression of countenance as hares that are  
taken alive, and they looked as though they were  
watching after the right moment for escape ; but  
they had fallen, as it were, into a great stream, and  
all they could do was to wonder, and yield, and flow  
on. There were few of those captured lads who had  
strength to withstand the sickness and the hardships  
of the campaign. For the most part, they sank and  
died.

## CHAPTER XIII.

THERE were now upon the coast of the Crimea some 37,000 French and Turks,\* with sixty-eight pieces of artillery, all under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud; and we saw that 27,000 English, including a full thousand of cavalry, and together with sixty guns, had been landed by Lord Raglan. Altogether, then, the Allies numbered 63,000 men and 128 guns. These forces, partly by means of the draught animals at their command, and partly by the aid of the soldier himself, could carry by land the ammunition necessary for perhaps two battles, and the means of subsistence for three days. Their provisions beyond those limits were to be replenished from the ships. It was intended, therefore, that the fleets should follow the march of the armies; and that the invaders, without attempting to dart upon the inland route which connected the enemy with St Petersburg, should move straight upon the north side of Sebastopol by following the line of the coast.

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The forces  
now on  
shore.

The nature  
of the  
operation  
by which  
the Allies  
were to  
make good  
their ad-  
vance to  
Sebas-  
topol.

\* 30,204 Frenchmen and 7000 Turks, according to the French accounts. Lord Raglan, I believe, thought that the French force was less, and put it at 27,600.



C H A P.  
XIII.

The whole body of the Allied armies was to operate as a 'movable column.' \*

Comparison between regular operations and the system of the 'movable column.'


Between an armed body engaged in regular operations, and that description of force which the French call a 'movable column,' the difference is broad ; and there is need to mark it, because the way in which regular operations are conducted is not even similar to that in which a 'movable column' is wielded. It is, of course, from the history of Continental wars that the principle of regular operations in the field is best deduced. A prince intending to invade his neighbour's territory takes care to have near his own frontier, or in states already under his control, not only the army with which he intends to begin the invasion, but also that sustained gathering of fresh troops, and that vast accumulation of stores, arms, and munitions, which will suffice, as he hopes, to feed the war. The territory on which these resources are spread is called the 'base of operations.' When the invading general has set out from this, his strategic home, to achieve the object he has in view, the neck of country by which he keeps up his communications with the base is called the 'line of operations ;'† and the maintenance of this line of operations is the one object which must never be

\* I make this endeavour to elucidate the true character of the operation for the purpose of causing the reader to understand the kind of hazard which was involved in the march along the coast, and also in order to lay the ground for explaining (in a future volume) the causes which afterwards brought upon the army cruel sufferings and privations.

† This is generally, but not invariably, the same line as the one by which he has advanced.

absent from his mind. The farther he goes, the more he needs to keep up an incessant communication with his 'base;' and yet, since the line is lengthening as he advances, it is constantly becoming more and more liable to be cut. Such a disaster as that he looks upon as nearly equal to ruin, and there is hardly anything that he will refuse to sacrifice for the defence of the dusty or mud-deep cart-roads which give him his means of living and fighting.

On the other hand, the commander of a 'movable 'column' begins his campaign by wilfully placing himself in those very circumstances which would bring ruin upon an army carrying on regular operations. He does not profess nor attempt to hold fast any 'line of operations' connecting him with his resources. He says to his enemy: 'Surround me if 'you will; gather upon my front; hover round me 'on flank and rear. Do not affront me too closely, 'unless you want to see something of my cavalry 'and my horse-artillery; but, keeping at a courteous 'distance, you may freely occupy the whole country 'through which I pass. I care nothing for the roads 'by which I have come; what I need whilst my task 'is doing I carry along with me. I have an enterprise 'in hand; that achieved, I shall march towards the 'resources which my countrymen have prepared for 'me. Those resources I will reach or else perish.' If an army engaged in regular operations were likened to an engine drawing its supplies by means of long pipes from a river, the principle of the





C H A P. 'movable column' would be well enough tokened  
XIII. by that simple skinful of water which, carried on the back of a camel, is the life of men passing a desert.

Each of the two systems has its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantages enjoyed by an army undertaking regular operations are : the lasting character of its power, and its comparative security against great disasters. The general conducting an army in regular operations is constantly replenishing his strength by drawing from his 'base' fresh troops and supplies to compensate the havoc which time and the enemy, or even time alone, will always be working in his army; and if he meets with a check, he retires upon a line already occupied by portions of his force, already strewn with his magazines. He retires, in short, upon a road prepared for his reception, and the farther he retreats, the nearer he is to his great resources. The drawbacks attending this system are : the great quantity of means of land-transport required for keeping up the communication, and the eternal necessity of having to be ready with a sufficient force to defend every mile of the 'line of operations' against the enterprises of the enemy.

The advantages of the 'movable column' are : that its means of land-transport may be comparatively small—may, in fact, be proportioned to the limited duration of the service which it undertakes ; and that, not being clogged with the duty of maintaining a 'line of operations,' it has, in truth, nothing to

defend except itself. But grave drawbacks limit the power of a 'movable column.' In the first place, it is an instrument fitted only for temporary use ; because, during the service in which it is engaged, it has no resources to rely upon except what it carries along with it. Another drawback is the hazard it incurs—not of mere defeat, but of total extermination ; for it is a force which has left no dominion in its wake, and if it falls back, it falls into the midst of enemies having hold of the country around, and emboldened by seeing it retreat.

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Then, also, a movable column, even though it be never defeated in any pitched battle, is liable to be brought to ruin by being well harassed ; and very inferior troops, or even armed peasants, if they have spirit and enterprise, may put it in peril ; for, having the command of the country all round it, they can easily prepare their measures for vexing the column by day and by night. Again, the 'movable column' cannot send its sick and wounded to the rear. It must either abandon the sufferers, or else find means of carrying them wherever it marches, and this, of course, is a task which is rendered more and more difficult by every succeeding combat. Again, if the 'movable column' is brought to frequent halts by the necessity of self-defence, there is danger that the operation in which it is engaged will last to a time beyond the narrow limit of the supplies which it is able to carry along with it.

In Algeria the French had brought the system of using small 'movable columns' to a high state of



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—

perfection ; and there one might see a force, complete in all arms, carrying with it the bread and the cartridges, and driving betwixt its battalions the little herd of cattle which would enable it to live and to fight ; one might see it bidding farewell for perhaps several weeks to all its communications, and boldly venturing into the midst of a wilderness alive with angry foes. But the Arabs and Kabyles, though not without some of the warlike virtues, were, upon the whole, too unintelligent and too feeble to be able to put the system of the 'movable column' to a test sufficing to prove that the contrivance would hold good in Europe.

Upon the whole, it may be acknowledged that, for operating in a country where the enemy is looked upon as at all formidable, the employment of a 'movable column' is a measure which will be likely to win more favour from those who love an adventure, than from those who are acquainted with the art of war.

But whichever of the two methods be chosen, it is of great moment to choose decisively, taking care that the operations are carried on in a way consistent with the principle of the system on which they proceed. A general conducting regular operations must be wary, circumspect, and resolutely patient. The leader of a 'movable column' must be swift, and even, for very safety's sake, he may have to be venturesome ; for what would be rashness in another may in him be rigid prudence. The two systems are so opposite, that to confuse the two, or to import into

the practice of one of them the practice applicable to the other, is to run into grave troubles and dangers. Yet this is what the Allies did. When the English Government committed to this enterprise a large proportion of their small, brilliant army, and appointed to the command of it a General mature in years, and schooled by his long subordination to Wellington, they acted as though they meant that the army should engage with all due prudence in regular operations. When they ordered that this force should make a descent upon the Crimea without intending to prepare for it a base of operations at the landing-place, they caused it to act as a 'movable column.' It will be seen hereafter that, from this ambiguity of purpose, or rather from this dimness of sight, the events of the campaign took their shape.

Again, it is right to see how far it be possible to change with the same force from one of the two systems to the other. Upon this, it can be said that an army engaged in regular operations may well enough be able to furnish forth a 'movable column;' but to hope that a 'movable column' will be able to gather to itself all at once the lasting strength of an army prepared for regular operations, is to hope for what cannot be. It is true, as we shall see hereafter, that by dint of great effort and the full command of the sea, the two mighty nations of the West were able in time to convert the remains of their 'movable column' into an army fitted for regular operations; but we shall have to remember that, before the

C H A P. XIII. one system could be effectually replaced by the other,  
 the soldiery underwent cruel sufferings.

The Allies  
 were to  
 operate  
 as a  
 'movable  
 column.'

The 63,000 invaders now preparing to march towards the south were the largest, and by far the best appointed, force that the Powers of modern Europe had ever dared to engage in what (as distinguishing it from regular operations) may rightly be called an adventure. Their plan was to advance towards the north of Sebastopol, suffering the enemy to close round their rear, and intending to march every day to a new point of contact with the fleet. It was only at the mouths of the rivers that the cliffs between Old Fort and Sebastopol left room for anything like a landing-place; and (except so far as concerned the mere interchange of signals) the land-forces, whilst marching from the banks of one river to the banks of another, could not expect to be in communication with the fleets. Moreover, the Allied Generals were still in ignorance of the numerical strength of the enemy whom they were thus to defy. All they knew was that, so far as concerned his numbers of brave, steady, highly-drilled troops, the Czar was reported to be the foremost potentate of the world; and that the publicity of the Allied counsels had given him a good deal of time for reinforcing the garrisons of the invaded province.

It may be said that, since the Allied armies were to be attended along the coast by their fleets, they were not in the strictest sense a 'movable column.' Each night, no doubt, they expected to be in communication with their ships; but, during each of the

marches they were about to undertake, their dangers were to be in all respects the same as those which attend upon any other ‘movable column ;’ for every morning they were to cast loose from the ties which connected them with their resources, as well as with their means of retreat, and were to ground their hopes of recovering their communications upon their power to force their way through a country held by the enemy. In short, the Allied armies were a ‘movable column ;’ but a movable column which could hope to find means of succour, and, if necessary, of retreat, by fighting its way to a point of contact with the attendant fleets, and covering its withdrawal by a victory. There is the more need for showing this by dint of words, since it happened that the true nature of the expedition was obscured by the course of events. It passed for a measure more prudent than it really was, because Prince Mentschikoff, being wilful and unskilled, did not take the right means for exposing its rashness.

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The march now about to be undertaken by the invaders was of such a kind that an enterprising enemy who understood his calling might bring them to a halt whenever he chose ; and, forcing them to try to convert their flank into a front, might compel them to fight a battle with their back to the sea-cliff—to fight, in short, upon ground where defeat would be ruin. When, therefore, on the 19th of September 1854, the Allied armies broke up from their bivouacs and marched towards the south, they were engaging in a venturesome enterprise.

Perilous  
character  
of the  
march  
from Old  
Fort.

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It seems that, although by human contrivance a whole people may be shut out from the knowledge of momentous events in which its armies are taking a part, there is yet a subtle essence of truth which will permeate into the mind of a nation thus kept in ignorance. To a degree which freemen can hardly imagine to be possible, the first Napoleon had succeeded in hiding the achievements of the English army from the sight of the French people ; and since the French in after years were little tempted to gather up by aid of history the events which they had been hindered from learning in the form of 'news,' there was—not merely in the French army, but even in all France—a very scant knowledge of the way in which the two mighty nations of the West had encountered one another in the great war. Yet, now that the time had come for testing the faith which one army had in the prowess of the other, it suddenly appeared that a belief in the quality of the English soldier was seated as deep in the mind of the French army as though it were a belief founded upon historic knowledge. This will be understood by observing the relative place which the French commander was content to take in the order of march, and by looking at it in connection with what then promised to be the character of the impending campaign.

When once the invaders had landed and seized the coast-road, the one line of communication which the Russians could trust to for linking the garrison of Sebastopol to the mainland was by the great road which passes through Bakshi Seräi and Simpheropol.

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It was vital to the Russian commander to be able to hold this road, for by that his reinforcements were to come. On the other hand, he had to try to cover Sebastopol; but such was the direction in which the Allies were preparing to march upon the place that, by manœuvring with his back towards the great road passing through Simpheropol, he could cling to his line of communication, and yet be able to come down upon the flank of the invading armies whilst they were marching across his front. In this way he would cover Sebastopol much more effectively than by risking his communications in order to place his army like a mere inert block between the invaders and their prey. Moreover, he was known to be relatively strong in cavalry, and the country was of such a kind that the Allies, advancing from Old Fort to the Belbec, would have upon their left a fair, undulating steppe, such as horsemen exult to look upon. It was, therefore, to be expected that the whole stress of the task undertaken by the invaders would be thrown, in the first instance, upon that portion of the Allied force which might be chosen to form their left wing.

The fate of the whole Allied army dependent upon the firmness of that portion of it which should take the left.

In the armies of Europe the right is the side of precedence, and from the time that the Western Powers had begun to act together in Turkey, the French had always claimed, or rather had always taken, the right. Now, it happened that, both in Turkey and in the Crimea, the side of precedence was the side nearest to the sea, whilst the left was the side nearest to the enemy. Lord Raglan had observed all this, but he

The French take the right.



C H A P.  
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had observed in silence; and finding the right always seized by our Allies, he had quietly put up with the left. Yet he was not without humour; and now, when he saw that, in this hazardous movement along the coast, the French were still taking the right, there was something like archness in his way of remarking that, although the French were bent upon taking precedence of him, their courtesy still gave him the post of danger. This he well might say; for, so far as concerned the duty of covering the venturesome march which was about to be undertaken, the whole stress of the enterprise was thrown upon the English army. The French force was covered on its right flank by the sea, on its front and rear by the fire from the steamers, and on its left by the English army. On the other hand, the English army, though covered on its right flank by the French, was exposed in front, and in rear, and on its whole left flank, to the full brunt of the enemy's attacks. If the Russian General should act in anything like conformity to the principles of the art of war, the whole weight of his attacks would have to be met, in the first instance, by the English alone; and although the French would have an opportunity of acting as a reserve, they would do so under circumstances rendering it very difficult for them to retrieve any check sustained by their Allies. In short, the French could not but know that, if the enemy should direct his enterprises against the open left flank of the invaders, the least weakness on the part of the English might enable him to roll up the

Their  
trustful-  
ness and  
good  
sense.



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1. *Pharmaceutical industry*—United States—History. I. Title. II. Series.

Time of Day	Sleeping (%)	Resting (%)	Standing (%)	Sitting (%)	Walking (%)
0	40	10	10	10	10
2	45	10	10	10	10
4	50	10	10	10	10
6	40	10	10	10	10
8	30	10	10	10	10
10	20	10	10	10	10
12	10	10	10	10	10
14	10	10	10	10	10
16	10	10	10	10	10
18	10	10	10	10	10
20	10	10	10	10	10
22	10	10	10	10	10
24	40	10	10	10	10

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15. Language.

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whole Allied force, involving French and English alike in one common disaster. Yet so steadfast was the trust which the French reposed in the English, so unshaken the courage and good sense with which they committed themselves to the prowess of their ancient foe, that they never for an instant sought to meddle with the duty of covering the march from an attack on the left flank. They planned that the English should be there.

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On the morning of the 19th of September the Allied armies began their advance towards the south. On the right, and nearest the sea, the French army marched in a formation adopted by Marshal Bugeaud at the battle of Isly. The outline of the ground covered by their troops took the shape of a lozenge—a lozenge, whereof the foremost apex was formed by the 1st Division, the angles on either flank by the 2d and 3d, and the rearmost point by the 4th Division. Within the masle or hollow lozenge thus formed, there marched the Turkish battalions and those portions of the artillery and the convoy which were not specially attached to one or other of the divisions. Each French division\* marched in two columns, consisting each of one brigade, and the artillery and encumbrances belonging to each division marched between the two

The ad-  
vance  
begun.

The order  
of march.

\* It was intended and ordered that the 1st and 4th French Divisions should affect a lozenge formation analogous to that which characterised the general order of march, but the direction was not practically attended to. No one knows better than an African General the art of enfolding the helpless portions of a column in battalions of infantry; but the French force being covered on all sides in the way already described, no elaborate precautions were needed.

CHAP. XIII. brigades. Each brigade was in regimental column at sectional distance. The Allied fleets, slowly gliding along the coast, covered the French army on its right flank, and carefully reconnoitred every seam and hollow of the ground in front which could be reached by the eyes of men looking from the ships.

Since the English army was to advance in a way which left it open to the enemy in front, in rear, and on its left flank, Lord Raglan of course deemed it likely that he would be attacked in his march ; and that, upon smooth, open ground, his army would be called upon to defend both itself and its trailing convoy against the assaults of an enemy who was strong in the cavalry arm. But this task was rendered less hard than it would otherwise be by the quality of the English soldier, and the peculiar order of battle in which he loves to fight. He fights in line ; and therefore, with his moderate force of infantry and artillery, Lord Raglan was able to resolve that, from whatever quarter the onset might come, he would be ready to meet it with a front of bayonets and field-artillery, extending along nearly two miles of ground.

In order to be able, at a few minutes' notice, to show a front of this extent either towards the south, the east, or the north, Lord Raglan kept each of his infantry divisions massed in close column, and he disposed his 1st, 2d, 3d, and Light Divisions in such a way that the whole body had both a front and a depth of two divisions. A body which moves

in columns of this kind is said to be marching ‘in C H A P.  
XIII.  
‘grand divisions.’\* The distances between the divisions were so arranged that, without dislocation, they could form line either in front or towards the flank. The artillery attached to each division marched on the right or seaward flank of the force to which it belonged.

The advance-guard consisted of the 11th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons under Lord Cardigan. In rear of the small infantry advance-guard, which followed the horsemen, there marched a detachment of the Rifles in extended order. Then, on the right, came the 2d Division; and, on the left, the Light Division. The 3d Division marched in rear of the 2d, and the Light Division was followed by the 1st Division. Of the 4th Division, the 63d Regiment and two companies of the 46th had been left (with a squadron† of the 4th Light Dragoons) to clear the beach at Kamishlu; but the remainder of the division, under Sir George Cathcart, marched in rear of the 1st Division. Along the left flank of the advancing columns, and at a distance from them of some 200 yards, were riflemen in skirmishing order, and a line of skirmishers from the same force closed the rear of the infantry. On the left flank, and nearly in the same alignment as the leading infantry divisions, was the 8th Hussars; and on the same

\* There are four or five different terms which have been used by experienced generals in describing this disposition of troops, but the authority on which I place the most reliance sanctions the term used in the text.

† No; only one troop.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

**C H A P.** flank, but in an alignment less advanced than the rear-  
**XIII.** most of the infantry columns, there was the 17th  
Lancers. The cattle and the baggage marched in  
rear of the 3d Division, and so as to be covered  
towards the left by the 4th Division. Then followed  
the rear-guard, and then a line of Rifles disposed at  
intervals in extended order. Last of all came the  
4th Light Dragoons, under Lord George Paget.

**The  
march.**

Thus marched the strength of the Western Powers. The sun shone hotly, as on a summer's day in England ; but breezes springing fresh from the sea floated briskly along the hills. The ground was an undulating steppe alluring to cavalry. It was rankly covered with a herb like southernwood ; and when the stems were crushed under foot by the advancing columns, the whole air became laden with bitter fragrance. The aroma was new to some. To men of the western counties of England it was so familiar that it carried them back to childhood and the village church ; they remembered the nosegay of ' boy's love ' that used to be set by the Prayer-Book of the Sunday maiden too demure for the vanity of flowers.

In each of the close-massed columns which were formed by our four complete divisions there were more than 5000 foot-soldiers. The colours were flying ; the bands at first were playing ; and once more the time had come round when in all this armed pride there was nothing of false majesty ; for already videttes could be seen on the hillocks, and (except at the spots where our horsemen were marching) there was nothing but air and sunshine,

and at intervals the dark form of a single rifleman, to divide our columns from the enemy. But more warlike than trumpet and drum was the grave quiet which followed the ceasing of the bands. The pain of weariness had begun : Few spoke—all toiled. Waves break upon the shore ; and though they are many, still distance will gather their numberless cadences into one. So, also, it was with one ceaseless hissing sound that a wilderness of tall crisping herbage bent under the tramp of the coming thousands. As each mighty column marched on, one hardly remembered at first the weary frames, the aching limbs which composed it ; for—instinct with its own proper soul and purpose, absorbing the volitions of thousands of men, and bearing no likeness to the mere sum of the human beings out of whom it was made—the column itself was the living thing—the slow, monstrous unit of strength which walks the modern earth where empire is brought into question. But a little while and then the sickness which had clung to the army began to make it seen that the columns in all their pride were things built with the bodies of suffering mortals.

We saw that, before the embarkation, our troops had fallen into a weak state of health, and that, even of those who were free from serious illness, there were hardly any who had been able to keep their accustomed strength. It had been hoped that the voyage would bring back health and strength, but the hope proved vain ; and Lord Raglan, knowing the weakly state of the men, had ordered that they should be

Sickness  
and failing  
strength  
of many  
of the  
soldiers.



C H A P. XIII. allowed to enfold the few things they most needed in their blankets, and to land and march without their knapsacks. Yet now, before the first hour of march was over, the men began to fall out from the ranks. Some of these were in the agonies of cholera. Their faces had a dark choked look; they threw themselves on the ground and writhed, but often without speaking and without a cry. Many more dropped out from mere weakness. These the officers tried to inspirit, and sometimes they succeeded;\* but more often the sufferer was left upon the ground. It was vain to tell him, though so it was believed at the time, that he would fall into the hands of the Cossacks. The tall stately men of the Guards dropped from their ranks in great numbers. It was believed at the time that the men who fell out would be taken by the enemy; but the number of stragglers at length became very great, and in the evening a force was sent back to bring them in.

The  
stream  
of the  
Bulganak.

During the march, the foot-soldiers of the Allied armies suffered thirst; but early in the afternoon the troops in advance reached the long-desired stream of the Bulganak; and as soon as a division came in sight of the water, the men broke from their ranks,

\* The officers themselves were so heavily laden that they could not get through the day's march without having to endure great fatigue. The scantiness of the means available for land-transport made it necessary for Lord Raglan to ask that the officers would trust to their own bodily strength for the carriage of all they required. This 'most unusual' demand upon their fortitude was met at the time in such a spirit that, in narrating the fact to the Secretary of War, Lord Raglan was able to say, 'I have not heard a single murmur.' Published Despatch, 23d September 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

and ran forward that they might plunge their lips C H A P.  
XIII.  
deep in the cool, turbid, grateful stream. In one brigade a stronger governance was maintained.\* Sir Colin Campbell would not allow that even the rage of thirst should loosen the discipline of his grand Highland regiments. He halted them a little before they reached the stream, and so ordered it that, by being saved from the confusion that would have been wrought by their own wild haste, they gained in comfort, and knew that they were gainers. When men toil in organised masses, they owe what well-being they have to wise and firm commanders.

It was on the banks of this stream of the Bulganak that the Allied armies were to bivouac for the night.

\* I ought not to cause it to be understood that in one brigade *only* this stronger governance was maintained. In General Codrington's, and probably in several other brigades, the discipline was proof against the rage of thirst.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

## CHAPTER XIV.

CHAP.  
XIV.The affair  
of the  
Bulganak.

EARLY in the afternoon, Lord Raglan, riding in advance of the infantry divisions, had reached the banks of the river, and, observing a group of Cossacks on the brow of the hill towards the south, he ordered the squadrons which Lord Cardigan had with him\* to move forward and reconnoitre the ground. Lord Lucan was present with this portion of his cavalry force.

Where the post-road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol crosses the Bulganak, the ground on the south side of the river rises gradually for some hundreds of yards from the banks of the stream, then dips a little, then rises again, then dips rather deeply, and then again rises up to the summit of the ridge which bounds the view of an observer in the valley of the Bulganak.

Our reconnoitring squadrons went forward a great way into the lower dip, and when they were there, it was perceived that, confronting them from the hill above, there was a body of cavalry 2000 strong. Our

\* The 11th Hussars and 13th Light Dragoons.

four squadrons halted and formed line. The Russian cavalry came forward a little, then halted, and, throwing out skirmishers, attempted some long fruitless shots with their carbines. Our squadrons also threw out skirmishers. C H A P.  
XIV.

But Lord Raglan, who had remained with his Staff on the northern side of the hollow, had now discerned the formidable body of cavalry which was confronting our four squadrons; and Airey, being gifted with a keen, far-reaching sight, was able to make out that the glitter which could be seen between the second crest and the summit was the play of the sun upon the points of bayonets, and that in the upper hollow there were several battalions. It was soon made plain that, within a few hundred yards of our four squadrons, the enemy was present with all three arms, and in some force. He had there, as we now know, about 6000 men of his 17th Division, two batteries of artillery, a brigade of regular cavalry, and nine sotnias of Cossacks.

Lord Raglan, whose army was still on its march, saw that he must take care to avoid provoking an action; but also he had to provide for the retreat of the four squadrons, which stood rooted in the centre of the lower hollow, so near to an overwhelming enemy's force of all arms, and so far from their supports, that they were in some danger. The problem was to extricate them, and to do this, if possible, without getting into that sort of conflict which would be likely to bring about a serious

C H A P. engagement. Lord Raglan saw that what made the  
XIV. Russians hesitate was the steadiness and the exact ceremonious formation of the little cavalry force of four squadrons which tranquilly confronted them ; and that, if he were to withdraw it before he had made arrangements for covering its retreat, it would be pursued and roughly handled by overwhelming numbers. He was anxious—for, small as was this little body of horse, it was a large proportion of his whole strength in the cavalry arm ; but he saw that its safety would be best provided for by bringing up troops to its support, and allowing it in the mean time to remain where it was, confusing the enemy by its obstinate presence and its careful array. He ordered up in all haste the Light and the 2d Divisions, the 8th Hussars, and 17th Lancers, and afterwards the nine-pounder batteries attached to the Light Division. When our infantry divisions came up they were formed in line, and the cavalry supports took a position in left rear of the advanced squadrons. All these operations the enemy suffered to take place without resistance, and when they were completed his opportunity was gone.

So, all being now in readiness, Lord Raglan wished that the four squadrons should forthwith retire ; and the more so as he was apprehensive lest these horsemen, in their evident longing for a combat, should be tempted to charge the body of cavalry in their immediate front. Still he was unwilling to embarrass Lord Lucan (close as he then was to the

enemy) by an order too precise or imperative. In these circumstances Airey galloped forward to give effect to Lord Raglan's wishes. C H A P.  
XIV.

When Airey came up, he found that by communicating Lord Raglan's wishes without delivering a positive order, he was supplying materials for a debate between Lord Lucan and his brigadier. Yet for a wordy debate the time and the place were ill-fitted, for the four squadrons, as we have seen, were within but a little distance of overwhelming forces. There is some obscurity as to the exact way in which Airey brought his will to bear; but he saw what was wanted, and he said the force must retire immediately, and by alternate squadrons. Though he spoke in terms which might have meant that he was only giving his own opinion, yet perhaps the decisiveness of his speech and manner led to the impression that he was delivering Lord Raglan's orders. Be this as it may, the result was quickly attained. Lord Lucan understood that he had to go forthwith to Lord Raglan. Lord Cardigan understood that the force was to retire immediately, and by alternate lines. The operation instantly commenced, and was conducted with excellent precision, for during the whole retreat there were always two squadrons out of the four which were showing a smooth front to the enemy.

The moment the withdrawal of our little cavalry force began, the enemy's artillery-teams, unseen before, came bounding up from the hollow, and his

CHAP.  
XIV. guns, being quickly unlimbered, were soon in battery upon the ridge. With these he opened fire upon our retreating squadrons; but he saw that these horsemen, no longer isolated, were retiring upon ample supports of all arms; he did not, therefore, venture to pursue with his cavalry. Two men in our cavalry force were wounded, and four or five horses killed. The six-pounder guns attached to our cavalry replied to the enemy's artillery without good effect; but when our nine-pounder guns were brought into action, they caused the enemy's artillery to limber up and retire. They also, it seems, inflicted some loss upon the enemy's cavalry, for it was said that as many as thirty-five of his troopers were killed or wounded. The Russians were soon out of sight.

The slight combat thus occurring on the Bulganak was the first approach to a passage of arms between Russia and the Western Powers. The pith of what had happened was this:—The Russians had been making a reconnaissance in force at a time when Lord Raglan was making a reconnaissance with only four squadrons; and as the nature of the ground concealed the enemy's strength, our lesser force was exposed for some minutes to a good deal of danger; but the enemy, being slow to take advantage of fortune, had given the English General full time to extricate his squadrons by the use of the three arms. Lord Raglan was so well pleased with the success of this last operation, and with the

steadiness shown by our cavalry, that, even on the night of the Alma (when it might have been supposed that the impressions produced by the battle would have superseded the recollection of the previous day), he spoke with complacency of this affair on the Bulganak.\*

C H A P.  
XIV.

\* In speaking of the affair of the Bulganak, Lord Raglan's despatch says: 'In the affair of the previous day, Major-General the Earl of Cardigan exhibited the utmost spirit and coolness, and kept his brigade under perfect command.' Published Despatch of the 23d of September 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



## CHAPTER XV.

C H A P.  
XV.

Appar-  
ently dan-  
gerous  
situation  
of the  
English  
army.

Lord Rag-  
lan causes  
it to  
bivouac  
in order  
of battle.

WHEN this affair was concluded, Lord Raglan began to prepare for a contingency of graver import. The enemy, as it now appeared, had a force of all arms in the immediate neighbourhood, and it was known that he had his whole field-army within a few hours' march of the Bulganak. On the other hand, Lord Raglan was exposed to attack in front, left flank, and rear ; and even on his right flank he was without immediate support, for the course of the day's march had thrown an interval of a mile between the French and the English armies. It was to be apprehended that the enemy, issuing during the night from his intrenched position on the Alma, would place himself in such a position as to be able to fall upon our army in front and flank at dawn of day. Lord Raglan, therefore, determined that the troops should bivouac in order of battle, and so as to be rapidly able to show a deployed front to the enemy either in front or flank. He placed the troops himself, fixing their exact position with minute care.

The first brigades of the 2d and Light Divisions





Plan  
 taken from the "Atlas Historique"  
 showing the disposition  
 of the English army when it  
 bivouacked in order of battle on the  
 Bulganak & shewing also how it  
 wheeled into the line of march on the  
 morning of the 20th

were drawn up in line parallel with the river, and some hundreds of yards in advance of it. The first C H A P.  
XV. brigades of the 1st and 3d Divisions were placed in an oblique line receding from the left of the Light Division, and going back to the river's bank. The troops thus deployed formed, with the river, a kind of three-sided enclosure, in which the principal part of the cavalry and the encumbrances of the army were enfolded. The second brigade of each of the divisions already named was formed in column in rear of the first or deployed brigade. The 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons were placed in observation on the northern side of the river. Finally, Colonel Lagondie, one of the French Commissioners at our headquarters, was requested to suggest to Prince Napoleon the expediency of his drawing his division somewhat more near to the English right.\*

Our troops piled arms, and bivouacked in order of battle.† There was a post-house at the point where the road crossed the river, and there Lord Raglan passed the night.

The situation of our army seemed to be critical; but when morning dawned it appeared that the enemy, attempting nothing, had drawn off to his intrenched position on the Alma.

So the peril which the Allies had been encountering for the last twenty-four hours was now at an end;

\* Colonel Lagondie fulfilled his mission; but on his return, being a near-sighted man, he rode into the midst of a Cossack picket, and was taken prisoner.

† See the Plan.

**C H A P.** and the duty of carrying the position on the Alma  
**XV.** might be regarded as easy, in comparison with that  
which would have devolved upon the invaders if  
our left flank had been briskly attacked on their  
march. It is common to attribute great results to  
careful design ; but the truth is, that the Allies owed  
their prosperous landing and their tranquil march to  
the forbearance of the Russian commander.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## I.

FOR an army undertaking to withstand the march of invaders who come along the shore from the north, the position on the left bank of the Alma is happily formed by nature, and is capable of being made strong. The river springs from the mountain-range in the south-east of the peninsula, and its tortuous channel, resulting at last in a westerly course, brings it down to the sea near the headland called Cape Loukool. In that region the right or northern bank of the stream inclines with a very gentle slope to the water's edge; but on the south or left bank the river presses close against a great range of hills, and the rocky ground which forms their base, being scarped by the action of the river in its swollen state, gives a measure of the loud, red torrent thrown down in flood-times from the sides of the Tchatir Dag. Yet, so long as it flows in its summer bed, the pure grey stream of the Alma, though strong and rapid even then, can be crossed in most places by a full-grown man without losing foot. There are, however, some deeps which would force a man to swim a few

C H A P.  
XVI.  
Position  
on the  
Alma.

C H A P.  
XVI.

strokes ; and, on the other hand, the river is passed in several places by easy and frequented fords. Near the village of Bourliouk, at the time of the action, there was a good timber bridge.

Along the course of the stream, on the north or right bank, there is a broad belt of gardens and vineyards, enclosed by low stone walls, and reaching down to the water ; but on the left or south side there are few enclosures, for in most places the rock formation, which marks the left bank of the river, has its base so close down to the water's edge as to leave but little soil deep enough for culture.

The smooth slopes by which the invader from the north approaches the Alma are contrasted by the aspect of the country on the opposite bank of the river ; for there the field is so broken up into hills and valleys—into steep acclivities and narrow ravines—into jutting knolls and winding gullies—that with the labour of a Russian army, and the resources of Sebastopol at his command, a skilled engineer would have found it hard to exhaust his contrivances for the defence of a ground having all this strength of feature.

It is the high land nearest to the shore which falls most abruptly : for when a man turns his back to the sea, and rides up along the river's bank, the summits of the hills on his right recede from him more and more—recede so far that, although they are higher than the hills near the shore, they are connected with the banks of the stream by slopes more gently inclining.

The main features of the ground are these : first and nearest to the sea-shore there is what may be called the 'West Cliff'—for the ground there rises to a height of some 350 feet, and not only presents, looking west, a bluff buttress of rock to the sea, but also on its northern side hangs over the river so steep that a man going up along the bank of the stream has at first an almost sheer precipice on his right hand ; and it is only when he all but reaches the village of Almatamack that he finds the cliff losing its severity. At that point the ground becomes so sloping and so broken as to be no longer difficult of ascent for a man on foot, nor even for country waggons. In rear—Russian rear—of the cliff there are the villages of Hadji-Boulat, Ulukul Tiouets, and Ulukul Akles.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Higher up the river, but joined on to the West Cliff, there is a height, which was crowned at the time of the war by an unfinished turret intended for a telegraph. This is the Telegraph Height. At top, the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height form one connected plateau or table-land ; but the sides of the Telegraph Height have not the abrupt character which marks the West Cliff. They are steep, but both towards the river and towards the east they are much broken up into knolls, ridges, hollows, and gullies. At all points they can be ascended by a man on foot, and at some by waggons. These steep sides of the Telegraph Height are divided from the river by a low and almost flat ledge with a varying breadth of from two to six hundred yards. The



**C H A P.** ledge was a good deal wooded at the time of the  
**XVI** war, and on some parts of it there were vineyards or orchards.

To the east of the Telegraph Height the trending away of the hills leaves a hollow or recess, so formed and so placed that its surface might be likened to a huge vine-leaf—a vine-leaf placed on a gentle incline, with its lower edge on the river, its stem at the bridge, and its main fibre following the course of the great road which bends up over the hill towards Sebastopol. This opening in the hills is the main Pass; and through it (as might be gathered from what has just been said) the Causeway or great post-road goes up from the bridge.\* Across the mouth of the Pass, at a distance of a few yards from the bridge, there are small natural mounds or risings of ground, having their tops at a height of about sixty feet above the level of the river. These are so ranged as to form, one with the other, a low and uneven but almost continuous embankment, running from east to west, and parallel with the river. The natural rampart thus formed controls the entrance to the Pass from the north; for it not only overlooks the bridge, but also commands the ground far and wide on both sides of the river, and on both sides of the great road. Behind, the ground falls and then rises again, till it mingles with the slopes and the many

\* In speaking of this opening as a 'Pass,' I have followed the example of one whom I regard as a great master of the diction applicable to military subjects; but it is not, of course, meant that there is anything at all Alpine in the character of this range of low hills—hills less than 400 feet high.





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knolls and hillocks which connect it with the receding flanks of the Telegraph Height on the one side, and the Kourganè Hill on the other. C H A P.  
XVI.

Still higher up the river, but receding from it in a south-easterly direction, the ground rises gradually to a commanding height, and terminates in a peak. This hill is the key of the position.\* It is called the Kourganè Hill. Around its slopes, at a distance of about three hundred yards from the river, the ground so swells out as to form a strong rib—a rib which bends round the front and the flanks of the bastion there built by nature, giving a command towards the south-west, the west, the north-west, and the north-east. Towards the west this terrace, if so it may be called, is all but joined to those mounds which we spoke of as barring the mouth of the Pass. Behind all these natural ramparts there are hollows and dips in the ground, which give ample means for concealing and sheltering troops ; but from the jutting rib down to the bank of the river, the slope is

\* This assertion was denied by a commentator in the 'Quarterly Review,' who professed to write with military knowledge. It may therefore be well to give here the following extract from Lord Raglan's published despatch : 'The high pinnacle and ridge before alluded to *was the key of the position*, and, consequently, there the greatest preparations had been made for defence.'—*Published Despatch of the 23d September 1854*. Probably no living man is a better judge of what is the true 'key' of a position than Sir John Burgoyne. Now, I have before me a manuscript in his handwriting, which he wrote at the time, and whilst he was still on the banks of the Alma. In that paper he says : 'The high pinnacle and ridge *on the right*' [he is speaking of the Russian right, and of the Kourganè Hill] *'was the key of the position if attacked in front.'*—*Notes to 4th Edition*.



CHAP.  
XVI. gentle and smooth like the glacis of a fortress. It was on this Kourganè Hill that Prince Mentschikoff established his headquarters.

The immediate approach to the river from its right bank is everywhere gentle, but the ground on its south side is a good deal scarped by the action of the water; and all along that part of the river which flows opposite to the Kourganè Hill and the main Pass, the left bank rises almost vertically from the water's edge to a height of from eight to fifteen feet.

On the north bank of the river, and at a distance of about a mile from its mouth, there is the village of Almatamack. On the same bank, but more than a mile and a quarter higher up the stream, there stood at the time of the war a large white homestead. Yet a mile higher up the river on the same bank, and nearly facing the mouth of the Pass, there stands the large straggling village of Bourliouk. The cottages and farm-buildings which skirt this village on its eastern side extend far up the river. From Bourliouk to the easternmost part of the position the distance is two miles.

To ascend the position from the north there are several frequented ways:—

1. Close to the sea and to the mouth of the river, there is a singular fissure in the rock, and through this a narrow way leads round, and up to the top of the cliff. This road was not traversed by artillery on the day of the battle, but it is believed that this was because the guns could not be brought across the river at the point where it flows into the sea.

2. From the ford at the village of Almatamack there is a waggon-road which leads up to the top of the plateau. It was practicable for artillery. C H A P.  
XVI.

3. From the white homestead there is a road which crosses the river and goes up to the plateau ; but, either because of the badness of the ford, or else the too rugged ascent beyond it, this road could not be used for artillery. The want of a road for their guns in this part of the field was the main cause which hampered the French army.

4. On the western side of the village of Bourliouk there is a frequented ford across the river, and from that spot two waggon-roads, forking off at no great distance from one another, lead up to the Telegraph and the villages in its rear. The westernmost of these roads was found to be practicable for artillery.

5. Opposite to Bourliouk two almost parallel waggon-roads lead up from the bank of the river to the top of the plateau.

6. The Great Causeway, or post-road leading from Eupatoria, goes through the eastern skirts of Bourliouk, crosses the bridge, enters the Pass, and ascends by a gentle incline towards the low chain of mounds running across its mouth. After piercing that natural rampart, it bends into the southerly course which leads it to Sebastopol.

7. To the east of the main Pass there are other roads ; but they are not further spoken of here, because all the hill-side in that part of the field is more or less accessible to artillery.



C H A P.  
XVI.

Except at the West Cliff, every part of the position can be reached by men on foot.

In the rear—Russian rear—of the hills which form this position, the ground falls, and it rises again at a distance of two miles.

Down to the edge of the vineyards, the whole of the field on the north or right bank of the river is ground tempting to cavalry ; and although the south side of the stream is marked, as we saw, by stronger features, still the summits of the heights spread out broad, like English ‘Downs.’ Except the sheer sides of the cliff, and the steeps of the Telegraph Height, there is little on the higher ground to obstruct the manœuvres of horsemen.

From the sea-shore to the easternmost spot occupied by Russian troops, the distance for a man going straight was nearly five miles and a half ; but if he were to go all the way on the Russian bank of the river he would have to pass over more ground ; for the Alma here makes a strong bend, and leaves open the chord of the arc to invaders who come from the north.\*

## II.

Against any plan for occupying the whole of this range of hills by the forces of the Czar there were


\* I am aware that in distances, and in other material points, this description of the position differs widely from the result of the hasty surveys which were made soon after the battle, by English officers. The French Government plans bear such strong marks of having been made with great care and labour, that, in general, I have ventured to take them for my guide in preference to those of my own countrymen.

two cogent reasons: one was, that the summits of the West Cliff, and even of part of the Telegraph Height, were exposed to fire from the ships; the other, that the position was too wide for the numbers which were brought to defend it. C H A P.  
XVI.

But the whole of the naval and military resources of the Crimea had been intrusted to the direction of Prince Mentschikoff. With him it rested to make head against the invasion; and it seems he had been so forcibly struck with the great apparent steepness of the West Cliff and the heights connected with it, that he thought it must be wholly inaccessible to troops. He conceived, therefore, that he might safely omit to occupy it, and might be content to take up a narrow position, beginning on the eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and terminating on the west of the Telegraph Height at a distance of more than two miles from the sea.\* By this course, as he thought, he would elude both of the obstacles which interfered with his hold of the position; for his extreme left would be comparatively distant from the shipping, and the whole ground occupied would be so far contracted that the troops which he had at his command might suffice to hold it. Upon this plan he acted. So, although the position of the Alma, as formed by nature, had an extent of more than five miles, the troops which stood charged to hold it had a front of only one league. Prince Mentschikoff rested upon the assumption that the whole of the

Mentschikoff's plan for availing himself of the position.

\* The Russian accounts estimate the distance at only two versts, but I adhere, as before stated, to the French plans.





**C H A P.** ground which he proposed to leave unoccupied was  
**XVI.** inaccessible to troops ; but if he had walked his horse into the road which was within half a mile of his extreme left, he would have found that it led down to a ford opposite to the village of Almatamack, and was perfectly practicable for artillery. His army had been on the ground for several days, yet, with a strange carelessness, he not only omitted to break up or to guard this road from Almatamack, but made all his dispositions exactly as though no such road existed.

**His forces.** The forces brought forward to defend this position for the Czar were 3400 cavalry, 33,000 infantry, and 2600 artillerymen, making altogether 39,000 men,\* with 106 guns.

**His personal position.** Prince Mentschikoff commanded in person. He was a wayward, presumptuous man, and his bearing towards the generals under his command was of such a kind that he did not or could not strengthen himself by the counsels of men abler than himself.† In times past he had been mutilated by a round-shot from a Turkish gun. He bore hatred against the Ottoman race ; he bore hatred against their faith. He had opened his mission at the Porte with insult ; he had closed it with threats. And now—a sequence rare in the lives of modern statesmen—he was out on a hill-

\* 39,017. See *post*, p. 239 *et seq.*, where the details of the force are fully given.

† I infer this from the fact that, the day before the action, General Kiriakoff, an officer of high reputation, was attempting indirect methods of calling Prince Mentschikoff's attention to the defectiveness of his arrangements.—*Kiriakoff's Statement*.

side, with horse and foot, having warrant—full warrant this time—to adduce ‘the last reason of kings.’

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So far as regards the general scheme of the campaign, his conception, it seems, was this : he would suffer the Allies to land without molestation, because he desired that the defeat which he was preparing for them should be, not a mere repulse, but a crushing and signal disaster. He would not attack them on their line of march, because he liked better to husband his strength for the great position on the Alma. It seemed to him that there he could hold his ground against the invaders for three weeks ; and his imagination was that, baffled for many days by the strength of his position, drawing their supplies from the ships with pain and uncertainty, and encumbered more and more every day with wounded men, the Allies would fall into evil days. In the mean time the troops long since despatched from Bessarabia would begin to reach him by way of Perekop and Simpheropol ; and thus reinforced, he would in due season take the offensive, inflicting upon the Western Powers a chastisement commensurate with their rashness.

His plan  
of cam-  
paign.

Prince Mentschikoff rested this structure of hope upon the assumption that he could hold the position on the Alma for at the least many days together, and against repeated assaults. Yet he took little pains to prepare the ground for a great defence.\* On the jutting rib which goes round the front of the Kour-

His reli-  
ance on  
the natural  
strength  
of the  
position.

\* I say this in the teeth of the English despatches, and, I fear, of many written and oral statements from officers ; but I am sure that every engineer who saw the ground will support my assertion.



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XVI.

The means  
he took for  
strengthen-  
ing it.

ganè Hill, at a distance of about 300 yards from the river, he threw up a breastwork—a work of a very slight kind, presenting no physical obstacle to the advance of troops, but sufficiently extended to be capable of receiving the fourteen heavy guns with which he armed it.\* This work was called the ‘Great Redoubt.’† Prince Mentschikoff was delighted with this earthwork. ‘Is not this a grand thing?’ said he to General Kiriakoff the day before the action; ‘see, it will do mischief both ways.’ And he then pointed out how, whilst the face of the redoubt commanded the smooth slope beneath it, the guns at the shoulder of the work would throw their fire across the great road on either side of the bridge.

\* Twelve only, according to Prince Gortschakoff. The pieces were 24-pound shot guns and 32-pound howitzers.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

A commentator in the ‘Quarterly Review’ says, The author ‘mistakes’ in asserting that it was armed with fourteen heavy guns. We believe ‘that its armament consisted of six or eight, not guns of position, but ‘field-guns and howitzers.’ As to the number of the guns, the author relies upon several English observers for the supposition that it amounted to fourteen, and upon high Russian authority—namely, Prince Gortschakoff himself—for the supposition that the number was not less than twelve.—See *post*, p. 242. That the two captured guns now at Woolwich are guns of position, and not mere field-pieces, as the Quarterly Reviewers imagined, will be seen from the following report of a competent officer, dated from Woolwich:—‘The calibres of the guns taken at the Alma were as follow:—

Brass shot-gun,	.	.	4.82 inches.
„ howitzer,	.	.	6.12 „

‘These calibres indicate, I believe, that the shot-gun was a 24-pounder, ‘and the howitzer a 32-pounder.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† The work was formed by cutting a shallow trench and throwing up the earth in front of it. I follow the military authorities in calling these works ‘redoubts,’ because our people at home came to know of them under this description; but the term is not accurate, for they were open towards the rear.

On the same hill, but higher up and more to his right, the Prince threw up another slight breastwork, which he armed with a battery of field-guns. This was the Lesser Redoubt. CHAP.  
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The vineyards at some points were marked and cleared so as to give full effect to the action of the artillery ; but except the two redoubts, no field-works were constructed by the Russian General. Wilful and confident, he was content to rest mainly upon the natural strength of the ground, the valour of his troops, and the faith that he had in his own prowess as a commander. He even omitted, as we have seen, to break up or to guard the waggon-road which led up from Almatamack to the left of his position. The Prince did not attempt to occupy the West Cliff ; but some days before the action a battalion \* and half a battery had been placed overlooking the sea in the village of Ulukul Akles, in order, as was said, to ‘ catch marauders,’ or to prevent a descent from the sea in the rear of the Russian army ; and the detachment remained in that part of the field until the time when the battle began.

On the ledge which divided the river from the steep broken side of the Telegraph Height Prince Mentschikoff placed four Militia† battalions, and sup- Disposi-  
tion of his  
troops.

\* The No. 2 battalion of Minsk.

† I adopt this inaccurate term as the best I can find to describe these semi-regular troops, because to call them, as the Russians do, ‘ reserve ‘ battalions,’ would tend to confuse, by suggesting the idea of ‘ reserves’ in the ordinary sense. I thought at one time I might have called them ‘ depôt battalions,’ but upon the whole it seemed to me that the term ‘ militia’ would be less likely to convey a wrong notion than the term ‘ depôt.’ They are troops regarded as very inferior in quality to troops

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Forces  
originally  
posted in  
the part  
of the  
position  
assailed  
by the  
French :

ported them by three battalions of regular infantry,\* placed only a hundred and fifty yards in their rear, and by a fourth battalion† drawn up in a neighbouring ravine.‡ Further still in rear, he held in hand, as a reserve for his left wing, the four battalions of the 'Moscow' corps which had joined him that morning.§ These, with two batteries of artillery,|| were all the forces occupying that part of the position which was about to be assailed by the French.¶ Including the battalion and the half-battery at Ulukul Akles, they consisted of thirteen battalions of infantry with twenty guns, and numbered altogether rather more than 10,000 men.\*\* They formed the left wing of the Russian army, and were commanded by General Kiriakoff. The battalions were placed at intervals, checkerwise, and each battalion was massed in column of companies. A line of skirmishers was thrown out in front; but

of the line. The four battalions which I call 'militia' were the 'reserve' battalions of the 13th Division.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

\* Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the Taroutine corps.—*Ibid.*

† The No. 1 battalion of the same corps.—*Ibid.*

‡ Chodasiewicz.

§ The battalions of the Moscow corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

|| Viz., the Nos. 3 and 5 batteries of the 17th brigade of artillery.

¶ The four batteries of the Minsk corps, with several guns, were afterwards moved into this part of the ground, as will be seen by-and-by.

** Thirteen battalions of 750 each, . . . . .	9,750
One battery of position, 263 men, . . . . .	263
One light battery, . . . . .	210
Half of another light battery, . . . . .	105

---

10,328

Anitchkoff and Chodasiewicz, writing with opposite feelings, and differing in many things, are strictly in accord as to the number of battalions posted in this part of the field.

for want, as was said, of better ground to act upon, these skirmishers were kept within ten yards of the 'Militia' battalions. The two batteries of artillery were not at first so placed as to be of any use. No part of this force on the Telegraph Height was covered by intrenchments, or by any kind of field-work.

In the 'main Pass, facing the bridge, and destined to confront the 2d Division of the English army, Prince Mentschikoff placed four battalions of light infantry,\* with one battalion of rifles;† and three out of those five battalions had orders to advance and skirmish in the vineyards. The other two battalions were kept massed in column. Near the bridge was posted a battalion of sappers and miners.‡ Astride the great road, and disposed along the chain of hillocks which runs across the Pass looking down on the bridge, the Prince placed two batteries of field-artillery.§ These two batteries, acting together, and comprising sixteen guns,|| are here termed 'the Causeway batteries.' The force in this part of the field formed the centre of the line, and was under the command of Prince Gortschakoff.¶

Forces  
originally  
posted in  
the part  
of the  
position  
assailed  
by the  
English.

\* The four battalions of the Borodino corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

† The sixth battalion of Riflemen.—*Ibid.*

‡ Anitchkoff.

§ Light batteries, Nos. 1 and 2 of the 16th Artillery brigade.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

|| Prince Gortschakoff says that these guns were eighteen in number.

¶ The Borodino corps formed part of General Kiriakoff's command; but the nature of the ground and the course which the action took prevented him from having it in his actual control; and Gortschakoff, in the absence of the General commanding in chief, was the General to whom the corps would have to look for guidance.

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The right wing of the Russian army was the force destined to confront, first our Light Division, and then the Guards and the Highlanders. It was posted on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Here was the Great Redoubt, armed with its fourteen heavy guns ; \* and Prince Mentschikoff was so keen to defend this part of the ground, that he gathered round the work, on the slopes of the hill, a force of no less than sixteen battalions of regular infantry, † besides the two battalions of sailors, ‡ and four batteries of field-artillery. § The right of the forces on the Kourganè Hill rested on a slope to the east of the Lesser Redoubt, || and the left on the great

\* Prince Gortschakoff puts the numbers of these guns at twelve. Chodasiewicz supposed that the redoubt was armed with the guns of the No. 2 battery of the 16th Artillery brigade ; and this was probably the authority which misled the commentator in the 'Quarterly Review.'—See note *ante*, p. 238. But the calibre of the gun and the howitzer now at Woolwich prove that the ordnance which armed the redoubt were not a part of the regular field-artillery, but were brought from Sebastopol.—See note, p. 238.

† The four battalions of the Kazan, or Prince Michael's corps, the four battalions of the Vladimir corps, the four battalions of the Sousdal corps, and the four battalions of the Uglitz corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

‡ Chodasiewicz. Anitchkoff calls this force a half battalion only ; but Chodasiewicz saw the two battalions in march with their four guns, and I accept his statement. Anitchkoff says that these men were thrown forward as skirmishers in the vineyards.

§ The No. 2 heavy battery of the 16th Artillery brigade, the No. 3 battery of position of the 17th brigade of Artillery, and the No. 3 battery of position, half of the No. 3 light battery of the 14th Artillery brigade, and the half battery belonging to the sailors.—*Anitchkoff, or Chodasiewicz.* The latter supposes that some of these batteries were posted more towards the centre with the reserve battalions.

|| It fired five guns only at the time when the Highlanders advanced ; but it is believed that the three additional guns requisite to complete the battery were in the work at the beginning of the action. It was

road. Twelve of the battalions of regular infantry were disposed into battalion-columns posted at intervals and checkerwise on the flanks of the Great Redoubt; the other four battalions, drawn up in one massive column, were held as a reserve for the right wing on the higher slope of the hill. Of the four field-batteries, one armed the Lesser Redoubt, another was on the high ground commanding and supporting the Great Redoubt, and the remaining two were held in reserve.\* General Kvetzinski commanded the troops in this part of the field. On his extreme right, and posted at intervals along a curve drawn from his right front to his centre rear, Prince Mentschikoff placed his cavalry,—a force comprising 3400 † lances, with three batteries of horse-artillery.‡

Each of these bodies of horse, when brought within sight of the Allies, was always massed in column.

Thus, then, it was to bar the Pass and the great road, to defend the Kourganè Hill and to cover his

probably the No. 2 battery of the 16th Artillery brigade referred to in the former note.

\* Although I gather the numbers and descriptions of these forces from Russian authorities, I draw much of my knowledge of the way in which they were disposed from the observation of our officers; and it should be observed that the above statement applies to the state of the field at the time when the battle was going on, and not to the dispositions which Prince Mentschikoff may have made in the earlier part of the day.

† The Russian official authorities confess to but 3000. The force consisted of the brigade of Hussars, 6th division of cavalry, and two regiments of Cossacks of the Don.—*Chodasiewicz*.

‡ The No. 12 Light-Horse battery, 6th brigade of Horse-Artillery (*Chodasiewicz*), and two batteries of the Cossacks of the Don.—*Anitchkoff*.



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right flank, that the Russian General gathered his main strength; and this was the part of the field destined to be assailed by our troops. That portion of the Russian force which directly confronted the English army, consisted of 3400 cavalry, twenty-four battalions of infantry, and seven batteries of field-artillery, besides the fourteen heavy guns in the Great Redoubt, making together 23,400 men\* and eighty-six guns.

But besides this force, Prince Mentschikoff, at the commencement of the action, had posted across the great road leading down to the bridge a force of seven battalions of infantry,† with two batteries‡ of artillery. These troops he called his ‘Great Reserve;’ and they were, in fact, his last. Yet he held them so closely in rear of the battalions facing the bridge, that they might be regarded as forces actually operating in support. Plainly this disposition of his troops was governed by a keen anxiety to defend the great road and the Kourganè Hill—for it was so ordered that, to sustain the struggle there, it

* Twenty-four battalions at 750 each,	.	.	18,000
Three heavy batteries at 263 each,	.	.	789
Six light batteries at 210 artillerymen each,	.	.	1,260
Cavalry,	.	.	3,400
			<hr/>
	Men,	.	23,449
Nine batteries at 8 guns each,	.	.	72
Heavy guns from Sebastopol in the Great Redoubt,			14
			<hr/>
	Guns,	.	86

† The four battalions of the Volhynia corps, and three battalions, Nos. 1, 3, 4, of the Minsk corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

‡ The No. 4 and No. 5 light batteries of the 17th brigade of Artillery; Chodasiewicz and Anitchkoff differ.

would cost him but a few moments to bring his last reserves into action; and, in truth, he committed himself so deeply to this, his favourite part of the battle-field, that, when he afterwards endeavoured to shift a portion of his reserves towards his left, he was unable to make their strength tell.

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It will be seen, however, that in the course of the action the Prince took off to his left, to use against the French, three of the battalions belonging to his great reserve, and also moved in the same direction two light batteries, together with a few squadrons of Hussars, which formed, as it seems, his personal escort. So, omitting only from the calculation the change effected by moving those horsemen,\* it would follow that the whole force which, sooner or later, confronted the French, was a force of 13,000 men† and thirty-six guns; and that the force which confronted the English was a force of 26,000 men‡ with eighty-six guns.

The numbers actually opposed to the French and the English respectively.

The forces with which the Allied commanders prepared to assail this position were thus composed :

Forces of the Allies.

\* I omit these horsemen from the calculation because I do not know their number. Anitchkoff calls the body 'a portion of the Hussar brigade.' The French official account says the force was one of eight squadrons. I imagine that an estimate putting it at 400 would not be far from the truth.

† Strictly, 12,998. This figure is attained by adding to the 10,328 before given, the three battalions taken from the Great Reserve (at 750 each) and the 420 artillerymen of the two light batteries which were moved during the action.

‡ Strictly, 26,029. This figure is attained by adding to the 23,449 before detailed, the four battalions of the Great Reserve which were dealt with by English alone, and by subtracting the 420 artillerymen referred to in the preceding note.

**C H A P.** There were some 30,000 French infantry and artill-  
**XVI.** lerymen,\* with sixty-eight guns ; and, added to this  
 force, under the command of the Marshal St Arnaud,  
 was the division of 7000 Turkish infantry.† With  
 Lord Raglan, and present under arms, there was a  
 force of fully 1000 cavalry, 25,000 ‡ infantry and  
 artillerymen, and sixty pieces of field-artillery.§ In  
 all, the Allied armies advancing upon the Alma com-  
 prised near 63,000 men and 128 guns.

St Arnaud, with 37,000 men and sixty - eight  
 guns, and effectually supported by the fire of nine  
 war-steamers,|| was destined to confront a Russian  
 force of 13,000 men and thirty-six guns. The Eng-  
 lish, with 26,000 men¶ and sixty guns, had to deal  
 with a Russian force comprising, so to speak, the  
 same number of men,\*\* but having with it eighty-

\* ‘Précis Historique,’ pp. 101, 102, which gives 30,204 as the total, but that is a computation of the force embarked ; and, since cholera was prevailing, the deductions from strength between the 7th and the 20th of the month must have brought the numbers below 30,000.

† Ibid.

‡ Or, speaking more closely, 24,400. The ‘morning state’ which I have before me is of the 18th September, and it gives as present under arms (without including the cavalry, of which there was no ‘state’) a total of 26,004 officers and men, and, deducting the 1600 men detached under Colonel Torrens, there remained 24,404 infantry and artillerymen.

§ The official ‘state’ prepared for Lord Raglan gives two troops of horse-artillery, and only seven batteries, but it omits the battery attached to the 4th Division.

|| Official despatch of Admiral Hamelin.

¶ Or, speaking more closely, 25,404.

\*\* Speaking more strictly, the English were 25,400, and the Russians they dealt with 26,000. In that calculation, as in those preceding it, the change effected by moving the horsemen of the escort is left unnoticed ; but if that change be taken into account, by subtracting 400 (the estimated number of the horsemen who were moved) the numbers of the

six guns. Therefore the French had to do with somewhat more than one-third of the Russian force ; and the other two-thirds of it—two-thirds of it, speaking roughly—were left to the care of the English. St Arnaud was to his adversaries in a proportion not very far short of three to one ;\* Lord Raglan was, so to speak, equal in numbers to his adversaries, and was inferior to them in point of artillery by a difference of twenty-six guns.

That part of the position which was attacked by the French presented some physical obstacles to the advance of the assailants, but was not very strong in a military sense, and was defended by no field-works. The ground attacked by the English did not oppose great physical obstacles to the advance of the assailants, but it was intrenched, and, besides, was so formed by nature as to give great destructive power, and, by consequence, great strength, to an enemy defending it with the resources of modern warfare. The French were covered and supported on their right by the sea and the ships—on their left by the English army.† The English had the French on their right, but they marched with their

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The tasks  
under-  
taken by  
the French  
and the  
English re-  
spectively.

English would be only 200 less than those of the Russians with whom they had to deal.

\* Or, more strictly, 37 to 13.

† This sentence, perhaps, may help to elucidate the one which goes before it, by showing what is meant when soldiers speak of ‘ the strength of a position.’ In these days mere inert physical obstacles are commonly overcome or eluded ; and the security of the defender depends not in general upon those geographical features which would make access difficult for travellers, but rather upon such a conformation of ground as will give him the means of doing harm to his assailants.

CHAP. left flank quite bare; the French advanced upon  
 XVI. heights well surveyed from the sea. Except in an imperfect way from maps, the English knew nothing of the ground before them. No spies or deserters had come in.

### III.

Late in the evening of the 19th, Marshal St Arnaud, attended by Colonel Trochu, rode up to the little post-house on the Bulganak in which Lord Raglan had established his quarters. He came to concert a plan of attack for the following day.

Confer-  
ence the  
night be-  
fore the  
battle be-  
tween St  
Arnaud  
and Lord  
Raglan.

The  
French  
plan.

From on board their ships the French had long been busily engaged in surveying the enemy's position, and by this time they had gathered a good deal of knowledge of that part of the ground which lies near the sea-shore. They had ascertained, or found means of inferring, that the stream was fordable at its mouth, and they moreover assured themselves that, at the time of their last observations, the West Cliff was not occupied in strength by the enemy. Upon these important discoveries Marshal St Arnaud based his plan of attack. He proposed that the war-steamers, closing in as nearly as was practicable, should move parallel with the land-forces, and a little in advance; that, under cover of their fire, a portion of the French force should advance along the shore and seize the West Cliff; and that this movement should be followed up by a resolute, vigorous, and unremitting attack

upon the enemy's left flank and left front.\* M. C H A P.  
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St Arnaud was at this time free from pain ; and, knowing that now, at last, he had an enemy in his front, and that a great conflict was near at hand, he seemed to be fired with a more than healthy energy. Sometimes in English, sometimes in the rapid words of his own tongue, and always with vehement gesture, he laboured to show how sure it was that the attack from his right centre would be fierce, unrelenting, decisive. Lord Raglan, cast in another mould, sat quiet, with governed features, restraining—or only, perhaps, postponing—his smiles, listening graciously, assenting, or not dissenting, putting forward no plan of his own, and, in short, eluding discussion. This method, perhaps, was instinctive with him ; but, in his intercourse with the French, he followed it deliberately and upon system. He never forgot that to keep good our relations with the French was his great duty ; and, studying how best to avert the danger of misunderstandings, he had already made it his maxim that there was hardly any danger so great as the danger of controversy. Whether in any even small degree the English General had been brought to share the opinion entertained of M. St Arnaud in the French capital and in the French army, the world will never know. Of a certainty, Lord Raglan dealt as though he held it to be a clear gain to be able to avoid intrusting

The part  
taken by  
Lord Rag-  
lan at the  
confer-  
ence.

\* The plan was like that of the great Frederick at Leuthen, but with the difference that the force advancing to turn the enemy's left was to be covered and supported by fire from the shipping.

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the Marshal with a knowledge of what our army would be likely to undertake ; but my belief is that this, his seemingly guarded method, was not so much based upon anything which may have come to his ears from Paris or from the French camp, but rather upon his desire to ward off controversy, and upon his true native English dislike of all premature planning. He was so sure of his troops, and so conscious of his own power to act swiftly when the occasion might come, that, although he was now within half a march of the enemy's assembled forces, he did not at all long to ruffle his mind with projects—with projects for the attack of a position not hitherto reconnoitred.

M. St Arnaud's plan of turning the enemy's left was to be executed by the French army, with the aid of the shipping ; and the part which the English land-forces should take in the action was a matter distinct. But for this, also, the French commander and his military counsellors had carefully taken thought.

French  
plan for  
the opera-  
tions of the  
English  
army.

To illustrate the operations which he proposed, M. St Arnaud produced a rough map, — a map slightly and rapidly drawn, yet traced with that spirit and significance which are characteristic of French military sketches. In this sketch Bosquet's Division and the Turkish troops were represented as effecting the turning movement on the enemy's left ; and the 1st and 3d French Divisions were shown to be so deployed, and so placed, that, in the order of attack assigned to them by the sketch, they would





General Plan of the "Battle of the Clouds" prepared by the Staff of the Russian Army, 1905

PROJET POUR LA BATAILLE DE LA MA  
préparé le 19 au soir et exécuté le 20 Nov 1905

Redoute

Redoute

Position des Russes

Armée anglaise tournant la droite ennemie

pour l'attaque

et ligne des 20 à 30 divisions

et ligne des 20 à 30 divisions

et ligne des 20 à 30 divisions

et ligne des 20 à 30 divisions

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confront almost the whole face of the enemy's position, leaving only one or two battalions to be dealt with in front by the English troops.\* So, to find some occupation for the English, the sketch represented our army as filing away obliquely, in order to turn the enemy's right flank. Of course this plan rested entirely upon the assumption that the enemy's front would be fully occupied (as represented in the sketch) by the French attack.

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Lord Raglan's experience or instinct told him that no such plan as this could go for much until the assailing forces should come to measure their line with that of the enemy. So, without either combating or accepting the suggestion addressed to him, he simply assured the Marshal that he might rely upon the vigorous co-operation of the British army. The French plan seems to have made little impression on Lord Raglan's mind. He foresaw, perhaps, that the ingenuity of the evening would be brought to nothingness by the teachings of the morrow.

Whilst the French Marshal was striving, in his vehement way, to convey an idea of the vigour with which he would conduct the attack, his appointed adviser, Colonel Trochu, whose mission it was to moderate the fire of his chief, thought it right to interpose with a question of a practical kind — a

St Ar-  
naud's de-  
meanour.

\* See the facsimile of this plan, taken from the 'Pièces Officielles,' published by the French Government.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

My justification for saying (in the corner of the plan) that it was 'untruly stated to have been accepted by Lord Raglan,' will be found in succeeding pages, and in particular at pp. 259, 276, 277.—*Note to 4th Edition*

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question as to the time and place for relieving the French soldiers of their packs. Instantly, if so one may speak, St Arnaud reared, for Trochu had touched him with the curb, and in the presence, too, of Lord Raglan. He angrily suppressed the question of the packs as one of mere detail. Yet, on the afternoon of the morrow, that question of the packs was destined to recur, and to govern the movements of the whole French army.

Before the Marshal and Lord Raglan parted, it was agreed that Bosquet with his Division should advance at five o'clock in the morning, and that, two hours later, the rest of the Allied forces should begin their march upon the enemy's position.

Result of  
the con-  
ference.

This determination as to the time for marching was almost the only fruit which St Arnaud drew from the interview. He had thought to engage his colleague in the plan contrived for the guidance of the English at the French headquarters; but when he came to be in the presence of the English General, he unconsciously yielded, as other men commonly did, to the spell of his personal ascendancy; and although he showed the sketch, and may have uttered, perhaps, a few hurried words to explain its meaning, he did not effectually bring himself to proffer advice to Lord Raglan. Either he altogether omitted the intended counsel, or else he so slurred it over as not to win for it any grave notice from even the most careful of listeners.

When the conference ended, Lord Raglan came out with his guests to the door of the hut. M. St

Arnaud mounted his horse, and was elate ; but he was elate, not with the knowledge of having achieved a purpose, but rather, it would seem, from the sense of that singular comfort which anxious men always derived from the mere power of Lord Raglan's presence. Perhaps, when the Marshal reached his quarters, he began to see that, after all, there was a gulf between him and the English General, and that, notwithstanding his energy and boldness, he had been unaccountably hindered from passing it.

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#### IV.

It had been determined that the troops should get under arms without bugle or drum.

March of  
the Allies.

Silently, therefore, on the morning of the 20th of September 1854, the men of the Allied armies rose from their bivouac, and made ready for the march which was to bring them into the presence of the enemy. It was so early as half-past five that Bosquet, with the 2d French Division and the Turkish battalions, began his march along the coast ; and at seven o'clock the main body of the French army was under arms and ready to march. But the position taken up by the English for the defence of the Allied armies on the Bulganak had imposed upon Lord Raglan the necessity of showing a front towards the east ; and for the Divisions so employed a long and toilsome evolution was needed in order to bring them into the general order of march.\* At

Causes de-  
laying the  
march of  
the Eng-  
lish army.

\* Those divisions had been posted nearly at right angles to the front

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that time too, there was a broad interval between our extreme right and Prince Napoleon's Division. Moreover, the line of the coast which the armies were to follow trended away towards the south-west, forming an obtuse angle with the course of the stream (the Bulganak) on which the Allies had bivouacked; and in the movement requisite for adjusting the front of the Allied forces to the direction of the shore, the English, marching upon the exterior arc, had to undergo more labour than those who moved near the pivot on which the variation of front was effected.\*


This was not all. The baggage-train accompanying our forces, though small in comparison with the encumbrances usually attending an army in the field, was large as compared with that of the French; and Lord Raglan (whose favourite anxiety was concerning his reserve ammunition) refused to allow the convoy to be stripped of protection. The oblique movement of the troops towards their right was tending to leave the convoy uncovered; and in order that it should be again enfolded, as in the previous day's order of march, it was necessary to move it far towards our right. Lord Raglan insisted that this should be done; so on the morning of the long-expected battle, and with the enemy in front, St

line, and the segment in which the troops would have to wheel in order to get into the line of march would be nearly 90 degrees.

\* Several military reports and documents explain this, but the plan prepared by the French Government shows with admirable clearness the nature of the evolution which the English army had to perform. See the Plan.

Arnaud and the whole French army, and the English army too, chafed bitterly at the delay they had to endure whilst strings of bullock-carts were slowly dragged westward into the true line of march. Besides, the enemy's cavalry gave the English no leave to examine the ground towards which they were marching; and whilst the French, being next to the sea, could make straight for the cliff already reconnoitred from the ships, the English army advanced without knowledge of that part of the position which it was to confront, and was twice compelled to make laborious changes in the direction of its march. Therefore, for much of the delay which occurred there were good reasons; but not for all. Sir George Brown had been directed on the night of the 19th to advance on the morrow at seven o'clock, and he imagined—it is strange if he, of all men, with his great knowledge of such things, was wrong upon a point of military usage—he imagined that the order would be repeated in the morning, and he waited accordingly. Also the English troops moved slowly. Time was growing to be of high worth, and from causes which justified a good deal, though not quite all, of their delay, the English at this time were behindhand.

In order that the operations of the day might be adjusted to the time which the English army required, orders were sent forward suspending for a while the advance of Bosquet's column; and at nine o'clock the main body of the French army came to a halt, and cooked their coffee. Whilst they



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rested, our troops, by moving obliquely towards their right, were slowly overcoming the distance which divided them from the French left, and were at the same time working their way through the angle which measured their divergence from the line of march.

Of those composing an armed force there are few who understand the hindrances which block its progress ; and naturally the French were vexed by the delay which seemed to be caused by the slowness of the English army. They, however, conformed with great care to the tardiness of our advance, and even allowed our army to gain upon them ; for when the Allies reached the ground which sloped down towards the Alma, the heads of our leading columns were abreast of the French skirmishers.\*

Meanwhile the Allied steamers had been seeking opportunities for bringing their guns to bear, and at twenty minutes past ten they opened fire.† One or two

\* Lord Raglan was amongst those who observed this fact, and he stated it in a letter which is before me.

† Private MS. by Mr Romaine, the Judge-Advocate. I may here say generally, to avoid repeated notes, that, whenever I speak of an event as happening at a time stated with exactness, I do so on the authority of Romaine. He was a man so gifted with long sight, as well as with power of estimating numbers, and, though a civilian, was so thoroughly apt for military business, that Lord Raglan used at a later time to call him ‘the eye of the army.’ During the action he rode an old hunter, steady enough to allow him to write without quitting his saddle ; so, whenever he observed a change in the progress of the action, he took out his watch and pocket-book and made at the minute the memoranda on which I rely. I am, therefore, very certain that the spaces of time intervening between any two events spoken of in this precise way were exactly those which I give ; but I have reason to think that the watches of men in the different camps had been differently set.

of their missiles, though at a very long range, reached some of those Russian battalions which stood posted in rear of the Telegraph. C H A P.  
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At half-past eleven o'clock the English right had got into direct contact with the French left, and our Light and 2d Divisions were marching in the same alignment as the 1st and 3d Divisions of our French Allies.

### V.

Twice again there were protracted halts. The last of these took place at a distance of about a mile and a half from the banks of the Alma. From the spot where the forces were halted the ground sloped gently down to the river's side; and though some men lay prostrate under the burning sun, with little thought except of fatigue, there were others who keenly scanned the ground before them, well knowing that now at last the long-expected conflict would begin. They could make out the course of the river from the dark belt of gardens and vineyards which marked its banks; and men with good eyes could descry a slight seam running across a rising-ground beyond the river, and could see, too, some dark squares or oblongs, encroaching like small patches of culture upon the broad downs. The seam was the Great Redoubt; the square-looking marks that stained the green sides of the hills were an army in order of battle.

The last  
halt of the  
Allies be-  
fore the  
battle.

That 20th of September on the Alma was like some



**C H A P.** remembered day of June in England, for the sun  
**XVI** was unclouded, and the soft breeze of the morning had lulled to a breath at noontide, and was creeping faintly along the hills. It was then that in the Allied armies there occurred a singular pause of sound—a pause so general as to have been observed and remembered by many in remote parts of the ground, and so marked that its interruption by the mere neighing of an angry horse seized the attention of thousands ; and although this strange silence was the mere result of weariness and chance, it seemed to carry a meaning ; for it was now that, after near forty years of peace, the great nations of Europe were once more meeting for battle.

Even after the sailing of the expedition, the troops had been followed by reports that the war, after all, would be stayed ; and the long frequent halts, and the quiet of the armies on the sunny slope, seemed to harmonise with the idea of disbelief in the coming of the long-promised fight. But in the midst of this repose Sir Colin Campbell said to one of his officers, ‘ This will be a good time for the men to get loose ‘ half their cartridges ; ’\* and when the command travelled on along the ranks of the Highlanders, it lit up the faces of the men one after another, assuring them that now at length, and after long expectance, they indeed would go into action. They began obeying the order, and with beaming joy, for they came of

\* The cartridges are delivered to each man in a packet, and, to avoid loss of time in presence of the enemy, a sufficient number should be ‘ shaken loose ’ before the troops are brought into action.

a warlike race ; yet not without emotion of a graver kind—they were young soldiers, new to battle.

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## VI.

Lord Raglan now crossed the front of Prince Napoleon's Division in order to meet Marshal St Arnaud, whose guidon was seen coming towards our lines.\* The two commanders rode forward together, inclining towards their left. No one was with them. They rode on till they came to one of those mounds or tumuli, of which there were many on the steppe. From that spot they scrutinised the enemy's position with their field-glasses.

Meeting  
between  
M. St  
Arnaud  
and Lord  
Raglan.

At this interview no change was made in that portion of the plan which determined that the French should turn the enemy's left ; but the part to be taken by the English was still in question, and St Arnaud threw out or revived the idea of a flank movement by the English on the enemy's right.† Lord Raglan, however, now gazed upon the real ground which the French counsellors of the night before had striven to scan in their imaginations, and, having an eye for country, he must have begun to see the truth. He must have begun to see that the

\* They had met before at about half-past nine, but the Russian cavalry had not then quitted the heights, and they were obliged to postpone their reconnaissance.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

When the Marshal got near, he was cheered by the English soldiery. Pleased with the compliment, he lifted his hat, and said (speaking in English and with only a slight accent)—‘ Hurrah for Old England ! ’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Inferred from what follows.

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XVI. French, hugging the sea-shore, and pouring two-fifths of their whole force against the undefended part of the opposite heights, would not only fail to confront the whole Russian army in the way promised by the sketch, but would in reality confront only a small portion of it, leaving to the English the duty of facing the enemy along two-thirds of their whole front. Of a certainty he did not entertain for a moment the idea of making a flank attack, but it was not according to his nature to explain to men their errors, and it seems he spoke so little that St Arnaud did not yet know what the English General would do ;\* but presently a general officer rode up and joined the two chiefs. Then the Marshal, closing his telescope, turned to Lord Raglan and asked him ‘whether he would turn the position ‘or attack it in front?’ Lord Raglan’s answer was to the effect, that, ‘with such a body of cavalry as the ‘enemy had in the plain, he would not attempt to ‘turn the position.’†

Whilst the chiefs were still side by side, it being now one o’clock, the advance sounded along the lines, and the French and the English armies moved forward close abreast. The Marshal then rode off towards his centre.

\* Inferred from what follows.

† This disposes of the notion which seems to have been really entertained by many of the French—the notion that Lord Raglan stood engaged to turn the enemy’s right.

## VII.

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The orders for the advance were sent forward to Bosquet ; and, as soon as they reached him, he threw out skirmishers and moved forward in two columns. His right column was the brigade commanded by General Bouat ; the left column was Autemarre's brigade. Each brigade, massed in column,\* was followed by its share of the artillery belonging to the Division ; and Bouat's brigade was followed by the whole of the Turkish Division except two battalions. Towards Bosquet's left, but far in his rear, there moved forward the 1st Division under Canrobert, and the 3d Division under Prince Napoleon. These two divisions advanced in the same alignment. The 4th Division, under General Forey, marched in rear of the 1st and 3d Divisions, and two Turkish battalions escorted the baggage.†

Bosquet's  
advance.He divides  
his force.

The formation of Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions was upon two lines. The first brigade of each division was in front and deployed,‡ and the second brigade of each division followed the first brigade, and was massed in column.§

Disposi-  
tion of the  
main body  
of the  
French  
army.

The 4th French Division marched in the same order as the 1st and 3d Divisions, except that its leading brigade was not deployed. The artillery

\* Regiments in column at section distance.

† 'Précis Historique' mainly.

‡ Not deployed into 'line,' according to the English plan, but merely brought into a formation, which, leaving each battalion massed, places them all in the same alignment.

§ Regiments in column at section distance.

CHAP. of each division was enfolded between its two  
 XVI. brigades.

Of the  
 English  
 army.

On the immediate left of Prince Napoleon, Sir De Lacy Evans marched, with the troops of his Division massed in battalion columns,\* and was followed by the 3d Division in column. The batteries belonging to each of these divisions marched on its right or inner flank.

Immediately on Sir De Lacy's left, the Light Division, preceded by Norcott† with a wing of the 2d Rifle battalion in skirmishing order, moved forward under Sir George Brown. The Division was

\* In contiguous battalion columns right in front at battalion distance. Sir De Lacy's touched Prince Napoleon's Division, and it was thought right to assimilate its order of march to that adopted by the Prince.

† In both of the places where it occurs in this and the next page, the name of Lawrence should be substituted for that of Norcott. It was on the flank of the division that Norcott was moving with the left wing of the 2d Rifle battalion.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

I may here say that I was led into the error of omitting Colonel Lawrence's name in this and in several other places by what I must call the erroneous wording of Sir George Brown's Report to Lord Raglan. I say 'erroneous,' because, though Sir George Brown does not, in terms, deny that the right wing of the 2d battalion of Rifles was fighting in front of his Division, he suppresses all mention of its achievements, and this in a despatch which gives a prominent place to the operations of the left wing under Major Norcott. In excuse for the error into which I was led by trusting too implicitly to Sir George Brown's Report, I may say that Lord Raglan also trusted to it, and was obviously misled by it into the adoption of the same mistake ; for although we now know that Lawrence and the men of the right wing were among the foremost of those who stormed the redoubt, Lord Raglan—seeing no mention of this in Sir George Brown's Report, and observing that Sir George specially spoke of Major Norcott's wing as taking part with the 23d Regiment in the capture of the redoubt—was induced to speak of the aid given by Major Norcott and the left wing of the Rifles, without speaking at all of the right wing, which was also taking a foremost part in the storming of the redoubt, under the orders of Colonel Lawrence.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

massed in column,\* and had the front and left flank covered by riflemen in extended order. It was supported by the 1st Division under the Duke of Cambridge, and that in turn was followed by the 4th Division† under Sir George Cathcart. Sir George Cathcart, however, in accordance with a suggestion made by himself, was authorised to take ground to his left, and place his force in échelon to the 1st Division.‡

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The three great infantry columns thus composing the left wing of our army were covered in front, left flank, and rear, by riflemen in extended order, and by the cavalry. The battery belonging to each division marched on its right or inner flank.

But soon, Major Norcott§ with his riflemen got on so far in advance as to provoke a fire from the Russian skirmishers, then swarming in the vineyards below, and some rifle-balls shot from that quarter came dropping into the ground near the column formed by the Light Division. Almost at the same moment, the artillerymen on the Russian heights began to try their range ; and although the air was so clear that our men could see and watch the flight of the cannon-balls thrown at so long a range, it seemed prudent for

\* In double column of companies from the centre.

† Minus the 63d and two companies of the 46th, left under the command of General Torrens at the place of disembarkation. The force actually with Sir George during the action consisted of the 20th, 21st, and 68th Regiments, the 1st battalion of Rifles, and Townsend's battery.

‡ Sir George Cathcart marched with the head of his column (at quarter distance right in front) in line with the rear companies of the 1st Division.

§ See note on preceding page.

**C H A P.** our leading divisions to go into line. Those divisions,  
**XVI.** therefore, were halted, and their deployment immediately began.

The leading Divisions of the English army deploy into line.

In deploying, Sir De Lacy Evans, being pressed upon by Prince Napoleon's Division on his right, was compelled to take ground to his left, and to encroach upon a part of the space which Sir George Brown had expected to occupy with his Division.

The Light Division not on its right ground.

The deployment of the Light Division was effected by each regiment with beautiful precision,\* but, unhappily, the division was not on its right ground.

Sir George Brown was near-sighted, and had not accustomed himself to repair the defect, as some commanders have done, by a constant and well-practised use of glasses; and, on the other hand, the very fire and energy of his nature, and his almost violent sense of duty, prevented him from getting into the habit of trusting to the eyes of other men. For hours in the early morning the Division had been wearied by having to incline towards its right. At half-past eleven the effort was reversed, and the Division then laboured to take ground to its left; but in that last direction it had not taken ground enough. Lord Raglan, with his quick eye, had seen the fault, and sent an order† to have it corrected. Not content with this, he soon after rode up to the Division, and, failing to see Sir George Brown at the moment, told Codrington that the Division must take

\* The deployment was upon the two centre companies of the division. Whilst the movement was proceeding, one man, a sergeant, was killed by a rifle-ball. This was probably the first death in our lines.

† Colonel Lysons carried it.

more ground to the left. Then, unhappily, when he had uttered the very words which would have thrown the British army into its true array, and averted much evil, Lord Raglan was checked by his ruling foible. He had already sent the order to the divisional general, and he could not bear to pain or embarrass him by pressing the execution of it upon one of his brigadiers ; so he recalled his wholesome words.\* The Division failed to take ground enough to the left ; and when the deployment was complete, Sir George Brown had the grief of seeing his right regiment (the 7th Fusiliers) overlapped by the left—nay, even by the centre—of Pennefather's brigade.† The fault was not retrieved : it was fruitful of confusion.

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The artillery attached to our two leading divisions was now also drawn up in line, and Sir George Brown reckoned that he alone showed a front extending to nearly a mile.

At the same time, the Duke of Cambridge, at Sir George Brown's request, altered the formation of his Division by distributing it into a line of columns.‡

These changes having been completed, the English army resumed its march ; and the leading divisions coming more closely within range, and being a little galled by the enemy's fire, Sir George Brown halted,

The march  
continued.

\* I derive my knowledge from an officer who heard Lord Raglan's words.

† When the deployment took place, the 7th Fusiliers was in rear of the 95th Regiment ; and it afterwards, as will be seen, marched through it.

‡ ' A line of contiguous quarter-distance columns.'



**C H A P.** and tried the experiment of wheeling into open  
**XVI.** column. Afterwards, however, he returned to his  
 line-formation, and in that order marched forward.\*

## VIII.

So now the whole Allied armies, hiding nothing of their splendour and their strength, descended slowly into the valley ; and the ground on the right bank of the river is so even and so gentle in its slope, and on the left bank so commanding, that every man of the invaders could be seen from the opposite heights.

Spectacle  
 presented  
 to the  
 Russians  
 by the  
 advance  
 of the  
 Allies.

The Russian officers had been accustomed all their days to military inspections and vast reviews, but they now saw before them that very thing for the confronting of which their lives had been one long rehearsal. They saw a European army coming down in order of battle—an army arrayed in no spirit of mimicry, and not at all meant to aid their endless study of tactics, but honestly marching against them, with a mind to carry their heights and take their lives. And gazing with keen and critical eyes upon this array of strangers, whose homes were in lands far away, they looked upon a phenomenon which raised their curiosity and their wonder, and which promised, too, to throw some new light on a notion they had lately been forming.

\* My knowledge respecting the movements and evolutions of our infantry divisions is derived mainly from original MSS. in my possession, written by Sir George Brown, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, and Sir George Cathcart.

The whole anxiety of Prince Mentschikoff had been for his right. If he could hold the main Pass, and scare the Allies from all endeavour to turn his right flank, he believed himself safe ; and it had been clear long ago that his conflict in this part of the field would be with the English. It was therefore the more useful to try to spread amongst the Russian troops an idea that the English, all-powerful at sea, were thoroughly worthless as soldiers.

The working of this little cheat had been hitherto aided by circumstance. With the force under Mentschikoff there were two battalions of Russian seamen ; and these men, partly from their clumsiness in manœuvring, partly from their sailor-like whims, and partly, no doubt, from the mere fact of their being a small and peculiar minority, had become a subject of merriment to the soldiery of the regular land-forces. The Russian soldiery, therefore, were prepared to receive the impression that the red-coats now discernible in the distance were battalions of sailors, men of no more use in a land engagement than their own derided seamen. This idea had fastened so well upon the mind of the Russian army, that before the battle began it was shared by some of the more illiterate of the officers, and even, it was said, in one instance by a general of division.

But the sight now watched with keen eyes from the enemy's heights was one which seemed to have some bearing upon the rumour that the English were powerless in a land engagement. The French and the Turks were in the deep, crowded masses which

C H A P.  
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Notion which the Russian soldiers had been taught to entertain of the English army.

Surprise at the sight of the English array.

C H A P.  
XVI.

every soldier of the Czar had been accustomed to look upon as the formations needed for battle ; but, to the astonishment of the Russian officers, the leading divisions of the men in red were massed in no sort of column, and were clearly seen coming on in a slender line—a line only two deep, yet extending far from east to west. They could not believe that with so fine a thread as that the English General was really intending to confront their massive columns.\* Yet the English troops had no idea that their formation was so singular as to be strange in the eyes of military Europe. Wars long past had taught them that they were gifted with the power of fighting in this order, and it was as a matter of course that, upon coming within range, they had gone at once into line.

Fire from  
the ship-  
ping.

Meanwhile, the war-steamers—eight French and one English—had pushed forward along the shore in single file, moving somewhat in advance of the land-forces ; and now, at twenty-five minutes past one o'clock, the leading vessels opened fire against the four guns at the village of Ulukul Akles, and again tried the skill of their gunners upon the distant masses of infantry which occupied the Telegraph Height and the low flat ledge at its base. Convinced that his chief had been guilty of a grievous error in placing the Taroutine and the militia battalions on this low narrow ledge, General Kiriakoff, who commanded in this part of the field, had tried by indirect means to procure a change of plan, but had not ventured to say anything on the subject to Prince

Movement  
made  
without  
orders by  
the Tarou-  
tine and  
the 'Mili-  
'tia' bat-  
talions.

\* Chodasiewicz.

Mentschikoff himself. It is plain, however, that Kiriakoff's opinion, getting abroad, was adopted by the officers of these two corps ; for first the militia battalions, and then the battalions of the Taroutine corps, without orders, and without having been assailed or touched (except perhaps by a chance shot or two at very long range from the shipping), began a retrograde movement, and slowly ascended the steep hill till they gained a more commanding position at no great distance from the Telegraph. No effort was made to check this seemingly spontaneous movement.\*

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## IX.

At half-past one o'clock a round-shot from the opposite heights came ripping the ground near Lord Raglan, and it marked the opening of the battle between the contending land-forces ; for in the next instant the enemy began to direct a steady cannonade against the English line. At first no one fell ; but presently an artilleryman riding in front of his gun bent forward his head, handled the reins with a convulsive grasp, and then, uttering a loud inarticulate sound, fell dead. The peace of Europe had been so long, that to many men the sight was a new one ; and of the young soldiers who stood near, some imagined that their comrade had fallen down in a sudden fit ; for they hardly yet knew that for

Half-past  
one  
o'clock.  
Cannon-  
ade di-  
rected  
against  
the Eng-  
lish line.

\* General Kiriakoff's statement, confirmed by Romaine, who observed and noted the movement. The General thought the change of position requisite ; but he admits that a retrograde movement of this kind, just before the commencement of the battle, was a grave evil.

C H A P.  
XVI

the most part, in modern warfare, death comes as though sent by blind chance, no one knows from whence or from whom.

Men of  
our lead-  
ing divi-  
sions or-  
dered to  
lie down.  
The First  
Division  
deployed  
into line.

Since the enemy's artillery fire had now become brisk, our leading infantry divisions were halted, and the men ordered to lie down. Soon afterwards it was found that the 1st Division had also come within range, and it was then forthwith thrown into line. In preparing for this manœuvre, the Duke of Cambridge took care that ground should not be wanting. Both on his right and on his left he took more ground than had been occupied by the division which marched in his front. Whilst the Light Division in his front was jammed in and entangled with the 2d Division, the Duke had the happiness of seeing his Guards and Highlanders well extended, and competent to act along the whole length of that superb line. The effect of this deployment was, that the extreme right of the Duke's line became a force operating in support of the 2d Division, and that a part of his Highland Brigade, reaching much further eastward than the extreme left of the Light Division, became in that part of the field the true front of the British line. When this manœuvre was completed, the men of the 1st Division lay down.

Sir  
Richard  
England  
ordered  
to sup-  
port the  
Guards.

Observing the extent of ground occupied by the 1st Division, Lord Raglan at once saw that the 3d Division would not have room to manœuvre in the same alignment with the Duke of Cambridge. He therefore ordered Sir Richard England to support

the Guards. It was this, or some other order sent nearly at the same time, which, for some reason, good or fanciful, Lord Raglan chose to have carried quietly. The directions had been given, and the aide-de-camp was whirling round his charger, in order to take a swift flight with the message, when Lord Raglan stopped him, and said, 'Go quietly; don't gallop.' He seemed to like that whenever the enemy pointed a field-glass towards the English headquarters he should look upon a scene of tranquillity and leisure.

Our batteries tried their range, but without effect, and they ceased to fire, reserving their strength for the time when they would come to close quarters.

The batteries on the Telegraph Height did not yet open fire upon the French columns.

Lord Raglan conceived that the operation determined upon by the French ought to take full effect before he engaged the English army in an assault upon the enemy's heights; and perhaps, if the whole body of the Allies had been one people, under the command of one general, their advance would have been effected in *échelon*, and the left would have been kept out of fire whilst the effort on the right was in progress; but the pride of nations must sometimes be suffered to deflect the course of armies; and although there was no military value in any of the ground north of the vineyards, Lord Raglan, it seems, did not like to withhold his infantry whilst the French were executing their forward

**C H A P.** movement. Since our soldiers lay facing downwards  
**XVI.** upon the smooth slope which looked against the enemy's batteries, they were seen, every man of them, from head to foot, by the Russian artillerymen, and they drew upon themselves a studious fire from thirty guns.

Fire undergone by our men whilst lying down.

Thus the first trial our men underwent in the action was a trial of passive, enduring courage. They had to lie down, with no duty to perform, except the duty of being motionless; and they made it their pastime to watch the play of the engines worked for their destruction—to watch the jet of smoke—the flash—the short, momentous interval—and then, happily and most often, the twang through the air above, and the welcome sound of the shot at length imbedded in earth. But sometimes, without knowing whence it came, a man would suddenly know the feel of a rushing blast and a mighty shock, and would find himself bespattered with the brains of the comrade who had just been speaking to him. When this happened, two of the comrades of the man killed would get up and gently lift the quivering body, carry it a few paces in rear of the line, then quietly return to their ranks, and again lie down.\* This sort of trial is well borne by our troops. They are so framed by nature, that, if only they know clearly what they have to do, or to leave undone, they are pleased and animated, nay, even soothed, by a little

\* Casualties of this sort were going on here and there along our line, but the exact incident described in the text was observed in the 30th Regiment.

danger. For, besides that they love strife, they love the arbitrament of chance ; and a game where death is the forfeit has a strange, gloomy charm for them. Among the guns ranged on the opposite heights to take his life a man would single out his favourite, and make it feminine for the sake of endearment. There was hardly perhaps a gun in the Great Redoubt which failed to be called by some corrupt variation of 'Mary' or 'Elizabeth.' It was plain that our infantry could be in a kindly humour whilst lying down under fire. They did not perhaps like the duty so well as an animating charge with the bayonet ; but if they were to be judged from their demeanour, they preferred it to a church parade. They were in their most gracious temper. Often, when an officer rode past them, they would give him the fruit of their steady and protracted view, and advise him to move a little on one side or the other to avoid a coming shot. And this the men would do, though they themselves, however well their quickened sight might warn them of the coming shot, lay riveted to the earth by duty.

C H A P.  
XVI.

## X.

The level posture of our infantry threw into strong prominence the figure of every mounted man who rode along their lines ; but the group of horsemen composing or following the Headquarter Staff was so marked by the white flowing plumes of the officers, that at a distance of a mile and a half it was a conspicuous object to the naked eye ; and a Russian



C H A P.  
XVI.

Cannon-  
ade di-  
rected  
against  
Lord  
Raglan  
and his  
Staff.

artilleryman at the Causeway batteries could make out, with a common field-glass, that of the two or three officers generally riding abreast at the head of the plumed cavalcade, there was one, in a dark blue frock, whose right arm hung ending in an empty sleeve. In truth, Lord Raglan, at this time, was so often standing still, or else was riding along the line of our prostrate infantry at so leisurely a pace, that he and the group about him could not fail to become a mark for the Russian artillery. The enemy did not, as it seemed, begin this effort malignantly ; and at first, perhaps, he had no further thought than that of subjecting the English Headquarters to an ordinary cannonade, and forcing them to choose a more retired ground for their surveys.

Still, as might be expected, the Russian artillerymen could not easily brook the conclusion that, whilst the English General chose to remain under their eyes and within range, it was beyond the power of their skill to bend him from his path, or even, as it seemed, to break the thread of his conversation ; so, at length growing earnest, they opened fire upon the group from a great number of guns—but in vain, for none of the Staff at this time were struck. Failing with round-shot, the enemy tried shells—shells with the fuses so cut as to burst them in the air a little above the white plumes. This method was tried so industriously and with so much skill, that a few feet over the heads of Lord Raglan and those around him there was kept up for a long time an almost constant bursting

of shells. Sometimes the missiles came singly, and sometimes in so thick a flight that several would be exploding nearly at the same moment, or briskly one after the other, right and left, and all around. The fragments of the shells, when they burst, tore their shrill way down from above, harshly sawing the air ; and when the novice heard the rush of the shattered missile along his right ear, and then along his left, and imagined that he felt the wind of another fragment of shell come rasping the cloth on his shoulders almost at the same moment, it seemed to him hardly possible that the iron shower would leave one man of the group untouched. But the truth is, that a fragment of shell rending the air with its jagged edges may sound much nearer than it is. None of the Staff were wounded at this time.

Some of the suite were half vexed and half angry ; for they knew the value of their chief's life, and they conceived that he was affronting great risk without due motive, and from mere inattention to danger. The storm of missiles generally fell most thickly when Lord Raglan happened to be riding near the great road ; for the enemy, having got the range at that point, always laboured to make the bursting of his shells coincide with the moment when our Headquarters were passing. This soon came to be understood, and thenceforth, when the Headquarter group were going to cross the Causeway, they rode at it briskly as at a leap, and spanned it with one or two strides, thus leaving the prepared storm of

CHAP. shells to burst a little behind them. This effort of  
 XVI. the Russian artillery against Lord Raglan and the  
 group surrounding him lasted a long time, and was  
 carried on upon a scale better proportioned to the  
 destruction of a whole division than to the mere  
 object of warning off a score of horsemen. If the  
 fire thus expended had been brought to bear on  
 Pennefather's brigade, it might have maimed the  
 English line in a vital part of the field.

## XI.


The Allies  
 could now  
 measure  
 their front  
 with that  
 of the  
 enemy.

The bear-  
 ing which  
 this ad-  
 measure-  
 ment had  
 upon the  
 plan which  
 the French  
 had pro-  
 posed to  
 the Eng-  
 lish.

The time was now come when the Allies could  
 measure their front with the enemy's position. It  
 will be remembered that the plan\* proposed to Lord  
 Raglan the night before by Marshal St Arnaud rested  
 upon the assumption that the whole of the enemy's  
 forces except two or three battalions would be con-  
 fronted by the French army, and that, therefore,  
 the only opportunity for important service which the  
 English army could find would be that of making a  
 great flank-movement against the enemy's right;  
 but it had long become plain that only a portion of  
 the Russian army would be met by the French, and  
 that, in providing a front to show against the main  
 body of the Russian army, there remained to the  
 English an ample field of duty; and now that the  
 invading armies had come within cannon-shot range,  
 it began to be seen that the entire front presented by  
 the 1st and 3d French Divisions, and by our 2d and

\* See the *facsimile*.

Light Divisions, would be only just commensurate with the length of the position which the Russian commander was occupying. C H A P.  
XVI.



Of course, therefore, if Lord Raglan had not already rejected the French plan of a flank attack by our forces, it would have now fallen to the ground. It had never made any impression on his mind.\*

The Allies were now so close to the enemy's position that the General of each of the five leading divisions could form a judgment as to the particular sphere of action which awaited him. To Bosquet the advance against the West Cliff had long ago been assigned. Canrobert faced towards the White Homestead and those spurs of the Telegraph Height which lie towards the west. Prince Napoleon confronted

The ground which each of the leading divisions had to assail.

\* I infer this from the fact that those with whom Lord Raglan was thoroughly confidential in such matters never heard him speak of it. Lord Raglan, as we saw, distinctly and finally rejected the plan at the close of his interview with St Arnaud. It became a plan simply preposterous as soon as it was apparent that St Arnaud would not confront any part of the Russian army except their left wing ; for to make two flank-movements, one against the enemy's left and the other against his right, and to do this without having any force wherewith to confront the enemy's centre, would have been a plan requiring no comment to show its absurdity. The French accounts, whether official or quasi-official, have always persisted in saying that Lord Raglan had engaged, and afterwards failed to make, a movement on the enemy's right flank. This is the only reason why the matter requires anything like careful elucidation.

**C H A P.** the centre and the eastern steeps of the Telegraph  
**XVI.** Height. Sir De Lacy Evans with the 2d Division  
 faced the village of Bourliouk ; and it seemed at this  
 time that his left would not reach further up the  
 river's bank than the bridge, for Sir George Brown  
 had been reckoning that his first or right brigade  
 would be charged with the duty of attacking the  
 enemy's position across the great road, and that it  
 would be his left, or Buller's brigade, which would  
 assail the Great Redoubt.

The vil-  
 lage of  
 Bourliouk  
 set on fire  
 by the  
 enemy.

The Generals of the five leading Divisions were  
 thus directing their forces, and already the swarms  
 of skirmishers thrown forward by the French, and  
 the thinner chains of riflemen in advance of our  
 divisions, were drawing close to the vineyards, and  
 beginning their combats with the enemy's sharp-  
 shooters; but then, and with a suddenness so strange  
 as to suggest the idea of some pyrotechnic con-  
 trivance, the whole village of Bourliouk, except the  
 straggling houses which skirted it towards the east,  
 became wrapped in tall flames.\* No man could live  
 in that conflagration ; and the result was, that in one  
 minute a third of the ground on which the English  
 army had meant to operate was, as it were, blotted  
 out of the field. If this firing of the village took  
 place under the orders of the Russian commander, it  
 was the most sagacious of all the steps he took that  
 day ; for his gravest source of care was the want of

\* The great number of haystacks, and the peculiar nature of the hay,  
 were the causes which made the conflagration so instantaneously com-  
 plete. The hay of that country is full of stiff prickly stems, which resist  
 compression, and so make ample room for air.

troops sufficing for the whole extent of the position at which he grasped, and therefore an operation which took away a large part of the battle-field was of great advantage to him. Our infantry were immediately thrown into trouble. The Light Division, as we saw, did not take ground enough on the left, and the firing of the village now cut short our front on the right. Sir De Lacy Evans, thus robbed of space, was obliged to keep his second brigade in rear of the first, and even then he continued to overlap the right of the Light Division.

C H A P.  
XVI.

The effect  
which this  
measure  
had in  
cramping  
the Eng-  
lish line.

The smoke from the burning village was depressed and gently turned towards the bridge by the faint breeze which came from the sea. There, for hours, in a long fallen pillar of cloud, it lay singularly firm and compact, obscuring the view of those who were near it, but not at all staining the air in any other part of the field.

## XII.

The operations of the great column intrusted to General Bosquet now began to take effect. Bosquet was a man in the prime of life. Ten years of struggle and frequent enterprise in Algeria had carried him from the rank of a lieutenant to the rank of a general officer ;\* and he was charged on this day, not only with the command of his own—the 2d—Division, but with the command of the troops which formed the Turkish Contingent. The

General  
Bosquet.

\* A brigadier ; and now, at the time of the Crimean war, he was a general of division.

**C H A P.** whole column under his orders numbered about  
**XVI.** 14,000 men. The Arabs and Kabyles of Algeria, though men of a fierce and brave nature, and prone to petty strife, are so wanting in the power of making war with effect, that, as far as concerns the art of fighting, they can scarcely be said to have given much schooling to the bold and skilful soldiery of France ; but the deserts, the broad solitudes, and the great mountain-ranges of Northern Africa, have inured the French army to some of those military toils which are next in worth to the business of the actual combat ; and for Bosquet, the hero of many a struggle in the passes of the Middle and the Lesser Atlas, it was no new problem to have to cross a stream and carry a body of troops to the summit of a hill with a steep-looking face.

In the morning, he had ridden forward escorted by a few Spahis, to reconnoitre the ground with his own eyes ; and thus, and by the aid of the careful surveys effected by the naval men, he was able to assure himself, not only that the river could be passed at its bar, but that troops there crossing it would be likely to find the means of getting round and ascending to the summit of the cliff from the south-west. Examining also the face of the cliff further inland, he saw that the broken ground opposite to the village of Almatamack could be easily ascended by foot-soldiers ; and he also, no doubt, perceived that the road leading up from the village (unless it should prove to have been effectually cut or guarded by the enemy) would give him a passage for his artillery.

Upon these observations Bosquet based his plan. He resolved to march in person with Autemarre's brigade upon the village of Almatamack, there to cross the river, and afterwards endeavour to ascend the plateau at the point where the road from Almatamack goes up between the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height; but he ordered General Bouat, with his brigade and with the Turkish Contingent, to incline far away towards his right, to try to pass the river at its bar, and then to find the best means he could for getting his troops up the cliff.

C H A P.  
XVI.

His plan  
of opera-  
tions.

The two bodies of troops under Bosquet's command began their diverging movement at the same time; and before two o'clock the swarms of skirmishers which covered the front of the columns were pushing their way through the village of Almatamack, and the vineyards on either side of it. A few moments more and they were firing with a briskness and vivacity which warmed the blood of the many thousands of hearers then new to war. One of our officers, kindling a little with the excitement thus foused, and impatient, perhaps, that the French should be in action before our people, could not help drawing Lord Raglan's attention to the firing on our right. But the stir of French skirmishers through thick ground was no new music to Lord Fitzroy Somerset; rather, perhaps, it recalled him for a moment to old times in Estramadura and Castile, when, at the side of the great Wellesley, he learned the brisk ways of Napoleon's infantry. So, when the young officer

Advance  
of Aute-  
marre  
under  
Bosquet  
in person.



CHAP. said, 'The French, my Lord, are warmly engaged,'  
 XVI. Lord Raglan answered, 'Are they? I cannot catch  
 'any return-fire.' His practised ear had told him  
 what we now know to be the truth. No troops were  
 opposed to the advance of Bosquet's columns in this  
 part of the field; but it is the custom of French  
 skirmishers, when they get into thick ground near  
 an enemy, to be continually firing. They do this  
 partly to show the chiefs behind them what progress  
 they are making, and partly, it would seem, in order  
 to give life and spirit to the scene.

Advance  
 of the  
 detached  
 force  
 under  
 Bouat.

When General Bouat reached the bank of the river, he found that the bar of sand at its mouth made it possible for his men to keep good their footing against the waves flowing in from the sea; and in process of time, with all his infantry, including the Turkish battalions, he succeeded in gaining the left bank of the river. He could not, however, carry across his artillery, and he therefore sent it back with orders to follow the march of Autemarre's brigade.

When he reached the left bank of the river, Bouat found an opening in the cliff before him, which promised to give him means of ascent. Into this opening he threw some skirmishers, and these, encountering no enemy, were followed by the main body of the brigade, and by the Turkish battalions. Pursuing the course thus opened to him, Bouat slowly crept forward with his column, and wound his way up and round towards the summit of the cliff. But it was only by marching with a very

narrow front that he was able to effect this movement ; and it was not until a late period of the action that he was able to show himself in force upon the plateau. Even then he was without artillery. The troops under his command had not an opportunity of engaging in any combat with the enemy, because they marched upon that part of the heights which the Russian General had determined to leave unoccupied.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Meanwhile Bosquet, marching in person with Autemarre's brigade, traversed the village of Almatamack, forded the river at ten minutes past two o'clock, and immediately began to ascend the road leading up to the plateau. The road, he found, was uninjured, and guarded by no troops. His artillery began the ascent ; and meanwhile the keen and active Zouaves, impatient of the winding road, climbed the heights by shorter and steeper paths, and so swiftly, that our sailors, looking from the ships (men accustomed to perpendicular racing), were loud in their praise of the briskness with which the Frenchmen rushed up and 'manned' the cliff. As yet, however, Bosquet had encountered no enemy.

Further  
advance  
of Aute-  
marre's  
brigade.

It has been seen that the position taken up by Prince Mentschikoff fell short of the sea-shore by a distance of more than two miles, and that he was not in military occupation of the cliff, now ascended by Bosquet with Autemarre's brigade ; but also it will be remembered that, at the village in rear of the cliff, called Ulukul Akles, there had been posted

Guns  
brought  
out against  
him from  
Ulukul  
Akles.

**C H A P.** some days before one of the 'Minsk' battalions of  
**XVI.** infantry, with four pieces of light artillery, and that  
 the detachment had there remained. These four  
 guns were now brought out of the village, and after  
 a time were placed in battery at a spot near the  
 village of Ulukul Tiouets, and within range of the  
 point where the Zouaves were beginning to crown the  
 summit of the cliff. The 'Minsk' battalion was not  
 brought into sight; but at some distance, on the cliff  
 overlooking the beach, there could be seen some  
 squadrons of horse.

Bosquet,  
 after a mo-  
 mentary  
 check, es-  
 tablishes  
 himself on  
 the cliff.

As soon as a whole battalion of Zouaves had  
 gained the summit, they were drawn up and formed  
 on the plateau. No shot was as yet fired by the  
 enemy; and General Bosquet, with his Staff, ascended  
 a tumulus or mound on the top of the cliff, in order  
 to reconnoitre the ground.

Meanwhile his artillery was coming up, and the  
 first two of his guns had just reached the summit  
 when one of the carriages broke down. This acci-  
 dent embarrassed the rest of the column, and whilst  
 the hindrance lasted the enemy opened fire from his  
 four guns.\* The fire and the breaking-down of the  
 gun-carriage produced for the moment an ill effect  
 upon the head of the French column, and one of its  
 battalions fell back under the shelter of the acclivity.  
 But this check did not last. The road blocked by  
 the broken-down gun-carriage was quickly cleared,  
 the guns were moved up rapidly, and swarms of  
 skirmishers pressed up in all directions. Then the

\* Half of the No. 4 battery of the 17th brigade of the Russian artillery.

troops which were already on the summit moved forward, and lodged themselves upon a part of the plateau a little in advance of the steep by which they had ascended.\*

C H A P.  
XVI.

As soon as he began to hear guns in the direction of the West Cliff, Kiriakoff took from his reserves two of his 'Moscow' battalions, and posted them, the one low down and the other higher up, on that part of the hill which looked down upon the White Homestead. He also drew from his reserve eight light pieces of artillery, and placed them in battery facing towards the sea, so as to command, though at a long range, the part of the plateau which Bosquet crossed by the Hadji road. Kiriakoff did not take upon himself to make any other dispositions for dealing with the turning movement which threatened his left.

Measures  
taken by  
Kiriakoff  
upon ob-  
serving  
Bosquet's  
turning  
move-  
ment.

Amongst the French who were gaining the summit of the plateau, no one seems to have divined the reason why a little body of Russian horsemen should have made its appearance on the cliff overlooking the sea, nor why, without attempting hostile action, it had tenaciously clung to the ground. Those troopers were the attendants of a man in great trouble. They were the escort of Prince Mentschikoff.

Horsemen  
on the  
cliff.

\* Sir Edward Colebrooke saw this operation from the deck of one of our ships of war, and describes it very well in his memorial. He was a skilful and very accurate observer of military movements.

C H A P.  
XVI.

## XIII.

The effect  
of Bos-  
quet's  
turning  
movement  
upon the  
mind of  
Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff.

The enemy's survey of the Allied armies had been so carelessly made, and had been so little directed towards the sea-shore, that Bosquet, it seems, had already got near to the river before his movement was perceived. Prince Mentschikoff, with Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski at his side, had been standing on the Kourganè Hill, watching the advance of the English army, and giving bold orders for its reception; but presently he was told that a French division was advancing towards the unoccupied cliff on his extreme left. At first, he was so shocked by the dislocation which his ideas would have to undergo if his left flank were indeed to be turned, that he had no refuge for his confusion except in mere disbelief, and he angrily refused to give faith to the unwelcome tidings.\* For days, he had been on the ground which he himself had chosen for the great struggle; but he was so certain that he had effectually learnt its character by glancing at its general features, that he had not, it seems, had the industry to ride over it, nor even to find out the roads by which the villagers were accustomed to ascend the heights with their waggons.

He seems to have imagined it to be impossible that ground so steep as the cliff had appeared to be could be ascended by troops at any point westward of the Telegraph Height; but when at length he was compelled to know that the French and the Turks

\* Chodasiewicz.

were marching in force towards the mouth of the river, his mind underwent so great a revulsion, that, having hitherto taken no thought for his left, he now seemed to have no care for any other part of the position. In his place, a general, calm, skilful, and conscious of knowing the ground, might have seen the turning movement of the French and the Turks with unspeakable joy ; but instead of tranquilly regarding the whole field of battle under the new aspect which was given to it by this manœuvre, he only laboured to see how best he could imitate the mistake of his adversary—how best he could shift his strength to the distant unoccupied cliff which was threatened by Bosquet's advance. The nature of the ground enabled him to make lateral movements in his line without much fear of disturbance from the Allies ; and as soon as he saw that the French were detaching two-fifths of their army in order to turn his flank, he wildly determined to engage a portion of his scanty force in a march from his right hand to his left—in a march which would take him far to the westward of his chosen ground. For this purpose he snatched two light batteries from his centre and his right, gave orders that he was to be followed by the four 'Moscow' battalions which were the reserve of his left wing, and by the three 'Minsk' battalions which formed part of his 'Great Reserves,' and then with some squadrons of hussars rode off towards the sea.

C H A P.  
XVI.

His measures for dealing with it. His flank march.

It was certain that a long time would elapse before the troops engaged in this vain journey could be ex-

Mentschikoff on the cliff.

C H A P.  
XVI.

pected to get into action with Bosquet ; and, meanwhile, the power of the whole force engaged in the flank-movement was neutralised. But that was not all. Prince Mentschikoff's mind was so strangely subverted by the sensation of having his left turned, that, although it must needs be a long time before he could be in force on the West Cliff, he could not endure to be personally absent from the ground to which he now fastened his thoughts. So when, with his Staff and the horsemen of his escort, he had got to the ground overlooking the sea, near the village of Ulukul Tiouets, and had seen the first groups of the Zouaves peering up on the crest of the hill, he still remained where he was. Whilst he sat in his saddle, the appearance of his escort drew fire from the shipping, and four of his suite were struck down ; but the Prince would not move. It is likely that the fire assuaged the pain of his thoughts.

His batteries at length coming up, there begins a cannonade between his and Bosquet's artillery.

At this time, it would seem, he gave either no orders, or none of a kind supplying real guidance for his generals. Lingered upon the ground without troops at hand, he impotently watched the progress of Autemarre's brigade. His light batteries soon came up ; but neither these nor the squadrons of hussars which formed his escort were the best of implements for pushing back General Bosquet into the steep mountain-road by which he had ascended ; and in the hands of Prince Mentschikoff they were simply powerless. However, his guns, when they came up, were placed in battery, and Bosquet's guns being now on the plateau, there began a cannonade at

long range between the twelve guns of the French and the whole of the light artillery which Prince Mentschikoff had hurried into this part of the field. At the same time the French artillery drew some shots from the distant guns which Kiriakoff had placed looking seaward on the Telegraph Height; and the annals of the French artillery record with pride that the twelve pieces which Bosquet brought up with him engaged and overpowered no less than forty of the enemy's guns. Nor is this statement altogether without something like a basis of truth, for the Russians had now thirty-six pieces of artillery on the West Cliff, or the Telegraph Height; and though most of them at this time were so placed that their gunners could attempt some shots at a more or less long range against Bosquet's guns, the French artillerymen not only held their ground without having a gun disabled, but soon pushed forward their batteries to a more commanding part of the plateau.

Bosquet  
maintains  
himself.

By this time, the seven battalions of infantry which Prince Mentschikoff had been moving flank-wise were very near to the spot where their General had been eagerly awaiting them; but just as he was about to have these troops in hand, the Prince seems to have come to the conclusion that, after all, he could do nothing in the part of the field to which he had dragged them. He was brought, perhaps, to this belief by seeing that the French and the Turks, who had been crossing the river at its mouth, were now beginning to show their strength towards the



C H A P.  
XVI.

Mentschi-  
koff coun-  
ter-march-  
ing.

westernmost part of the cliff; for he may not have known that this force, being without artillery, could be easily prevented from advancing against his batteries on the open plateau. At all events, Prince Mentschikoff now thought it necessary to reverse his flank-movement, and to travel back towards his centre with all the forces which he had brought from thence to his left.

But when the Prince began this last counter-movement, he was already beginning to fall under the dominion of events in another part of the field.

Position of  
Bosquet  
on the  
cliff.

Bosquet now stood undisturbed on the part of the plateau which he had reached. But he was not without grounds for deep anxiety. It did not fall to his lot on that day to be engaged in any conflict except with the enemy's artillery; but, from the moment when he began to establish himself on the plateau until towards the close of the action, he was in a dangerously isolated position, for he had no troops around him except Autemarre's brigade; and, until the action was near its end, he got no effective support either from Bouat on his right or from Canrobert on his left.

#### XIV.


As soon as Marshal St Arnaud perceived that Bosquet would be able to gain the summit of the cliff, he tried to give him the support towards his left which his position, when he got established on the cliff, would deeply need; and he determined that

the time was come for the immediate advance of his 1st and 3d Divisions. Addressing General Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, and giving them the signal for the attack, he said, I am told, these words: 'With men such as you I have no orders to give. I have but to point to the enemy!'<sup>\*</sup> Hitherto these two French divisions had been nearly in the same alignment as the leading divisions of the English army; but now that they were ordered forward, leaving the English army still halted, the true character of the movement to be undertaken by the Allies was for the first time developed. Their array was to be what strategists call 'an order of battle in three échelons by the right, the first échelon making a turning movement.'<sup>†</sup>

CHAP.  
XVI.

St Arnaud orders the advance of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon.

The order into which the Allies now fell.



This disposition for the attack was not the result of any agreement made in words between Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan. It resulted almost naturally, if so one may speak, from Bosquet's turning

Lord Raglan's conception of the part he had to take.

<sup>\*</sup> I have this from an officer who assures me that he heard the words.

<sup>†</sup> 'Un ordre de bataille à trois échelons par la droite, le premier échelon attaquant par le flanc.' These are the words in which a staff officer present in the action, and very high in the French service, has described to me the advance of the Allies. See the diagram, a much better guide than mere words.

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movement, from the extent of the front which the enemy was now seen to present, and from the character of the ground. Just as the Marshal had kept back his 1st and 3d Divisions till he saw that Bosquet could gain the height, so Lord Raglan, according to his conception at this time, had to see whether Canrobert and Prince Napoleon could establish themselves upon the Telegraph Height, before he endangered the continuity of the order of battle by allowing the English army to advance.

Artillery  
contest be-  
tween the  
Russian  
and the  
French  
batteries.

During the first forty minutes of the cannonade directed against the English infantry, there had been no corresponding fire upon the French from the Telegraph Height, because the guns in that part of the field had been placed at first so low down on the hill-side that no use could be made of them, and the process of moving them to higher ground was tedious: but when Kiriakoff had at length established a couple of batteries upon the high ground near the Telegraph,\* the fire of those guns, passing over the heads of the Taroutine and the militia battalions, began to molest the divisions which were led by Canrobert and Prince Napoleon.

On the other hand, the artillery belonging to the Divisions of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon came down to a convenient ground above the edge of the vineyards, and opened fire upon the columns of the ' militia ' battalions, now posted much farther up than before on the opposite height. And with effect ; for

\* These were the batteries before spoken of as those from which shots at long range were attempted against Bosquet's artillery.

although the range did not admit of great slaughter, some men were struck, and the rest, though they did not yet move, began to be displeased with the ground on which they stood.\*

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The swarms of skirmishers which the French threw forward went briskly into the cover, forded the river, and then made themselves at home in the broken ground at the foot of the Telegraph Height. When the soldier is upon service of this kind, his natural character, neutralised in general by organisation, is often seen to reassert itself. One man, prying eagerly forward, would labour to get shots at Russian sharpshooters still lingering near the river; another would sit down, take out his little store of food and drink, and be glad to engage with any one who passed him in something like cynical talk concerning the pastime of war. But, upon the whole, French skirmishers push on with great boldness and skill.

When the foremost ranks of Canrobert's massed battalions had entered the vineyards, each man got through as best he could, and rapidly crossed the river; and though, during part of the advance, the troops were under the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height, yet the nature of the acclivity before them was of such a kind that the further they advanced (provided the heads of the battalions did not show themselves on the plateau above the broken ground), the better they were covered from fire. And, except some lingering skirmishers, they had no in-

Canrobert's advance across the river.

His troops are sheltered from fire by the steepness of the hill-side.

\* Chodasiewicz.

C H A P. fantry opposed to them at this time ; for the two  
XVI. ' Moscow ' battalions which Kiriakoff had sent down towards the ford of the White Homestead were now, it seems, made to take part in the marches and counter-marches which Mentschikoff was directing in person, and there were then no other Russian columns in this part of the field.\* So, when the head of Canrobert's Division gained the broken ground on the Russian side of the river, it was for the moment sheltered ; but if it had then ascended above the broken ground so as to peer up over the crest and face the open plateau at the top, it would not only have come under the fire of artillery, but would have before it the four battalions of militiamen, supported by the four Taroutine battalions.

For an army advancing to the attack, a rim of sheltered ground on the verge of the enemy's position is of infinite use, because it enables the assailants to make without hurry their final arrangements for the assault ; but to troops which are not propelled by the decisive order of some resolute commander, such shelter as that is sometimes a snare, because it tempts men to hang back. In such a situation the best

\* There is some ground for supposing that the second ' Moscow ' battalion was for a while forgotten, and that, not receiving in due time the order to rejoin the other battalions of the corps, it was left alone in the ravine till it found itself opposed to Canrobert's whole division. If this is the case, and if there resulted anything which could be called a combat between the Russian battalion and the French Division, the statement that Canrobert was not met by any troops except skirmishers would have to be qualified. The statement of Chodasiewicz on this point receives no support from Kiriakoff, and that is the reason why I have not adopted it. Chodasiewicz did not belong to the ' Moscow ' corps.

troops will often abstain from going forward of their own accord ; for it seems, to officers and men, that if they are to quit good shelter and go out into the storm, they ought, at the least, to know that the movement is one really intended, and is needful to the purpose of the battle. The duty of pressing forward to terminate the isolation of Bosquet rested primarily with the General of the 1st Division.

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Duty attaching upon the commander of the 1st French Division.

General Canrobert was a man of whom great hopes were entertained. According to every test which could be applied by school and college examinations, he promised to be an accomplished general. To the military studies of his youth he had added the experience of many campaigns in Africa ; and even in the French army, where brave men abound, his personal valour had become a subject of remark. He was so deeply trusted by his Emperor, that he had become the bearer of a then secret paper which was to put him at the head of the French army in the event of St Arnaud's death. He had the misfortune to have upon his hands the blood of the Parisians slain by his brigade on the 4th of December ; but it was said, to his honour, that he, more than all the other generals employed at that time, had loathed the work of having to abet the midnight seizure of his country's foremost generals. His spirit, they say, had been broken by the pestilence which some few weeks before had come upon his Division in the country of the Danube ; but the extremity of the grief to which he then gave way had so much to justify it in the appalling nature of the calamity which slew

General  
Canrobert.

**C H A P.** his troops, that it was not a conclusive proof of his  
**XVI.** being wanting in military composure. The most  
 successful of respondents to school and college ques-  
 tions now had to undergo a new test. Commanding  
 a fine French division, he had the head of his column  
 close under a height occupied by the enemy, and this  
 at a time when the isolated condition of a French  
 brigade on his right seemed to make it a business of  
 great moment for him to be able to bring support to  
 his comrades.

Unable to  
 get up his  
 artillery,  
 he is un-  
 willing to  
 advance  
 without it  
 upon open  
 ground.

But at the point where Canrobert faced the height  
 he found it impracticable to drag up artillery, and  
 he was obliged to send his guns all the way down  
 to the village of Almatamack, in order that they  
 might there ford the river and ascend to the top  
 of the plateau by the road which Bosquet had  
 taken. This operation could not but take a long  
 time ; and what Canrobert was now called upon  
 to determine was, whether he would wait until  
 his artillery had completed its circuitous and diffi-  
 cult journey, or at once carry forward his infantry  
 to the summit of the plateau and engage the bat-  
 talions there posted. He determined to wait. The  
 maxims of the French army discourage the idea of  
 bringing infantry into action upon open ground  
 without the support of artillery ; and Canrobert did  
 not, it seems, conceive that the predicament in which  
 Bosquet stood was a circumstance which dispensed  
 him from the observance of a general rule. So,  
 whilst he was thus waiting for his artillery, he did  
 not deem it right to push forward his battalions on

the open plateau, but he brought the head of his Division to a point high up on the steep broken side of the hill, and extended it, in single and double battalion columns, on either side of the track by which he had ascended. He spread himself more towards his left than towards his right, and did not move any of his battalions in such a way as to be able to give a hand to Bosquet.

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He posts his battalions on the higher steeps of the Telegraph Height close under the plateau.

Prince Napoleon's Division hung back in the valley, and the bulk of it at this time was still on the north bank of the river.

The bulk of Prince Napoleon's Division still on the north bank of the river.

Although the head of Canrobert's Division, being under the heights on the Russian side of the river, was enjoying good shelter, the masses of troops which stood more towards the rear, including some of Canrobert's battalions and the great bulk of Prince Napoleon's Division, were exposed to the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height. They suffered ; and a feeling of discouragement began to spread.

Fire sustained by such of the French troops as are not forward enough to have shelter from the hill-side.

Marshal St Arnaud had understood the gravity of the danger which would result from any delay in the advance of his centre, but to meet it he used an ill-chosen safeguard. The way to send help to Bosquet was to give Canrobert due warrant to move up at once upon the plateau, whether with or without his artillery.\* What the Marshal did, however, was to

Discouragement.

\* If the objection to advancing on the plateau without artillery was, according to French ideas, insuperable, an effort, one would think, should have been made to push forward Prince Napoleon's Division. Prince Napoleon had in his front two roads leading up to the Telegraph, and one of these, at the least, was practicable (and was afterwards used) for artillery.



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St Arnaud  
pushes for-  
ward his  
reserves.

The ill  
effect of  
this mea-  
sure upon  
the French  
troops.

Their com-  
plaint that  
they were  
being  
'mas-  
'sacred.'

Anxiety  
on account  
of Bos-  
quet.

State of  
the battle  
at this  
time.

order up his reserves, sending one brigade of his 4th Division to follow the march of Bosquet, and the other to support Canrobert. This last measure was actually a source of weakness rather than of strength ; for, as far as numbers were concerned, Canrobert and Prince Napoleon were already in more than ample strength. With two superb divisions, numbering some 15,000 men, and having Bosquet and Bouat on their right with many thousands more, they were advancing upon a very narrow front ; and the bringing up of fresh troops augmented the masses who came under the fire of the guns without at all propelling the leading divisions. So the evil lasted and increased. Inaction in the midst of a battle is hateful to the brave, impetuous Frenchman, and inaction under fire is intolerable to him. The troops towards the rear of the columns, not having the close presence of the enemy to animate them, and being without that shelter from the Russian guns which was enjoyed by the leading battalions, became discontented and uneasy. It was then that there sprang up among the French troops the ill-omened complaint that they were being ' mas-  
'sacred.'

All this while, Bosquet was on the summit of the cliff with his one brigade ; and his isolation, as we shall presently see, was becoming a source of great anxiety.

Minute after minute aides-de-camp were coming to Lord Raglan with these gloomy tidings ; and, in truth, the action at this time was going on ill for the

Allies. The duty of crowning the West Cliff had been fulfilled with great spirit and despatch by a small body of men ; but the step had not been followed up. Bouat, filing slowly round near the sea with some nine thousand men, but without guns, was for the time annulled. Bosquet, with one brigade, stood halted upon the heights which he had climbed ; and though, happily, he had not been assailed by infantry, his advanced and isolated position had become a source of weakness to the Allies. Of the two French divisions charged with the duty of attacking the front and western flank of the Telegraph Hill, the one had its foremost battalions high up the steep and on the verge of the open ground at its top, whilst the other was all down in the valley ; but (although in different ways, and for different reasons) these divisions were both hanging back, and no French force had hitherto attacked any part of the ground held by the enemy's formed battalions. Meanwhile the batteries still swept the smooth approach to the table-land where the Telegraph stood, and not only kept it free of all assailants, but, pouring their fire over the heads of their own soldiery, were able to throw plunging shots into the midst of Prince Napoleon's Division.

All this while, the English army had been kept under the fire of the Russian artillery ; and although the men had been ordered to lie down, the ground, sloping towards the river, yielded no shelter, and many had been killed and wounded.

At first, our batteries replied ; but after a while it



**C H A P.** had been ascertained that the advantage the enemy  
**XVI.** had in his commanding ground was too great to be overcome, and the English artillery had ceased to fire. Lord Raglan asked why this was : ‘ I observe,’ said he, ‘ the enemy’s six-pounders amongst us ; why ‘ cannot we send our nine-pounders amongst them ? ’ But he was told that our fire had proved to be ineffectual, and that it was therefore discontinued. He seemed struck. Perhaps the answer which he had received became one of the grounds on which, a few minutes later, he resolved to change the face of the battle.

## XV.

Oppor-  
 tunities  
 offered to  
 Mentschi-  
 koff.

For some time, the course of the action had been offering to the Russian General an opportunity of striking a great blow ; and, circumstanced as he was, it would have been easier for him to gain a signal victory before three o’clock, than to stand on the defensive and hold his ground till sunset. The English forces, confronting as they did a position of great natural strength, and having their left on ground as open as a race-course, would have been hampered in every attempt to storm the Great Redoubt if their flank had been assiduously threatened, and now and then charged, by the enemy’s powerful cavalry. Therefore, if Mentschikoff, checking the English forces by a vigorous use of his horsemen, had undertaken at this time such an advance against Canrobert’s Division as was afterwards successfully executed by Kiriakoff, he would have found the

French battalions quite soft to his touch by reason of their want of artillery ;\* and Canrobert's retreat from the verge of the plateau would have occurred at a time when half the French army was so far from the true scene of conflict as to be unable to give the least help. Except by reckoning broadly upon the quality of the French and the British troops, or else upon the smiles of fortune, it is hard to see how the Allies could then have escaped a disaster.

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But men move so blindly in the complex business of war, that often, very often, it is the enemy himself who is the best repairer of their faults.

It was so that day. During the precious hour in which the Russian forces might have wrought a way to great glory, their cavalry were suffered to remain in idleness, and the battalions which formed the instrument afterwards used for striking the blow were marching in vain from east to west and from west to east. The torpor and the false moves of the enemy countervailed the shortcomings of the Allies.

No combat of any moment was going on at this time. It is true that† Major Norcott with the left wing of the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade, had gone into the vineyards in front‡ of our Light Divi-

The battle  
at this  
time lan-  
guished.

\* I should not have ventured upon this sentence if it were not that I am warranted in doing so by what actually occurred a little later. See *post*.

† Here should come these words: 'Colonel Lawrence with the right, and.'—*Note to 4th Edition*.

‡ During the march, as was shown in a former note, Major Norcott had been on the flank of the Division ; but when the battle opened, he began to operate in front of Buller's brigade.—*Note to 4th Edition*.



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sion. But everywhere else the battle flagged. The men of our infantry divisions, though they were under the fire of thirty guns, still lay passive upon the ground. Our cavalry awaited orders ; our artillery declined to fire without being able to strike ; the Russian and the French artillery continued engaged at long range. No French battalion advanced above the broken ground, though, covering their front and the left flank of their trailing columns, swarms of skirmishers were alive. Of these, some were firing to show where they were, some duelling with the Russian riflemen who yet remained in the valley ; others ascended the knolls and vexed any Russians they saw with long, careful shots ; others, again, sat down and contentedly took their rest.

This languishing of the battle seemed to promise ill for the Allies. They had undertaken to assault the enemy's left, and to that enterprise they stood committed, for they had drawn away from the real field of battle to the West Cliff some fourteen thousand men. Yet, since the moment when Bosquet began to ascend the cliff, more than forty minutes had elapsed, and nothing had yet been done to win a result from his movement, nor even to give him that support which he very grievously wanted. Both from Bouat on his right and from Canrobert on his left he was divided by a wide tract of ground.

Hitherto, then, the operations planned and undertaken by the French had not only done nothing towards carrying the position, but had even brought the Allies into danger.

The causes of the miscarriage were,—the physical obstructions which hindered both Bouat and Canrobert from bringing up their guns with them, and the stiffness of the objection which prevents French Generals from engaging their infantry on open ground without the support of artillery. According to the intended plan of operations, Bosquet, after gaining the cliff with his whole column of some 14,000 men, was to bring round his right shoulder in order to fall upon the flank of the Russians ; and, simultaneously with his appearance on the plateau, a vigorous and resolute onslaught was to be made by the rest of the French army upon the front of the enemy's left wing. But Bosquet, as we saw, though he was personally present on the part of the plateau overhanging Almatamack, had only one brigade there ; and whether he looked to Bouat on his right, or to Canrobert on his left, he looked in either case to a general who, though he had masses of infantry, was without artillery, and he therefore looked in vain. In such circumstances the utmost that Bosquet could be expected to do was to hold his ground,—and this he did.

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Causes  
which had  
occasioned  
the failure  
of the  
French  
operations.

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For an hour and a half the Allies had lain under fire without even beginning to assail the enemy's formed battalions. The only ground gained was that occupied by Bosquet ; but Bosquet's achievement not having been followed up, his very success now threatened to bring disaster upon the Allies.



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A de-  
sponding  
account of  
Bosquet's  
condition  
is brought  
to Lord  
Raglan.

When a French soldier is one of a body placed in a false position, he knows it, and comments on the fact ; and the very force and vivacity of his nature make it difficult to keep him long upon ground to which he feels a scientific objection. A French aide-de-camp came in haste to Lord Raglan, and represented that unless something could be done to support or relieve Bosquet's column it would be 'compromised.'\* Gifted himself with the command of graceful diction, Lord Raglan was not without fastidious prejudices against particular forms of expression, and it chanced that he bore a singular hatred against the French word which we translate into 'compromised.' So he archly resolved to have the meaning of the word fully expanded into plain French, and he asked the aide-de-camp what would

\* Exactly the same pressure had just been applied by the French Marshal to Sir De Lacy Evans. In his published letter of the 28th of June 1855, Evans writes : ' On the arrival of the 2d Division in front of the ' village of Bourliouk, which, having been prepared for conflagration by ' the Russians, became suddenly for some hundred yards an impenetrable ' blaze, Major Claremont came to me in great haste, to say from the ' Marshal, that a part of the French army, having ascended the heights ' on the south of the river, became threatened by large bodies of Russians, ' and might become compromised unless the attention of the enemy ' were immediately drawn away by pressing them in our front. I made ' instant dispositions to conform to this wish, sending at the same time, ' as was my duty, an officer of my Staff (Colonel Herbert) to Lord Raglan, ' who was then a short distance in our rear, for his Lordship's approval, ' which was instantly granted.' From the recurrence of the word ' com- ' promised,' and from the coincidence in point of time, one is led to in- fer that the message given in the text and the message conveyed to Lord Raglan through General Evans may have been one and the same. There is nothing that I know of to interfere with this conclusion, if it be supposed that Major Claremont was accompanied by a French aide-de-camp, who rode first to General Evans, and from him to Lord Raglan.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

be the actual effect upon the brigade of its being 'compromised.'

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The answer was, 'It will retreat.'\*

Was it time for the English General to take the battle into his own hands?

So long as Bosquet, with Autemarre's brigade, stood isolated upon the cliff, and Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions remained hanging back in the vineyards and the broken ground below the Telegraph Height, an advance of our forces would plainly distort the Allied line in a hazardous way; and Lord Raglan had watched for the moment when the development of the expected French attack on the Telegraph Height would warrant him in suffering our infantry to go forward.

But he had hitherto watched in vain; and, not knowing how long the causes of the French delay might continue to operate, he resolved to depart from the scheme of action which had hitherto governed him, and to precipitate the advance of the English forces. It is true that while Bosquet stood halted on the cliff, whilst Canrobert abstained from assailing the Telegraph Height, and whilst Prince Napoleon's Division was still low down in the valley, the advance of the English forces against the Causeway and the Kourganè Hill would ruin the symmetry of the plan which the French had contrived; and if Bosquet should be obliged to retreat at a time when the English were hotly engaged in an attack upon the enemy's heights, the whole array of the Allies

Lord Raglan resolves to precipitate the advance of the English army.

\* 'Batta en retraite.'





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Grounds  
tending to  
cause, or  
to justify,  
the re-  
solve.

would be brought into peril. But the timely incurring of dangers is proper to the business of war; and though the enemy had hitherto been torpid and indulgent, the cause of the Allies had fallen into such a plight, that a remedy which involved heavy risks might nevertheless be the right one. And, so far as concerned his understanding with the French, Lord Raglan was freed from all care; for he had been already assured that Marshal St Arnaud anxiously desired him to advance; and one aide-de-camp, as we have seen, had told him plainly that nothing less than a diversion by the English forces would prevent General Bosquet from retreating.

A man may weigh reasons against reasons, but sometimes, after all, it is the power of the imagination, or else some manly passion, which comes to strike the balance and lead him on to action. The motive of which Lord Raglan felt the most conscious was the simple and natural longing to cease from being passive. He could no longer endure to see our soldiery lying down without resistance under the enemy's fire.\*

Order for  
the ad-  
vance of  
the Eng-  
lish in-  
fantry.


He had been riding slowly upon the ground between the Great Causeway and the left of the French army; but he now stopped his horse, and the cavalcade which had trailed in his wake whilst he moved then gathered more closely around him. There were altogether some twenty horsemen; and although

\* This is the motive for accelerating the advance of the British troops which Lord Raglan avowed to me on the evening of the 25th.

with several of them Lord Raglan from time to time talked gaily, yet, so far as concerned the duty of taking thought how best to conduct the action, he was like a man riding in mere solitude; for it was not his custom to seek counsel, and the men around him so held their chief in honour that none of them would have liked to assail him with question or advice. Still, any one there could see that, besides Lord Raglan himself, there was one man of the Headquarter Staff whose mind was engaged in the business of the hour. We saw that Airey had already begun to wield great power in the English army. With the power was its burthen. Whilst most of the other men on the Headquarter Staff seemed to be merely spectators or messengers, there was care, vexing care, on the lean, eager, imperious features of the Quartermaster-General. He was not simply impatient of the delay; he judged it to be a great evil.

It was to him that Lord Raglan now spoke some five words. Whatever it was that was said, it lit the face of the hearer, and turned his look of care into sunshine. The horsemen in the surrounding group rose taller in their saddles, and handled their reins like men whose limbs are braced by the joy of passing from expectancy to action. Every man, whether he had heard the words or not, saw in the gladness of his neighbour's face that the moment long awaited was come.

Our infantry was to advance. The order flew; for it was Nolan—the impetuous Nolan—who carried



**CHAP.** it to the 2d Division.\* A few moments later and  
**XVI** the order had reached the Light Division. The whole of the foremost English line, from the 47th Regiment on our right to the extreme left of the Light Division, rose alert from the ground, dressed well their ranks, and then, having a front of two miles with a depth of only two men, marched grandly down the slope.†

## XVII.

Evans de-  
taches  
Adams

Sir De Lacy Evans, commanding the 2d Division, had before him the blazing village. In that conflagration

\* My authority for this statement is the journal of poor Nolan now lying before me. There, after stating that 'a general advance was ordered,' he says: 'To the 2d Division I carried the order myself, and in riding forward with the advanced brigade had my horse shot under me by a round-shot.' On the other hand, General Evans, I think, conceives that he got his warrant to advance when Colonel Herbert returned to him with the message that Lord Raglan granted his request to be allowed to accede to the prayer of the French Marshal. And again, Colonel Lysons (who was Assistant Adjutant-General of the 2d Division) states that he carried the order, and he adds this spirited record of the emotion which impressed the fact upon his memory: 'I could not be mistaken on this point; I so well remember the excitement I felt as I galloped back to the 2d Division, and then went on to the right of the Light Division, passing the order along the line; and I shall never forget the excited look of delight from each face as I repeated the words, "The line will advance!"' It is evident that both Nolan's and Colonel Lysons's statements are correct; and I conceive that the impression which each of them entertained, as well as the impression entertained by General Evans, may be reconciled by supposing that the return of Colonel Herbert to Evans's side preceded the arrival of the formal orders, and that (either intentionally, or else from some mistake) the carriage of the formal order was intrusted to two Staff officers.—  
*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Computing from the right of the 47th Regiment, the English front was a little short of two miles; but, computing it from the ground on which Adams was advancing, the front was more than two miles in extent.

gration no man could live; and in order to make good his advance on either side of the flames, he had split his force by detaching General Adams to his right with two regiments\* and Turner's battery. With that force Adams, driving before him some Russian skirmishers, marched down towards the ford which divided the French and English armies. Evans himself, with four battalions† and Fitzmayer's battery of field-artillery,‡ had to assail the defences which Prince Mentschikoff had accumulated for the dominion of the Pass and the great road. Soon, however, Evans was a good deal strengthened in the artillery arm; for an opportunity of rendering service in this part of the field was observed and seized by Captain Anderson with a battery belonging to the Light Division, and by Colonel Dacres with a battery belonging to the 1st Division. By the time that the infantry had got down to near the enclosures, eighteen English guns had begun to reply to the fire which the enemy was pouring upon Pennefather's brigade.

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with two  
battalions,  
and with  
the rest  
of his  
Division  
advances  
towards  
the bridge.

But Evans's task was a hard one; for having on his right an impassable conflagration, and being cramped towards his left by our Light Division, he was forced to move along the unsheltered line of the Great Causeway upon a narrow and crowded front, and this under a converging fire of artillery; for

The con-  
flict in  
which he  
became  
engaged.

\* The 41st and 49th.

† The 1st brigade, under Pennefather, and the 47th Regiment, belonging to Adams's brigade.

‡ Fitzmayer commanded both this and Turner's battery; the Captain of this battery was Franklin.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

CHAP. with the sixteen guns of the Causeway batteries, and  
 XVI. the flanking fire poured down from the left shoulder of the Great Redoubt, the enemy swept the main road and the bridge, and searched the fords both above and below it. And whilst the enemy's batteries thus dealt with the more open approaches to the bridge, his infantry was strong in that part of the ground which could not be searched by round-shot, for, posted in the covert on either side of the Causeway, Prince Mentschikoff had six battalions;\* and, besides these, there was a great portion of the sixteen battalions posted on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill, which was near enough to be available for the defence of the Causeway as well as the Great Redoubt. Moreover, the enemy's reserves were so disposed as to be in close and easy communication with this part of the field. The Russian skirmishers at this time were swarming in the thick ground which belts the river.†

Confronting these defences, Evans strove to work his way forward; but although the walls and enclosures on the skirts of the village here and there formed islands of shelter, the rest of the ground

\* Viz., the four battalions of Borodino, the 6th battalion of 'riflemen,' and the battalion of sappers and miners. According to some accounts, there were only a few companies of the sappers and miners. There is some obscurity as to the operations of the Borodino corps. They were so placed as to become severed from the actual control of their divisional general, and they were covered, it seems, by the conflagration; but all accounts agree in stating that the Borodino corps was in the Pass and close to the great road.

† No less than three out of the above six battalions were thrown out as skirmishers.

which had to be traversed was so bare, that every man of the force, as long as he stood there, came under the eyes of the Russian gunners; and their fire being therefore effective, Pennefather's brigade, though always moving forward a little, could only gain ground by degrees. C H A P.  
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At times, when the balls were falling thickly, the men would shelter themselves as well as they could behind such little cover as the ground afforded; and when there came a lull, they would spring forward and find shelter more in advance. There were some buildings which afforded good cover against grape and musketry; and some of the men, having gained this shelter by a swift rush across the open ground under very heavy fire, were slow to move out again into a storm of grape, canister, and musket-balls. At a later time the enemy shattered the walls of these buildings with round-shot, and some of our men were crushed or suffocated by the ruins; but those who died that poor death were men hanging back.

This kind of struggle did not of course allow the troops to adhere to their order of formation; but whenever any number of men got together upon ground which enabled them to extend, they quickly fell into line; and this they did notwithstanding that the groups thus instinctively hastening into their English formation were sometimes men of different regiments. Several times the men were ordered to lie down.

The 47th Regiment, pushing in between the river



**C H A P.** and the burning village, and afterwards fording the  
**XVI.** stream a good way below the bridge, was better sheltered from the fire of the Causeway batteries than the regiments of Pennefather's brigade.

Colonel Hoey of the 30th persistently worked his men through the gardens and enclosures till at length he was able to cross the river and establish his regiment under cover of the steep bank on the Russian side of the stream. Thence, for some time, he maintained a steady fire against the gunners of the Causeway batteries.

The 95th, like the other regiments of the brigade, stole forward from one sheltering spot to another; and at one time three of its companies got divided from the rest of the corps, and united themselves in line with the 55th; but the whole regiment had been again got together, when, the Light Division coming on, it appeared that its right regiment was overlapped by the 95th. Lacy Yea did not choose to stop; and, the 95th being halted at the time, he with his 7th Fusiliers passed through it. But the 'Derbies' could not endure to be thus left behind, and soon the regiment rushed forward, bearing so strongly towards the left that the fortunes of the corps thenceforth became connected with the exploits of Codrington's brigade.

The 55th Regiment, whilst advancing in line over open ground, came under so crushing a fire that it staggered; and though the line did not fall back, it was broken. But Colonel Warren soon rallied his regiment, and carried it forward. Afterwards, when

he reached a spot which yielded shelter to a man C H A P.  
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lying flat on the ground, he ordered his men to lie down ; but he himself kept his saddle and remained steadfast in the centre of his regiment until the moment came when again he could lead it forward.

The kind of struggle in which Evans was engaged could not be long maintained without involving heavy loss. Evans himself received a severe contusion, and almost all his Staff were struck ; for Percy Herbert, his Assistant Quartermaster-General, was dangerously hit ; and Captain Thompson, Ensign St Clair, and Captain A. M. M'Donald were severely wounded. Of the officers of the 30th, 55th, and 47th regiments, Major Rose, Captain Schaw, and Lieutenant Luxmore were killed. Colonel Warren was wounded, and so were Pakenham, Dickson, Conolly, Whimper, Walker, Coats, Bissett, Armstrong, Lieutenants Warren, Wollocombe, Philips, and Maycock. Pennefather's brigade alone lost in killed and wounded nearly one-fourth of its strength.\*

So long as the Causeway batteries swept the mouth of the Pass, Evans, with his three shattered battalions,† could do no more than maintain an obstinate and bloody combat in this part of the field, and gain ground by slow degrees. He was not yet able to push forward beyond the left bank of the river, and assail the enemy in the heart of his position across the great road.

\* This, as well as all other statements which I make of casualties in the English army, is taken from the official returns.

† The 30th, 55th, and 47th Regiments. As to the 95th, see post.



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## XVIII.

Advance  
of the  
Light  
Division.

The task  
it had  
before it.

On Evans's left, but entangled with some of his regiments, Sir George Brown moved forward with the Light Division. He had before him the Great Redoubt, armed with fourteen guns of heavy calibre; and this stronghold was flanked on the one side by the Lesser Redoubt with its eight guns, and on the other by the artillery and the infantry which guarded the Pass. Upon the slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and so posted as to look down into the Great Redoubt, there was a battery of field-artillery; and in rear of this a battery and a half, besides the four guns of the sailors, were held in reserve.\*

Sixteen battalions of infantry† were posted upon the flanks, or in the immediate rear, of the Great Redoubt. Of this force, the four Kazan battalions, formed in two columns of attack, stood in front near to either shoulder of the Great Redoubt, and these were supported by the four battalions of the Vladimir corps. On the right—proper right—of these troops, but somewhat refused, there were two of the Soudal battalions: more in advance, and so placed as to form the extreme right of the Russian infantry line, there were the two remaining battalions of the same corps. Besides the masses thus pushed forward, General Kvetzinski held in hand the four battalions of the Ouglitz corps as an immediate reserve, and

\* The details of these forces have been given already.

† The four Kazan (or Archduke Michael's) battalions, the four Vladimir battalions, the four Soudal battalions, and the four Ouglitz battalions.

posted them upon the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Further towards the rear (except, perhaps, whilst they were employed as skirmishers) there were placed the two battalions of sailors. On the extreme right, and massed in columns at intervals upon the eastern and south-eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, there were the bulk of the Russian cavalry.\* This force of horsemen was so placed that, whilst it covered the right and the right rear of the position, the Russian commander could, so to speak, swing it round, and hurl it against the flank of an enemy assailing his Great Redoubt. In few words, that Kourganè Hill, now about to be assailed by our Light Division, was defended by two redoubts, by forty-two guns, and by a force of some 17,000 men.

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Again, the troops which defended the Causeway could aid the defence of the Kourganè Hill; and, moreover, the troops which Prince Mentschikoff called his 'Great Reserve,' were so placed that they might be regarded as operating in support of the troops in this part of the field.

It rested with the four Kazan battalions to make the first attack upon the English troops. This was to be done whilst our soldiery, after struggling through the fords, were gaining the top of the bank. The enemy's massive columns were to throw our men back into the channel of the river before they could find time to form.†

\* The whole of it, except the squadrons which Prince Mentschikoff took with him when he rode towards the sea.

† After speaking of the disposition of the Russian infantry on the



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The slope which led up from the top of the bank to the parapet of the Great Redoubt was almost as even as the glacis of a fortress ; and, except to one who knew beforehand how unaccountably life and limb are spared in a storm of artillery-fire, it seemed hard to understand that upon that smooth ground men would be able to live for many moments under round-shot, grape, and canister from fourteen heavy guns.

Being on the extreme left of the Allied forces, Sir G. Brown had to stand prepared for an attack of cavalry on his flank. On our side of the river, home down to the edge of the vineyards, the broad and gently undulating downs, thickly clothed with elastic herbage, were all that horsemen could wish for, and even on the left bank the ground in this part of the field was practicable for the evolutions of cavalry. Hardly ever in war did 3000 troopers sit still in their saddles under stronger provocation to enterprise, for they were upon fair ground—they were confronted by a body of horse which was in numbers but one-third of their strength—and they gazed upon the naked flank of an infantry force advancing to the attack of a strong position. Therefore the contingency which actually occurred—the contingency of the enemy's withholding his cavalry

banks of the river, Prince Gortschakoff writes : 'These arrangements  
' had been taken with a view to the unavoidable disorders amongst the  
' enemy's lines when crossing the river, and in order to throw the  
' Allies backward by a violent shock. Orders had been issued to that  
' effect by Prince Mentschikoff, and severally reported to the com-  
' manding generals under me, and by me.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

arm instead of lifting it against the open flank of the Allies—could not have been looked for beforehand, and can only be accounted for now by ascribing it to the eccentric forbearance of the Russian commander.\*

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Rightly, therefore—though the apprehension was not afterwards justified by the event—the Light Division was carried into action with an idea that cavalry charges were to be expected on the flank; and the duty of preparing against enterprises of this sort pressed specially upon General Buller, because he commanded the left brigade.

To storm a position thus held in strength by forces of all arms, and to answer at the same time for the safety of the whole of the Allied army against a flank attack, was a task of great moment; but, on the other hand, Sir George Brown was not without means for preparing a well-ordered assault—for the enemy was making no attempt to hold the vineyards in strength; and on the Russian side of the river, the bank, though very steep, and from eight to fifteen feet in height, was yet so broken that a skirmisher seeking to bring his eye and his rifle to a level with the summit, would easily find a ledge for his foot. Here, then, was exactly the kind of cover which the assailants needed; for if this steep bank could be seized and lined for a few minutes by their skirmishers, it would enable their

Means for preparing a well-ordered assault were open to the assailants.

\* Before the action, there was a good deal of conversation amongst officers in the Light Division with respect to the way in which the expected charges of the Russian cavalry should be met; and it was then—then, perhaps, for the first time—that the idea of receiving the enemy's horse in line was broached.

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The Division not covered by skirmishers.

main body to recover its formation after passing through the enclosures and fording the river. But in order to lay hold of the advantage thus offered by the nature of the ground, it was of necessity to take care that the advance of the Light Division should be amply covered by skirmishers. This was not done. The Rifles under\* Norcott had long before scoured the vineyards; but they had swerved away towards their left, and, fording the river higher up, had left Codrington's brigade without any skirmishers to cover its advance.† No other light-infantry men were thrown forward in their stead, and the whole body went stark on with bare front, driving full at the enemy's stronghold. ‡

\* Here the words 'Lawrence and' should be inserted.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Both the wings of this Rifle battalion had inclined to their left at the time of crossing the river; and it is strictly accurate to say that the battalion, *taken as a whole*, did just what is stated in the text. The two wings, however, were not under the same commander, and therefore it may be well to repeat that the right wing—the wing under Lawrence—was the wing which had had to advance in front of Codrington's brigade. Lawrence found himself so baffled by the smoke of the burning village, that he inclined away to his left, leaving Codrington's front uncovered, and got at last to the front of the 19th Regiment.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ Sir George Brown's omission to cause skirmishers to be thrown out from the regiments of Codrington's and Buller's brigades seems to have been caused by his imagining that the necessity of the step would be effectually superseded by the operations of the Rifle battalion. The event proved his error; but one would have thought that it might have been perceived beforehand; for, however well an independent body of riflemen may be led, and however important a share it may be likely to have in governing the result of a battle, there is no safe ground for anticipating that its operations will supply the place of skirmishers thrown out from the formed battalions. Indeed, it may be said that the more able and enterprising the leader of an independent body of light-infantry men may be, the less his force will be likely to fulfil the peculiar duty

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Sir George Brown's right brigade, consisting of the 7th Fusiliers, the 33d and the 23d Regiments,\* was under General Codrington. The left brigade, consisting of the 19th, the 88th, and 77th Regiments, was commanded by General Buller. The orders which General Codrington received from Sir George were simply to advance with his brigade, and not to stop until he had crossed the river. A like order, it is believed, was given to General Buller. The Division still moved in line; and, after losing a few men from the fire of the enemy's artillery, it reached the boundary of the vineyards and gardens which belt the course of the river.

The tenor  
of Sir G.  
Brown's  
orders for  
the ad-  
vance.

In their eagerness for the conflict, the regiments strove to advance quickly; but it was a laborious task to traverse the gardens and enclosures, and many of those who had hitherto kept their knapsacks here laid them down. In a few minutes the whole of the Light Division of infantry, drawing along with it, in its impetuous course, the 95th Regiment, had forced a way into the vineyards. There our young

The ad-  
vance  
through  
the vine-  
yards;

of companies thrown out from the formed battalions, and kept in close relation with them by the link of that obedience which a captain owes to his colonel.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* When I speak of several regiments in the same limb of the sentence, I generally follow the order in which they would be ranged, going from right to left. In a brigade consisting of three regiments—say, *e. g.*, of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Foot—the 1st would be posted at the right, the 3d in the centre, and the 2d on the left. So if one wished to speak of those three regiments in the order in which they would stand when ranged in the same battalion, one would take them from right to left, and in this order—viz., 1st Foot, 3d Foot, 2d Foot.

CHAP. soldiers found themselves, as they imagined, in a  
XVI. thick storm of shot and cannon-balls ; but it seems  
that missiles of war fly crashing so audibly through  
foliage that they sound more dangerous than they  
are.

The loss at this time was not great. Our men were in the belief that speed was required of them ; and having before them no chain of skirmishers to feel the way and control the pace of the Division, they struggled forward with eager haste. In passing from one of the enclosures to another, part of the line came to the top of a vertical bank, revetted with stone, and forming a kind of ‘sunk fence.’ Standing there, the men observed that a violent gust of shot was beating in against the stone-work at their feet ; and it seemed to them that, the moment they sprang from the top of the fence to the lower vineyard, their legs would be shattered by a thousand missiles. For a moment they paused, as though for some guidance ; but the guidance was such as is given by—‘Forward, first company!’ ‘Second company, ‘show them the way!’ The first who leaped down stood unscathed in the vineyard below ; the rest followed. Dangers shrink before the advance of resolute men. There was not much loss in that lower vineyard. The troops pressed on.

And by this time he\* had not only driven the enemy’s riflemen from the enclosures, but had even†

\* Instead of the word ‘he,’ read ‘the 2d battalion of the Rifle brigade.’  
—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Instead of the word ‘even,’ insert the following words : ‘already

stolen over the river higher up,\* and was opening fire on the left bank. C H A P.  
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Amongst the vineyards there were, here and there, farm-cottages and homesteads; and since the obstructions which the men were encountering had destroyed their formation, it became possible for such as loved their safety more than their honour to linger in the shelter afforded by these buildings. Some few, they say, lingered.

The Division hurried forward with just such trace of its original line-formation as could remain to it after rapidly passing through difficult enclosures. The river, though flowing in a swift current, was fordable by a strong man in most places, but it was of very unequal depth. General Codrington was seen riding quickly across at a point where the stream hardly flowed above his horse's fetlocks, and yet, almost close to him, the taller charger of another

and over  
the river.

‘crossed the stream; for Colonel Lawrence, with the right wing, advancing in front of the 19th Regiment, had brought his men straight across the river as though it were only a brook; and Major Norcott, with the left wing, had.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* The expression, ‘stolen over the stream higher up,’ is not, in its origin, mine, but Sir George Brown's. Before the 88th and 77th Regiments reached the bank of the river, Major Norcott's left wing (then operating in front of those two regiments) inclined to its left for the sake of a ford which crossed the river somewhat higher up; and that is the reason for retaining the statement, though it now stands in a page which connects it with a later part of the battle than that in which Sir George Brown placed it. Sir George imagined (I have his report before me) that Major Norcott had crossed the stream before the orders came for the advance of the Light Division, and I accepted Sir George's account as accurate in this respect; but I was wrong in doing so. Colonel Norcott writes, ‘At length the line came up, and without a moment's pause I threw Fyer's and Errol's companies,’ &c.; and he *then* goes on to describe his passage of the river.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



C H A P. officer went down and had to swim. The soldiers  
XVI. rapidly waded across. Some few perished in the stream, and it was never known whether they fell from shot or from not being able to keep their footing in the current.

That part of Pennefather's brigade which was overlapped by the 7th Fusiliers\* had become entangled with the Light Division ; and at the moment of Codrington's advance, Hume of the 95th seized a colour, and, dashing across the river, carried with him almost the whole of the regiment ; but the men bore so much towards their left, that by the time they gained the foot of the bank on the Russian side of the river, they had got blended, not (as might be supposed) with the right, but with the left regiment of Codrington's brigade. They were destined to share the glory and the carnage which awaited the 23d Fusiliers.

At length the whole Light Division, together with the additional regiment which had strayed into its company, was upon the Russian side of the river ; but as yet the troops only stood upon the narrow strip of dry ground at the water's edge, and such of them as were in the centre, or towards the right, were penned back by the rocky bank which rose steep and high over their heads. The soldiery were a crowd—a crowd shaped and twisted by the winding of the river's bank, yet with some remains of military coherence ; for although the enclosures and the fording of the river could not but destroy all for-

\* *i.e.*, after the Fusiliers had marched through the 95th.

mation, the men of every company had kept together as well as they were able. C H A P.  
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But a general who had omitted to line the bank with his own skirmishers might well expect to see it fringed with the enemy's rifles; and the strong wall which nature had offered to the English as a cover for the formation of their battalions was now, of course, held by the enemy's skirmishers. These light troops were in greatest force along the bank which faced the centre and the right of the Light Division. They came to the edge of the bank, fired down into the crowd of the red-coats, and then drew back for a pace or two that they might load in peace and be ready to fire again. They could kill and wound men in the crowd below without laying themselves open to fire.

Along the part reached by Codrington's brigade the left bank is lined with the enemy's skirmishers.

Towards the left of the Light Division the bank was less abrupt, and also more free from the enemy's skirmishers.\* There, after passing the river, General Buller, who commanded the 2d brigade, was able to form it at his leisure. He ordered the 77th Regiment to lie down under the cover afforded by the configuration of the ground, and upon a slope somewhat sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery he placed the 88th Regiment.† With these two regiments he remained long halted, not partaking in the subsequent advance of Codrington's brigade. His reason was, that, a large body of

Course taken by General Buller.

\* Because our riflemen, as we saw, were operating in this part of the field. The whole of the 2d battalion of Rifles was operating in the front or left front of Buller's brigade.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† As to the 19th Regiment, see *post*.

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Nature  
of the  
duty  
attaching  
upon him.

cavalry and infantry appearing on the plain to threaten his left,\* he thought it right to keep two regiments in hand until he should find himself supported by the near approach of the Highland brigade. He conceived that he ought to beware of outstripping the 1st Division by too great an interval ; and, in truth, the duty which attached upon General Buller at this moment was one of a grave kind ; for if the enemy should seize the moment of Sir George Brown's assault upon the Great Redoubt as his time for making a resolute attack with horse, foot, and artillery upon the flank of our advancing troops, the safety of the whole Allied army would be challenged, and would be found to rest upon such dispositions as General Buller might have made for covering our left.

\* The absence of Prince Mentschikoff in a distant part of the field was probably the cause of the enemy's want of enterprise in not pressing with any degree of vigour upon the open flank of the English army. The only approach to any actual movement against the flank of the Light Division at the time of its advance from the river was one perceived and checked by Major Norcott. Norcott, having crossed the stream, had thrown forward his two right companies to a ridge in advance of the bank, and with his two remaining companies was occupying the precincts of a farmstead which offered him a point of *appui* for his left flank. Whilst he was thus posted, he saw some sixty or seventy Cossacks coming down from the south-east by a road which led to the farm, and close following these he perceived the head of a column of infantry. Norcott immediately withdrew his two right companies from the ridge, and prepared to make a stand at the farm. To aid him in this undertaking, he requested Captain Colville (who had come into this part of the field with one of Colonel Lawrence's companies) to draw up his men in line across the road leading down to the farm. Seeing these preparations for their reception, the horsemen, and the column of infantry which had been following them, turned about and withdrew.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

Sir George Brown's order to Buller empowered him to advance until he was over the stream ; but that duty having been executed, the brigadier now found himself on the bank of a river, without, so far as I know, having any fresh orders to guide him, yet charged by circumstance with the duty of covering the flank of the whole Allied army at the moment of an assault upon the enemy's stronghold. The business was a vital one ; and the caution which Buller used at this time was required by the occasion.\* For to push forward the two regiments which formed the extreme left of the whole Allied front, and to march them against the enemy's stronghold in a line, outflanked by the enemy's horse, and even, it would seem, by a portion of his foot, would have been to lay open, not Buller's brigade merely, but the whole Allied army, to the risk of a flank attack involving great disasters. In these circumstances it was Buller's duty to take up such a position as would enable him to cover the advance of Codrington's brigade, and to sustain the shock of a flank attack. It was to that end that he kept in hand the 88th and the 77th Regiments.

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## XX.

Though forming part of Buller's brigade, the 19th Regiment† was suffered ere long to associate itself

The 19th  
Regiment.

\* The way in which the 88th and the 77th Regiments were handled at a later period of the action was not the necessary result of the dispositions made at this time, and is a fit subject for distinct comments.

† Having Lawrence on its front with the right wing of the 2d Rifle battalion.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

C H A P.  
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with General Codrington's advance. So, with this and the other stray regiment\* which clung to it, Codrington's brigade was swollen to a force of five battalions.

State of  
the five  
battalions  
standing  
crowded  
along the  
left bank  
of the  
river.

Sir George  
Brown.

These five battalions were extended in a broken chain at the foot of the bank on the Russian side of the river, and were falling—especially towards the right—under the close fire of the skirmishers who crowned the top. In this strait some of our officers instinctively tried to clear the front by getting the men to mount part way up the bank, and bring their rifles to a level with the summit. But among the foremost the General commanding the Division had forded the river. Sir George Brown was an officer whose career had begun, and begun with glory, in the great days under Wellington; but whilst he was still in his early manhood, wars had ceased, and thenceforth, for near forty years, he had brought his strong energies to bear upon the kind of military business which used to be practised by the English in peace-time. A long immersion in the Adjutant-General's department had led him to go even beyond other men in laying stress upon the value of discipline;† but the practice of this sort of industry had not at all helped to school him for the command of

\* The 95th. See *ante*.

† One of the commentators said that the above account of the career of Sir George Brown from 1815 to 1854 was inaccurate; but he was wrong. The commentator's error was occasioned—not by any want of knowledge about Sir George Brown's career, but—by misreading the passage. The account given in the text is right as it stands.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

a division in war-time ; for in labouring after that mechanic perfection which, after all, is only one of many means towards an end, the end itself had been much forgotten by those who controlled our military system, and the business of war (as, for instance, the art of carrying a brigade in line through enclosures and thick grounds) had been little or never practised in England.\* To a military system which omits to anticipate and to deal with the common obstacles to be expected in a battle-field, war is a rough disturber ; and unless the industry of the barrack-yard is supported by other and better resources, it is liable to be turned to nothingness by even a gentle contact with reality. A belt of garden-ground, a winding though fordable stream, and an enemy hitherto inert, had sufficed to make Sir George Brown despair of being able to present his troops to the enemy in a state of formation. Great dislocation of military order was, of course, the necessary result of having to pass through enclosures and to ford a winding stream ; so what the main body needed to have before it when it approached the left bank of the river, was a swarm of skirmishers clearing its immediate front, and prepared to cover it during the process of forming anew. This cover, however, was wanting. Sir George Brown declared that to attempt any formation after the passage of the river would be impossible, and that he had ‘determined to trust to the spirit and individual courage

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\* Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Scinde, used to press the importance of practising troops in this way, but without success.

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
‘ of the troops.’ Thus, on ground giving rare opportunity for the deliberate preparation of an attack, and under no great stress of battle, the Light Division—the ‘Light Division’ whose very name carried with it a great inheritance of glory—was suffered to lapse into a mere throng of brave men. In this plight the five battalions had to advance under the guns of a powerful battery supported by heavy columns of foot.

But an officer honoured with the command of British troops can always hope that, when his skill fails him, his men may still retrieve the day by sheer fighting ; and to a commander frustrated in his evolutions, the prospect of a rude conflict with the enemy may offer the best kind of solace, and perhaps even a happy issue out of trouble. Of such comfort as was to be got from close fighting, there seemed to be fair promise in the Great Redoubt ; and there Sir George Brown resolved to seek it. Eager to have, at the least, a forward place in the armed throng, he suffered agony lest the bank, very steep at the spot where he faced it, should be inaccessible to a mounted officer ; but he soon found a place where a break in the stiffness of the acclivity left room for the two or three ledges which a horseman must find before he can reach the top. Then he quickly gained the open ground above. The Russian skirmishers were there. Schooled in habits of deep reverence for military rank, these men may have been startled, perhaps, by the sudden apparition of the flowing plumes\* which bespoke a general officer, and,

\* Instead of ‘the flowing plumes,’ I ought to have been content to

Section intended to convey an idea of the formation  
of the ground beneath the Great Redoubt

is the  
Great Redoubt



AB. This is not a section made from survey. It is not intended to be taken as a representation  
that such was the actual configuration of the ground. It is only meant to help the reader  
towards understanding the description given in the text.





what was worse, a general officer in a state of displeasure. It seems, too, there is something in the bearing of a fearless, near-sighted man which disturbs the reckonings of other people ; for they see that his ways are not their ways, and they do not know but that he may be right in not fearing them, and that, if they were not to be afraid of him, they themselves might be in the wrong. At all events, the enemy's skirmishers, omitting or failing to bring down the English General, suffered him to remain unhurt on the top of the bank. There, flushed and angry—he was angry, perhaps, with himself, or angry with the gardens and walls and the perverse winding of a stream which had broken the cherished structure of his battalions—he sat on his grey charger full under the guns of the Great Redoubt, and the dun oblong columns of the enemy's infantry that flanked it on either side. However eagerly he might be longing to carry forward his Division, he was without the means of sending swift orders along his line.

But towards the right of Sir George Brown a movement corresponding with his determination had already begun. General Codrington, ordered to advance in line and not to stop till he had crossed the river, had obeyed very swiftly ; and the men of his brigade, in common with the 95th Regiment, having moved with a converging tendency during their passage through the vineyards and the river, were

General  
Codring-  
ton.

say 'the hat;' for, adopting the evidently authentic information on this subject which was obtained by the conductors of the 'Quarterly Review,' I have come to the conclusion that, at this time, Sir George Brown's hat was without its plumes.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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now thickly clustered under the left bank in a chain which took its bends from the winding of the stream. Codrington was at this time between the 33d Regiment and the 23d Fusiliers. He strove to do something towards restoring the formation of his troops ; but the crowd, jammed together, twisted into fantastic shape by the bends of the river's bank, and standing helpless under the fire of the skirmishers, shooting down into it from above, could hardly even try to perform an evolution requiring free space and time. And if, for a moment, it seemed possible that any approach to a formation under the bank could be effected, the hope was rudely destroyed ; for, on ground lower down the river, a body of the enemy's light troops found for themselves a spot yielding them shelter, yet so placed that it enabled them to pour a flanking fire along the strip or ledge which divided the stream from the bank, and this at a part where the earth was alive with our devoted soldiery.

To keep the men under this fire for many minutes, and to keep them, too, standing all the time in unresisting masses, would be to lose a brigade. The only order received by General Codrington had been obeyed to the full. He had no time to seek guidance from his Divisional General. Clearly there was come upon him one of those rare conjunctures in which a career is made to hinge upon the decision of a moment. General Codrington, a few weeks before, had been only a traveller\* on a visit to the army in

\* He had come out in command of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream ;

Bulgaria. He now commanded a brigade. His father was that Admiral whose achievement at Navarino had been a link in the chain of events which now brought the son in arms for the Sultan's cause. And any one who loved our navy, even to jealousy of the land service, might persuade himself that the bright, ardent, straightforward glance, and the bold, decisive speech of the Coldstream officer, must have come by inheritance from a sailor. He had the close, tight lips, bespeaking the obstinate man who lives a life undistracted by breadth and diversity of views. And much of what he seemed he was—a firm, plain soldier, not liable to be bent from the simple path by refined or complex views.\* He could not see far without the help of the glass which he kept attached to his cap, but he was more alive to the world around him than near-sighted men often are. He had never before been in action. He could not suffer his troops to remain for another minute a helpless crowd under

C H A P.  
XVI.

but the brevet of the 20th of June (which reached him at Varna in the following month) deprived him for the time of all military occupation by raising him to the rank of Major-General. Greatly distressed by a change which seemed to rob him of his opportunity of seeing active service before the enemy, General Codrington pressed to be allowed to remain serving with the army in any capacity; but the opportunity of granting his prayer did not occur until nearly two months afterwards, and during the interval he was without any military occupation, so he travelled in the country of the Balkan. On the 1st of September he was appointed to the command he now held—the command of the 1st brigade of the Light Division.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* I of course know that an opinion attributing to General Codrington this manly simplicity of mind is liable to be challenged by those who remember the style of his despatches. My answer is, that his despatches do not indicate the man. His private letters do. They are written very simply, but with a good deal of power.



CHAP. heavy fire. He knew not how he could withdraw  
 XVI. them to any ground apt for manœuvring; and it was hardly possible for him to exert such a control over the crowd of soldiers hemmed in under the bank as would enable him to repair the evil by covering his brigade with skirmishers.

## XXI.

Nelson, gliding into the Bay of Aboukir, told his assembled captains that if any one of them in the coming battle should chance to be disturbed by doubts about what he ought to do, he might find a good way out of trouble by closing with an enemy's ship.

Codrington resolves to storm the Great Redoubt.

And it was a solution of this sort which Codrington sought; for, with no authority except that which was cast upon him by the stress of the moment, he resolved to storm the Great Redoubt; and he resolved to do this instantly. His immediate power over the disordered masses around him was confined within the range of his voice; but, lifting himself a little in his stirrups, he spoke to the men in his clear ringing voice, and ordered them (all who could hear him) 'to fix bayonets, get up the bank, and advance to the attack.'

His words to the men.

He gains the top of the bank.

Then, also, Codrington imagined that the need of the moment was a ready leader rather than a cool and placid general. Besides, this was his first battle; and perhaps—our army, and not the world, will understand him if so it was—he unconsciously felt that the foremost place was peculiarly befitting a Guards-



man who commanded a brigade of the line. With C H A P.  
XVI.  
the quickness of a man accustomed to hunting, he found a spot where the bank was practicable, and, facing it obliquely, his small white Arab with two or three strides carried him to the summit. From the spot which he thus reached the enemy's skirmishers had withdrawn ;\* and Codrington, with the few soldiers who had already been able to gain the top, was alone upon this part of the hill-side. Looking up the smooth, gentle slope, he had before him the Great Redoubt ; but for the moment the mouths of the heavy guns which armed it remained black and silent. On his right front he saw a body of infantry massed in column. The men, in their long, grey, sombre coats, stood formed with great precision and rigidly still ; but right and left of the mass there was a chain of skirmishers so placed on the flanks of the column as to be abreast of its front rank. The troops close in rear of the body in front could hardly be seen, for they were almost hidden by the dip of the ground ; but the crest was fringed with sparkling light, and the light was light playing upon the bayonet-points of battalions massed in the hollow.

Our troops were yearning to be commanded ; and if the men, far and near, could have seen that the horseman on the small white Arab above them was a general officer, they would have looked to every wave of his arm for a guiding signal ; but Codrington had

\* I imagine that they were withdrawn from this spot because it was under the guns — the guns of the Great Redoubt — from which the enemy was about to open fire on our troops.

C H A P.  
XVI.

come to the East a mere traveller,\* and his simple forage-cap had not the significance of the hat and the flowing plumes, which would have shown men far from the spot that a general officer was on the top of the bank. There were soldiers, however, who gained the top almost at the same moment as their leader. First one here and there, then knots, then bevvies of men clambered up.

Hitherto the knowledge that there was to be an advance beyond the bank had been confined to the people who chanced to be near Sir George Brown or General Codrington ; but those who heard the words or caught the meaning of the divisional general and the brigadier, hastened to give effect to the will of their chiefs by sending their words along the line.

Lacy Yea  
and his  
Fusiliers.

The 7th Fusiliers, being on the extreme right of Codrington's brigade, was beyond the reach of his personal guidance, but Lacy Yea,† who commanded the regiment, was a man of an onward, fiery, violent nature, not likely to suffer his cherished regiment to stand helpless under muzzles pointed down on him and his people by the skirmishers close overhead. The will of a horseman to move forward, no less than his power to elude or overcome all obstacles, is singularly strengthened by the education of the hunting-field, and Lacy Yea had been used in early days to ride to hounds in one of the stiffest of all hunting-counties. To him this left bank of the Alma crowned with Russian troops was very like the wayside ac-

\* No ; see note, p. 330.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Pronounced Yaw.

clivity which often enough in his boyhood had threatened to wall him back and keep him down in the depths of a Somersetshire lane whilst the hounds were running high up in the field some ten or fifteen feet above. His practised eye soon showed him a fit 'shord' or break in the scarped face of the bank, and then, shouting out to his people, 'Never mind forming! Come on, men! Come on, anyhow!' he put his cob to the task, and quickly gained the top.

C H A P.  
XVI.

On either side of him, men of his regiment rapidly climbed up, and in such numbers that the Russian skirmishers who had been lining it fell back upon their battalions.

And now, in the masses still crowded along the foot of the bank, there rose up that murmur of prayer for closer fighting which, coming of a sudden from men of Teuton blood, is the advent of a new and seemingly extrinsic power—the power ascribed in old times to the hand of an Immortal. From the first company of the 7th Fusiliers to the left of the 19th Regiment, the deep, angry, gathering sound was 'Forward!' 'Forward!' 'Forward!' The throng was heaved; and presently the whole 1st brigade of the Light Division, carrying with it the 19th and the 95th Regiments, surged up, and in numberless waves broke over the bank.

The heaving of the crowd beneath the bank.

That tendency to converge, of which we have already spoken, had contracted the front presented by the five regiments now on the crest of the bank to a fraction only of the line which they would have formed if they had been deployed in due order. The

Effect of the converging tendency which had governed the troops.





C H A P.  
XVI.

Endea-  
vours of  
the men to  
form line  
on the top  
of the  
bank.

operation of taking ground and opening out into line is hardly one to be undertaken by a crowd of soldiery on ground which may be called the glacis of the enemy's fortress, and in the close presence of his formed battalions; but the 7th Fusiliers, being on the extreme right of the brigade, and not being cramped at that time by any pressure from the regiments of the 2d Division, was able to find space; and though numbers of the regiment were wanting, and though many belonging to other corps were mixed up with the Fusiliers, Lacy Yea, using violent energy, was able in some degree to make the men open out. But the silence which is the pride of the English army could not at that moment be preserved, for numbers of men, separated from their companies and their regiments, yet eager to follow the path of duty, were anxiously seeking advice from officers, and trying, in fact, to place themselves under such command as time and circumstance would allow. In this condition of things the utmost that could be done was to give to the mass the rudiments of a line-formation. Colonel Blake with the 33d was able to make his regiment open out and form line.

In the other three regiments, too, the soldiers strove hard to put themselves in their English array; but on either flank space was wanting; and although these battalions, having now open ground before them, were no longer a helpless mass, their state was not such as to enable them to move at the will of a commander. They were an armed and warlike crowd.

The five regiments now gathered on the crest of

the bank were the first body of Allied troops which moved up on that day to dispute with the enemy for ground which he held in strength. Both their right and their extreme left confronted the Russian infantry massed in columns upon either flank of the Great Redoubt ; but the centre and left centre of this part of our assailing force stood right under the face of the work.

C H A P.  
XVI.

The task  
they had  
before  
them.

Although at this time there was in general no due formation, still the knotted chain into which the men of the five regiments found themselves extended, was much more than long enough to outflank the Great Redoubt on either side ; and the troops which formed the extreme left and the extreme right of our line were less exposed than the centre regiments to fire from the face of the work. But in order that he might at once crush those portions of our clustered force, the enemy, as we have seen, had massive columns of infantry posted on either flank of the redoubt. Two of these columns—columns formed of the Kazan corps—now moved down the hill.

The column,\* descending from the eastern flank of the work, marched against that part of our line which was formed by the 19th Regiment† and some of the left companies of the 23d. It had already come part way down the slope before any great number of the English had clambered up to the top

The Right  
Kazan  
column  
advances  
against the  
19th Regi-  
ment and  
some com-  
panies of  
the 23d.

\* A double-battalion column, I believe, containing 1500 men. This Kazan corps, of which we shall see a great deal, is more commonly called in Russian accounts the 'Grand Duke Michael's Regiment.' It was a regiment of 'chasseurs.'

† Having Lawrence's Rifles on its front.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

C H A P.  
XVI.

of the bank ; and our soldiers, it would seem, at that time might have been forced back into the channel of the river by a continued and resolute advance of the column ; but when, one by one, and in knots and groups, our men gained the top of the bank, when they saw the ground above spreading smooth and open before them, and the huge grey square-built mass gliding down to where they were, then, happily for England and for the freedom of Europe—for on this in no small measure the common weal seems to rest—it came to be seen that now, after near forty years of peace, our soldiery were still gifted with the priceless quality which hinders them from feeling, in the way that foreigners feel it, the weight of a column of infantry. In their English way, half sportive, half surly, our young soldiers seemed to measure their task ; and then—many of them still holding betwixt their teeth the clusters of grapes which they had gathered in the vineyards below—they began shooting easy shots into the big, solid mass of infantry which was solemnly marching against them.\* The column was not unsteady, but it was perhaps an over-drilled body of men unskilfully or weakly handled. At all events, those who wielded it were unable to make its strength tell against clusters of English lads who stood facing it merrily, and teasing it with rifle-balls. Soon the column was ordered or suffered to yield ; and since it fell back to a spot

The  
column is  
defeated,  
and re-  
treats.

\* The column, it seems, was also under a flanking fire poured into it by some of the riflemen whom Major Norcott had posted at the farmstead on the extreme left of the English line.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

where the ground was hollow, it lapsed nearly or quite out of sight. Then the 19th\* and the left companies of the 23d, having thus ridded themselves of the infantry force in their front, began, as they advanced, to bend towards their right, and became a part of the force which was storming the Great Redoubt.

C H A P.  
XVI.

But the other Kazan column †—the column coming down from the west flank of the redoubt—was a force of high mettle; and it now began that obstinate fight with the 7th Fusiliers which was destined to last from the commencement of the infantry fight until almost the close of the battle.

The Left  
Kazan  
column  
begins its  
fight with  
the 7th  
Fusiliers.

## XXII.

But between the two bodies of troops thus engaged on either flank with the enemy's infantry, the great bulk of Codrington's brigade, swollen by the accession of the 95th Regiment, was already moving up under the guns of the Great Redoubt. Codrington, indeed, had not waited for the moment when his whole brigade reached the top of the bank; for, having gathered some knots of men on either side of him, he rode forward gently a few paces, then waited until he gained some increase of numbers, and

The storm-  
ing of the  
Great  
Redoubt.

\* With Lawrence's Rifles in front of it. Major Norcott's two right companies were extended along the ridge above the river's bank, and were lying down, when Colonel Lawrence, advancing in person with his wing of the Rifle battalion, rode through them. It was through a part of Fyers's company that Colonel Lawrence rode.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† A double-battalion column, I believe, containing 1500 men.

CHAP.  
XVI. then again moved on, thus canvassing, as it were, for followers, and gradually carrying forward with him more and more of the troops. At first, he got on slowly ; for the bulk of our officers having had no order to dispense with formation, they judged, when they gained the top of the bank, that they ought to strive to form line before they advanced, and they were labouring to that end ; but when it came to be understood that an advance without formation was sanctioned by the generals or compelled by stress of events, the whole of the force, though clubbed and broken into clusters of men, began to move up the gentle slope of the hill.

For a little while every gun in the great battery above remained dark and silent.

Amongst the Russians who were plying their field-glasses from the parapet of the Great Redoubt there was a question meet for debate :—‘ If the  
‘ scarlet men of the sea were presumptuously bent  
‘ upon storming the work, where was the great  
‘ column of attack, and where the great column of  
‘ support, and where the great columns of reserve  
‘ which would have been formed for such an enter-  
‘ prise ? Yet, if they had no such purpose, why  
‘ were so many men coming up under the guns  
‘ within grape-shot range ? And unless those Eng-  
‘ lish were really attacking in force, why, in the name  
‘ of the Holy Virgin and our own blessed Sergius,\*

\* The troops in and near the redoubt belonged to the 16th Division; and this Division carried with it a wooden image of the saint, solemnly intrusted to it by the Bishop of Moscow.


‘ why, riding forward even in front of the skirmishers, C H A P.  
‘ should there be that superb-looking horseman on the XVI.  
‘ grey charger, whose visible rage no less than his  
‘ flowing plumes\* clearly showed that he held high  
‘ command?’

Upon the whole, it seemed that the advance of the red-coated soldiery was an irruption of skirmishers preparatory to an attack in force, but was an irruption so strong as to be worthy of all that artillery could do to crush it. So, the Russian sharpshooters having now for the most part fallen back, or moved aside out of the line of fire, the gunners in the Great Redoubt made ready to open fire upon our regiments with round-shot, canister, and grape.

First one gun, then another, then more. From east to west the parapet grew white, and henceforth it lay so enfolded in its bank of silver smoke that no gun could any longer be seen by our men, except at the moment when it was pouring its blaze through the cloud. On what one may call a glacis, at three hundred yards from the mouths of the guns, the lightning, the thunder, and the bolt are not far apart. Death loves a crowd; and in some places our soldiery were pressing on so close together that when a round-shot cut its way into the midst of them, it dealt a sure havoc.

There began a slaughter of our people. Some of the men struck down had got up a good way on

\* Instead of ‘his flowing plumes,’ I should have been content to say ‘his general’s hat.’ See note on this subject in a former page.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



C H A P.  
XVI.

the slope, others were so newly come to the top of the bank that they fell back dead and dying into the channel of the river; but all who were not struck down moved forward. Some of the clusters into which our men had gathered were eight or ten deep; and the round-shot, tearing cruelly through and through, mowed down so many of our devoted soldiery that several times the crowd left standing was thinned.

But only for a moment; because that singular tendency which had begun with the advance into the vineyards was now setting in more strongly. Moving to the attack without being ordered to make towards any given spot, almost every officer and man (except those towards the flanks who were engaged with the enemy's infantry) had instinctively proposed to himself the same goal; and this goal was the Great Redoubt. Upon the Great Redoubt, therefore, the regiments kept always converging; and in less time than it took the Russian artillerymen to sponge and load their guns, our people, inclining away from the flanks, and pressing in towards the centre, filled up every space cut clear by the shot; and this so constantly that, again, after a fall of many men, and again, and still again, there was always a flock ready for the slaughter. In the 'Derbyshire,'\* Captain Eddington was shot in the throat and killed; Polhill was torn and slain with grape. The colonel was wounded, and Champion took the command of the regiment. He was a man of great gentle-

\* The 95th.

# The storming of The Great Redoubt



The Oughly  
battalions

Russian battery commanding  
the Great Redoubt



The Vladimir



The Vladimir  
battalions



The Great Redoubt  
Fourteen heavy guns



The right Kazan column  
returning



The Great Redoubt  
Fourteen heavy guns



The left  
Kazan column

The 7th Infantry successfully  
formed and engaged with  
the left Kazan Column.

The 7th Infantry successfully  
formed and engaged with  
the left Kazan Column.





ness and piety; and if he was not highly endowed with intellectual gifts, he was able to express the feelings of his heart with something of a poetic force. His mind was accustomed to dwell very much on the world that lies beyond the grave; and in the midst of this scene of carnage he gained, as it were, a seeming glimpse of the happy state; for when the younger Eddington fell at his side, Champion paused to see what ailed him, and looking upon his young friend's pale face, he saw it suddenly clothed with a 'most sweet expression.' It was because death was on him that the blissful look had come. In the mind of Champion the sight had a deep import; for he was of the faith that God's Providence is special, and to him the beautiful smile on the features of 'the dead' was the smile of an immortal man gently carried away from earth by the very hand of his Maker.

Yet this piety of his was of no unwarlike cast. Nay, he was of so noble a sort that, though he had not willingly chosen the profession of arms, yet, when he prayed, he was accustomed to render thanks to his Creator for vouchsafing to make him a hardy soldier; and being, he said, very strong in the belief that he could die as piously on the battle-field as in 'a downy bed,' he pressed on, content with his 'Derbies,' to the face of the Great Redoubt.\*

And now, whilst the assailing force was rent from front to rear with grape and canister poured down from the heavy guns above, another and a not less

\* Champion's Letters.


CHAP. XVI. deadly arm was brought to bear against it ; for the enemy marched a body of infantry into the rear of the breastwork ; and his helmeted soldiers, kneeling behind the parapet at the intervals between the embrasures, watched, ready with their muskets on the earthwork, till they thought our people were near enough, and then fired into the crowd. Moreover, the troops on either flank of the redoubt began to fire obliquely into the assailing mass.

Then, for such of our men as were new to war, it became time to learn that the ear is a false guide in the computation of passing shot ; and that amid notes sounding like a very torrent of balls, the greater part of even a crowded force may remain unhurt. The storm of rifle and musket balls, of grape and canister, came in blasts ; and though there were pauses, yet whilst a blast was sweeping through, it seemed to any young soldier, guided by the sound of the rushing missiles, that nowhere betwixt them, however closely he might draw in his limbs, could there be room for him to stand unscathed. But no man shrank. Our soldiers, still panting with the violence of their labour in crossing the river and scaling the bank, scarcely fired a shot, and they did not speak ; but they, every one, went forward. The truth is, that the weak-hearted men had been left behind in the gardens and buildings of the village ; the dross was below, and the force on the hill-side was pure metal. It was so intent on its purpose, that no one, they say, at this time, was seen to cast back a look towards the 1st Division.

The assailants were nearing the breastwork, when, after a lull of a few moments, its ordnance all thundered at once, or at least so nearly at the same moment that the pathway of their blast was a broad one; and there were many who fell; but the onset of our soldiery was becoming a rush. Codrington, riding in front of the men, gaily cheered them on; and all who were not struck down by shot pressed on towards the long bank of smoke which lay dimly enfolding the redoubt. C H A P.  
XVI.

But already—though none of the soldiery engaged then knew who wrought the spell—a hard stress had been put upon the enemy. For a while, indeed, the white bank of smoke, lit through here and there with the slender flashes of musketry, stood fast in the front of the parapet, and still all but shrouded the helmets and the glittering bayonets within; but it grew more thin: it began to rise; and, rising, it disclosed a grave change in the counsels of the Russian Generals. Some Englishman—or many, perhaps, at the same moment—looking keen through the smoke, saw teams of artillery-horses moving, and there was a sound of ordnance-wheels. Our panting soldiery broke from their silence. ‘By all that is holy! he is limbering up!’ ‘He is carrying off his guns!’ ‘Stole away!’ ‘Stole away! Stole away!’ The glacis of the Great Redoubt had come to sound more joyous than the covert’s side in England.

The embrasures were empty, and in rear of the work, long artillery-teams—eight-horse and ten-horse teams—were rapidly dragging off the guns.



C H A P.  
XVI.

Then a small childlike youth ran forward before the throng, carrying a colour. This was young Anstruther. He carried the Queen's colour of the Royal Welsh. Fresh from the games of English school-life, he ran fast ; for, heading all who strove to keep up with him, he gained the redoubt, and dug the butt-end of the flagstaff into the parapet ; and there for a moment he stood, holding it tight, and taking breath. Then he was shot dead ; but his small hands, still clasping the flagstaff, drew it down along with him, and the crimson silk lay covering the boy with its folds ; but only for a moment, because William Evans, a swift-footed soldier, ran forward, gathered up the flag, and, raising it proudly, made claim to the Great Redoubt on behalf of the 'Royal Welsh.'\*

\* It almost always happens that incidents occurring in a battle are told by the most truthful bystanders with differences more or less wide. One of the eyewitnesses of the above-mentioned incident, whose impressions wear all the appearance of being accurate, has given me the following account of it :—Young Anstruther, he says, rushed forward just as is mentioned in the text, and being shot dead, he fell clasping the colour in the way above described ; but the spot of ground where he fell was short of the redoubt by some thirty or forty yards. At the moment when Anstruther fell, Sergeant Luke O'Connor (the centre sergeant), who had been keeping close up with the colour, was also struck down by a shot which wounded him in the breast. Then, as is told in the text, William Evans gathered up the colour, but in the next moment Sergeant Luke O'Connor became aware that, bad as his wound was, it would not prevent him from springing to his feet. So rising up quickly, he asserted his right as sergeant to the honour of carrying the colour. He accordingly received it from the hands of William Evans, carried it up to the breastwork, and planted it on the parapet, laying claim to the Great Redoubt on behalf of the Royal Welsh. And after this, notwithstanding his wound, O'Connor persisted in refusing to part with the honour of carrying the colour. Lieutenant Granville, and also, I think, some other officers of the regiment, observed that O'Connor was growing weak from the effect of his wound, and pressed him to go to the rear ;

The colour floating high in the air, and seen by our people far and near, kindled in them a raging love for the ground where it stood. Breathless men found speech. Codrington, still in the front, uncovered his head, waved his cap for a sign to his people, and then, riding straight at one of the embrasures, leapt his grey Arab into the breastwork. There were some eager and swift-footed soldiers who sprang the parapet nearly at the same moment ; more followed.\* At the same instant Norcott's riflemen † came

C H A P.  
XVI.

but, setting at nought all these counsels, O'Connor persisted in his determination to carry the cherished standard until the close of the battle. He received the thanks of Sir George Brown and General Codrington on the field ; and, for having done what is above told, he was decorated with the Victoria Cross. He was also promoted. He is now a captain in that same devoted regiment with which he had the glory of serving on the day of the Alma.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* Amongst the foremost of these was Major Norcott with some of his riflemen. After the moment when Colonel Lawrence with his wing pushed forward through Major Norcott's right companies, Major Norcott moved so far westward that he entered the redoubt—not, as might have been expected, at its (proper) left shoulder, but towards its right. The effect of the movements made by these two wings of the Rifle battalion was, that their respective positions were in a manner reversed ; for when the redoubt was seized, the right wing of the Rifle battalion was heading the extreme left of the storming force ; and, on the other hand, the left wing had inclined a good way to the right.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† 'Lawrence's riflemen' should here be substituted for 'Norcott's. Both Lawrence and Ross, his adjutant, were dismounted when within a few yards of the work by a discharge of grape—grape discharged from the field-battery on the higher slope of the Kourganè Hill. Lawrence rolled almost under the breastwork.

It may be remembered that, in the published despatch, Lord Raglan spoke of the capture of the redoubt as an operation 'materially aided by 'the advance of four companies of the Rifle Brigade under Major Norcott, who promises to be a distinguished officer of light troops.' The omission of Colonel Lawrence's name in a despatch containing that sentence, was obviously occasioned by what (in the sense indicated in a

**C H A P.** running in from the east, and the swiftest of them  
**XVI.** bounded into the work at its right flank. The enemy's still lingering skirmishers began to fall back, and descended—some of them slowly—into the dip where their battalions were massed. Our soldiery were up ; and in a minute they flooded in over the parapet, hurrahing, jumping over, hurrahing—a joyful English crowd.

The cheer had not yet died away on the hill-side, when, from the enemy's battalions standing massed in the hollow, there rose up, as though it had been wrung from the very hearts of brave men defeated, a long, sorrowful, wailing sound. This was the bitter and wholesome grief of a valiant soldiery not content to yield. For men who so grieve there is hope. The redoubt had been seized by our people ; it was not yet lost to the Czar.

There was only one piece of ordnance remaining in the work. This was a brass 24-pound howitzer.\* At the sight of the piece (for our people were mainly of Anglo-Saxon blood) a characteristic desire to assert the claims of private ownership began to seize upon the crowd ; and more than one man—so they say—scratched his mark upon the piece, that he might make it the peculiar trophy of himself or his regiment.

former note) I have ventured to call the 'erroneous wording' of Sir George Brown's report to Lord Raglan. My omission of Colonel Lawrence's name in the text was brought about by the same cause.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* It appears, by a former note, that the calibre of this howitzer is 6.12—a calibre which indicates, I believe, a 32-pounder.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

But there was a better prize than this within the reach of a nimble soldier ; for of the guns moving off towards the rear there was one which, dragged by only three horses, had scarcely yet gained the rear of the redoubt. Captain Bell, of the Royal Welsh, ran up, overtook it, and, pointing his capless pistol at the head of the driver, ordered him, or rather signed to him, to stop instantly and dismount. The driver sprang from his saddle and fled. Bell seized the bridle of the near horse, and he had already turned the gun round, when, Sir George Brown riding up angry, and ordering him to go to his company, he of course obeyed, yet not until he had effectually started the horses in the right direction ; for they drew the gun down the hill, and the capture became complete.\*

Bell went back to his corps, and in truth his services there were soon about to be needed ; for already Colonel Chester, commanding the regiment, had been killed,† and Campbell, who then took the command, being afterwards struck down, the charge of the regiment devolved upon Bell.

Of the men of the five regiments which had moved forward from the top of the river's bank, many now lay upon the hill-side dead or wounded ; and the 7th Fusiliers, with fragments of other regiments, was still engaged with the enemy's infantry ; but the greatest

\* The gun is now at Woolwich. The horses served for some time in our ' Black Battery.'

† No ; it was some minutes later, as will be seen in a future page, that Colonel Chester fell.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



C H A P. portions of four battalions,\* and a wing† of another  
XVI. battalion,‡ were now upon the ground which the enemy had made his stronghold.

Yet the tendency to converge towards the redoubt as their goal had so closely compressed the assailing mass, that its front now hardly outflanked the parapet ; and all the assailants of the redoubt were either within the work or closely gathered round it.

They were perhaps 2000 men, and their onset had for the moment so bewildered the enemy that, having close at hand great masses of infantry, unbroken and scarcely touched — masses numbering full 10,000 bayonets — he nevertheless hung back, and for a while did little to molest our people in their occupation of the work. Our soldiery were well inclined to rest and make themselves at home ; and Codrington, alighting from his horse, began to show the men how best to establish themselves on the ground they had won by lying down outside the parapet, and resting their rifles upon its top.

Thus the assaulting force had carried the great field-work which was the key of the enemy's position on the Alma ; and if at this time the supporting Division had been half-way up the hill, or even if it had been beginning to crown the banks of the river on the Russian side, the toils and perils of the day would perhaps have been over. But our men were

\* The 33d, the ' Royal Welsh ' (or 23d), the ' Derbies ' (95th), and the 19th.

† Instead of ' a wing,' read ' the whole.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ 2d battalion Rifle Brigade.

only a crowd ; and they, all of them, wise and simple, now began to learn in the great school of action that the most brilliant achievement by a disordered mass of soldiery requires the speedy support of formed troops. C H A P.  
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Then—and then, as is said, for the first time—the men cast back a look towards the quarter from which they might hope to see supports advancing ; but when they carried their eyes down the slope strewn thick with the wounded and the dead, they saw that, from the ground where they stood down home to the top of the river's bank, there were no succours coming. No sup-  
ports yet  
coming up  
from the  
top of the  
river's  
bank.

## XXIII.

Where were the supports ?

The right of the 1st Division was formed by the brigade of 'Guards.' In its origin, the appellation given to the regiments called 'the Guards' imported that the personal safety of the sovereign was peculiarly committed to their charge. Princes have imagined that, by specially ascribing this duty to a particular portion of their armed forces rather than to the whole, and by granting some privileges to troops specially distinguished as their chosen defenders, they secure to themselves good means of safety in time of trouble ; and that still, upon the whole, they do more good than harm to their military system, by establishing a healthy spirit of rivalry between the favoured body and the rest of the army. The danger is, that a corps thus set The  
Guards.



C H A P.  
XVI

apart will come to be considered as a great reserve of military strength, and that, for that very reason, any disaster which it may sustain will be looked upon as more ruinous than a disaster of equal proportions occurring to other regiments.

With us, the corps of Guards numbers only seven battalions, distributed into three regiments, called the Grenadier Guards, the Coldstream, and the Scots Fusilier Guards; and each of these three regiments had sent one battalion to form the brigade of Guards now serving in the 1st Division. The officers of the corps enjoy some privileges tending to accelerate their advancement in the army. They are, for the most part, men well born or well connected; and being aided by a singularly able body of sergeants and corporals, they are not so overburthened in peace-time by their regimental duties as to have their minds in the condition which too often results from monotonous labour. They have deeply at heart the honour of the whole brigade as well as of their respective corps; and the feeling is quickened by a sense of the jealousy which their privileges breed, or rather, perhaps, by the tradition of that ancient rivalry which exists between the 'Guards' and the 'Line.'

The men of the rank and file have some advantages over the line in the way of allowances and accoutrements. They are all of fine stature. Without being overdrilled, they are well enough practised in their duties; and whoever loves war sees grandeur in the movement of the stately forms and the

towering bearskins which mark a battalion of the Guards. It is true that these household troops are cut off from the experience gained by line regiments in India and the Colonies ; but whenever England is at war in Europe, or against people of European descent, it is the custom and the pride of the Guards to take their part.

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The force is deeply prized by the Queen, and the class from which it takes its officers connects it with many families of high station in the country. Its officers have so many relatives and friends amongst those who generate conversation in London, that when the Guards are sent upon active service, the war in which they engage becomes, as it were for their sake, a subject of interest in circles which commonly yield only a languid attention to events beyond the seas. Grief for the death of line officers is dispersed among the counties of the three kingdoms ; and when they fall in battle, it is the once merry country-house, the vicarage, or the wayside cottage of some old Peninsular officer, that becomes the house of mourning. But by the loss of officers of the household regiments the central body of English society is touched, is shocked, is almost angered ; and he who has to sit in his saddle and see a heavy slaughter of the Guards, may be almost forced to think ruefully of fathers, of mothers, of wives, of sisters, who are amongst his own friends.

There was nothing in the history or traditions of the famous corps of the Guards to justify the

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notion that they were to be more often kept out of the brunt of the battle than the troops of the line; and in this very war they were destined to encounter the hardest trials of soldiers, and to go on fighting and enduring until the glory of past achievements, the strange ascendancy which those achievements had won, and a few score of wan men with hardly the garb of soldiers, should be all that remained of 'the Guards.' Still it is certain that the household battalions were more or less regarded as a cherished body of troops, and that the loss of the brigade of Guards would be looked upon as a loss more signal, and in that sense more disastrous, than the loss of three other battalions of equal strength.

The Duke  
of Cam-  
bridge.

The Duke of Cambridge is the grandson of King George III., and a cousin of the Queen. At the outbreak of the war he was thirty-five years of age. He had made the most of such experience as could be gained by following the vocation of a military life in the British Isles. He understood the mechanism of our army system; and so far as could be judged by the test of home service, he was a good and a diligent soldier. Nay, he had some qualifications for command which are not very common in England. He loved order, method, and organisation. Long before the war it had been said that he was gifted with that faculty of moving troops which is one of the prime qualifications of a general officer; and the skill with which his superb Division had been now deployed, seemed to give safe ground

for saying that the flattering rumour was true. He was zealous and devoted to duty. He had the habit of exercising forethought. He was sagacious, and was more keenly alive than most other men of our land-service to passing and coming events. He had a good military eye.\*

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He was a great respecter of the public voice in England, and was even, perhaps, too ready to suffer himself to be swayed by light, transient breezes of 'opinion.' He had no dread of innovations; and the beard that clothed his frank, handsome, manly face, was the symbol of his adhesion to a then new revolt against custom. He was much loved, for he was of a genial temper; and his rank was so well helped out by his hereditary faculty of remembering those with whom he had once conversed, that, far from chilling his intercourse with other men, it enabled him to give happy effect to the kindness of his nature. But after all, what a general has to do is to try to overcome the enemy by exposing his own soldiery to all needful risks. At any fit time he must be willing and eager to bring his own people to the slaughter for the sake of making havoc with the enemy; and it is right for him to be able to do this without at the time being

\* A few words which fell from Lord Raglan in October 1854 have caused me, perhaps, to speak with more confidence on this subject than I might otherwise venture to show. In that month—I believe on the 15th—Lord Raglan spoke to me of the exceeding anxiety of the Duke of Cambridge about the Inkerman position, and he said that in consequence of this pressure measures had been taken. Exactly three weeks afterwards the very ground about which the Duke had been so anxious was the scene of the mighty onslaught which commenced the battle of Inkerman.

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seen to feel one pang. Nay, however certain it may be that his gentler nature will overcome him on the morrow, it is well for him to be able to pass through the bloodiest hours of battle with something of a ruthless joy. The Duke of Cambridge was wanting in this kind of truculence; and, however careless of his own life (for he had the personal courage of his race), he was liable to be cruelly wrung by the weight of a command which charged him with the lives of other men. He was of an anxious temperament; and with him the danger was that, in moments when great stress might come to be put upon him, the very keenness of his desire to judge aright would become a cruel hindrance. Nor was he a man who would be driven to burst his way through scruples and doubts by the impulse of any selfish ambition. Far from straining after occasions for acting on his own judgment, he would have liked, if he could, to receive a series of precise orders which would serve to guide him in every successive change. But a general of division must not expect to be long in a campaign without being thrown upon his own judgment. Lord Raglan had furnished the Duke with one order—an order ‘to support the Light Division in its forward movement’—and the Duke of Cambridge had begun to obey it by following the advance of the Light Division, and bringing his force home down to the enclosures; but having thus come to the end of the open ground, he felt the want of some new sanction before he carried his Division into the

vineyards. He knew that, for a while at least, the superb array of his Guards and Highlanders would be shattered by passing through enclosures, and he wished for another order from Headquarters before he submitted to see his beautiful line broken up. The order 'to support the Light Division' was becoming an imperfect guide, because that same Light Division had rushed headlong upon a task which was dissolving great part of it into a vast swarm of skirmishers. Were the Guards and Highlanders to do the like? Were they to do thus, although their efficacy as a force acting in support of the troops in advance was likely to depend upon their being able to come up in good order? The 1st Division was halted; yet the Light Division was moving rapidly forward.

Halt of  
the 1st  
Division  
before  
entering  
the vine-  
yards.

Why was there this failure of concert between the Light and the 1st Divisions? Why was there no man there who could link the one Division to the other by a few decisive words?

Lord Raglan had already given his orders, and at this moment, led forward by a golden chance, he was riding far away in another part of the field. Sir George Brown, already in the enclosures, and having no line of skirmishers to cover the advance of his battalions, was unable to govern the movements of his Division in such a way as to prevent it from getting too far in advance of the Guards and Highlanders; and afterwards, when Sir George went forward in person with that part of his Division which stormed the redoubt, he seems to





CHAP. have found no means of communicating with the  
 XVI. Duke of Cambridge and pressing for the immediate support of the 1st Division.

Every moment was precious ; for the men of the Light Division were moving down at a run through the vineyards, or wading across the river.

General  
Airey  
comes up.

At the time of this halt the battalion of the Grenadier Guards was across the great road. Thither now, from the west, a horseman came galloping up. Of an actual order General Airey was not the bearer ; but he was a man whose loyalty towards his chief made him always feel certain that what he himself saw clearly to be right was exactly what his chief desired to have done ; and the result was, that in an emergency he was able to speak with a weight which virtually brought to bear upon the matter in hand the whole power of Headquarters. His keen eye had detected the halt of the 1st Division, and he saw also that the Light Division was pushing forward at a run. Another man would have gone round or sent to the commander of the forces for his opinion ; but every moment of the lapsing time was bringing danger.

His expo-  
sition of  
the order  
to advance  
in support.

Airey rode straight up to General Bentinck,\* and explained it to be Lord Raglan's meaning that the 1st Division should instantly continue its advance in support of the Light Division. 'Must we,' asked Bentinck — 'must we always keep within three

\* Lord Raglan had made an order specially providing that the bearer of an order for a divisional general should deliver it to the first brigadier whom he happened to find, to be by him transmitted to the divisional chief

‘ hundred yards of the Light Division ? ’ ‘ No,’ CHAP.  
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 said Airey, ‘ not necessarily at any fixed distance ;  
 ‘ that would not be possible. What His Royal  
 ‘ Highness has to do is to support the Light Division  
 ‘ by advancing in conformity with its movements.’ \*  
 Then the 1st Division moved forward.

Now the enemy, whilst he dealt with the tumultuous onset of Codrington’s brigade, had rightly enough given some of his care to the more ceremonious advance of the 1st Division ; and since the Guards confronted both the Causeway batteries and the Great Redoubt, they of course underwent for a time a fire of artillery, and some men were struck down.† The Grenadiers and the Scots Fusiliers suffered the most. This loss did not occur as a consequence of any mistake : it was in the order of things that it should be. But when men are new to war, and so placed in the battle-field as to be for the moment cut off from all knowledge of what is going on elsewhere, they are prone to imagine that a force which they see undergoing slaughter, yet having no immediate means of attack or resistance, must needs be the victim of some piece of forgetfulness or error ; and when once this notion has got its lodgment in the brain of an officer, his next step probably is to

\* At this moment the Duke of Cambridge rode up, and to him Airey repeated it to be Lord Raglan’s meaning that the Division should instantly ‘ push on.’ H.R.H. then gave orders for the immediate advance of the Division, and Clifton, I think, was the aide-de-camp who carried the order to Sir Colin Campbell.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† Even when the Great Redoubt had been dismantled, and the Causeway batteries withdrawn, there were some guns in battery at more remote spots, which seem to have been brought to bear on the Guards.

CHAP. XVI. try to avert what he fancies to be an impending disaster by venturing to disobey orders, or by counselling another to do so.

The Division again stopped for a time.

Step taken by Evans.

Afterwards—but not, it seems, by any formal order to halt—the advance of the 1st Division was again stopped for a time; yet Codrington's brigade had then begun to rush forward. From the ground on which he was riding, Sir De Lacy Evans could see in profile the swift disordered advance of Codrington's brigade, and the stop to which the 1st Division had come. He understood the danger; and, comprehending at once that the advance of Codrington's brigade was a movement requiring instant support, he took upon himself to send a message conveying his opinion to the Duke of Cambridge.\*

The 1st Division resumes its advance.

The Division went forward, and, breaking into the enclosures, began to work its difficult way through the vineyards.

Want of free communication along a line passing through enclosures.

But when a division of infantry extended in line is marched through gardens and walled enclosures, the power of the general commanding it must always be more or less thrown into abeyance, because the want of an unobstructed view and of free lateral communication makes it impossible for him to know what is going on along the whole line, or to send swift orders to the more distant companies. For a time his authority is necessarily dispersed among many; and if the force is moving deliberately and in the

\* Evans sent the message by Colonel Steel, who chanced to be near him at the time. Steel was Military Secretary, and he seems to have fulfilled his mission in a way which caused it to be understood that the message he brought was an order from Lord Raglan.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

face of an enemy, numbers of little councils of war will of necessity be going on here and there, in order to judge how best to deal with what seems to be the state of the battle in each field, each garden, each vineyard.

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Meanwhile\* the Guards descended towards the bank with so much of the line-formation as was permitted by the obstacles they had to overcome. Upon gaining the river's side, the Coldstream broke into open column of sections, in order to make the most advantage of the ford; and when it reached the opposite bank it preserved its column-formation for a time, in order to march the more conveniently round an elbow there formed by the river. When this movement was complete, the colour-sergeants went out to take ground, and the battalion opened out into line-formation with all the precision and ceremony of a birthday review. On the right of this battalion, and moving with less deliberation, the Scots Fusilier Guards got through the enclosures and the river. On the right of that last corps there marched the battalion of the Grenadier Guards. The Grenadiers were a body of men so well instructed, and so skilfully handled, that in working their way through the enclosures they were able to preserve all the essential elements of their line-formation.† When they came to the bank they looked for no

Advance  
of the  
Guards  
to the left  
bank of  
the river.

\* The word 'still' would be a better adverb for establishing the connection between this and the preceding sentence.

† No less than seven of the officers serving with this battalion had acted as adjutants of the regiment, and to this circumstance the skill with which it was carried through the enclosures is in some measure ascribed.



C H A P. XVI. ford, but, treating the river as a brook—as a brook which a soldier must pass without picking his way \* —the battalion marched through it in line ; † and though there were some points where a passage was easy, others where the soldiers had to wade deep, and some few—so they say—where the men were put to their swimming, still each file kept its place in the line with a near approach to exactness. At length—but after a painful lapse of time, for Codrington's disordered battalions were clinging all this while to the parapet of the Great Redoubt—the brigade of Guards stood halted, and formed anew under cover of the bank on the Russian side of the river. Their people were sheltered ; but the heads of their colours, protruding a little above the top of the bank, could be seen by men looking down from the redoubt.

Advance  
of the  
Highland  
Brigade to  
the left  
bank of  
the river.

His ‡ brigade at this time was not under a heavy fire, and he effected the operation of passing the river very simply ; for, without attempting formal evolutions, each of his regiments, whilst it advanced, tried to keep up, as well as the nature of the ground would allow, the rudiments of its line-formation ; and when it gained the opposite bank, its array was carefully restored. As soon as one of the regiments was duly formed on the Russian side of the river, it was moved

\* For very good reasons, soldiers in marching are called upon to go straight through brooks and pools of water without picking their way.

† With the exception of one (the 2d) company, commanded by Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, which, happening to be near the bridge, filed over it.

‡ That is, Sir Colin Campbell's.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

forward ; and since the ground presented more obstacles towards our left than towards our right, the brigade fell naturally, and without design, into direct échelon of regiments. The 42d was in advance ; on the left of that regiment there was the 93d, somewhat refused ; and on the left of the 93d, but still further refused, there came the 79th.

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But already there was nearly an end of the precious moments in which it was possible for the 1st Division to bring an effective support to the troops in the Great Redoubt.

Time was  
lapsing.

Nor did General Buller succeed in bringing his battalions to the rescue. We saw that the 19th Regiment had slipped from his control and joined with Codrington's brigade in storming the redoubt. The two battalions which remained in his power were the 88th and the 77th Regiments. He was in person with the 88th some way above the bank of the river ; and the 77th, under the orders of Colonel Egerton, was on the extreme left of the English infantry line. The 88th and the 77th were not at this time under fire ; but before them, at somewhat long distances, there were heavy columns of Russian infantry ; and the enemy's horsemen, though not, it seems, visible at this moment, were known to be hovering on the left front of the English line. Buller, however, had not yet apprehended that the Russians were preparing any enterprise against his left flank ; and when he saw how matters stood in the redoubt, he rightly determined to advance at once with the two battalions which remained under his control.

No sup-  
port  
brought  
by the  
two bat-  
talions  
which re-  
mained  
under  
Buller.

The cause  
of this.



**C H A P.** He therefore sent an order to Colonel Egerton directing him at once to move forward with the 77th, and he himself prepared to advance at the same moment with the 88th.  
**XVI.**

Colonel Egerton was a firm, able man, and he felt the momentous importance of the duties attaching upon an officer who had charge of the extreme left of our infantry line ; for it was obvious that a successful flank-attack upon the one battalion which he commanded would bring into grievous jeopardy the whole array, English and French. The dips and hollows which marked the hill-side towards his left, made it hard for him to see what the enemy was intending to do ; and he failed to infer that the Czar's renowned forces were really abstaining from the enterprise which seemed to be almost forced upon them by the nakedness of our left wing, and by their strength in the cavalry arm. At the moment when Buller's order was brought to him, Colonel Egerton was so deeply impressed with a sense of the danger which he had to withstand in this part of the field, that—deliberately, and with a firmness which might have won him great praise if the actual course of events had brought him his justification—he took upon himself a grave burthen. He took upon himself to say that, in the circumstances in which he stood, he ought not to obey the order. This answer the aide-de-camp carried back to General Buller. Buller was a near-sighted man ;\* and being, it would

\* It has already been said that Sir George Brown, who commanded the Division, and Codrington, who commanded its 1st brigade, were both

seem, distrustful of what had been his own impression of the enemy's attitude, he acquiesced in Colonel Egerton's decision, allowed the 77th to remain where it was, and not only refrained from advancing with the 88th, but threw the regiment into square, as though it were about to be attacked by cavalry.

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of them near-sighted. The Light Division was the force which had to feel and fight its way to the key of the position ; and it was an error to allow it to be carried into action by three near-sighted generals.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

Experience has shown that by the use of glasses, and by a judicious use of the eyes of other men, an officer may do much to compensate for the defect of near-sightedness ; and of the truth of this, both General Codrington and General Buller were instances more or less strong. But when near-sightedness is combined with an unconsciousness of the defect, it of course becomes very dangerous. People who served in the Light Division will smile at the idea of my taking the trouble to prove that which everybody knew—namely, that Sir George Brown was extremely near-sighted ; but the fact has been gravely contradicted by a commentator in the ‘Quarterly Review,’ who wrote under the instructions of Sir George Brown himself, and it does not always do to attempt to establish a truth by speaking of it as ‘notorious ;’ so perhaps a succinct proof may be useful. I can give it thus :—We know that in the gorge or opening through which the great road runs, Evans was operating with Pennefather's brigade and the 47th Regiment ; and he was there engaged in so hard a struggle that Pennefather's brigade lost a fourth of its strength. Yet, incredible as it may seem, Sir George Brown imagined that he, with his right brigade, *was in the occupation of the whole of that ground.* In the Report, in his own handwriting, now lying before me, he writes : ‘My 1st brigade itself *completely filled the whole mouth of the gorge or valley through which the road runs.*’ Obviously, the cause of this extraordinary misstatement by Sir George Brown was near-sightedness—near-sightedness combined with so imperfect a consciousness of the defect as to cause him to rely with undue confidence on his own uncorrected impressions.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



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## XXIV.

State of  
things  
in the  
redoubt.

So when the men of Codrington's force looked back to whence they came, and when also they looked to their left rear, they saw they were alone—still alone—upon the hill-side. Then such of them as had the instinct of war began to understand that the blood of their comrades had been shed in vain.

A battery  
on the  
higher  
slopes of  
the hill  
brought  
to bear on  
our men.

For they were only clusters of men without the strength of order; and masses of infantry, in a perfect state of formation, were heavily impending over them. The columns which were the nearest to them were in the dip behind the redoubt, and so placed that, without any danger to them, a Russian battery which had been planted higher up on the side of the Kourganè Hill, could throw its fire into the site of the redoubt. The guns of this battery were soon brought to bear upon those of our soldiery who were within the redoubt; and this fire, after killing and wounding several men, drove the rest to seek cover by betaking themselves to the outer side of the parapet. This movement, though it wanted the sanction of orders, was scarcely wrong or unsoldierly; for since the men were without formation, their duty became like the duty of skirmishers, and the parapet of the redoubt supplied that kind of shelter which the need of the moment demanded. Yet the movement looked like the beginning of a retreat, and Codrington strove to check it; for being at the moment on the outside of the work, he for the second time put his horse at the parapet, and again entered the redoubt, with a

hope that the men would follow him in once more. But this time, his example was little observed ; for almost every man, being driven, by want of formation, to rely upon his own means of making a stand, was busied with the work of settling himself down as well as he could for a stubborn defence ; and it was plain (as Codrington himself had been showing the men some few minutes before) that the best ground for making a stand was the foot of the parapet on its outer side.

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Our men  
lodge  
them-  
selves out-  
side the  
parapet.

When good infantry soldiers, in the immediate presence of a powerful enemy, are disordered, but still undaunted, the slightest rudiment of a fieldwork is of infinite value to it—not simply nor chiefly on account of the shelter which it affords, but rather because it gives a base and nucleus for that coherence which is endangered by the want of formation. If our men, then lying or kneeling along the foot of the parapet, had been well covered at the flanks, it would have been their duty to hold the ground firmly against even a great body of infantry attacking them in front.

But on either flank, as well as in front of the lengthened crowd of English soldiery which lay clustering about the parapet, the enemy's masses were gathered. On their right rear there was the double-battalion column of the Kazan corps still engaged with the 7th Fusiliers. On their left and left front there were the two remaining battalions of the Kazan corps and the four battalions of the Sousdal corps ; but in their immediate front, and posted in the hollow behind the redoubt, they had

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The forces  
gathered  
against  
them.

before them the four superb battalions of the Vladimir Regiment. These forces were supported by the four battalions of the Ouglitz corps, which stood massed in one column on a higher slope of the Kourganè Hill. The two battalions of sailors also were in this part of the field ; and, besides the battery which armed the lesser fieldwork and the one which commanded the dismantled redoubt, there were two batteries of artillery held in reserve. Moreover, 3000 horsemen were close at hand on the enemy's extreme right. Thus (omitting the Kazan column, which was occupied with the 7th Fusiliers) there was impending over our 2000 men, then kneeling or lying down by the parapet of the redoubt, a force of some 14,000 cavalry and infantry in a state of perfect formation, and supported by powerful batteries.

Warlike  
indigna-  
tion of the  
Russian  
infantry  
on the  
Kourganè  
Hill.

And by this time there had sprung up amongst the Russian infantry on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill a sentiment of warlike indignation. Any Russian officer who had been standing on ground high enough to command a view of the river, must have seen that, from the moment of their first onset on the left bank, the troops which stormed the redoubt were an isolated, and, for the most part, a disordered force ; and even for some minutes after seeing them carry the work, he would be unable to make out that any supports moved up from the river were coming as yet to their aid. Naturally he would be shamed to think that many thousands of the once famous Russian infantry had been yielding up the Great Redoubt to a body which might almost be called a

mere flush of skirmishers. Besides, it was known by C H A P.  
XVI. this time in some of the Russian battalions, that of the pieces which had armed the redoubt, two were wanting, and to recover these there arose a burning desire. Unless the stain was to be lasting, it seemed clear that the red-coats still clinging to the dismantled redoubt must be driven at once down the hill.

Without, it seems, receiving any orders from Headquarters, or from the divisional commander, the great column formed of the Ouglitz battalions, and posted on the high ground above the redoubt, began to come swiftly down the hill ; and for a few moments it came on, hot with zeal or anger, for the men of the front ranks fired vain passionate shots whilst they marched, and young soldiers in the centre of the column kept shooting wildly into the air above them. Soon, however, this body was halted.\*

Move-  
ment of  
the  
Ouglitz  
column.

But it was in the great Vladimir column that there sprang up the warlike spirit which was destined to bring the foot soldiery of Russia and of England into a closer strife. The column, as we have seen, was a mass composed of the four battalions of the Vladimir corps ; and although it stood near to the English soldiery lying clustered along the outer side of the parapet, still, since it was in the dip behind the rear of the earthwork, it could not be perfectly seen even

Advance  
of the  
Vladimir  
column.

\* No mention is made of this movement in the Russian accounts, and I imagine that it was a spontaneous movement soon stopped by orders from some one in authority. The movement was observed by English officers so placed as to command a view of this part of the field ; and if I am guilty of any error, it is the error of ascribing the movement to the wrong corps.

CHAP. by such of our men as might be standing up, and  
XVI. could not be seen at all by those who were lying down or kneeling.

For the honour of having led this high-mettled column against English infantry two men contend. From the time when Prince Mentschikoff rode off towards the sea, Prince Gortschakoff had been left in command of the whole of the forces opposed to the English ; and General Kvetzinski, who commanded the Division to which the Vladimir battalions belonged, was under Prince Gortschakoff's orders. Each of these Generals says that (without knowing of the presence of the other) he gave orders for the advance of the column, and led it on in person. Their statements may perhaps be reconciled ; for it is possible that Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski—the one riding with the left, the other with the right, of the column—may have, both of them, done what they said they did. In that view of the matter the coincidence would be accounted for by supposing that the resolve of each of the two Generals sprang from the same cause—sprang from the warlike anger which was heaving the mass. I am, however, inclined to believe that Prince Gortschakoff is mistaken in his statement ;\* and that the impulse which he gave to the Vladimir battalions was after the movement now spoken of. Be this as it may, it is certain enough that—either alone, or jointly with Prince Gortschakoff—Kvetzinski led on the column.

\* I found this belief upon a comparison of Prince Gortschakoff's statements with the known facts.

These troops of the 16th Division had been touched with the warlike fire which a patriot priesthood can draw from Gospels, Epistles, and Psalms. With the baggage of the Division there was carried an image of the blessed Sergius; and when these troops were ordered to the south, the Archbishop of Moscow had taken care to whet them for the strife. ‘Children of the Czar’—so ran the Primate’s blessing—‘Children of the Czar our father, and Russia our mother, my warrior brethren! The Czar, your country, the Christian faith, call you to brave deeds, and the prayers of the Church and country are with you. . . . Should it be the will of God that you too face the foe, forget not that you are doing battle for the most pious Czar, for our beloved country, for holy Church, against infidels, against persecutors of the Christian faith—persecutors of men united to us by ties of religion and of blood—insulters of those who bow before the Holy Places, sanctified by the birth, passion, and ascension of Christ. Blessing and honour to him who conquers! Blessing and happiness to him who, with faith in God, and love for his Czar and country, offers up his life as a sacrifice! It is written in the Scriptures, concerning those of olden times who fought for their country, “By faith were “kingdoms conquered” (Heb. xi. 33). Now, by faith you too shall be conquerors. Our most holy father Sergius whilome blessed our victorious war against the enemies of Russia. His image was borne in your ranks in the days of the Emperor Alexis, of Peter the Great, and, finally, in the great war against

CHAP. ' twenty nations in the reign of Alexander the First.  
 XVI. ' That sacred form journeys with you also as a token  
 ' of his fervent and beseeching prayers to God on  
 ' your behalf. Take unto yourselves, moreover, the  
 ' triumphal war-cry of the Czar and prophet David,  
 ' " In God is my salvation and glory !" '\*

The Vladimir column came on. It moved slowly as though it were held in by some kind of awe or doubt. Still it moved, and without firing a shot ; for the orders were not to fire but to charge with the bayonet. Huge and grey, the mass crept gliding up the slope which divided it from our soldiery.

Our men, gathered round the parapet, were kneeling or lying down ; and being thus low they could not see into the dip which lay at a little distance before them ; but mounted officers, of course, could see farther, and even men on foot (especially those near to either flank of the redoubt), if they stood up for a moment to gain a wider view, could see a whole field of bayonet-points, ranged close as corn, and seeming to grow taller and taller. And though none of our men knew the strength of the column which was closing upon them, yet, sometimes from what he himself saw, but more commonly by hearsay, almost every man came to know that towards the part of the parapet where he lay there was a mass of Russian soldiery coming.

Presently the head of the great Vladimir column approached the crest ; and our men, whilst they lay

\* Psalm li. 8 ; ' Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 50.

with their rifles levelled across the parapet, and their eyes a little above its top, were face to face with the front rank of the mass. C H A P.  
XVI.

Before it confuses itself by hasty firing, a Russian column in good order is a solemn expression of warlike strength. With the hard, upright outlines of a wall, it is in its colour a dark cloud ; and the lowly beings who compose it are so merged in the grand unity of the mass, that in the hour of battle the aspect of it weighs heavy upon the imagination of anxious men. More, a hundredfold more, than it is it seems to portend ; and now, when the Vladimir column, three thousand strong, and withholding its fire, emerged in silence from the hollow, when it slowly grew over the crest, and rose up at last stark and square between the eyes of our soldiery and the light beyond, its power over the mind of a beholder was less the power of a substance than of a shadow—a shadow approaching—the dim, mighty shadow that is thrown forward by a military empire when it comes in great earnest to the front. Aspect  
of the  
column.

It is certain, however, that, whatever the cause be—some high quality of the soul, or only, after all, a certain hardness of temperament—our people in general are not impressed by the sight of massed infantry in the way that the nations of the Continent are ; and when our soldiers are formed in their English array, they can make merry with a mere column as a thing that is foreign—a thing with vast pretensions to strength, but helpless as a flock of sheep against firm men standing in line. Even now,





C H A P.  
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though our men lay in clusters without formation, they were ready enough to begin shooting into the column ; and those who first caught sight of the Russian helmets were going to deliver their fire, when suddenly they were checked by a voice which implored every man to stay his hand.

Confusing  
rumours  
amongst  
our  
soldiery.

When troops are about to be overpowered, confusing rumours flit round them ; and if it happen that these rumours become the immediate causes of a default, they do not for that reason excuse it, because the very spreading of such tales is not the cause, but the effect of the bewildered state into which the troops are lapsing. The voice which had stayed the fire of our men was a voice crying out, ‘ The column ‘ is French !—the column is French ! Don’t fire, men ! ‘ For God’s sake don’t fire ! ’ The prohibition, repeated again and again, travelled fast along the line ; and presently it was further impressed, for a bugler of the 19th, under orders from a mounted officer, began to sound the ‘ cease firing.’ \*

Unau-  
thentic  
orders and  
signals to  
the men.

Our men, obeying the voice and the signal, with-

\* At this moment—for so an eyewitness tells me—Colonel Chester was still living. He was sitting in his saddle close to the redoubt, and when he saw the soldiery beginning to catch the belief that the approaching column was French, he eagerly strove to undeceive them. Enforcing his words by gesture, he was impatiently moving his uplifted sword, as though he would say to those who might see without being able to hear, ‘ No ! no ! nonsense ! the column is not French—it is an enemy’s ‘ column. Fire into it ! fire into it ! ’ Whilst he was thus speaking, and thus making signs to his people, he was struck first by one shot, and then almost instantly by another. Upon receiving the first shot, he seemed to put his hand to the wound, but when the second shot struck him he dropped from his horse and fell dead.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

held their fire and remained still. The belief that the column must be French was confirmed—and, indeed, it is likely that it had been caused—by observing that it delivered no fire; and although, if Kvetzinski's statement be accurate, the front-rank men had their muskets brought down as though for a charge with the bayonet,\* still the slow, formal movement of the approaching mass was so little like what the English regard as a 'charge,' that no one seems to have accounted for the silence of their firelocks by suggesting that the movement was intended for an attack with the bayonet. It seems that the column now halted,† as if from a suspicion of some snare, or perhaps from a dread of the unknown; for the men of the column could not see the stature of our men, but they saw forage-caps and a crowd of English faces of a fresh-coloured hue very strange to their eyes, and they saw the muzzles of rifles levelled thickly across the parapet. From mistake on one side, and misgiving on the other, there had come to be a strange pause; yet not along the whole line; for, either with a part of the Vladimir column or else with some other body of troops, two or three of the

\* His expression, as rendered from the Russian into French, is, 'l'arme 'au bras, prête à la baionette.' This, I suppose, must mean that the front-rank men had their bayonets 'at the charge,' and not merely 'at the trail.'

† The Russian accounts do not speak of this halt. They represent the whole advance of the column as a bayonet-charge, and it seems quite true that the column really withheld its fire; but it would be a mistake to suppose that the forward movement of this body was marked with any of the swiftness or violence commonly associated with the idea of a 'charge.'



**CHAP.** companies of the 33d were exchanging at this time  
**XVI.** a sharp fire. Obeying the light, simple motive which sometimes governs the soldier when his mind is a blank, the men of the column took the fancy of pouring the main volume of their shot towards the ground where the colours of the 33d were upraised. The colours were new; and, as though the mere richness of their crimson folds were enough to draw the eye and the aim of the Russian musketeer, they were riddled in two or three minutes with numbers of balls. Of those who stood near them a large proportion were struck down.\*

Codrington, seeing that the fruits of the exploit performed by his brigade were going to be lost for want of supports, had already sent his aide-de-camp, Campbell, to press the advance of the Scots Fusilier Guards, the battalion most directly in his rear. But the very moments then passing were the moments charged with the result, and there were no other and later moments that could ever be used in their stead.

It is said—but my faith in men's impressions of what passed at this minute is wanting in strength—it is said that one of the heavy columns which the enemy had on his extreme right was now seen to be marching upon the left flank of the English soldiery who lay clustered along the parapet of the redoubt;†

\* I do not see anything in the Russian narratives which I can identify with the combat in which a part of the 33d was engaged, and I have not been able to say which of the Russian corps it was with which the 33d was at this time exchanging fire.

† The Russian accounts do not confirm this belief.

and it seems there are grounds for believing that the left of our line was the spot where a conviction of the necessity of retiring was first acted upon. According to testimony which seems to be trustworthy, a mounted officer\* rode up to a bugler of the 19th Regiment, and ordered him to sound the 'retire.' The man obeyed; and buglers along the whole line, from left to right, took up and repeated the signal. But the instinct of self-preservation, no less than the natural courage and tenacity of the soldier, made almost every man of the force very unwilling to abandon the ground; for it happened that at this time a brisk shower of missiles was passing over the heads of our men without doing them harm; and hearing how thickly the balls were raining into the ground behind them, they knew that a retreat would not only be an abandonment of ground dearly won, but also would bring them at once under a heavy fire. So strong was their conviction of the expediency of holding fast to the ground where they lay, that the sounding of the 'retire' was believed to have originated in some error; and in order that they might determine what should be done, the officers of several regiments, but more especially of the 23d, gathered into a group and began to consult

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A bugler  
sounds the  
'retire.'

The troops  
had a  
double  
motive  
for re-  
main-  
ing  
where  
they were.

\* Afterwards the bugler described the officer in a way which might have enabled a court of inquiry to identify him. He was not an officer of the regiment to which the bugler belonged, and he was not a general officer; and he did not deliver the order as coming from any one other than himself. The incident goes far to justify the opinion of officers who think that (unless it is strictly confined to the business of guiding skirmishers) the use of a bugle during an action is dangerous.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Confer-  
ence of  
officers  
at the  
parapet.

Their fate.

The 're-  
'tire'  
again  
sounded.

Our  
soldiery  
retreat  
from the  
redoubt.

together. Being firm, proud men, with a great self-respect, they did not, it seems, like to crouch for shelter under the parapet whilst they were exchanging counsel; so they conferred standing upright, but under so thick a flight of balls that several—nay, they say almost all of them—were struck down and killed.\* However, those who survived continued to say that the sounding of the 'retire' must have been a mistake, and that the force ought to hold its ground.

But then, again, and from the same quarter as before, a bugle sounded the 'retire,' and again, as before, the signal was taken up along the line. The repetition of the signal seemed to make it almost certain that the order must be authentic; but the troops were yet slow to persuade themselves that this was the case, and they still lingered at the parapet. Then a sergeant of the 23d, standing upright in order to make himself better heard, told the men that they had twice heard the 'retire' sounded, and that they must do their duty and obey. Whilst he spoke he was shot down and killed. But it was now judged by officers and men that a signal twice made and

\* I shall presently give the names of the officers who were killed in the 23d and the other regiments which stormed the redoubt, but I cannot undertake to say which of them fell at this time. In general, it seems to be almost beyond the power of human testimony to fix the time and the spot at which an officer falls when he is killed in battle. The difficulty is occasioned, not by the dearth, but by the vast abundance of testimony—testimony all seeming to be perfectly trustworthy, yet strangely contradictory. It will be seen, however, that the number of officers killed in the 23d was very great; and there is an impression that no small proportion of them met their death in the way above stated.

twice carried on along the line from regiment to regiment was not to be neglected. The retreat began ; and the men, quitting the shelter of the breastwork, fell back into the open ground, and incurred the fire which was pelting into the slope beneath. C H A P.  
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As the advance had been, so also the retreat was for the most part without order, but for the most part also it was not hurried. Our soldiers in their retreat took care to ply the enemy with fire ; and they picked up and carried off with them those of our wounded officers and men whom they found lying wounded on the slope. Except in one place, the retreat was like the movement of skirmishers when they find themselves recalled to their battalions by sound of bugle. But a part of the retreating force, consisting mainly of the 23d and the 95th, got heaped together in an unwieldy crowd, and became, as will be presently seen, the cause of a fresh disaster.

The enemy might have inflicted heavy loss upon the clusters of our soldiery then retreating down the slope, but there was some spell which bound him ; for when the Vladimir column had moved forward as far as the parapet of the breastwork, it used a strange abstinence, and halted, attempting no movement in pursuit. Of the two missing pieces of ordnance which the enemy had yearned to recover, one, they found, had disappeared ;\* and the other (the howitzer) was lying on the ground dismounted, and was so unwieldy that Kvetzinski says his Vladimir men were unable to drag it away. It remained in the redoubt.

\* This was the gun taken by Captain Bell.



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At the moment when this retreat began, the 1st Division had not yet emerged from the cover afforded by the river's bank ; but General Codrington's message hurried the forward movement of the Scots Fusilier Guards. The battalion climbed to the summit of the bank, formed line, and advanced.\*

But whilst this battalion moved forward, the remnant of the men who had stormed the redoubt were coming down the hill, and some of them were huddled in a throng, and bearing towards the left companies of the Scots Fusilier Guards. Therefore the Scots Fusilier Guards received in their advance much of the fire directed against our retreating soldiery, and many were struck down ; still the onward movement was maintained ; and the Grenadiers on the right, and the Coldstreams on the left of this battalion, were now also moving up. But at last the advancing line of the Scots Fusiliers and the crowd descending from the redoubt came into bodily contact ; and this so roughly, that the retreating crowd, by its sheer weight, broke through the left companies of the Scots Fusiliers† and destroyed their

\* But it seems in an imperfect way, for the advance was urgently hurried. The left-flank company had got separated, and from that circumstance it escaped the confusion which involved the main body.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† That is to say, through the left companies of the main body. The left-flank company, as before mentioned, had got separated.—*End of Note to 3d Edition.*

A commentator in the 'Quarterly Review,' who had suffered himself to receive, in an indiscriminate way, the impressions of Sir George Brown, said I was 'wrong in having asserted that the Fusiliers, in their tumultuous advance, encountered a heap of our men running away from

formation.\* The weight of the retreating throng at that one spot was so great and so unwieldy, that a soldier of the Scots Fusiliers was thrown, it is said,

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‘ the redoubt. The fugitives from the redoubt were clean out of the way when the Fusilier Guards pushed forward.’

Is there any truth—any semblance of truth—in this denial? We will see.

General Bentinck, who was personally present with the Fusilier Guards when they began their advance, wrote in his Report the day next after the battle: ‘ The intrenchment partially won by the Light Division was lost, and at the moment *some confusion was occasioned by the regiment obliged to abandon it retiring through the Scots Fusilier Guards, and thereby putting their left wing out of line.* The battalion retired for a short time, re-formed, and returned to its post. In this partial movement to the rear, a severe loss was sustained by the Scots Fusilier Guards.’ — *Holograph Report by General Bentinck.* Colonel (now General) Ridley commanded one of the wings of the Fusilier Guards, and he has orally confirmed to me the truth of the statement.

Colonel Percy commanded the left-flank company of the Grenadiers, and was therefore so placed as to be able to see what happened to the Fusilier Guards. He writes: ‘ *The repulsed regiments came down violently upon them and broke their line.* If the Russians alone had come down upon them, they would have been received with the bayonets.’

Captain Annesley, an officer of the Fusilier Guards, two days after the battle, made this entry in his journal: ‘ Then the 23d *came down in one mass right on top of our line.* Their disorder was caused by the Colonel and both Majors being killed, and no one knowing who to look to for orders. However it was, *they swept half my company clean away, and a great many of the next one to it.*’—*Extracted from the original MS.*

Of the officers of the Fusilier Guards with whom I have conversed on the subject, the one who was the least impressed with the extent of the confusion thus wrought was Lord Listowel; but it is only in regard to the *extent* of the mischief that he differs from the other eyewitnesses. I hear that Colonel Sir Charles Hamilton (who commanded the battalion), Colonel Jocelyn, Colonel Francis Seymour, and others, all agree in stating that the line of the Fusilier Guards was broken by the bodily pressure of the retreating troops of the Light Division. With the exception of Sir George Brown, I do not remember to have heard of any one present at the battle who held a contrary belief.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* For the battalion was hurrying forward so impatiently as to be unable to open its ranks in the usual way.—*Note to 4th Edition.*





**C H A P.** to the ground, and got his ribs fractured.\* The left  
**XVI.** companies of the Scots Fusilier Guards, being thrust  
 out of line by physical pressure, fell back in disorder.

At a later moment, some of the men who were retreating, but retreating in less heavy clusters, came down upon the Grenadier Guards. The Grenadiers neatly opened their ranks for the discomfited soldiery, and afterwards formed up again, soon recovering their perfect array.

Losses of  
the regi-  
ments  
which  
stormed  
the work.

During this conflict the four regiments which stormed the redoubt had undergone cruel slaughter. In the 23d Regiment, besides Colonel Chester, Wynn, Evans, Conolly, Radcliffe, Young, Anstruther, and Butler, and 3 sergeants, were killed; and Campbell, Hopton, Bathurst, Sayer,† and Applethwaite, and 9 sergeants, were wounded. Of the rank and file 40 were killed and 139 wounded.

In the 33d, Lieutenant Montagu and 3 sergeants were killed, and Colonel Blake, Major Gough, Captain Fitzgerald, Wallis, Worthington, Siree, and Greenwood, and 16 sergeants, were wounded.‡ Of the rank and file 52 were killed, and 172 were wounded.

\* I have heard that this man's name was Hesketh.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Sayer was one of those struck down by that salvo-like discharge which preceded the dismantling of the redoubt.

‡ Colonel Blake would not report his wound lest the account should alarm his wife and family. His horse was struck in three places. Siree, though badly wounded, insisted upon remaining out on the hill-side all night, in order that men in a worse condition should be first attended to. Wallis was badly wounded, but he tied a handkerchief round the place, and remained with his regiment to the close of the battle. Worthington died from the amputation which was necessitated by the wound he received.

In the 95th, Dowdall, Eddington, the younger Ed-  
 dington, Polhill, Kingsley, Braybrooke, and 3 sergeants,  
 were killed ; and Hume, Reyland, Wing, Sargent, Mac-  
 donald, Garrard, Braybrook, Brooke, Boothby, Bazal-  
 gette, Gordon, and 12 sergeants, were wounded.\* Of  
 the rank and file 42 were killed and 116 wounded.

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In the 19th, Stockwell and Wardlaw were killed ;  
 and Cardew, Saunders, M'Gee, Warden, and Currie,  
 and 4 sergeants, wounded. Of the rank and file 39  
 were killed and 170 wounded.

In the Rifles there were 11 killed and 38 wounded,  
 and most of these casualties occurred in the left wing.†  
 So, of the four line battalions and the four companies  
 of Rifles‡ which had stormed the redoubt, there was a  
 loss, in killed and wounded, of about 100 officers and  
 sergeants, and 800 men.

## XXV.

But what was the spell which bound the Czar's com-  
 manders? and why did they throw back the gifts which  
 seemed to be brought them by the fortune of battle?

Cause  
 which  
 paralysed  
 the Rus-  
 sians in  
 the midst  
 of their  
 success.

When our storming-force under Codrington was  
 ascending the glacis in a crowd—in a crowd torn  
 through and through by grape and canister—how came

\* Colonel Webber Smith also (whose name was omitted by mistake  
 in the text) received two gun-shot wounds, and a hardish contusion  
 besides.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† I am not sure that that was the case. I have not before me the  
 materials for showing the proportions in which the two wings suffered.  
 —*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ Instead of 'the four companies of Rifles,' read 'the battalion of  
 'Rifles.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P. it that the enemy could suddenly make up his mind to  
XVI. stop the massacre and dismantle his Great Redoubt ?

When the remnant of our storming-force was flocking back down the hill, why did the enemy spare from destroying it, and bring to a halt his triumphant Vladimir column ?

Having several thousands of troops between the Causeway and the Kourganè Hill, why did the Russian Generals suffer Lacy Yea still to keep his stand on open ground with one disordered battalion ?

We saw that when Mentschikoff, disturbed by the report of Bosquet's flank movement, rode off in great haste towards the sea, Prince Gortschakoff was left in command of all that part of the Russian army which confronted the English. Kvetzinski, the brave and able general who commanded the Division on the Kourganè Hill, was under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff; and as long as the absence of the Commander-in-chief was protracted, Gortschakoff was the officer who had to answer for the defence of the Pass, and of the whole position thence extending to the extreme right of the Russian army. Every part of the ground thus committed to Prince Gortschakoff's care was precious, but the Kourganè Hill was the key of the whole position on the Alma. There, and there only, the ground had been intrenched ; there, and there only, heavy guns had been planted. That barren hill had become the very gage for which the Great Powers of the West and the Czar of All the Russias were to join in a strife computed to last many days. Prince Mentschikoff himself had so judged it. Establishing

his headquarters on the slope overlooking the Great Redoubt, and so disposing his troops that whilst standing there he could exercise an immediate personal control over more than two-thirds of his whole force, he had intended that every movement of this part of the field should be under his own eyes. It might well be deemed certain that any one of Prince Mentschikoff's lieutenants intrusted, during the absence of his general, with this great charge, would be tenacious of the ground. As a general in high command, he would act upon the knowledge that the hill was vital to the whole position : as an officer commanding troops placed in a fortified work, he would be taught by the punctilio of his profession to hold his intrenchments, even at great sacrifice, until the weight of his charge should be taken from him by an order from the commander of the forces.

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But there was a whim of the Emperor Nicholas which tended to weaken and disperse the authority of any man in command of his army. Longing always to make Wellington an example for his generals, but mistaking the gist of the saying that 'the Duke never lost a gun,' Nicholas gave his commanders to understand that the loss of a piece of ordnance would be likely to bring them into disgrace.\* The result of such an intimation was just what a more sagacious

\* The fact of the Duke never having lost a gun in action is a superb and summary proof that his career was uncheckered by the loss of a battle ; but his avoidance of the loss of guns was not the cause, but the effect and the proof, of his ascendancy in war. The Duke would have scorned the notion of risking the loss of a battle for the sake of keeping his guns safe.

**C H A P.** prince would have easily foreseen. The commander  
**XVI.** who received the warning took good care to hand it  
 down—to hand it all down the steps of the military hierarchy ; and every general of division, every brigadier, nay, every artillery officer who commanded a battery, was evidently made to understand that, happen what might, he must not lose a gun. In other words, every such officer, rather than run the risk of losing a gun, was empowered to resolve upon the abandonment of a fortified position, and even to commence a retreat, which might carry with it the retreat of the whole army.

It was therefore very natural that the anxiety which had seized upon the mind of Prince Mentschikoff should not only extend to Prince Gortschakoff and to General Kvetzinski, but also to the artillery officers who commanded the Causeway batteries and the guns in the Great Redoubt. Now, from the moment when Prince Mentschikoff rode off towards the sea, he had never reappeared in the Pass, or on the Kourganè Hill ; he had sent no good tidings, and apparently had despatched no orders or directions of any kind.\* With every moment the just grounds for alarm were increasing ; and when the foremost divisions of the British army sprang to their feet and rapidly advanced along their whole line, the Russian generals and commanders of batteries had to cast in their minds and see how far their desire to hold fast a position very precious to the

\* I think I might have almost ventured to leave out the ‘apparently,’ for although the narratives of Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski do not in terms declare that they received no orders, the tenor of their statements is all but equivalent to actual assertion.

army and to the honour of the empire could be made to consist with the absolute safety of a few pieces of ordnance. They were about to be assailed by the English army. But this was not all they had to look for. The continued detention of Prince Mentschikoff in that part of the position which confronted the French, gave ground for the fear that an evil crisis must there be passing. The fear would be that Bosquet's turning movement against the Russian left was producing its full effect, and that the tide of war, rolling up along the line of the Russian position, had set in from west to east.

If men were filled with this dread—a dread well justified by inference fairly drawn at the time, though not by actual facts—it would be to the Telegraph Height that they would bend their inquiring eyes, and there they would gaze with minds prepared to learn that the French, marching eastward, had doubled up the Russian left wing, and were coming to ground from which they would look down triumphant into the flank of the Causeway batteries. Suddenly, to men thus expectant of a dreaded calamity, there was presented a sight well fitted to confirm their worst fears—nay, even to make them imagine that the whole tenor of their duty was changed. For one of the high knolls jutting up from the eastern slopes of the Telegraph Height, and closely overlooking the Russian reserves, became crowded all at once with a gay-looking group of horsemen, whose hats and white plumes showed that they were Staff officers. What made the apparition seem the more fatal was that it was deep in the very

Appari-  
tion of  
horsemen  
on a knoll  
in the  
midst of  
the Rus-  
sian posi-  
tion.

**C H A P.** heart of the Russian lines, and even somewhat near  
**XVI.** to the ground where Prince Mentschikoff had posted his reserves. It could be seen that the horsemen wore coats of dark blue. They were exactly on the ground where the van of the French army might hope to be if it had achieved a signal victory over the left wing of the Russian army. It was hardly to be imagined possible that the Allies could have a numerous staff in that part of the field without being there in great strength. Even a tranquil and cautious observer of the apparition could hardly have failed to infer that the French, carrying all before them, had marched through and through from west to east, and made good their way into the centre, nay, almost into the rear, of the Russian position. Oppressed by this belief, Russian officers would be left to think that if they stood bound to provide against the possibility of losing their guns, the time they had for saving them was beginning to run very short.

The divisional general who was in command on the Kourganè Hill does not allege that he had any authority from Prince Gortschakoff or from the commander of the forces to remove the guns which armed the Great Redoubt. What he says is, that the defeat of the Kazan battalions by the English troops left the battery exposed, and necessitated its withdrawal.\*

\* This is what Kvetzinski says : ‘ During this time masses of English troops were directing their steps towards the regiment of the Grand Duke Michael (the Kazan regiment). The batteries of our first lines began firing violently. Shells and missiles worked their bloody way through the lines of the enemies, but they immediately re-formed their lines, and, under cover of a strong line of bayonets and their battery

General Kvetzinski, however, was the master of sixteen prime battalions, of which twelve were at this time untouched. At the time when the order must have been given for the removal of the guns, the defeat which one of his Kazan columns had sustained was nothing which, in the eyes of a man so firm as he was, would seem to justify despair.\* Yet to remove these guns was to abandon the key of the position on the Alma. It is hard to imagine that Kvetzinski could have brought himself to take such a step without trying resistance, unless he had been in some measure governed by an inculcated dread of losing guns, and also by what he wrongly imagined to be the state of the battle on the other side of the Causeway. Be this as it may, it is certain that, within some fifteen minutes from the time when the horsemen were first seen on the knoll, the Great Redoubt was dismantled.

The riders whose sudden appearance on the knoll thus scared and misled the enemy were a group of perhaps eighteen or twenty Englishmen. How came it that they were sitting unmolested in their saddles

‘ then standing behind the smoking ruins of Bourliouk, they hastened to  
 ‘ force their way over the ford in order to reach the breastwork. The  
 ‘ Kazan regiment bravely met them, but, tormented by the destroying  
 ‘ fire of the enemy, and having lost a frightful amount of men, was  
 ‘ obliged to give way under the superior numbers of the enemy. The  
 ‘ battery, being thus left exposed, was obliged to move.’

\* Up to the time when Kvetzinski dismantled the redoubt, the only defeat which the Kazan corps had sustained was the one inflicted upon two of its battalions by the 19th Regiment and the left companies of the 23d : see *ante*. The defeat of the other two battalions—the battalions engaged with Lacy Yea—had not then occurred.



C H A P. and contentedly adjusting their field-glasses in the  
XVI. heart of the Russian position ?

The road  
which  
Lord Rag-  
lan took  
when he  
had or-  
dered the  
advance  
of his  
infantry.

At the time when Lord Raglan despatched to his leading divisions the final order to advance, he was riding between the French and the English armies, and was close to a road or track which led down towards a ford below the burning village. Impelled by his desire for a clear view of the coming struggle, and guided only by Fortune, or by the course of the track, he rode down briskly into the valley, followed close by his Staff, but leaving our troops in his rear. He soon reached, soon passed through the vineyards, and gained the bank of the river.

The stream at this spot flowed rapidly, breaking against a mass of rock, which so far dammed it back as to form on the upper side of it a pool about four feet deep. One of the Staff rode into the stream at that point, and his horse nearly lost his footing. Lord Raglan, almost at the same moment, took the river on the right or lower side of the rock, and crossed it without any trouble. Though he was parted at this time from his own troops, there were several French soldiers near him. They were a part of the chain of skirmishers which covered the left flank and left front of Prince Napoleon's Division. They seemed to be engaged with some of the enemy's sharpshooters, whom they were able to discern through the foliage ; for they were sheltering themselves behind vineyard walls, watching moments for firing, and receding in order to load, or cautiously peering forward. They looked surprised when Lord Raglan, with the group

which followed him, rode down and passed them. More than one of them, sagacious and curious, paused in his loading, and stood gazing, with ramrod half-down, as though he were trying to make out how it accorded with the great science of war that the English General and his Staff should be riding through the skirmishers, and entering without his battalions into the midst of the enemy's dominions. C H A P.  
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Though they were unseen by our officers, the Russian sharpshooters, who had been exchanging shots with the French riflemen, were not far away. Of this they gave proof. Leslie dropped out of his saddle and fell to the ground. His startled horse making a move much as though he were blundering at a grip, the fall seemed at first sight like a fall in hunting ; but a rifle-ball had entered Leslie's shoulder. Nearly at the same time Weare, another of the Staff, was struck down. There was not a heavy fire, but the Russian sharpshooters had been patiently duelling with the French skirmishers, and of course, when they saw Lord Raglan and his plumed followers, they seized the occasion for easier shooting, and tried to bring down two or three of the gay cavalcade.

After gaining the left bank of the river, Lord Raglan at first got parted from most of those who had followed him, for he took a track into a kind of gully towards his right, and there for a moment he had no one very near him, except one man who had crossed the stream next after him ; for the rest of the horsemen, when they reached the dry ground, had borne rather towards their left. Some one, however, from

**C H A P.** that quarter cried out, 'This seems a better way,  
**XVI.** 'my lord;' and Lord Raglan, then turning, rejoined the rest of the Staff, and took the path recommended. I do not know who the officer was who advised this road. He has possibly forgotten the counsel which he gave; but if he remembers it, and sees how the issue was governed by taking the path which he chose, he may suffer himself to trace the gain of a battle, with all its progeny of events, to his few hurried words.

The brown bay Lord Raglan rode was of course well broken to fire, and he had been quiet enough during the earlier part of the action; but now, suddenly, his blood rose, and for all the rest of the day he was so eager that he would hardly suffer his rider to use a field-glass from the saddle. The truth is, that in other times he had been ridden to hounds in England, and although he had long stood careless of all that was done by the Causeway batteries, yet when he and his rider and the horsemen around him cantered down into the valley, when they plunged into the river, when they briskly dashed through it, and began to gallop up the steep broken ground on the Russian side, the old hunter seemed to think of the chase and great days in the Gloucestershire country.

But it was not 'Shadrach'\* alone who felt the onward impulse. They say that there lurks in the men of these isles a vestige of Man the Hunter and Man the Savage, and that this, after all, is the subtle leaven which, in spite of the dangerous inroads of luxury,

\* The name of the horse.

still keeps alive the warlike spirit of the people and the freedom which goes along with it. It was not right—nay, if it were not that success brings justification, it would have been scarcely pardonable—that a general, charged with the care of an army, should be under the guidance of feelings akin to the impulses of the chase; but what one has to speak of is not of what ought to have been, but what was. By the stir and joyous animation of the moment, Lord Raglan was led on into a part of the field which he would not have sought to reach in cold blood. He would have regarded as nothing the mere difference between the risk of being struck by shot in one part of the field and the risk of being struck by shot in another; but he knew that, in general, it is from a point more or less in rear of battalions actually engaged that a chief can exercise the most constant and the most extended control over his army; and an ideal commander would not suffer himself to ride to so forward a spot as to run the risk of losing the government of his troops for many minutes together in the critical period of an action: but the horseman who now rode his hunter across the valley of the Alma, and indulgently gave him his head, was not an ideal personage, but a man of flesh and blood, with many very English failings. ‘*Avant tout je suis gentilhomme Anglais,*’ was the preface of the fierce message sent by the then foremost man of the world to the King of France;\* and certainly in the nature of that ‘*gentilhomme Anglais*’

\* To Louis the Eighteenth in the summer of 1815, shortly after his second restoration.

**C H A P.** the wilfulness is so firmly set that no true sample of  
**XVI.** the breed can be altered, and altered down, to suit a pattern. The State must dispense with his services or take him as he is.

Body and soul, Lord Raglan was so made by nature, that, though he knew how to be prudent enough in the orders he gave to officers at a distance, yet when he was in the saddle directing affairs in person, and there came to be a question between holding back and going forward, his blood always used to get heated, and, like his great master, he had so often been happy in his choice of the time for running a venture, that his spirit had never been cowed. Having once begun to ride forward, he did not restrain himself. And surely there was a great fascination to draw him on. The ground was of such a kind that, with every stride of his charger, a fresh view was opened to him. For months and months he had failed to tear off the veil which hid from him the strength of the army he undertook to assail ; and now suddenly, in the midst of a battle, he found himself suffered to pass forward between the enemy's centre and his left wing. As at Badajoz, in old times, he had galloped alone to the drawbridge and obtained the surrender of St Christoval, so now, driven on by the same hot blood, he joyously rode without troops into the heart of the enemy's position ; and Fortune, still enamoured of his boldness, was awaiting him with her radiant smile ; for the path he took led winding up—by a way rather steep and rough here and there, but easy enough for saddle-horses ; and presently in the front,

but some way off towards the left, he saw before him a high commanding knoll, and, strange to say, there seemed to be no Russians near it. Instantly, and before he reached the high ground, he saw the prize and divined its worth. He was swift to seize it. Without stopping—nay, even, one almost may say, without breaking the stride of his horse—he turned to Airey, who rode close at his side, and ordered him to bring up Adams's brigade with all possible speed. Then, still pressing on and on, the foremost rider of the Allied armies, he gained the summit of the knoll.

I know of no battle in which, whilst the forces of his adversary were still upon their ground, and still unbroken, a general has had the fortune to stand upon a spot so commanding as that which Lord Raglan now found on the summit of the knoll. The truth is, that the Russian commander had not troops enough to occupy the whole position, and the part which he neglected was, happily, that very one into which Lord Raglan had ridden. During the earlier part of the day a battalion had been posted in the ravine close under the knoll ; but, in an evil hour for the Czar, the battalion had been removed,\* and the enemy having no other troops in the immediate neighbourhood, and having no guns in battery which commanded the summit of the knoll, the English General, though as yet he had no troops with him, stood unmolested in the heart of the enemy's position—stood between that wing of the Russian army which con-

Lord Raglan's position on the knoll.

\* The No. 1 Taroutine battalion.—*Chodasiewicz*.

**C H A P.** fronted the French, and that much larger portion of it  
**XVI.** which confronted the English, but so far in advance  
 as to be actually in the close neighbourhood of the Russian reserves. The knoll was not, indeed, so situated as to command a distant view towards our right, and the view towards the front was obstructed by the features of the ground; but, looking to his left, or, in other words, looking eastward and up the valley of the river, Lord Raglan commanded nearly the whole ground destined to be the scene of the English attack.\*


But more; he looked upon that part of the Russian army which confronted ours; he saw it in profile; he saw down into the flank of the Causeway batteries which barred the mouth of the Pass; and, beyond, he saw into the shoulder of the Great Redoubt, then about to be stormed by Codrington's brigade.† Above all, he saw, drawn up with splendid precision, the bodies of infantry which the enemy held in reserve. They were massed in two columns.‡ The formation of each mass looked close and perfect as though it had been made of marble, and cut by rule and plumb-line. These troops being in reserve, were, of course, some way in rear of the enemy's batteries and his foremost battalions, but they were only 900 yards from the eye of the English General; for it was Lord Raglan's strange and happy destiny to have ridden

\* *i. e.*, that attack, the first stages of which have been already described.

† As already narrated. It will be remembered that Codrington's brigade was joined in the storming by the 19th and 95th Regiments.

‡ See former note as to the probable number of the troops in these columns, and the corps to which they belonged.

almost into the rear of the position, and to be almost as near to the enemy's reserves as he was to the front of their array. C H A P.  
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All this—now told with labour of words—Lord Raglan saw at a glance, and at the same moment he divined the fatal perturbation which would be inflicted upon the enemy by the mere appearance of our Head-quarter Staff in this part of the field. The knoll, though much lower than the summit of the Telegraph Height, stood out bold and plain above the Pass. It was clear that even from afar the enemy would make out that it was crowned by a group of plumed officers; and Lord Raglan's imagination being so true and so swift as to gift him with the faculty of knowing how, in given circumstances, other men must needs be thinking and feeling, it hardly cost him a moment to infer that this apparition of a few horsemen on the spur of a hill was likely to govern the enemy's fate. It would not, he thought, occur to any Russian general that fifteen or twenty Staff officers, whether French or English, could have reached the knoll without having thousands of troops close at hand. The enemy's generals would therefore infer that a large proportion of the Allied force had won its way into the heart of



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Lord Raglan desires to have a couple of guns brought up to the top of the knoll.

Meantime he watches the progress of the battle.

the Russian position. This was the view which Lord Raglan's mind had seized when, at the very moment of crowning the knoll, he looked round and said, 'Our presence here will have the best effect.' Then, glancing down, as he spoke, into the flank of the Causeway batteries, and carrying his eye round to the enemy's infantry reserves, Lord Raglan said, 'Now, if we had a couple of guns here !'\*

His wish was instantly seized by Colonel Dickson† and one or two other officers. 'They rode off in all haste.

The rest of the group which had followed Lord Raglan remained with him upon the summit of the knoll, and every one, facing eastward and taking out his glass, began to scan the ground destined to be assailed by the English troops.

The Light Division had not then begun to emerge from the thick ground and the channel of the river ; but presently some small groups, and afterwards larger gatherings of the red-coats, appeared upon the top of the river's bank on the Russian side, and at length—seen in profile by Lord Raglan—there began the tumultuous onset of Codrington's brigade against the Great Redoubt.‡

Lord Raglan knew that the distance between him and the scene of the struggle at the redoubt was too

\* I heard him say so, and say so immediately upon crowning the knoll.

† Colonel Dickson of the Artillery. It was the happy accident of his being with Lord Raglan as chief of the staff of interpreters which gave him the opportunity of rendering the services narrated in the text.

‡ See *ante*.

great to allow of his then tampering with it ; for any order that he might send would lose its worth in the journey, and tend to breed confusion. And it was not in his way to assuage his impatience by making impotent efforts ; nor would he even give vent to his feeling by words or looks disclosing vexation. He had so great a power of preventing his animal spirits from drooping, that no one could see in his glowing countenance the faintest reflection of the sight which his eyes took in. His manner all the time was the manner of a man enlivened by the progress of a great undertaking without being robbed of his leisure. He spoke to me, I remember, about his horse. He seemed like a man who had a clue of his own and knew his way through the battle.

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Watching the onslaught of Codrington's brigade, Lord Raglan had seen the men ascend the slope and rush up over the parapet of the Great Redoubt. Then moments, then whole minutes—precious minutes—elapsed, and he had to bear the anguish of finding that the ground where he longed to see the supports marching up was still left bare. Then—a too sure result of that default—he had to see our soldiery relinquishing their capture and retreating in clusters down the hill.

Moreover, at that moment affairs were going ill with the French. The appearance of our Headquarters on the knoll had been marked by our Allies as well as by the enemy ; for now a French aide-de-camp, in great haste, came climbing up the knoll to seek Lord Raglan. He seemed to be in a state of

A French  
aide-de-  
camp on  
the knoll.

C H A P.  
XVI.

His  
mission.

Lord Rag-  
lan's way  
with him.

grievous excitement ; but perhaps it was the violence of his bodily exertion which gave him this appearance, for he had quitted his horse in order the better to mount the steep, and he rushed up bareheaded to Lord Raglan, but so breathless from his exertions that for a moment he could hardly articulate ; and when he spoke, he spoke panting. He persisted in remaining uncovered. What he came to ask was that Lord Raglan would give some support to the French ; and, as a ground for the demand, he urged that the French were hardly pressed by the enemy. ‘My Lord,’ he said—‘my Lord, my Lord, we have before us eight ‘battalions!’\* One could see, or imagine that one saw, what was passing in Lord Raglan’s mind. He was pained by thinking that, either from mental excitement or from the violence of his bodily exertion, the officer should seem discomposed ; but what tormented him most was the sight of the young man standing bareheaded, for to tell him to be covered would be to assume that the bared head was an obeisance meant to be rendered to himself. Bending in his saddle, Lord Raglan turned kindly round towards his right—towards the side of his maimed arm—and his expression was that of one intent to assuage another’s pain, but the sunshine of the last two days had tanned him so crimson that it masked the generous flush which used to come to his face in such moments. He did not look at all like an anxious and vexed commander who had to listen to a desponding

\* ‘Milord, milord, nous avons devant nous huit bataillons.’ I heard him say those words.

message in the midst of a battle. He was rather the courteous, lively host entertaining a shy, youthful visitor, and trying to place him at his ease. In his comforting, cheerful way, he said, 'I can spare you a battalion.'\* But it was something of more worth than the promise of a battalion that the aide-de-camp carried back with him. He carried back tidings of the spirit in which Lord Raglan was conducting the battle. At the time when the French were cast down, it was of some moment to them to learn that the English Headquarters, strangely placed as they were in the midst of the Russian position, were a scene of robust animation, and that Lord Raglan looked and spoke like a man who had the foe in his power.

C H A P.  
XVI.

## XXVI.

It is now time to speak of the events which had been bringing the French army into a state of increased depression. We saw that General Kiriakoff, commanding the Russian left wing, had charge of the Telegraph Height, and confronted the Divisions of Prince Napoleon and Canrobert, having also on his left and left front, though at greater distances, the two separated brigades of Bosquet's Division, and the five battalions of Turks. The infantry force re-

Causes of  
the de-  
pression  
which had  
come  
upon the  
French.

\* 'Je puis vous donner un bataillon.' I heard Lord Raglan make that answer. Lord Raglan, I imagine, meant to fulfil the promise by detaching one of the two battalions about to arrive under Adams ; but by the time that force came up the course of events rendered it unnecessary to send the promised aid. However, Sir Richard England afterwards moved into the close neighbourhood of Prince Napoleon's Division.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Opera-  
tions on  
the Tele-  
graph  
Height.

maining under Kiriakoff's orders had been reduced, by Prince Mentschikoff's abstraction of the 'Moscow' troops, to a force of only nine battalions ; and afterwards, when the second 'Moscow' battalion rejoined the rest of the corps, the infantry force remaining under Kiriakoff consisted only of the four 'Taroutine' and the four 'Militia' battalions. The part which these 'Taroutine' and 'Militia' battalions had been taking in the battle may be told in a summary way. They did not attack the French, and no French infantry attacked them ; but since they were kept massed in battalion columns upon slopes which faced towards the French, they were exposed to a good deal of artillery-fire at long range, and were from time to time forced to shift their ground. The 'Militia' battalions were troops of inferior quality ; and finding at last that, wherever they stood, they were more or less galled by artillery, they dissolved.\* So, although he was supported by Prince Mentschikoff in person, with 'the column of the eight battalions,' of which we shall presently speak, yet in his own hands Kiriakoff had only four battalions of sound infantry with which to show a countenance to thirty thousand Frenchmen and Turks. But both of Bosquet's brigades were distant. Canrobert, indeed, was on the verge of the plateau, and had so spread out his battalions as to have them in readiness for an encounter. Nay, seeing that he had no enemy before him, except on his left front, he had somewhat brought round his right shoulder, and was fronting towards the Tele-

\* Chodasiewicz.

graph, but he was still without his artillery, and was therefore hanging back cautiously on the steep ground close below the smooth cap of the hill. C H A P.  
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Prince Napoleon's Division at this time was in the bottom of the valley close to the river ; and, indeed, of the whole force which the Prince at this time had around him, there were only two battalions which had hitherto forded the stream.\* To the hopes which the French army had of being able to take a great part in the action, this backwardness of one of their finest divisions was almost ruinous ; and it is natural enough that a divisional general, whose rank gave him shelter from the ordeal of a fair military investigation, should for that very reason be made to suffer the more bitterly from the stings which men robbed of their freedom are accustomed to plant with the tongue. Back-  
wardness  
of the 3d  
French  
Division.

Resembling the first French Emperor in outward looks, Prince Napoleon was also very like his uncle, not apparently in his main objects, but in the character of his intellect ; for he had that rare and exceeding clearness of view which man is able to command when he can separate things essential from things of circumstance, and keep the two sets of thoughts so clean asunder as to be able to go to the solution of his main problem with a mind unclouded by details—unclouded by even those details which it is vital for him to master and provide for, though he refuses to let them mix with the elements from which he fetches Prince  
Napoleon.

\* The battalion of the 19th Chasseurs, and one of the battalions of the Marine Corps. The 2d Zouave Regiment had also crossed, but this, it will presently be seen, was not a part of the force which Prince Napoleon 'had around him.'

C H A P.  
XVI.

out his conclusion. And although one cannot help knowing that the most cruel of all the imputations which can be brought against a soldier has long been kept fastened upon Prince Napoleon, I may say that such knowledge as I have hitherto chanced to gain of his career has not yet enabled me to infer that he is a man of lower grade than his uncle in the matter of personal courage.

The mis-  
haps  
which  
befell him.

Before the delinquency of the 3d French Division on the day of the Alma is accepted as one of the grounds which entitle the world to ratify its harsh judgment against Prince Napoleon, men ought in all fairness to know the mishap which befell the Division, and to understand the considerations which rendered this same mishap a much more grave evil than it might seem to be at first sight.

The ma-  
terials  
from  
which the  
bulk of  
the French  
army is  
taken.

The French are so military a people that, when a great national sentiment is once aroused, the very children are ready to seize their little muskets and fall into columns of companies; but in the mean time, and until the mighty nation is challenged, the great bulk of the French peasantry are perhaps more homely, more rustic, more unadventurous than most of the people of Europe. From these quiet millions of people, many tens of thousands of small, sad, harmless-looking young men are every year torn by the conscription; and immense energy—energy informed with the traditions of an ancient and ever warlike nation—is brought to bear upon the object of turning these forlorn young captives into able soldiers. All that instruction can achieve is carefully done; but the

enforced change from rural life to the life of barracks and camps seems not to be favourable to the animal spirits of the men : for although, when seen in masses or groups working hard at their military duties, they always appear to be brisk, and almost merry, their seeming animation is the result of smart orders—the animation of a horse when the rowels on either side are lightly touching his flanks ; and during the hours whilst they are left to themselves, the French soldiers of the line engaged in campaigning are commonly depressed and spiritless.\* Of course, this want of lustiness in the French army is superbly masked by all the resources of military pomp, and all the outward signs which seem to show the presence of vigour, despatch, and warlike ardour ; but the material of which the line regiments are composed must always keep a good deal of its original nature ; and whoever glances at the rising steps of French officers successful in Africa will find that they have climbed to eminence, not by leading troops of the line, but by obtaining, in the critical part of their career, the command of choice French regiments, or, failing that, the command of troops of foreign race.† These choice French regiments are not composed of materials at all like those which supply the line ; on the contrary, they number in their ranks many thousands of bold, adventurous men who take service in the army of their own accord ; and it is in these choice regiments

C H A P.  
XVI.

The great difference between their choice regiments and the rest of their troops.

\* I rest this upon what I have seen of the French army in Africa, in the Crimea, and on board ship.

† i.e., of the Foreign Legion, or of the native African levies.



C H A P.  
XVI.

Each  
Division,  
therefore,  
is fur-  
nished  
with a  
Zouave  
or other  
choice  
regiment.

Prince  
Napoleon  
is aban-  
doned by  
his Zouave  
regiment.

that France sees the true expression of her warlike nature. Of all these choice regiments the 'Zouaves' are the most famous ; and each of the three foremost Divisions of the French army on the Alma had in it a regiment—a regiment with its two war battalions—belonging to the corps of the Zouaves. What the spear-head is to a spear, that its Zouave Regiment was to each of these three Divisions.\*

Prince Napoleon's Division comprised 9000 men ; and of these, some 2000 were men of the 2d Regiment of Zouaves. Whether this regiment was impatient of the supposed slowness with which Prince Napoleon had hitherto advanced—whether it was governed by its contempt of line regiments, and a fierce resolve to have no neighbourship with any other than Zouave comrades—or whether there were other causes which shaped its movements, I have not learnt ; but what happened was this : the regiment, after fording the river, broke away from the unfortunate Division to which it belonged, marched off towards its right front, began to climb the height, and never stopped until it had coolly ranged itself close alongside of the 1st Zouave Regiment—a regiment which formed the left of Canrobert's array. With Canrobert's Division, instead of with Prince Napoleon's, the regiment continued to act until the close of the battle. Before men are hard upon a divisional general for his seeming backwardness in

\* I have borrowed this expressive image from one of our veteran commanders, who used it once in conversation as a means of illustrating the kind of power which even a large body of our native Indian troops is accustomed to derive from the presence of one or two English battalions.

an action, they ought to allow for the misfortune which left him indeed the master of some 7000 men, but robbed him of the warlike corps on which he must have relied as the element for giving life and fire to his masses. For, if one might recur to the image already used, one would say that the spear-head had flown off, and that what remained in the hands of Prince Napoleon was only the wooden shaft. Justice in this regard is the more needful, since it would plainly be unfitting and impolitic for Prince Napoleon to say in his defence, that with 7000 French troops around him he was still reduced to helplessness by the want of his Zouave Regiment.

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There is another consideration which alone would seem to free Prince Napoleon from almost all the blame founded upon the backwardness of his Division. In the midst of that very Division, Marshal St Arnaud was all this time riding ; and it is obvious that by being thus present with a force which was hanging back out of its place, the officer who commanded the whole French army brought full upon his own shoulders the weight of the blame which might otherwise be thrown upon the divisional general.

Also St Arnaud was riding with this Division, and he therefore was answerable for its place in the field.

But the eloping of his Zouave Regiment was not the only mishap which befell Prince Napoleon. We saw that D'Aurelle's brigade—a brigade forming part of the 4th or Reserve Division—had been ordered to support Canrobert. Of the motives which governed the leader of this brigade I know nothing. Perhaps, whilst he was low down in the bottom of the valley, he lost his conception of the distance (the

D'Aurelle's brigade thrusts itself forward in advance of Prince Napoleon ;

C H A P.  
XVI.

but in  
 an order  
 which in-  
 capaci-  
 tates it  
 from any  
 immediate  
 combat.

lateral distance from east to west) which separated him from the Division he was ordered to support. At all events, what he did was this: having his whole brigade in a close, deep, narrow column, he pushed forward and jammed it into a steep road exactly in front of Prince Napoleon's foremost battalion. He thus made it impossible for Prince Napoleon to get into action by that road,\* and put him in the plight of a man left behind—in the plight of a general who commands one of the Divisions intended to be foremost, and yet is left planted with his force in the rear of troops meant to act as reserves. Nor did D'Aurelle's brigade do any the least good by thus thrusting itself into the road in advance of Prince Napoleon; for, either because of the nature of the ground or from some other cause, the brigade never spread itself out so as to be capable of fighting. Always in deep column with narrow front, it hung back clinging fast to the steep part of the hill, and remaining unseen by Kiria-koff, who moved freely across its front as though there were no such force on the hill-side. Upon the whole, the result was, that, taken together, D'Aurelle's brigade and Prince Napoleon's mutilated Division were a column of near 12,000 men, which might be said to be in mere order of march during all the critical period of the battle; for, with a depth of nearly a mile, the column had a front of only a few yards. Thus disposed, the 12,000 men who formed the column were not, of course, in a state which

\* There was another road by which the Prince could, and by which at a later period he did, ascend.





allowed of their attempting to engage an enemy inclined to make a stand against them; and they were even, it would seem, very helpless for purposes of mere self-defence.\* Indeed, it is hard to see how they could have escaped a great disaster, if a bold Russian officer who knew the ground had come down with a few score of light-infantry men upon the flank of D'Aurelle's brigade. Apparently Kiriakoff's abstinence from all enterprises of this sort, and the quiet confidence with which he afterwards manœuvred on the plateau, were both owing to the steepness of ground, which hindered him from perceiving the small slender head of D'Aurelle's column.

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Helplessness of the deep column which was formed by D'Aurelle's brigade and Prince Napoleon's Division.

Upon the whole, then, Kiriakoff, though handling no forces except his two batteries, his four Taroutine battalions, and his fast-dissolving militiamen, was not at this time out of heart. His artillery, sweeping down the smooth cap of the Telegraph Height, both on its northern and north-western sides, commanded the only ground by which Canrobert could advance; and, firing over the heads of the Taroutine battalions, effectually kept him down. Moreover, it still tormented all those masses of French infantry which, though approaching the Telegraph Height, were yet so low down as not to have come in for the shelter which the steepness of the hill-side afforded.

Condition of Kiriakoff on the Telegraph Height.

And now we shall see the cause of the stress which had been put upon the French army by that incubus

\* See the plan showing the way in which Prince Napoleon's Division and D'Aurelle's brigade were disposed. It is taken from the official French plan of the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient.'



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XVI.

The 'co-  
'lumn of  
'the eight  
'battal-  
'ions.'

of the 'eight battalions' of which the aide-de-camp spoke. We left Prince Mentschikoff countermarching from west to east with the seven battalions which he had under his personal orders. The detached battalion of the 'Moscow' corps had been afterwards called in, and its junction brought up the whole body to eight battalions. With this force gathered in mass, and standing halted on the right rear of the Telegraph, Prince Mentschikoff was preparing to make an onslaught upon the head of Canrobert's Division; but just as he was going to move, he abandoned the idea of leading the column in person. The cause of this change is obvious. Evidently Prince Mentschikoff was called off to another part of the field by tidings of what the English were doing.

Kiriakoff  
is invested  
with the  
charge of  
this co-  
lumn.

Kiriakoff had had a horse shot under him, and was standing on foot near one of his 'Taroutine' battalions, when Prince Mentschikoff rode up, and (apparently suppressing the tidings which forced him to quit this part of the field) gave Kiriakoff the charge of the great 'column of the eight battalions' which had been amassed for the purpose of an attack upon Canrobert's Division. The Prince then rode off, and was not seen again or heard of in this part of the field. Of course it follows that he went as straight as he could towards that part of his position which was undergoing the assault of the English.\*


Kiriakoff instantly took a fresh horse and rode to

\* I say 'it follows,' because Prince Mentschikoff was a brave man, incapable of quitting one of the two scenes of battle except for the purpose of going to the other. In the mention which they make of Prince Menta-





Plan taken from the French official Atlas showing  
the advance of the "Column of the eight Battalions"  
against Canrobert's Division



*All those parts of the above plan which show the  
position of the 'Column of eight Battalions' &  
of the French troops are believed to be nearly  
accurate but the other parts of the plan are not  
to be relied upon*

the ground—ground on the right rear of the Telegraph—where the ‘column of the eight battalions’ awaited him. This vast column he disposed in a solid body, with a front of two and a depth of four massed battalions. When all was ready, he began to

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He  
marches  
it across  
the front  
of D’Au-  
relle’s  
brigade ;



move it flankwise from east to west. Plainly hindered by the ground from seeing the head of the column which was formed by D’Aurelle’s brigade and Prince Napoleon’s Division, he dealt with the French as though they had no such force near ; for with that heavy column of his, which trailed, as we have seen, to a depth of four battalions, he marched straight across the front of D’Aurelle’s brigade. He marched in peace. Nay, so far were the French from looking upon his hazardous movement in the light of a gift offered them by Fortune, that it was the dread apparition of this vast Russian column which had sent the panting aide-de-camp to the side of Lord Raglan’s stirrup.

Bending afterwards more towards the north, Kiria-koff advanced upon the right centre of the ground on which Canrobert had spread his battalions. Canrobert’s troops did not long stand their ground ; for

and then  
advances  
upon the  
right  
centre of  
Canro-  
bert’s Di-  
vision.

chikoff’s presence in different parts of the field, the narratives of the Russian divisional generals leave a chasm of several important minutes. This chasm, as will be seen at a later page, is filled up by conjecture.



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when Kiriakoff, advancing and still advancing, was nearly at last within musket-shot of his foe, the French no longer bore up under the weight that is laid upon the heart of a Continental soldier by the approach of a great column of infantry. Kiriakoff conceives that he inflicted a sheer defeat upon his foe. 'Canrobert's Division,' he writes, 'could not resist our charge. Hastily taking off their batteries, they began to descend the hilly bank.\* On the other hand, the French say nothing of this reverse. Perhaps the truth lies intermediately between the broad assertion of Kiriakoff and the unfaithful silence of the French; for what seems the most likely is, that Canrobert, being still without his artillery, was for the moment resolved to decline the combat, and that with that view, and of his own free will, without waiting to be put under stress of actual fight, he drew his troops down to a steeper part of the hill-side. Be this as it may, it is certain that, under the pressure of Kiriakoff's great column, the head of Canrobert's Division fell back.†

The head  
of Can-  
robert's  
Division  
falls back.

State of  
the battle  
at this  
time.

Along almost their whole array at this time it seemed to fare ill with the Allies. Still close to the sea-shore, Bouat, with one French brigade and 5000

\* Kiriakoff's narrative. It will be observed that his statement clashes with the passage in which I say that Canrobert was without his guns. I have relied upon the detailed statements supplied to me from French sources; and if I am right in doing so, it follows that Kiriakoff must have been mistaken in supposing that he saw the French carrying off their guns.

† Upon this point Kiriakoff's narrative is confirmed by Romaine. Writing from his saddle, and at the very minute of witnessing the event, he recorded it in these words: 'French centre falling back.'—Romaine's saddle-notes.

Turks, was without artillery, and was therefore holding back from the plateau, far away from any scene of strife. Following the same barren track, General Forey with Lourmel's brigade was marching to the sea-shore, and was annulled. Bosquet, with his one brigade on the plateau, had long been isolated, and was not so near to any Russian battalion as to be able to engage it with his infantry. Canrobert was undergoing the check which we have just seen. The unwieldy column formed by D'Aurelle's brigade and by Prince Napoleon's Division—a column with a front of only a few yards and the depth of a mile—was in an order adapted for the march, but not for fighting, and, its small slender crest being kept close down out of sight, had failed to exert that pressure which, even without firing a shot, may be inflicted by the known presence of a great body of troops. And the forces thus palsied were nothing less than the whole French army, including even their reserves. Much, of course, might always be hoped from the bravery and the swift invention of the warlike French ; but apart from that vast though undefined resource, and apart from what fortune might do for him, Marshal St Arnaud was without the means which would enable him to bear up against any grave disaster, and hinder it from becoming sheer ruin.

The fortunes of the English had been checkered ; and it might be said that at this moment their prospects were a good deal overcast. Evans, still repressed by the commanding fire of the Causeway

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batteries, and having but three battalions to fight with, was sustaining a hard conflict. Codrington's people had been forced to relinquish their hold of the Great Redoubt; and the shattered remains of the battalions which stormed the work were descending the slope of the hill, and breaking down by their bodily weight the left wing of a battalion of Guards. Finally, General Buller, on our extreme left, was in an attitude of mere defence. It is true that the Great Redoubt had been dismantled—that (with the exception of the centre battalion of the Guards) our supports had not yet tried their prowess—and that the bare apparition of our Headquarter Staff on the knoll was putting a heavy stress on the enemy. It is true, also, that there was one English regiment still fighting with a Russian column. All else had of late gone ill.

XXVII.

The two  
guns  
which  
Lord Rag-  
lan had  
called  
for are  
brought to  
the top of  
the knoll.

This was the condition of things when, having been hurried down to the ford, and dragged through the river, and up over steep rugged ground, the two guns for which Lord Raglan had prayed were brought up at length to the summit of the knoll. They were guns belonging to Turner's battery, and they were already crossing the river when Dickson came upon them. The two pieces were soon unlimbered; and one of them—for the artillerymen had not all been able to keep pace—was worked by Dickson with his own hands. The guns were pointed upon the flank of the Causeway batteries. Every one

watched keenly for the result of the first shot. The first shot failed. Some one said, 'Allow a little ' more for the wind ;' and the words were not spoken as though they were a quotation from 'Ivanhoe,' but rather in a way showing that the speaker knew something of artillery practice. The next shot, or the next shot but one, took effect upon the Causeway batteries. It struck, they say, a tumbril which stood just in the rear of the guns.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Their fire  
enfilades  
the Cause-  
way bat-  
teries, and  
causes the  
enemy to  
withdraw  
his guns.

It presently became a joyful certainty that the Causeway batteries, exposing their flank to this fire from the knoll, could not hold their ground ; and in a few moments a keen-eyed officer, who was one of the group around Lord Raglan, cried out with great joy, 'He is carrying off his guns!' And this was true. The field-pieces which formed the Causeway batteries were rapidly limbered up and dragged to another ground far up in the rear.\*

With the two great columns of infantry which constituted the enemy's reserves it fared no better. After not more than two failures, the gunner got their range, and our nine-pounders ploughed through the serried masses of the two Russian columns, cutting lanes through and through them. Yet for some minutes the column stood firm ; and even when the still increasing havoc at length overruled the punctilio of those brave men, it seemed to be in obedience to orders,

It ploughs  
through  
the  
enemy's  
reserves,  
and drives  
them from  
the field.

\* Kiriakoff says that these guns were dragged off by the men of the Borodino corps. I do not think that there were any observers on the knoll who saw guns dragged from the field by infantry ; but there were features in the ground which prevented their seeing into the line of retreat as effectually as they had seen into the batteries.

C H A P. and not under the stress of any confusing terror, that  
 XVI. the two great columns gave way. They retreated in  
 good order.

Our gunners then tried their pieces upon the Vladimir battalions, and although the range was too great to allow of their striking the column, they impressed Kvetzinski with a contrary belief. He was sure that these troops were reached by the guns on the knoll ; and it will be seen by-and-by that this his belief was one of the causes which helped to govern his movements.

This was the time when the great column of the Ouglitz corps, being fired, as it seemed, with a vehement spirit, was still marching down from the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill with a mind to support the Vladimir battalions, and enable them to press the retreat of our soldiery then coming down in clusters from the Great Redoubt ; but the disasters which Lord Raglan had that moment inflicted upon the enemy by the aid of the two guns on the knoll, made it natural for the Russian Generals, who saw what was done, to stop short in any forward movement. The Ouglitz column, as we before saw, was stopped in the midst of its eager advance ; and for want of the support which these troops had been going to lend, the triumphant Vladimir column was brought to a halt on the site of the Great Redoubt.

So here was the spell which now for several minutes had been governing the battle. The apparition of a score of plumed horsemen on this knoll may have had more or less to do with the resolve

The  
 Ouglitz  
 column  
 was  
 stopped  
 in its  
 advance.

So also  
 was the  
 Vladimir.

which led Kvetzinski to dismantle the Great Redoubt : but, at all events, this apparition, and the fire of Lord Raglan's two guns, had enforced the withdrawal of the Causeway batteries ; had laid open the entrance of the Pass ; had shattered the enemy's reserves ; had stopped the onward march of the Ouglitz battalions ; and had chained up the high-mettled Vladimir in the midst of its triumphant advance.

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## XXVIII.

On and near the great road leading down to the bridge Evans had been continuing his difficult struggle. He still shared with the flames the possession of the village—still held the vineyards below it ; and a part of his small force had succeeded, as already shown, in crossing the river, and establishing itself under the bank on the Russian side ; but beyond the ground thus gained Evans had not yet been able to push ; for the Causeway batteries were so well placed, and so diligently served, that they closed the mouth of the Pass.

Progress  
hitherto  
made by  
Evans.

The force around Evans was scant, but in other times he had commanded an army ; and whilst he watched the efforts of the only three battalions \* remaining near him, he was alive to the progress of the action in other parts of the field. He had just witnessed the onset of Codrington's brigade ; and he

\* The 47th, the 30th, and the 55th. The 95th, as we saw, was carried forward in the rush of Codrington's brigade, and Evans's second brigade (with the exception of the 47th Regiment) was in another part of the field.



C H A P.  
XVI.

He hears  
the guns  
from the  
knoll, and  
presently  
sees their  
effect  
upon the  
Causeway  
batteries.

was sitting in his saddle tormented with the grief of observing that, for want of supports, the storming of the Great Redoubt was likely to be all in vain, when suddenly he heard the report of a nine-pounder gun sounding from a very new quarter—sounding from somewhere among the knolls and broken ground on his right front, and in the heart of the Russian position. The fire was repeated. Evans keenly watched the Causeway batteries in his front. And not in vain, for again the nine-pounder was heard, and there followed that sort of change in the Russian batteries which seemed to show that they were under fire—under fire coming flankwise from the west. Again and again the fire of the nine-pounder was repeated. The sound came from a quarter to which it was to be expected that the French might have reached; but some, they say, fancied and said, ‘That is an English gun!’ A busy change began to stir in the Russian batteries. Presently, though the smoke of the burning village lay heavy in this part of the field, our people could make out what the change was. It was one of great moment to the Allies; for the enemy was limbering up, and beginning to carry off the sixteen guns which up to this minute had barred the mouth of the Pass. The great road lay open.

He at once  
advances.

Evans understood the battle. He acted instantly. He saw that though he was weak, yet the moment had come for the advance of his three battalions.

The 47th Regiment had to ford the river below the bridge, and at a part where the water was deep. It

encountered a good deal of difficulty in crossing. Some men were drowned, but the rest gained the bank on the Russian side of the stream and moved forward. Evans rode across the stream at a point between the 47th and Pennefather's brigade. C H A P.  
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Pennefather pressed forward. Colonel Hoey needed no order to advance. Understanding the business of war, he had already gained a lodgment for his battalion\* under the farther bank of the river, and he was plying the Russian artillerymen with rifle fire when he observed that the enemy's batteries suddenly slackened their fire. He inferred the change that was coming; and at once caused his men to spring up the bank, formed them carefully on the top, and then, having his battalion in a beautiful line, marched straight up towards the site of the Causeway batteries. Colonel Warren moved up his battalion† in the same direction.‡ The enemy had partly destroyed the bridge.§

From first to last the enemy, so far as I know, had done but little with the two formed battalions of his

\* The 30th Regiment.

† The 55th Regiment.

‡ Whilst the 55th was approaching the Alma, General Pennefather wished to form line; but after forming two or three groups which were immediately struck down by the enemy's shot, Pennefather allowed the 55th Regiment to follow Colonel Warren. Colonel Warren instantly crossed the river, and formed the regiment in line under cover of a spur or rising-ground at the base of the hills. When the line had been formed, it moved forward, General Pennefather leading in front. At that time the line of the 55th was parallel with the river.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

§ He imagined that his battalion of sappers and miners had destroyed it, but this was an error. Except to the parapet, which was removed, not much harm was done to the bridge.

C H A P. XVI. Borodino corps which had been posted in this part of the field ;\* and he now began to draw in the multi-

The enemy does not further resist this advance with his infantry.

tude of skirmishers which had hitherto swarmed in the valley.† He did not engage his infantry in further endeavours to bar the mouth of the Pass, nor even show one of his battalions in this part of the great road ; but upon the hillocks, a good way in rear of the ground just abandoned by the Causeway batteries, he again established his guns ; and from this new position, though not with great effect, he opened fire upon our advancing troops.

Evans, joined by Sir Richard England in person, now has with him thirty guns.

To this fire Evans was now able to reply with a strong force of artillery ; for Sir Richard England rode up, proposed to accompany him in the advance, and offered to place both his batteries at Evans's disposal. So the two divisional generals rode forward together, having with them altogether some thirty pieces of field-artillery.‡

Moreover, the Division of Sir Richard England was following him into the Pass, and would soon bring a welcome support to Evans's three battalions.§

\* General Kiriakoff says, as we have already mentioned, that the Borodino battalions dragged away the guns of the Causeway batteries, but I cannot find any other distinct statement of things done by the regiment in the course of the battle.

† Three battalions, it seems—viz., two out of the four Borodino battalions, and the No. 6 Rifle battalion—were employed as skirmishers.

‡ i.e., with the three batteries belonging respectively to the 1st, the 2d, and the Light Divisions.

§ Apparently Sir Richard England did not know of the disaster which befell the Scots Fusilier Guards in time to be able to adapt his measures to that event. Of course, if he had known it in time, he would have been anxious to put a literal interpretation upon the order 'to support the 'Guards,' and would have moved a part of his force towards the chasm

But some minutes elapsed before these supports could come up ; and, by reason of the disasters which had befallen our soldiery at the Great Redoubt, the three battalions which Evans had with him were for some time almost alone upon the enemy's ground. Yet not utterly ; for, on the western slope of the Kourganè Hill, one English battalion—Lacy Yea, with his 7th Fusiliers—was still holding its ground, still engaged with a mass of the enemy's infantry. That stand that Lacy Yea had been making was a hinge on which a good deal might turn. If he should hold his ground a few minutes more, he would cover from the enemy's masses the left flank and left front of Evans's three battalions, and at the end of that time the supports would be up. Evans was an old commander, who knew how to read the signs of a battle, and he was able to see and understand that the enemy, almost in the very moment of his success at the Great Redoubt, was palsied by the guns still sounding from the knoll, and was losing his freedom of action. He resolved to stand firm in the Pass ; and he established his thirty guns near the site of the batteries which had just been withdrawn by the

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XVI.

Sir  
Richard  
England's  
disposi-  
tions for  
bringing  
support  
to Evans.

Evans's  
situation  
in the  
mean time.

which had been wrought in the centre of the brigade of Guards. I took pains to make out the exact movements of the 3d Division, but in vain ; for those who would be the most likely to know differ broadly the one from the other. By further trouble I might have dispelled this obscurity ; but the Division was not engaged to an extent greater than might be inferred from its losses (one killed and seventeen wounded), and therefore I have desisted from further endeavours. It may be safely said, however, that after receiving the order to support the Guards, Sir Richard England held his Division in hand, sending portions of it to give support where he deemed it to be needed ; and that when Pennefather's brigade crossed the river it was followed by the whole or by the bulk of the 3d Division.

**C H A P.** Russians. For some minutes his position was rather  
**XVI.** critical ; and he had to trust much to the hope that  
 Lacy Yea and his Fusiliers would be able to hold  
 their ground.

## XXIX.

Protracted  
 fight  
 between  
 the 7th  
 Fusiliers  
 and the  
 left Kazan  
 column.

It was between the Great Causeway and the slopes of the Kourganè Hill that Lacy Yea, with his 7th Fusiliers, had long been maintaining an obstinate conflict. Long ago, as we saw, he had crossed the river, had brought his men to the top of the bank, and was trying to form them, when there came down marching upon him a strong Russian column—a column of two battalions, and numbering 1500 men. These battalions belonged to the corps which was sometimes called the Regiment of the Grand Duke Michael, and more often the Regiment of Kazan. Like the English corps to which they stood opposed, these battalions were ‘Fusiliers.’\* Soon the column was halted.

It was then that, for the first time in that war, the soldiery of the Western Powers were brought so near to a body of Russian troops as to be able to scrutinise its material. The men of the column were of high stature and strictly upright, with broad, plain, whitish faces, all seemingly cast in a common mould, and very similar the one to the other. The long grey over-coat, worn alike by all the officers and men of

\* The English MS. translation from the Russian original on which I founded this statement, spoke of the Kazan battalions as ‘Fusiliers ;’ but I believe that this was an error, and that the word should have been translated ‘Chasseurs.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

the Russian forces, and reaching down to the ankles, gave no clue to distinguish this mass from any other of the Czar's battalions ; but spiked helmets, glittering with burnished plates of brass, led some of the English to imagine that the column formed part of the Emperor's guard.\* The body was formed with great precision in close column, with a front of only one company ; but a chain of skirmishers thrown out on either flank in prolongation of the front rank, sought to combine with the solid formation of the column some of the advantages of an array in line.† The steady men were in the front and on the flanks of the column ; and the constant firing in the air which went on in the interior of the solid battalions showed that that was the place assigned to the young soldiers. The column stood halted at a distance of, perhaps, some fifty yards from the knotted chain of soldiery which represented the 7th Fusiliers.

Lacy Yea was so rough an enforcer of discipline that he had never been much liked in peace-time by those who had to obey him ; but when once the 7th Fusiliers were in campaign, and still more when they came to be engaged with the enemy, they found

\* The notion was ill-founded, there being none of the Imperial Guard in the Crimea. I supposed at one time that the helmet imported the presence of heavy infantry, and that the flat round forage-cap with which Crimea men are so familiar denoted a light-infantry regiment. This, however, is not, it seems, the case. The regiment of Kazan was a light-infantry regiment.

† The advantages of this hybrid formation were strongly urged about the middle of the last century by General Lloyd, an Englishman. General Lloyd was an officer in the service of Russia, and it seems probable that the formation of which he was a vehement advocate may have been adopted in the Russian service in consequence of his advice.

**C H A P.** that their chief was a man who could and would  
**XVI.** seize for his regiment all such chances of welfare and glory as might come with the fortune of war. Before many months were over, they learnt that although other regiments might be dying of want, yet, by force of their Colonel's strong will, there was food and warmth to be got for the 7th Fusiliers; and still sooner they came to know that the fiery nature of their chief was the quality which would help them to have dominion over the enemy. Thenceforth the strong man was a king beloved by his people.

Lacy Yea had not time to put his Fusiliers in their wonted array, for the enemy's column was so near that, forthwith and at the instant, it was necessary to ply it with fire; but what man could do, he did. His very shoulders so laboured and strove with the might of his desire to form line, that the curt red shell-jacket he wore was as though it were a world too scant for the strength of the man and the passion that raged within him; but when he turned, his dark eyes yielded fire, and all the while from his deep-chiselled, merciless lips, there pealed the thunder of imprecation and command. Wherever the men had got clustered together, there, fiercely coming, he wedged his cob into the thick of the crowd—the 'rooge,' he would call it, in his old Eton idiom of speech—and by dint of will tore it asunder. Though he could not form an even array, yet he disentangled the thickest clusters of the soldiery, and forced the men to open out into a lengthened chain, approaching

to line formation. Numbers of the Fusiliers were wanting, and, on the other hand, there were mingled with the battalion many of the soldiery of other regiments. With a force in this state, Yea was not in a condition to attempt a charge or any other combined movement. All he could hope to be able to do was to keep his people firm on their ground, to hinder them from contracting their front or gathering into heavy clusters, and then leave every man to make the best use he could of his rifle.

Continental generals would not easily believe that, upon fair, open ground, there could be a doubtful conflict between, on the one side, a body of fifteen hundred brave, steady, disciplined soldiers, superbly massed in close column, and on the other a loose knotted chain of six or seven hundred light-infantry men without formation. Yet the fight was not so unequal as it seemed. A close column of infantry has only small means of offence, and is itself a thing so easy to hurt that every volley it receives from steady troops must load it with corpses and wounded men. Tested strictly in that way—tested strictly by its small means of hurting people, and the ease with which it can be hurt—the close column is a weak thing to fight with ; and yet it has power over the troops of most nations, because its grandeur well fits it for weighing upon the imaginations of men.

But Lacy Yea and his islanders were not so fashioned by nature, nor so tamed down by much learning, as to be liable to be easily coerced in any subtle, metaphysical way ; and although the shots of



**C H A P.**  
**XVI**  
individual soldiers and small knots of men had not, of course, the crushing power which would have been exerted by the fire of the 7th Fusiliers when formed and drawn up in line, still, the well-handled rifles of our men soon began to carry havoc into the dark-grey oblong mass of living beings which served them for their easy target. And though, seemingly, the front rank of the compact mass yearned to move forward, there was always occurring in the interior some sudden death or some trouble with a wounded man, which seemed not only to breed difficulty in the way of an advance, but also to make the column here and there begin to look spotted and faulty. The distance was such as to allow of a good deal of shooting at particular men. Once, Yea himself found that he was singled out to be killed, and was covered by a musket or rifle; but the marksman was so fastidious about his aim that, before he touched the trigger, a quick-eyed English corporal found time to intervene and save his colonel's life, by shooting the careful Russian in the midst of his studies. 'Thank you, my man,' said Lacy Yea; 'if I live through this you shall be a sergeant to-night.'

Whilst this long fight went on, it sometimes happened that the fire and impatience of one or other of the Fusiliers would carry a man into closer quarters with the column. Of those who were spurred by sudden impulses of this kind, Monck was one. He sprang forward, they say, from his place on the left of the Fusiliers, and saying, 'Come on, 8th com-

‘pany!’ rushed up to the enemy’s massed battalions, ran his sword through a man in the front rank, and struck another with his fist. He was then shot dead by a musket fired from the second rank of the column. Personal enterprises of this kind were incidents varying the tenor of the fight; but it was by musket or rifle ball at the distance of some fifty yards that the real strife between the two corps was waged.

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It was not always against the enemy that Lacy Yea was labouring. He came to know or imagine that some of his Fusiliers had remained behind in the valley finding base shelter. That this should be, and that even for a few minutes this should pass, was to him not tolerable; and in the fiercest heat of his strife with the column, one of his best officers was sent back that he might turn the drove out of their sheds, and force them to come instantly into the presence of the enemy,—into the presence, more terrible still, of their raging colonel.

The fight lasted. When Codrington’s people were scarce beginning their rush towards the face of the Great Redoubt, the 7th Fusiliers—rudely and hastily gathered, but contriving to hold together—were beginning this battle of their own. When the storming battalions came down, the regiment was fighting still. When the despondency of the French army was at its worst—when the head of Canrobert’s Division was pushed back down the hill by the ‘column of the eight battalions’—when, along the whole line of the Allies, there was no other regiment

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fighting—Lacy Yea and his people were still at their work. When Evans, having crossed the river, was leading his three battalions to the site of the Causeway batteries, it was the 7th Fusiliers that stood fighting alone on his left; and nearly at the very time when disaster befell the centre of the brigade of Guards, Lacy Yea and his Fusiliers were gathering at last the reward of their soldierly virtue.

For by this time death and wounds, making cavities and compelling small changes in the great living mass, had injured the symmetry of the spruce Russian column. As a piece of mechanism, it was no longer what it had been when the fight began, but the spirit of the brave and obedient men who composed it was still high. The cohesion of the mass was not yet destroyed; but it was endangered, and had come to depend very much upon the personal exertions of officers.

Lacy Yea observed that every now and then, when a part of the column was becoming faulty, a certain man, always on foot, but of vast towering stature, would stride quickly to the defective spot, and exert so great an ascendancy, that steadiness and order seemed always to be restored by his presence. The grey over-coat common to all shrouded the rank of every Russian officer; and since this man was not on horseback, there was nothing to disclose his station in the corps save the power which he seemed to wield. What its colonel was to the 7th Fusiliers, that the big man seemed to be to the Russian column; and it was not, I think, without a kind of sympathy with

him—it was not, one would believe, without a manly reluctance—that Yea ordered his people to shoot the tall man. He did, however, so order; and he was quickly obeyed. The tall man dropped dead, and when he had fallen there was no one who seemed to be the like of him in power.

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The issue of this long fight of the Fusiliers was growing to be a thing of so great moment, or else the sight of it was become so heating, that Prince Gortschakoff now resolved to take part in it bodily. So, deputing Colonel Issakoff, then acting as his Chief of the Staff, to represent him in his absence, he rode down to the column and strove to lead it on to a charge with the bayonet.\* But he could do nothing; for, because of the disorder already beginning, and the loss of great numbers of its officers, the heart was nearly out of the column.† So, giving orders for the

\* This statement is founded, as will be seen below, upon a narrative written by Prince Gortschakoff himself; but it interested me to hear, as I lately did from an officer in the 7th Fusiliers, a statement coinciding exactly (so far as it goes) with the Prince's narrative. Sir Thomas Troubridge, who was the Major commanding the right wing of the 7th Fusiliers, told me he remembers that after the fight between the column and the 7th Fusiliers had been going on a long time, he saw a horseman, with some mounted followers—evidently, as he conceived, a General and his Staff—ride down and join the column.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† What Prince Gortschakoff says is this: 'I first rode towards the 'chasseurs' (meaning the Kazan troops), 'who were standing firm 'under a very heavy fire, although losing a large amount of men. I first 'tried to lead them on (à la baionette), but finding that they could not 're-form immediately for a charge, and had lost nearly all their officers, 'I left them with orders to continue their feu de bataillons.'—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

When Prince Gortschakoff had ridden off, the column was subjected, as I now know, to this further stress: Colonel Warren, with the 55th extended in line—a regiment belonging to Evans's Division—was ad-

**C H A P.** battalions to keep up their fire, he rode away to his  
**XVI.** right, and left the column still engaged with Yea  
and his Fusiliers.

Portions of the column—mainly those in the centre and in the rear—became discomposed and unsettled. Numbers of men moved a little one way or another, and of these, some looked as though they stepped a pace backwards ; but no man as yet turned round to face the rear. However, though the movement of each soldier taken singly was trifling and insignificant, yet even that little displacement of many men at the same time was shaking the structure. Plainly, the men must be ceasing to feel that the column they stood in was solid. The ranks which had been straight as arrows became bent any wavy.

The Russian officers well understood these signs. With drawn swords, moving hither and thither as actively as they could in their long, grey, melancholy coats, they seemed to become loud and vehement with their orders, their entreaties, their threats. Presently their gestures grew violent, and more than one officer was seen to go and seize a wavering soldier by the throat. But in vain ; for seemingly by some law of its own nature, rather than under any new

vancing up the Pass when he saw on his left front the column which was engaged with the 7th Fusiliers. Colonel Warren instantly caused his regiment to bring forward their right shoulders, and in fact to wheel upon their centre, very much as a company wheels. This manœuvre was performed under fire from the column, and the change of front was carried to the length of bringing the battalion into a line almost perpendicular to the line of its former front, and almost parallel with the flanks of the Russian column. When the manœuvre was complete, the 55th opened fire upon the flank of the Russian column.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

stress of external force, the column began to dissolve; the hard mass became fluid. It still cohered; but what had been, as it were, the outlines of a wall, were becoming like the outlines of a cloud. First some, then more, then all, turned round. Moving slowly, and as though discontent with its fate, the column began to fall back.\*

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Defeat  
of the  
column.

The 7th Fusiliers bought this triumph with blood. In killed and wounded it lost twelve officers and more than two hundred men. Monck, we before saw, was killed; and Hare,† Watson, Fitzgerald, Persse, Appleyard, Coney, Crofton, Carpenter, and Jones, were wounded.‡ For some time one of the colours of the regiment was missing, but it did not at any time fall into the hands of the enemy. It was safe in the charge of some soldiers belonging to the Royal Welsh.§

A regimental officer engaged in a general action cannot often at the time compute the relative importance of the duty which he is performing; but

\* It seems that, at the moment when the discomfiture of the column became evident, the 55th received orders (probably from General Pennefather) to 'cease firing and charge.' Thereupon the officers went forward in front, 'stopping the firing,' and meanwhile the column gliding off, and afterwards betaking itself to a more rapid retreat, escaped a good deal of the slaughter which would have been inflicted upon it if the fire of the 55th had not been stayed by the order to charge.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Hare died of his wounds a few hours after the battle.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ Add to this list of wounded, Lieutenant Hibberd and Adjutant Hobson.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

§ The colour, I believe, was found lying upon the ground, but how that came to happen I do not know, and I have not thought it necessary to find out, because the colour was never for a moment 'lost.'

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on the morrow after the battle, or even perhaps much later, he may learn that the fortune of the day was hinging upon the conduct of his single regiment. Lacy Yea was a simple-hearted, straight-going man, with a wholesome ardour for fighting, and a great care for the honour and welfare of his regiment, but not looking far beyond it. Around him the battle had been flowing and ebbing. With the watching of those changes he did not much vex his mind—he hardly, perhaps, remarked them. He was too busy with the fight to be able to contemplate the battle. Except when he yearned to unearth the people whom he believed to be skulking, and to have them dragged before him, he thought of nothing but that the corps he commanded should stand fighting and fighting till it got the victory. He went through with his resolve, and hardly knew at the time the full worth of his constancy. He hardly knew that, whilst he fought, the whole of the English front line—first on his left hand and then on his right—had been getting the support it grievously needed from the tenacity of his 7th Fusiliers.\*

\* See Plan. When Codrington's people were storming the redoubt, they were covered on their right by the fight which Yea was there maintaining; when they had to fall back, it was still that stand of the Fusiliers which covered their flank. When Evans advanced with his three battalions, there was nothing but the 7th Fusiliers to cover his left.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

It has been declared that no such fight as is above described took place; that the 7th Fusiliers was not separately engaged with any Russian column on the day of the Alma; and that, far from maintaining, and maintaining victoriously, the struggle which I have described, this 7th

It was plainly right that the defeated column should be pressed in its retreat by troops in a state of formation ; and Yea, looking back, perceived that the Guards were now at hand. Troubridge went to the Grenadiers—saw one of its officers—told him of the defeat of the Russian column, and of the condition of the 7th Fusiliers—and asked whether it would not be well that the Grenadier Guards should come up and clinch the defeat of the retiring column. Colonel Hood was referred to, and he at once consented to do as was proposed.

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It is arranged that the defeated column is to be pressed by the Grenadier Guards.

Sir George Brown—his grey so wounded that men saw the blood from afar—now chanced to ride to the part of the hill-side where Troubridge was passing. After telling him of the defeat of the Russian column, and of the state of the 7th Fusiliers, Troubridge asked him whether the Fusiliers should go on, or allow the Guards to pass them.\*

Sir George said, ‘ Let the Guards go on. Collect your men, and afterwards resume the advance.’

Fusiliers fell back in the midst of the fight, retreating through the Grenadier Guards. This notion has been propounded—not by a common gatherer of the many contradictory stories which battles are apt to breed, but—by General Sir George Brown, the officer commanding the Division to which the 7th Fusiliers belonged. Under these circumstances, I have thought it right to give in the Appendix (Note No. III.), first, a copy of the statement on this subject which is understood to be based on Sir George Brown’s instructions, and then the series of proofs by which I undertake to refute it.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* At this time, and whilst he was still speaking with Sir George Brown, Troubridge observed the sight which will be referred to in a future page, as fixing the order in which events followed one another in different parts of the field.



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## XXX.

State of  
the field  
in this  
part of the  
Russian  
position.

When it was nearly abreast of the Great Redoubt, the column just defeated by Lacy Yea's Fusiliers was able to rally and again show a front to the English;\* for it had on its right the great Vladimir column, which still stood halted near the parapet of the Great Redoubt. On the right rear of the Vladimir men there was a double-battalion column, formed out of the Kazan corps.† On the right of that last column, but still further held back, there was another double-battalion column, formed of the Sousdal corps; and next to these, but much more in advance, and standing on the extreme right of the whole of the Russian infantry, there were posted the two remaining battalions of the Sousdal corps. Somewhere in this part of the field, but operating, it would seem, as skirmishers, and not perhaps bringing any very material accession of strength, there were the two battalions of sailors. As an immediate reserve, or rather as a support for all these forces, the four Ouglitz battalions were kept in hand on the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and were still, as before, massed in column. At some distance on the extreme right of the Russian position, the enemy's cavalry stood posted as before, confronting from afar, but never

\* After their defeat, the two battalions which composed the column seem to have parted from one another. The two bodies into which it resolved itself remained, bravely lingering on the hill-side, though, having lost most of their officers, they were in a helpless condition.

† The column defeated by the 19th Regiment, and by some of the men of the 23d.

provoking, the horsemen of our Light Brigade. After allowing for casualties, and especially for the heavy losses sustained by the column which engaged our 7th Fusiliers, it may be conjectured that these Russian forces on the Kourganè Hill amounted to some 15,000 men. Except the Kazan battalions, none of these troops had been hitherto engaged in hard fighting, for the triumphant Vladimir column had not yet encountered formed troops. Nearly all the Russian artillery had been taken away from the front, and, except that there were five pieces of ordnance not yet withdrawn from the Lesser Redoubt, the enemy had no guns now remaining in battery. The impending struggle was a fight—a sheer fight—of infantry.

The advance of the Guards had an ill beginning. We saw that, whilst the Grenadiers and the Coldstream were still forming under the bank or completing their passage of the river, the centre battalion of the brigade—the battalion called the ‘Scots Fusilier Guards’—had been hurried forward by the appeal from the troops then still clinging to the redoubt, had incurred the fire of the Vladimir column, and had afterwards encountered a heap of our men retreating, which broke the formation of its left companies by sheer bodily force, and compelled them to fall back in disorder. The remnant of the battalion thus maimed was at the moment without support; for directly in its rear there were no formed troops coming up, and of the two battalions on its right hand and on its left, neither one nor the other

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The Scots  
Fusilier  
Guards  
advance  
up the  
slope.

Disaster  
which  
befell its  
left com-  
panies.

CHAP. XVI. had hitherto come up abreast of it. On the other hand, the force to which the remnant of this English battalion stood opposed was that majestic Vladimir column which had just been driving our light infantry men from the parapet of the redoubt. Numbering, perhaps, some four or five hundred men, these remains of what had been the centre battalion of the Guards stood drawn up in line upon a smooth, open slope, and were met by a hitherto victorious column, which was nearly three thousand strong. Still, for some time the maimed battalion pushed forward, and when, afterwards, it came to a halt, a hard effort was made to hold the ground,—but in vain. Either the overwhelming weight of the column in its front, or the mishap encountered by the left companies of the English battalion, or some other cause of evil, had destroyed its principle of cohesion; for this right wing now followed the fate of the left one, got into disorder, and fell back.\* For a time the whole battalion of the Scots Fusilier Guards was in confusion near the bank of the river.†

Situation  
in which  
the rem-  
nant of the  
battalion  
stood.

It falls  
back in  
disorder.

\* But the immediate cause which brought about the retreat of this small and disordered body of men was, after all, the word of command. See the more detailed account given in the Appendix, Note IV. The state of increased disorder into which the battalion fell was not before, but *after* the delivery of the command to retire. The retreat of the Fusilier Guards was pressed, but not with great vigour, by Russian skirmishers pushing forward in advance of the Vladimir column; and the column itself was tempted, as it were, by the movement of retreat, to come down below the redoubt, and advance in pursuit. Colonel Hood, who was on the immediate right of the Fusilier Guards, speaks of them as ‘beaten back, and pursued.’ Private letter, 21st September 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition*

† The main part of the battalion was rallied upon ground just in

This disaster, and the hard struggle maintained by those who sought to avert it, inflicted loss upon the Scots Fusilier Guards. Lord Chewton and 3 sergeants were killed. Colonel Dalrymple, Colonel Berkeley, Colonel Hepburn, Colonel Haygarth, Astley, Bulwer, Buckley, Gipps, Lord Ennismore, and Hugh Annesley,\* and 13 sergeants, were wounded; and

advance of the road which runs parallel with the bank of the river. Judging from the French map, this road would seem to be about 150 yards above the water's edge; and that space, therefore, would about represent the distance between the river and the ground on which the main part of the battalion was rallied.—*End of Note to 3d Edition.*

In this note I have ventured to say that the main part of the battalion of the Fusilier Guards was rallied *in advance of the road running parallel with the river*. The 'Quarterly Review,' however, in an article written with the aid of instructions from Sir George Brown, has made the following statement: 'The men of the Light Division who had 'been driven out of the Redan *were lying in an irregular line with the Fusilier Guards under the bank.*' That, for some little time after the check they had sustained, many of the men of the Fusilier Guards were lingering about under the bank, I have never doubted; but it is new to me to hear that, taken as a whole, the centre battalion of the Guards—the 'Quarterly Review' calls the body, simply without subtraction or qualification, 'the Fusilier Guards'—was content to be deliberately lying down under the bank at this period of the battle, and there joining with the light-infantry men in keeping up 'a heavy fire upon the space 'between themselves and the work.' If this passage is an accurate representation of Sir George Brown's assertion, Sir George is at variance with every one of the officers who have spoken to me on the subject. Deliberately, and in a careful detailed way, Colonel (now General) Ridley has assured me that, immediately after the check sustained by the battalion of the Fusilier Guards, it was rallied and re-formed under his own eyes in advance of the road above spoken of, and that thenceforth it took part in the advance of the Guards without afterwards retreating a step, and, of course, without afterwards falling back under the bank. General Ridley's statement tallies perfectly with the report which H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge addressed to Headquarters the day next but one after the battle, for the Duke there says that the Fusilier Guards re-formed '*with the greatest alacrity.*' Holograph MS. Report of the 22d September 1854, by H.R.H.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* It happened to me afterwards to see and wonder at the high cour-

CHAP. of the rank and file 17 were killed and 137  
 XVI. wounded.\*

The Grenadier Guards ascend to the top of the bank, and there dress their ranks under fire.

When Colonel Hood consented to move forward his battalion against the column just defeated by Lacy Yea, he at once caused his men to ascend the bank which had hitherto sheltered it ;† and as soon

age and composure with which Annesley bore his dreadful wound. A musket-shot had entered his jaw, and passed, tearing its way through the mouth. The wound was of such a kind that it seemed as though nothing but death could be of use to him. Yet he was not only uncomplaining, but able to think and act for others.

\* Some of the officers who were pained by the above account of the operations of the Scots Fusilier Guards, did me the honour to request an interview with me, in order that they might have an opportunity of submitting to me their view of the matter. I was of course most ready to accede to this request, and some interviews accordingly took place. With much care we went together over the passages in question, discussing them, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, and sometimes almost word by word. The result was that, at the close of the discussion, those who had been the most pained by the narrative did not at all maintain that any one sentence was wrong, but they stated to me many *additional* facts which they thought it would be well for the repute of the regiment to have stated. They, in short, seemed to think that an account upon a somewhat larger scale than the one I had adopted would put the conduct of the battalion in a better light. I gladly acceded to this view, and the 3d edition gave the new facts which had been imparted to me in notes at the foot of the page ; but it now occurs to me that I shall still better carry out the object in view if, instead of breaking up the additional matter into several footnotes, I put into a connected form the more minute narrative which I am now enabled to give. Accordingly, this more minute narrative will be found in the Appendix, Note No. IV. I think it will be found that the difference between the account here appearing, and the account appearing in the Appendix, is a difference resulting entirely, or almost entirely, from the difference of the scale.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Colonel Hood had not failed to seize the precious opportunity which was offered to his battalion by the sheltering steepness of the bank. In a private letter he writes: ‘ Under the steep bank of the river, we ‘ closed in to our centre ; and to this manœuvre our after-success was ‘ mainly attributable.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

as the battalion was on the top, its left wing began to incur a good deal of the fire of the Vladimir column. Burgoyne, carrying one of the colours, was wounded; and the charge of the colours then devolving on Lieutenant Robert Hamilton, he also in the next minute was struck down by shot; but he quickly rose from the ground, recovered his hold of the standard, and was able to carry it to the end of the battle. Under this fire, the battalion dressed its ranks with precision, and marched forward in beautiful order.\* This it kept till its left wing encountered some of the clusters of men coming down from the Great Redoubt. Then, as we saw before, the battalion opened its ranks for the passage of the retreating soldiery, and afterwards formed up anew.† This done, it marched on.

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Their  
march up  
the slope.

Meanwhile, General Codrington had been labouring to bring together the remnant of his brigade. Sergeant O'Connor of the 23d still bore the colour which he had been carrying with loving care through the worst stress of the fight.‡ The missing colour of the 7th Fusiliers, now committed to the honour of the 23d, was borne by Captain Pearson. Around these two standards Codrington rallied such men as he could gather, and made them open out and

Codrington rallies some of the men of the Light Division, and proposes to place them in the interval left by the centre battalion of the Guards.

\* 'We formed in perfect and compact order on the top of the bank, and then advanced steadily up the intrenched position.' Colonel Hood, private letter.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† 'Our 6th and 7th companies opened out to let them pass, and closed up as coolly as if in Hyde Park.' Colonel Hood, private letter.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ Notwithstanding his wound. See *ante*.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

CHAP. form line two deep. The body thus formed num-  
 XVI. bered about 300 men, and Codrington was going to move it forward and place it on the left of the Grenadier Guards, in order to fill up a part of the chasm\* which had been wrought in the Household Brigade by the discomfiture of its centre battalion.† But it occurred to him—for he was himself a Guardsman, and he knew the feelings of the corps—that to place soldiers of the line abreast of the Grenadiers, and in the room of the broken regiment, might give pain to a battalion of the Guards; so he sent to the Grenadiers to know if they would like troops to come up to fill the empty space. The answer was a proud one. It was also, perhaps, a rash answer;‡ for the Vladimir column—vast and strong, with a sense of the power it had just put forth—was impending over the left front of the Grenadiers, and confronting the interval which the defeat of the centre battalion left empty. However, the answer was ‘No!’ and the

His  
proposal  
rejected  
by the  
Grenadier  
Guards.

\* Of course it is not intended that this word ‘chasm’ (which occurs in several places) should be taken as indicating that the Scots Fusilier Guards were not on the ground, but merely that, for the moment, the main body of the battalion had lost its formation, and was re-forming upon an alignment very little in rear of that on which the Grenadiers were standing.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† The Scots Fusilier Guards. See *ante*, p. 436.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

The term ‘Household Brigade’ is so habitually applied to the Household *Cavalry*, that although the three battalions of Guards at the Alma were ‘Household’ battalions, and although they formed a ‘brigade,’ it would have been better to avoid the expression used in the text.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ It would be so, if the emergency was one in which three or four hundred men, hastily gathered from several broken regiments, were likely to do good. Upon the contrary supposition, the answer, of course, was a wise one.

Grenadiers, with their left flank stark open, but in beautiful order, contentedly marched up the slope.\*

A little later, and at a moment when the Grenadiers were halted on the slope, with the Vladimir column impending over their left flank, Major Home of the 95th, and an ensign of the same corps, came bearing the colours of their regiment, and having with them eight men. Home, accosting Colonel Hamilton, who commanded the left wing of the Grenadiers, said that the eight men then following the colours of the 'Derbyshire' were all that remained together, and that he wished to take part with the Grenadiers in continuing the fight. Colonel Hamilton, assenting, told Home to fall in on the left of the Grenadiers. Afterwards, other men of the 'Derbyshire' came up and joined their colours. A few moments later Colonel Berkeley† came up, bringing with him a company of the Scots Fusilier Guards,

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Continued  
advance of  
the 1st  
Division.

After-  
wards  
some men  
of the  
95th Regi-  
ment, and  
a rallied  
company  
of the  
Scots  
Fusilier  
Guards,  
come and  
advance  
on the left  
of the  
Grena-  
diers.

\* It was in disobedience to the contingent orders he had received that Colonel Hood thus advanced with the Grenadiers. In his journal he writes: 'Last order received by me was from Captain Fielding, 'Brigade-Major (when battalion was lying down under cannonade and 'shelling)—"The Brigadier desires you to conform to any movements "on your left." ' Now the movement on Colonel Hood's left, to which, by the words of General Bentinck's orders, he thus found himself told to conform, was the retreat of the Fusilier Guards. In other words, there had occurred an event which placed Colonel Hood under orders to retire. Therefore it was that, immediately after the sentence above quoted, he wrote in his journal these words: 'Thank God, I disobeyed!!! Advanced steadily in line.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† It seems that Colonel Dalrymple was the officer whose name should have here appeared, instead of that of Colonel Berkeley, who, it seems, was wounded. Colonel Dalrymple, from the first, had kept the right-flank company together, and now, with General Bentinck's sanction, he formed it on the left of the Grenadiers.—*End of Note to 2d Edition.*

It is still maintained by an eyewitness that the text as it stands is



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which he had been able to rally, and he also was requested to place himself on the left of the Grenadiers.

The Cold-  
stream.

On the left of the Grenadiers, there was that chasm which had been wrought in the brigade of Guards by the defeat of its centre battalion ; and on the left of the chasm there stood the ‘ Coldstream.’ This battalion of the Guards confronted the centre and right of the great Vladimir column, and was drawn up in line with beautiful precision. Because of the position of the ground on which it advanced, it had been much less exposed to fire and mishaps than either of the other battalions of the brigade ; and it had not been pressed forward, as each of the two other battalions had been, to meet any especial emergency occurring on its front. Therefore it was that it fell to the lot of the Coldstream to become an almost prim sample of what our Guards can be in the moment which precedes a close fight. What the best of battalions is, when, in some Royal Park at home, it manœuvres before a great princess, that the Coldstream was now on the banks of the Alma, when it came to show its graces to the enemy. And it was no ignoble pride which caused the battalion to maintain all this ceremonious exactness ; for though it be true that the precision of a line in peace-time is only a success in mechanics, the precision of a line on a hill-side with the enemy close in front is the result and the proof of a warlike composure. And it ought to be

right ; but if it is true that Berkeley brought up some men of the Scots Fusiliers, it is certain that Colonel Dalrymple did the like with his company.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

remembered—though our knowledge of the final result makes it hard to go back into the dark, trying dimly to measure the worth of deeds done in the hour of trial—it ought to be remembered that the undertaking of the troops in this part of the field was not an undertaking to swell the tide of victory, but to retrieve a disaster.

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Happily, it is then, just then, after the discomfiture of troops in front, that English soldiery advancing in support attain their highest glory; for by nature they are so constituted, that the misfortune of their comrades carries no alarm into their ranks. It only heats their blood, rousing, as it seems, a sentiment akin to anger; and when they have thus been wrought upon, they are sterner men for a foe to have to do with than they are when all has gone well.

The temper of English soldiery advancing in support after a check sustained by their comrades.


The Duke of Cambridge was with this battalion, for its left was nearly in the centre of the troops over which his command extended. With it, also, there was a visitor, whose presence showed the strength of the tie between the officer and his regiment. Colonel Steele had broken loose from his duty at Headquarters, and was riding with his own beloved ‘Coldstream.’\*

Further to the left, and in the same formation, the three battalions of the Highland Brigade were extended. But the 42d had found less difficulty than the 93d in getting through the thick ground and the river, and, again, the 93d had found less difficulty than the 79th; so, as each regiment had been formed and moved forward with all the speed it

Advance of the Highland Brigade.

\* He was military secretary to Lord Raglan.

C H A P. could command, the brigade fell naturally into di-  
XVI. rect échelon of regiments, the 42d in front. And



although this order was occasioned by the nature of the ground traversed and not by design, it was so well suited to the work in hand that Sir Colin Campbell did not for a moment seek to change it.

These young soldiers, distinguished to the vulgar eye by their tall stature, their tartan uniforms, and the plumes of their Highland bonnets, were yet more marked in the eyes of those who know what soldiers are by the warlike carriage of the men, and their strong, lithesome, resolute step. And Sir Colin Campbell was known to be so proud of them, that already, like the Guards, they had a kind of prominence in the army, which was sure to make their bearing in action a broad mark for blame or for praise.

The two  
battalions  
remaining  
with  
General  
Buller.

From the time when General Buller had judged it right to abstain from bringing his force to the support of his comrades in the Great Redoubt, the two battalions which remained under his control had stood halted near the bank of the river, and one of them, the 88th, was still formed in a hollow square, as though expecting a charge of cavalry. Sir Colin Campbell conceived that this attitude of the 88th was unsuited to the time and the place, and, not know-

ing that General Buller in person was directing the regiment, Sir Colin, in some anger, took upon himself to request, nay, almost to command, that the hollow square should be instantly changed into line-formation. When the ranks of the Highlanders came up to this part of the ground, and still went on continuing their advance, a man of one of the halted regiments—a man speaking perhaps in a coarse cynic spirit, perhaps in the deep, honest bitterness of his heart—cried out, ‘Let the Scotchmen go on! they’ll do the work!’ Then the Highlanders marched through, leaving General Buller and his two battalions in their rear.

C H A P.  
XVI.

\* ‘The brigade of Guards will be destroyed,’ said

\* When the incident now about to be narrated took place, the state of things in this part of the field was as follows:—The 88th, whilst still formed in square, was retreating, and the 77th, though extended in line, was also falling back. Whilst this was the condition of the troops under Buller, the soldiery who had been forced to relinquish the redoubt were spread along the lower part of the slope firing powerless shots towards the earthwork. It seemed to Sir Colin Campbell that this discomfiture of Sir George Brown’s troops was fast involving the fate of the battle, and that it was a thing of great need to show, and to show at the very instant, a steady and well-formed battalion ranged frank and fair on the slope. With this intent he was carrying forward the 42d, and placing it in advance of the alignment which the Coldstream was taking up on his right. The 42d had just been taking ground to its left, and was still in the formation which had been resorted to for effecting the change—that is, it was in open column of companies, ‘right in front,’ and facing westwards, but was preparing to wheel into line. So far as concerned all this part of the field, the fight was in its crisis. The Staff of the 1st Division were near the left, or left front of the Coldstream, and not far from the ground where the grenadier company of the 42d stood ranged. It was then that there occurred the incident described in the text.—*End of Note to 3d Edition.*

An officer of the Coldstream informs me, of what I certainly did not

C H A P. one adviser ; and he asked whether it ought not to  
 XVI. fall back a little in order to recover its formation ?

Suggestion  
 that the  
 Guards  
 should fall  
 back in  
 order to  
 re-form.

These words were spoken by an officer not holding any high rank,\* and they owe their whole importance to the answer which they elicited and the propulsion which thereupon followed.

He who answered the question† was a veteran soldier, and it was with a deference no less wise than

know before, namely, that an order ‘to retire’ passed along the line of his battalion, and that the buglers, too, sounded ‘the retire.’ With the information which I at present possess, I must decline to speak of this order as one which came from an authentic source ; but that it passed along the line in the way above described I am unable to doubt. The order, however, was met by the battalion with loud and general cries of ‘No ! no ! —it must be a mistake !’ ‘Retire !—No ! no !’ This popular opposition to the notion of retiring was probably reinforced (though I have not yet heard the fact stated) by proper orders from the divisional general, for the Duke of Cambridge was present in person with this battalion. At all events the opposition was completely successful, for the battalion kept its ground, and did not, as I believe, make any the least movement in retreat. It is true that, in his journal, Colonel Hood (who commanded the Grenadier Guards) wrote : ‘Scots Fusiliers and Coldstream !!—retired by command !’ but he was mistaken in supposing that the retreating movement which he observed on his left extended so far as to include the Coldstream. The Coldstream was not advancing at the moment, but it did not retire.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* I foresee that what I here say as to the obscure rank of the officer who made this suggestion will be regarded by some as inaccurate ; and, indeed, I am aware that the belief of those who hold the contrary of this to be true is based upon grounds apparently strong. I did not hear the words myself ; and all I can say is, that my statement is founded upon authority which makes me feel certain that I do rightly in making it ; though I also think I am right in saying that I did not myself hear the words. If my statement as to the obscure rank of the officer is true, it follows, I think, that I am right in not disclosing his name ; because (upon that supposition) his words had no sort of importance beyond that attributed to them in the text.

† He answered the question the moment he heard its purport told to him. He had not himself heard it fall from the lips of the officer with whom it originated.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

graceful that the Duke of Cambridge loved to seek and to follow his counsels. C H A P.  
XVI.

Whilst Ensign Campbell was passing from boyhood to man's estate, he was made partaker in the great transactions which were then beginning to work out the liberation of Europe. In the May of 1808 he received his first commission—a commission in the 6th Foot; and a few weeks afterwards—then too young to carry the colours—he was serving with his regiment upon the heights of Vimieira. There the lad saw the turning of a tide in human affairs; saw the opening of the mighty strife between 'Column' and 'Line;'\* saw France, long unmatched upon the Continent, retreating before British infantry; saw the first of Napoleon's stumbles, and the fame of Sir Arthur Wellesley beginning to dawn over Europe.

Sir Colin  
Campbell.

He was in Sir John Moore's campaign, and at its closing scene—Corunna. He was with the Walcheren expedition; and afterwards, returning to the Peninsula, he was at the battle of Barossa, the defence of Tarifa, the relief of Taragona, and the combats at Malaga and Osma. He led a forlorn hope at the storming of St Sebastian, and was there wounded twice; he was at Vittoria; he was at the passage

\* In his most interesting and most valuable 'Life of the Duke of Wellington,' Mr Gleig repeats the description of Vimieira, which the Duke once gave in his presence at Strathfieldsaye. The Duke's words are thus given by Mr Gleig: 'The French came on, on that occasion, with great boldness, and seemed to feel their way less than I always found them to do afterwards. They came on, as usual, in very heavy columns, and I received them in line, which they were not accustomed to, and we repulsed them three several times.'

CHAP. of the Bidassoa ; he took part in the American war  
XVI. of 1814 ; he served in the West Indies ; he served  
in the Chinese war of 1842. These occasions he  
had so well used that his quality as a soldier  
was perfectly well known. He had been praised  
and praised again and again ; but since he was not  
so connected as to be able to move the dispensers  
of military rank, he gained promotion slowly, and  
it was not until the second Sikh war that he had  
a command as a general : even then he had  
no rank in the army above that of a colonel. At  
Chilianwalla he commanded a division. Marching  
in person with one of his two brigades, he had  
gained the heights on the extreme right of the  
Sikh position, and then bringing round the left  
shoulder, he had rolled up the enemy's line and  
won the day ; but since his other brigade (being  
separated from him by a long distance) had wanted  
his personal control, and fallen into trouble, the  
brilliancy of the general result which he had  
achieved did not save him altogether from criti-  
cism. That day he was wounded for the fourth  
time. He commanded a division at the great battle  
of Gujerat ; and, being charged to press the enemy's  
retreat, he had so executed his task that 158 guns  
and the ruin of the foe were the fruit of the victory.  
In 1851 and the following year he commanded  
against the hill-tribes. It was he who forced the  
Kohat Pass. It was he who, with only a few horse-  
men and some guns, at Punj Pao, compelled the  
submission of the combined tribes then acting against

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him with a force of 8000 men. It was he who, at Ishakote, with a force of less than 3000 men, was able to end the strife ; and when he had brought to submission all those beyond the Indus who were in arms against the Government, he instantly gave proof of the breadth and scope of his mind as well as of the force of his character ; for he withstood the angry impatience of men in authority over him, and insisted that he must be suffered to deal with the conquered people in the spirit of a politic and merciful ruler.

C H A P.  
XVI.

After serving with all this glory for some forty-four years, he came back to England ; but between the Queen and him there stood a dense crowd of families—men, women, and children—extending further than the eye could reach, and armed with strange precedents which made it out to be right that people who had seen no service should be invested with high command, and that Sir Colin Campbell should be only a colonel. Yet he was of so fine a nature that, although he did not always avoid great bursts of anger, there was no ignoble bitterness in his sense of wrong. He awaited the time when perhaps he might have high command, and be able to serve his country in a sphere proportioned to his strength. His friends, however, were angry for his sake ; and along with their strong devotion towards him there was bred a fierce hatred of a system of military dispensation which could keep in the background a man thus tried and thus known.

Upon the breaking-out of the war with Russia, Sir



**C H A P.** Colin was appointed—not to the command of a division, but of a brigade. It was not till the June of 1854 that his rank in the army became higher than that of a colonel.  
**XVI.**

Campbell was not the slave, he was the master of his calling, and therefore it was that he had been able to save his intellect from the fate of being drowned in military details. He knew that although a general must have a complete mastery of even the smallest of such things, still they were only a part—a minute though essential part—of the great science of war. He understood the precious material whereof our army is formed. He heartily loved our soldiery; for he was a soldier, and had fellow-feeling with soldiers, and they had fellow-feeling with him. Instinctively they knew that, together, they might do great things—he by their help, they by his. Knowing the worth of their devotion and their bodily strength, he cherished them with watchful care; and they, on their part, loved, honoured, and obeyed him with a faith that all he ordered was right. He set great store upon discipline, but it was never for discipline's sake that he did so (as if that were itself an end), but because he knew it to be one of the main sources of military ascendancy. So, although the officers and soldiers serving under him got no more rest than was good for them, they were never vexed wantonly; and in proportion as they grew in knowledge of their calling, they came to understand why it was that their chief compelled them to toil.

A bodily ardour for fighting may be more or less

masked and hidden ; but he to whom this great passion is wanting is without the quality of a general. CHAP.  
XVI. For warfare is so anxious and complex a business, that against every vigorous movement heaps of reasons can for ever be found ; and if a man is so cold a lover of battle as to have no stronger guide than the poor balance of the arguments and counter-arguments which he addresses to his troubled spirit, his mind, driven first one way and then another, will oscillate, or even revolve, turning miserably on its own axis, and making no movement straight forward. Now, it is a characteristic still marking the Scottish blood, that often—and not the less so when it flows in the veins of a gentle-hearted being—it is seen to fire strangely and suddenly at the prospect of a fight. Campbell loved warfare with a deep passion ; and at the thought of battle his grand, rugged face used to kindle with uncontrollable joy.

‘The brigade of Guards will be destroyed ; ought it not to fall back ?’\* When Sir Colin Campbell, heard this saying,† his blood rose so high that the answer he gave—impassioned and far-resounding—was of a quality to govern events.

‘It is better, sir, that every man of Her Majesty’s Guards should lie dead upon the field than that they should now turn their backs upon the enemy!’‡

Campbell’s answer to the suggestion that the Guards should fall back.

\* As to the comparatively subordinate rank of the officer with whom this suggestion originated, see the foot-note five pages back.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† Respecting the way in which he came to hear its purport, see the note five pages back.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

‡ Then, speaking apart to the Duke of Cambridge, and counselling

C H A P. Doubts and questionings ceased.\* Sir Colin Campbell  
 XVI. rode off to his left.

His dis-  
 position  
 of the  
 Highland  
 Brigade.

It was upon Sir Colin Campbell now, as on General Buller a short time before, that there devolved the anxious duty of securing the Allied armies from any flank attack which might be undertaken against them at a moment when our troops were engaging the enemy in front ; and Sir Colin, at one moment, judged that with the battalion which formed his extreme left he ought to stand ready to show a front in any direction. He, therefore, sent Sterling† to direct that the 79th should go into column.‡

But, seen in the dim field of battle, an enemy's force bears marked on its front faint, delicate, momentous signs, analogous to those which, in speaking of a man or a woman, are called ' expression of countenance ;' and it is given to men who know and love the business of war to be able to read those signs. Sir Colin Campbell well understood that the enemy ought to assail his left flank with a storm of horse, foot, and artillery ; and, to deal with any such on-

him to go straight on with the Guards, Sir Colin Campbell undertook to turn the redoubt by marching up instantly with the 42d.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

\* The advance was continued.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† Colonel Douglas's narrative of the part which the 79th took in the battle is to the effect that no order was brought him by any officer of the brigade except Shadwell ; but it also appears from his statement that he has no recollection of having received from any one the order stated in the text.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

‡ It is from a body of troops massed in column that the greatest variety of manœuvres can be quickly and safely evolved. When a battalion extended in line is called upon to change its front, the radius of the segment in which it must wheel is of course very long.

slaught, he at first took care to stand ready ; but when he came to ride forward and gain higher ground, the old soldier was able to divine that with all their three thousand lances, and all their columns of infantry, the Russians would venture nothing against his flank. He therefore recalled his order to the 79th, and allowed it to go forward in line.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Including the chasm which divided the Grenadier Guards from the Coldstream, the whole line in which the Duke of Cambridge now moved forward to the attack of the Kourganè Hill was more than a mile and a half in length.\* It was only two deep ; but his right regiment was supported by a part of Sir Richard England's Division ; and Sir George Cathcart was on its left rear with the part of his Division then on the field. On the extreme left and left rear of the whole force there was the cavalry under Lord Lucan.

These troops were going to take part in the first approach to close strife which men had yet seen on that day between bodies of troops in a state of formation deliberately marshalled against each other.† The

The nature of the fight now about to take place on the Kourganè Hill.

\* The 1st Division was upon a greater front than had been covered by the 47th Regiment, Pennefather's brigade, and the Light Division ; yet it did not cover a foot more of ground than was right. We before saw the effect produced by trying to put ten battalions upon ground which was now found to be not more than enough for six. It is hardly necessary to say that a knowledge of the quantity of ground covered by a single battalion in a barrack-yard would not give a sufficient clue for getting at the extent of ground which was covered by six battalions drawn up in line upon a field of battle. Sir Colin Campbell was free to take ground to his left, and he took it amply, contriving to outflank, or almost to outflank, the enemy's infantry array.

† The French had not been engaged in any conflicts of this sort, for,

C H A P.  
XVI.

slender red line which began near the bridge, and vanished from the straining sight on the eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, was a thread which in any one part of it had the strength of only two men. But along the whole line, from east to west, these files of two men each were strong in the exercise of their country's great prerogative. They were in English array. They were fighting in line against column.

After the rupture of the peace of Amiens, Sir Arthur Wellesley, being then in India, became singularly changed, growing every day more and more emaciated, and seemingly more and more sad. He pined ; and was like a man dying without any known bodily illness, the prey of some consuming thought. At length he suddenly announced to Lord Wellesley his resolve to go back to England ; and when he was asked why, he said, ' I observe that in Europe the French are fighting in column, and carrying everything before them ; and I am sure that I ought to go home directly, because I know that our men can fight in line.' From that simple yet mighty faith he never swerved ; for, always encountering the massive columns of infantry, he always was ready to meet them with his slender line of two deep. With what result the world knows.\*

though the head of Canrobert's Division confronted formed troops for a moment at a distance of a few hundred yards, it dropped back, as we saw, without fighting. Evans's struggle had been in thick ground, not allowing regular array. Codrington's people (including Lacy Yea's Fusiliers as well as the stormers of the redoubt) had had hard fighting, and against troops in perfect order, but they had gone through their struggles without the advantage of being themselves in a state of formation.

\* An account of Sir Arthur Wellesley's pining sickness, his 'wasting

Long years had passed since the close of those great wars, and now once more in Europe there was going to be waged yet again the old strife of line against column. C H A P.  
XVI.

Looking down a smooth, gentle, green slope, checkered red with the slaughtered soldiery who had stormed the redoubt, the front-rank men of the great Vladimir column were free to gaze upon two battalions of the English Guards, far apart the one from the other, but each carefully drawn up in line; and now that they saw more closely, and without the distractions of artillery, they had more than ever grounds for their wonder at the kind of array in which the English soldiery were undertaking to assail them. 'We were all astonished,' says Chodasiewicz—yet he wrote of what he saw when the English line was much less close to the foe than the Guards now were—'we were all astonished at the extraordinary firmness with which the red-jackets, having crossed the river, opened a heavy fire in line upon the redoubt. This was the most extraordinary thing to us, as we had never before seen troops fight in lines of two deep, nor did we think it possible for men to be found with sufficient firmness of morale to be able to attack in this apparently weak formation our massive columns.' But soon the men of

'away,' as he himself described it, is given in published accounts of men who remarked it (in Malcolm's book, I think, or Monro's), and his disclosure of the motive which caused him to return to Europe was preserved and handed down by Lord Wellesley. What I have ventured to do is to seem to connect the pining sickness with the mighty resolve which was destined to change the fate of the world.

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C H A P.  
XVI.

the column began to see that though the scarlet line was slender, it was very rigid and exact. Presently, too, they saw that even when the Grenadiers or the Coldstream began to move, the long line of the black bearskins still kept a good deal of its straightness ; and that here on the bloody slope, no less than in the barrack-yard at home, the same moment was made to serve for the tramp of a thousand feet.


### XXXI.

Beginning on our right hand with the Grenadier Guards, and going thence leftwards to the Coldstream, and, lastly, to the Highland Brigade, we shall now see what manner of strife it was when at length, after many a hindrance, five British battalions, each grandly formed in line, marched up to the enemy's columns.

Advancing upon the immediate left of the ground already won by Pennefather's brigade, the Grenadiers were covered on their right, but their left was bare ; \* and it was in that direction—in the direction of their left front—that the Vladimir battalions stood impending. The Grenadiers were marching against the defeated but now rallied column which had fought with the 7th Fusiliers, when Prince Gortschakoff, having just ridden up to the two left battalions of the Vladimir, undertook to lead them forward. First sending his only unwounded aide-de-camp to press the ad-

Prince  
Gortscha-  
koff's ad-  
vance  
with a  
column  
of the  
Vladimir  
corps.

\* By reason of the retreat of the Scots Fusilier Guards.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



The English  
Battalions

Second fight on the morning  
The guards engaged



Left Grenadier Battalion



Right Grenadier Battalion

Right Sutherland  
Battalion



Right Mademoiselle  
Battalion



Left Grenadier  
Battalions



Left Mademoiselle  
Battalion

The 12th

The 13th

The 14th

Grenadier Guards

7th Fusiliers reforming

The main  
Part of the Scots  
Fusileer Guards & also  
The Light Infantry troops which  
had stormed the Redoubt re forming





ance of any troops he could find, the Prince put himself at the head of the two left Vladimir battalions, and ordered them to charge with the bayonet.\* The Prince then rode forward a good deal in advance of his troops, and his order for a bayonet-charge was so obeyed, that the column, without firing a shot, moved boldly down towards the chasm which had been left in the centre of our brigade of Guards.† The

\* I must acknowledge that I do not gather from the Russian accounts any distinct mention of this separation of the great Vladimir column into two columns of two battalions each. Prince Gortschakoff's narrative speaks of the column with which he moved as 'the battalions of the Vladimir regiment standing on the left of the epaulement' (the breast-work), and this is an expression which might either apply to two battalions which had been separated from the other two, or it might apply to all the four battalions of the corps. I have, however, found it so practicable to reconcile this last interpretation with known facts that I have adopted the former one. Upon this point I am not in terms helped by Kvetzinski's narrative; but as he himself was clearly with one of the Vladimir battalions all this time, and as he had no knowledge of the fact that Gortschakoff had made a charge with battalions of the same corps, it seems to follow as a necessary consequence that at the same time the four battalions had been divided into two columns. A concurrence of circumstances leads me to infer that this was the case, and that one of the columns, as I have stated, was towards the right and the other towards the left of the redoubt. At first sight it may seem odd that Kvetzinski, the divisional general, should not know what was being done with two of his battalions posted at only a small distance from the column with which he rode; but the truth is that Gortschakoff, having for the time the supreme command in this part of the field, and being (as is evident from his own account) in a high state of excitement, rode up to the Vladimir battalions, which he found near the (Russian) left of the earthwork, and, so to speak, snatched them without saying a word to the general commanding the Division. After this, the movement which he made in advance was only a slight one; and for that reason, perhaps, it was hardly looked upon as severing the troops taking part in it from those which remained with Kvetzinski.

† 'I saw a heavy mass of Russians in column in pursuit.'—Private letter from Colonel Hood. In another letter he says, 'The Russian column then passed out in pursuit.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P. XVI. north-west angle of this strong and hitherto victorious column was coming down nearer and nearer to the file—the file composed of only two men—which formed the extreme left of the Grenadiers.

Colonel  
Hood's  
man-  
œuvre.


Then, and by as fair a test as war could apply, there was tried the strength of the line-formation, the quality of the English officer, the quality of the English soldier. Colonel Hood first halted, and then caused\* the left subdivision of the left company to wheel—to wheel back in such a way as to form, with the rest of the battalion, an obtuse angle. The manœuvre was executed by Colonel Percy (he was wounded just at this time) under the directions of Colonel Hamilton, the officer in command of the left wing.† In this way, whilst he still faced the column which he had originally undertaken to attack, Colonel Hood showed another front—a small, but smooth, comely front—to the mass which was coming upon his flank. His manœuvre instantly brought the Vladimir to a halt; and to those who—without being near enough to hear the giving and the repeating of the orders—

\* Or allowed. See the next note.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† It seems that at the moment of the halt, a mounted officer not belonging to the battalion rode up to near where the left flank company was, and used the word 'retire!' Then Percy, looking at the Vladimir column, and seeing in an instant what ought and what ought not to be done, inferred, or professed to infer, that the manœuvre which the conjuncture required was the one which the mounted officer must mean. 'Retire!' he said. 'What the devil do they mean? They must mean "dress back."' Percy then, aided by Neville, his senior subaltern, began causing the subdivision to 'dress back' in such a way as to make it face towards the Vladimir column; and this, it quickly appeared, was exactly what Colonel Hood desired, for he rode up and told Percy to go on with the operation.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

still were able to see Colonel Hood thus changing a part of his front and stopping a mighty column C H A P.  
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Russian Column.



Grenadier Guards.



by making a bend in his line, it seemed that he was handling his fine slender English blade with a singular grace—with the gentleness and grace of the skilled swordsman, when, smiling all the while, he parries an angry thrust. In the midst of its pride and vast strength of numbers, the Vladimir found itself checked—nay, found itself gravely engaged—with half a company of our Guardsmen ; and the minds of these two-score of islanders were so little inclined to bend under the weight of the column, that they kept their perfect array.\* Their fire was deadly, for it was poured into a close mass of living men. It was at the work of ‘file-firing’ that the whole battalion now laboured.

On the left of the interval wrought by the displacement of the centre battalion of the Guards, the Coldstream, drawn up in superb array,† began to open its

*The Coldstream.*

\* Dalrymple, with the right-flank company of the Scots Fusilier Guards, seems to have done good service at this conjuncture ; for, wheeling back his left, in conformity with the bend effected by Colonel Hood in the line of the Grenadiers, he poured some fifteen volleys into the Vladimir column.—*Note to 2d Edition.*

† But from ground less advanced than that which the Grenadiers had reached.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

C H A P.  
XVI.

The  
Grena-  
diers and  
the 'Cold-  
'stream'  
engaged  
with six  
battalions  
in column.

smart crashing fire upon the more distant battalions which formed the right wing of the Vladimir force.

We shall see the share which other Russian and other British troops were destined to have in governing the result of the struggle ; but if for a moment we limit our reckoning to the troops which stood fighting at this time, it appears that the whole of the four Vladimir battalions and the lessened mass of the left Kazan column were engaged with the Grenadiers and the Coldstream. In other words, two English battalions, each ranged in line, but divided the one from the other by a very broad chasm, were contending with six battalions in column. And although of these six battalions standing in column there were two which had cruelly suffered, the remaining four had hitherto had no hard fighting, and were flushed with the thought that they stood on ground which they themselves had reconquered.

### XXXII.

The stress  
which a  
line puts  
upon the  
soldiery  
of a  
column ;

But, after all, if only the firmness of the slender English line should chance to endure, there was nothing except the amost chimerical event of a thorough charge home with the bayonet which could give to the columns the ascendancy due to their vast weight and numbers ; for the fire from a straitened, narrow front could comparatively do little harm, whilst the fire of the battalion in line was carrying havoc into the living masses. Still, neither column nor line gave way. On the other hand, neither column nor line moved forward. Fast rooted as yet to the

ground, the groaning masses of the Russians and the two scarlet strings of Guardsmen stood receiving and delivering their fire. C H A P.  
XVI.

But meanwhile, on the part of the English, another mind, as we shall see by-and-by, was bringing its strength to bear upon this part of the battle.

If the English method of array puts a grievous stress upon the soldiery of Continental masses, its pressure is not less hard upon the mind of a general who has the suffering columns in his charge. It not only shocks him by the sight of a great slaughter of his people occurring in small spaces of ground; it not only forces upon him a sense of being outflanked, but sometimes, it even seems, oppresses him with a belief that he is overwhelmed by mighty numbers. General Kvetzinski was with the right Vladimir column. He was a brave, able man, and we have already seen something of what the relative numbers were with which the Russians and the English were fighting; but it seems that the spectacle of the immense front presented by the English array broke down the General's sense of his own comparative strength, and put upon him the belief that he was cruelly outnumbered. Even the sight of the wide chasm there was between the two battalions of the Guards did not lift the weight from his heart. 'The enormous forces,' said he,—'the enormous forces of the enemy made our position a very dangerous one.'

and upon  
a general  
who has  
charge of  
columns.

Impres-  
sions  
wrought  
upon the  
mind of  
Kvetzin-  
ski by the  
English  
array.

It was near the eastern shoulder of the redoubt that he sat in his saddle. Every moment he had been growing more anxious, for, besides the troubles that were besetting his front, he could not but know

**H A P.**  
**XVI.** that Pennefather's brigade was established in the Pass; and the apparition of our Headquarter Staff on the knoll, followed quick by Turner's guns, had cheated him into the notion that the whole French army was marching straight eastward into the English field of battle. Nay, he imagined that the guns on the knoll were throwing a flanking fire into the left of his Vladimir battalions;\* and indeed it would seem that these battalions were really struck—not by cannon on the knoll, but by some guns just put in battery on one of the spurs overlooking the Pass.† But now, when he looked to his right—when


\* He was wrong in this. Turner's guns tried their range against the columns on the Kourganè Hill, but found the distance too great. The passage in which Kvetzinski speaks of the state of things in the direction of 'the knoll' is this:—'From the left, the French, having forced our 'left-wing foreposts, were hurrying to the rescue of their allies, whose 'efforts were beginning to flag before the unheard-of and unparalleled 'heroism of the brave Vladimirtzi. The French battery, having taken up 'its position on the left wing of our side' (this so-called 'French battery' was Turner's battery on the knoll), 'began to fire sideways on the fast-'thinning ranks of our gallant regiment. Their reserve were hastening 'to cut off our retreat.' I have already shown how all but inevitable it was that Kvetzinski and all other Russians on the Kourganè Hill should make this mistake—should suppose that the group of plumed officers in blue frocks who crowned the knoll betokened the presence of the French army in that part of the field, and that Turner's guns were a French battery. If amongst the French or their friends there are any men so constituted as to wish to keep the benefit derived from this mistake, their best course will be to quote this passage from Kvetzinski, and to suppress the explanation which shows how his error arose. For the sake of fairness, and not without a foresight of the wrongful use which may be made of the passage, I give what I believe to be a close and accurate translation from the Russian words in which it was written.

† I rest this belief entirely upon the authority of Colonel Hamley's soldierly narrative, 'The Campaign of Sebastopol,' p. 31. Colonel Hamley was himself in the Artillery, and all that he says respecting the operations of the arm to which he belonged has, of course, a peculiar

he looked slantwise down to the east of where the Coldstream stood ranged—he saw an array of tall plumes, having eight times the front of one of his own battalion columns ; looking a little farther eastward, he saw another array which, though it was not yet so near, was like to the first, and was moving. Again, when he looked still farther eastward, he saw yet another array coming up, and though it was less near than the first, and even less near than the second, it was like to either of them in the greatness of its front and the towering plumes of the men. Kvetzinski could see that, taken together, these three lines of plumed soldiers had a front some twenty times broader than one of his battalion columns, and (still, it seems, suffering himself to infer vast numbers from mere extent of front) he began to have that torturing sense of being outnumbered and outflanked which weighed upon the memory and for ever replenished the diction of the warlike Psalmist. It seemed to him that the enemy ‘increased upon him to trouble him ;’ that ‘the nations compassed him round about ;’ that they ‘came round about him like water ;’ that they ‘kept him in on every side ; yea, that they kept him ‘in on every side.’ This anxiety was all wrongly based. Far from having his whole array outflanked towards the east to any woeful extent, Kvetzinski had a column on his extreme right which fairly enough

value. The guns were some of those thirty pieces of ordnance which Evans and Sir Richard England had just brought into the Pass.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

I think that the shot which struck the column were thrown from guns belonging to Franklin's battery.—*Note to 4th Edition.*





C H A P. confronted the extreme left of the English infantry ;  
XVI. and, far indeed from being outnumbered, he was fighting this fight of the Kourganè Hill with a strength of nearly three against two ; but it followed from the difference between his and his enemy's manner of fighting that each of his columns, taken separately, was widely outflanked, and he was becoming an example of what must happen to the commander of columns when (without exerting his weight by trying to charge home with the bayonet) he strives to set his dense masses against troops standing firmly in line.

The sight of a battalion advancing upon his right front convinces him that he must move.

Presently he saw that the array of plumed soldiers which had stood ranged next to the Coldstream was moving—was moving up—was moving swiftly ; and he knew that the nearest of the columns which he had on his right was so far from the ground where he stood, and so hindered, too, by the intervening dip of the ground, as to be unable to engage the newcomers before the moment when (unless he retreated) they would reach the flank of his right Vladimir battalions. On the other hand, he could not, in common prudence, stand still and wait to be turned by the battalion now gliding up the slope on his right ; for brave as were his Vladimir men, a huge massive Russian column was not the delicate weapon with which he could try to imitate Colonel Hood, showing a front at once on two sides. Therefore it became but too clear to him that the columns along the redoubt must move to some ground other than where they were, and this almost instantly, for the bending plumes did not cease from coming.

But, also, all this while the columns along the redoubt were more and more feeling the stress that was put upon them by the fire and the array of the Guards. Just after the moment when the Vladimir men were brought to a halt by Colonel Hood's manœuvre, Prince Gortschakoff, still riding at the head of the column, was violently thrown to the ground. He had received no wound from the shot which caused his fall, but his charger was killed by it; and, there being no other horseman near, he was obliged to remain on foot. It would seem that the concussion of the fall may have clouded his judgment. At all events, after this accident he walked away towards a column which he saw coming down in support.\* On his road, he passed through the site of the Great Redoubt, and there found General Kvetzinski. The Prince, walking up to the Divisional General, told him that he had had his horse shot under him, and that all the field-officers of the regiment† he commanded had been killed. It is not stated that the two generals, thus meeting at a critical moment, took occasion to consult about the way in which they should fight out the battle. When their conversation had ended, Prince Gortschakoff walked up the hill-side, going on towards the column which he wanted to meet.‡

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Meantime  
the co-  
lums  
along the  
redoubt  
are be-  
coming  
distressed  
by the  
fire of the  
Guards.

The shot which dismounted Prince Gortschakoff,

\* The four Ouglitz battalions.

† Meaning, I imagine, the Kazan Chasseurs.

‡ All this is told by Prince Gortschakoff himself with simplicity and apparent truthfulness. It is plain that his fall had shaken and confused him.

C H A P.  
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his departure from the ground where the Vladimir stood, the spruce beauty of the slender red line which had brought it to bay, and the steadiness of the fire with which the brave column had been plied for now several minutes—all these were causes which helped to distress the left Vladimir battalions ; and although it was the turning movement on the right of the Russian columns which made it a thing of sheer need to move, and to move at once,\* still, it would seem that General Kvetzinski's measures for dealing with the new emergency were forestalled by what he presently saw on his left front ; and the event which was destined to put its actual and direct governance upon this part of the battle was the still pending fight between the left Vladimir battalions and the Grenadier Guards.†

Continu-  
ance of the  
fight be-  
tween the  
Grenadier  
Guards  
and the  
left  
Vladimir  
column.

The Grenadiers, when we left them just now, were busy with their rifles along their whole line, and were making good use of that delicate bend in the formation of their leftmost company which enabled them to pour their fire into the heart of the Vladimir column then hanging on their flank. The reckoning of him who puts his trust in column is mainly based on the notion that its mere grandeur of aspect will

\* Kvetzinski says, 'The decisive moment I had been fearing and expecting had arrived : the English moved higher up in three lines, and threatened to turn our right wing.'

† 'The left wing,' he says, 'began to falter, leaving my left side exposed.' I understand him to be speaking of troops on the immediate left of the column with which he was riding, and not of any troops on the left of the whole Division which he commanded, because the retreat of the troops in the Pass had taken place before the time of which he is speaking.

give it a clear ascendant as soon as it is seen at all near ; and when the English line had once delivered its fire, the front-rank men of the column were not without grounds for making sure that their next glimpse of the red-coats would be a glimpse of men in retreat ; for to have come forward to within a distance convenient for musket-shots and to have once delivered their fire, this was surely the utmost in the way of close fighting that files of only two men each would attempt against masses. But when, though only a little, the smoke began to lift, the gleams that pierced it were the light that is shed from bayonet-points and busy ramrods—gleams twinkling along the line of the two ranks of soldiery who still, as it seemed, must be lingering in their strange array ; and wherever the smoke lifted clear, there—steadfast as oaks disclosed by rising mist—the long avenue of the Bearskins loomed out, and so righteously in place as to begin to enforce a surmise that, after all, the files of the two men each might be minded to stand where they were, ceremoniously shooting into the column and filling it minute by minute with the tumult of men killed or wounded. And though it was but a few of the men planted close in the massive columns who could thus from time to time look upon the dim forms of the soldiery who dealt the slaughter, yet the anxiousness of those who could gain no glimpse of the Bearskins was not for that reason the less. Nay, it was the greater ; for he who knows of a present danger through his reading of other men's countenances, or by seeing his neighbours fall

CHAP.  
XVI. wounded or killed around him, is commonly more disturbed than he who, standing in the front, looks straight into the eye of the storm.


Still, up to this time it was only from the extreme left of the Grenadiers' line that fire was poured into the column. A harder trial was awaiting the Vladimir men. Colonel Hood had hitherto wielded his line as though he judged it right to deal carefully with the left Kazan battalions still lingering on his front; and, up to the last, he did not think himself warranted in disdaining their presence, for he could not know that their loss in officers had made them so helpless as they were; but he now saw enough to assure him that his real foe was the left Vladimir column on his flank. Thither, therefore (though he would not altogether avert his line from the defeated troops in his front), he now determined to bend the eyes and the rifles of a great portion of his battalion. So he wheeled forward his battalion upon its left—or in other, and perhaps the more expressive, form of military speech, he 'brought forward his right shoulder.\*' Still respecting the presence of the defeated Kazan troops, he did not carry this man-

\* 'I brought up my right shoulder.'—Private letter from Colonel Hood, dated the day after the battle. One of the characteristics which can hardly fail to interest any one who has had the advantage of reading Colonel Hood's letters, is the exceeding modesty which makes him continually seek to ascribe all merit to others rather than to himself. Thus, although, in hurriedly writing the six words above quoted, he chanced to use the first person, he hastened, in a subsequent letter from the banks of the Alma, to give the whole merit of the manœuvre to the battalion. He writes, '*Instinctively* our men brought right shoulders forward.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

œuvre so far as to place his battalion bodily on the flank of the Vladimir column ; but he carried it far enough to make the column a mark for the troops which formed his left wing. The Vladimir was

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Vladimir column.



wrapped in fire ; was wrapped in that fire which is hardly tolerable to soldiery massed in column—fire poured upon its flank.\* Even this, for some minutes, the brave Vladimir bore.†

If the voice of the English soldier is heard loud in fight, his shout may be the shout of triumph achieved, or else—and then it is of a thousandfold higher worth—it may be the like of what used to foretoken the crisis of the old Peninsular battles, when late in the day the voice of ‘the Light Division’ was heard ;—the almost inspired utterance by which the soldier, growing suddenly conscious of an overmastering power, declares and makes known his ascendant. Of two things happening in a field

\* ‘Instinctively our men brought right shoulders forward, and commenced file-firing with such coolness and accuracy that the effect was instantaneous. They [the Russians] were checked perceptibly with astonishment at the telling nature of our flank-fire.’ *N.B.* The word which I have written ‘perceptibly’ seems in the original to have the syllable ‘im’ at its commencement, but I imagine that the word as I have written it was the one intended.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Speaking of course roughly, Colonel Hood puts this period of Russian endurance at ‘five minutes.’ Private letter, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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of battle at nearly the same time, it is often hard to say which was the first; and yet upon that narrow priority of a few moments there may depend the question of which event was the cause, and which the effect. What people know is, that there was an instant when the Vladimir column was seen to look hurt and unstable, and that, either at the same instant, or the instant before, or the instant after, the Grenadiers were hurrahing on their left, hurrahing at their centre, hurrahing along their whole line. As though its term of life were measured—as though its structure were touched and sundered by the very cadence of the cheering—the column bulged, heaving, heaving. ‘The line will advance on the centre!’\* ‘The men may advance firing.’† This, or this nearly, was what Hood had to say to his Grenadiers. Instant sounded the echo of his will: ‘The line will advance on the centre! Quick march!’ Then between the column and the seeing of its fate the cloud which hangs over a modern battle-field was no longer a sufficing veil; for although, whilst the English battalion stood halted, there lay in front of its line that dim, mystic region which divides contending soldiery, yet the Bearskins, since now they were marching, grew darker from east to west, grew taller, grew real, broke through. A moment, and the column hung loose; another, and it was lapsing into sheer

Defeat of  
the left  
Vladimir  
column,  
and of the  
left Kazan  
battalions.

\* In this, and in the sentence presently following where it recurs, the word ‘on’ should be replaced by the word ‘by.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† ‘Unsupported I would not charge, but made my men advance, ‘firing steadily.’ Private letter from Colonel Hood, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

retreat; yet another, and it had come to be like a throng in confusion.\* Of the left Kazan troops there was no more question. In an array which was all but found fault with for being too grand and too stately, the English battalion swept on.†

Seeing that, before many moments were over, the Grenadiers would be up in the redoubt, Kvetzinski conceived that his retreat by the great road was already cut off, and he ordered that the right Vladimir column—the column with which he was present—should move from the field obliquely, avoiding the English right. This was a path which would take the column along the eastern skirts of the Kourganè Hill, and bring it towards the spot where the right

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Kvetzinski's oblique movement of retreat with the right Vladimir column.

\* 'In five minutes the Russian column faltered, then turned, then ran.' Private letter from Colonel Hood, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† The criticism alluded to in this sentence was that of a French officer who witnessed the advance of the Guards. After speaking of it with enthusiastic admiration, he ended by saying that it was 'too majestic'—'*trop majestueux.*'—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

Speaking of this advance of his Grenadiers, Colonel Hood writes: 'I am told the effect was great, and *this common-sense manoeuvre of a line against a dense column is my only merit.* It was done at Waterloo effectively, and on the Alma yesterday. I hope due credit will be done to my fine fellows, for it was a proud sight to see them behave so well; and what an honour to command such a body of men! . . . The battalion has been the admiration of French, English, and Russians.'—Private letter, 21st September 1854. See in a note at the foot of a later page an account of the thanks publicly addressed to Colonel Hood and the Grenadiers at the close of the battle.

My numerous quotations from the private journal and private letters of Colonel Hood correspond so closely with the tenor of this part of the narrative that the reader will be likely to say, 'That journal and those letters were evidently the authority on which the Author based his account of the operations of the Grenadier Guards.' It is, however, a fact, that I never saw the journal nor the letters, and never knew anything of their tenor, until after the publication of the first and second editions of this book.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



**CHAP.** **XVI** Kazan column stood posted. Kvetzinski, still firm and soldierly, charged a few of his men with the duty of covering his retreat; and, intrusting the command of this little rear-guard to Ensign Berestoffsky, gave orders that the march should be leisurely. He was not ill obeyed; but the movement was hardly one which could be executed with all the accustomed dignity of Russian troops in retreat, for the column had to move slantwise across the front of the battalion which was swiftly ascending the hill, and, if it were to lose many moments, the plumed soldiery would be on its flank.

The Duke of Cambridge is master of the Great Redoubt.

The left wing of the Grenadiers was quickly in the part of the battery where lay the dismounted howitzer;\* and on the opposite or eastern shoulder of the work, the Duke of Cambridge, riding up with the Coldstream, stood master of the Great Redoubt.†

\* Respecting the theory—a theory propounded by the ‘Quarterly Review’—that it was Sir George Brown who caused the Grenadier Guards to enter the redoubt, see Appendix, Note V.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† Considering that H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge commanded the Division to which the Grenadiers as well as the Coldstream belonged, and that the Coldstream (with which His Royal Highness was personally present) advanced to the proper right of the redoubt at a moment not very much later than that at which the Grenadiers entered the work at its western extremity, I thought it a fair and not untruthful use of language to say, that His Royal Highness, ‘riding up with the ‘Coldstream, stood master of the Great Redoubt.’ But I see that, according to Sir George Brown, as represented by the ‘Quarterly Review,’ the interval between the final advance of the Grenadiers and the final advance of the Coldstream was so great as to exclude the Coldstream, and, with it, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, from the honour of being actual partakers in the movement which effected the recapture of the redoubt; and, moreover, it is represented by the same authority, that the final advance of the Coldstream did not take place at all *until after a conference, which Sir George Brown thought proper to hold with*

In its retreat the right Vladimir column was still plied with the fire of the Coldstream. General Kvetzinski had his horse shot under him; and presently afterwards he was so wounded in the leg as to be unable to move on foot. The soldiers around formed a litter for him with their muskets, and the brave man, causing his bearers to march with the rear-guard, continued to give his orders to Ensign Berestoffsky. Presently, however, he was again struck by shot; and indeed he was now almost shattered, being wounded in two of his limbs and in the side. To the last he had comported himself as a good soldier.


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Kvetzin-  
ski is  
wounded  
and dis-  
abled.

### XXXIII.

But whose was the mind which had freshly come to bear upon this part of the fight, and what was the plumed array which, threatening Kvetzinski on his right front, forbade him from further tarrying on the line of the Great Redoubt? Before the moment when the Guards and the columns began their fight,

*H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge and with General Bentinck—a conference held after the time when (according to the ‘Quarterly Review’) Sir George Brown had caused the redoubt to be occupied by a detachment from the Grenadier Guards. The statement made on this subject by the ‘Quarterly Review,’ with the apparent (or transparent) authority of Sir George Brown, is given in the Appendix, Note No. VI., together with the few words of comment which I have chosen to add. From these, and from any other materials at his command, the reader may judge whether the above sentence of the text, in which I connect the Duke of Cambridge and the Coldstream with the recapture of the redoubt, is worded in terms which should be qualified by bringing to bear on them the testimony of Sir George Brown.—Note to 4th Edition.*



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Sir Colin Campbell's conception of the part he would take with his brigade.

The 42d was at his side.

Sir Colin Campbell was sitting in his saddle by the left of the Coldstream, and talking from time to time with the Duke of Cambridge. The veteran was watching for his time. And, although the ground before him favoured the concealment of troops, yet his skill in the reading of a field of battle had enabled him to see, or in some way know or divine, that what forces the Russians had on their right of the Great Redoubt were all more or less held back. So, if he could swiftly move up a battalion to the crest which rose straight before him, he would be on the flank of the position from which the Vladimir confronted the Guards before any other battalions could come down to engage him.\* Upon descrying his advance, the Russians, he thought, would see the instant need of abandoning their struggle with the Guards; but if by chance, or because of their obstinacy, they should fail to do so, then, as soon as he could reach the ground he longed for, he would bring round the left shoulder, turn full towards the west, and roll up the Muscovite columns before their supports could come down to save them. This was what he thought might be done; and the keen, perfect weapon with which to do it had come fresh into his hand. The other battalions of the Highland Brigade were approaching; but the 42d—the far-famed ‘Black Watch’—had already come up. It was ranged in line. The ancient glory of the corps was

\* ‘The immediate object being to turn the redoubt, while the attack ‘in front was made by the Guards.’ Original MS. Report, dated ‘Bivouac on the river Alma, 22d September 1854,’ and signed ‘C. Campbell, Major-General.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

a treasure now committed to the charge of young soldiers new to battle ; but Campbell knew them—  
 was sure of their excellence—and was sure, too, of Colonel Cameron, their commanding officer. Very eager—for the Guards were now engaged with the enemy's columns—very eager, yet silent and majestic, the battalion stood ready.

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Before the action had begun, and whilst his men were still in column, Campbell had spoken to his brigade a few words—words simple, and, for the most part, workmanlike, yet touched with the fire of warlike sentiment. ‘ Now, men, you are going into action. Remember this : whoever is wounded—I don’t care what his rank is—whoever is wounded must lie where he falls till the bandsmen come to attend to him. No soldiers must go carrying off wounded men. If any soldier does such a thing, his name shall be stuck up in his parish church. Don’t be in a hurry about firing. Your officers will tell you when it is time to open fire. Be steady. Keep silence. Fire low. Now, men’—those who know the old soldier can tell how his voice would falter the while his features were kindling—‘ Now, men, the army will watch us ; make me proud of the Highland Brigade ! ’ \*

Sir Colin  
 Campbell  
 and the  
 Highland  
 Brigade.

\* Of course, the memory of those who unexpectedly found themselves hearing Sir Colin’s address to his brigade, can supply but an imperfect record of the words which were uttered ; and perhaps, if the impressions of any great number of the hearers were compared, few or none would be found to be closely similar. I think, however, that the address given in the text is not grossly wide of the truth : at all events, I can answer for the substantial accuracy of the injunction against quitting the ranks in order to carry off wounded men.

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Their engagement  
with several Russian  
columns.

It was before the battle that this, or the like of this, was addressed to the brigade; and now, when Sir Colin rode up to the corps which awaited his signal, he only gave it two words. But because of his accustomed manner of utterance, and because he was a true, faithful lover of war, the two words he spoke were as the roll of the drum: 'Forward, 42d!' This was all he then said; and, 'as a steed that knows 'his rider,' the great heart of the battalion bounded proudly to his touch.


Sir Colin Campbell \* went forward in front of the 42d; but before he had ridden far, he saw that his reckoning was already made good by the event, and that the column which had engaged the Coldstream was moving off obliquely towards its right rear. Then with his Staff† he rode up a good way in advance, for he was swift to hope that the withdrawal of the column from the line of the redoubt might give him the means of learning the ground before him, and seeing how the enemy's strength was disposed in this part of the field. In a few moments he was abreast of the redoubt, and upon the ridge or crest which divided the slope he had just ascended from the broad and rather deep hollow which lay before him. On his right he had the now empty redoubt, on his right front the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Straight before him there was the

\* Riding quite alone. He did not choose his Staff to be with him at this time, for he knew that a group of officers would be likely to draw more fire than a single horseman.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

† It was not till the 42d had come up that he was rejoined by his Staff.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

hollow, or basin, just spoken of, bounded on its farther side by a swelling wave or ridge of ground which he called the 'inner crest.' Beyond that, whilst he looked straight before him, he could see that the ground fell off into a valley; but when he glanced towards his left front he observed that the hollow which lay on his front was, so to speak, bridged over by a bending rib which connected the inner with the outer crest—bridged over in such a way that a column on his left front might march to the spot where he stood without having first to descend into the lower ground. More towards his left, the ground was high, but so undulating and varied that it would not necessarily disclose any troops which might be posted in that part of the field.

Confronting Sir Colin Campbell from the other side of the hollow, the enemy had a strong column—the two right battalions of the Kazan corps—and it was towards this body that the Vladimir column, moving off from the line of the redoubt, was all this time making its way. The Russians saw that they were the subject of a general officer's studies; and Campbell's horse at this time was twice struck by shot, but not disabled. When the retiring column came abreast of the right Kazan column it faced about to the front, and, striving to recover its formation, took part with the Kazan column in opposing a strength of four battalions—four battalions 'hard-worked and much thinned—to the one which, eager and fresh, was following the steps of the Highland General. Looking towards his left front, and also

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the natural bridge or viaduct which has just been spoken of, Sir Colin Campbell saw another column much heavier than either of the two which confronted him. This heavy column was composed of two battalions of the Sousdal corps, and it was of greater size and strength than the Vladimir and the Kazan columns, because it was as yet untouched. A column formed of the two remaining Sousdal battalions—battalions also untouched—was on the extreme right of the enemy's infantry position, but so placed that at this moment it could not be seen by Campbell. On the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill, the four Ouglitz battalions stood impending over the scene of the coming fight, and these battalions were also untouched. With three battalions Sir Colin Campbell was about to engage no less than twelve ;\* but the three were in line, and the twelve were massed in five columns.

\* Taking the eight untouched Russian battalions at 6000, and supposing the four thinned battalions to have been reduced by one-third—i. e., from 3000 to 2000—the Russian force here engaged would be 8000 ; and if the numbers of the Highland Brigade be put at 2500, it results that the numbers of the Russians were to those of Sir Colin as 16 to 5, or rather more than 3 to 1. If it be thought fairer to exclude the Ouglitz column (on the ground that its soldiery did not actually exchange fire with the Highlanders, and might therefore be regarded as counterbalanced by the force under Cathcart), the numbers of the Russians actually engaging Sir Colin Campbell would be to the Highland Brigade in a proportion of exactly two to one. This comparison of numbers is given in order to convey a true idea of the nature of the fight in which the Highland Brigade took part ; but it would be a mistake to use it as a warrant for anything like vaunting over a brave enemy ; for after the retreat of the Vladimir from the Great Redoubt, and the shot which disabled Kvetzinski, the Divisional General, a comparison of the mere numbers which took part in the succeeding fight could not be justly put forward as a means of showing the relative prowess of the combatants.

Few were the moments that Campbell took to learn the ground before him, and to read the enemy's mind ; but, few though they were, they were all but enough to bring the 42d to the crest where their General stood. The ground they had to ascend was a good deal more steep and more broken than the slope close beneath the redoubt. In the land where those Scots were bred, there are shadows of sailing clouds skimming straight up the mountain's side, and their paths are rugged, are steep, yet their course is smooth, easy, and swift. Smoothly, easily, swiftly, the 'Black Watch' seemed to glide up the hill. A few instants before, and their tartans ranged dark in the valley—now, their plumes were on the crest. The small knot of horsemen who had ridden on before them were still there. Any stranger looking into the group might almost be able to know—might know by the mere carriage of the head—that he in the plain, dark-coloured frock, he whose sword-belt hung crosswise from his shoulder, was the man there charged with command ; for in battle, men who have to obey sit erect in their saddles ; he who has on him the care of the fight seems always to fall into the pensive yet eager bend which the Greeks—keen perceivers of truth—used to join with their conception of Mind brought to bear upon War. It is on board ship, perhaps, more commonly than ashore, that people in peace-time have been used to see their fate hanging upon the skill of one man. Often, landsmen at sea have watched the skilled, weather-worn sailor when he seems to look through the gale,



CHAP.  
XVI


and search deep into the home of the storm. He sees what they cannot see; he knows what, except from his lips, they never will be able to learn. They stand silent, but they question him with their eyes. So men new to war gaze upon the veteran commander, when, with knitted brow and steady eyes, he measures the enemy's power, and draws near to his final resolve. Campbell, fastening his eyes on the two columns standing before him, and on the heavier and more distant column on his left front, seemed not to think lightly of the enemy's strength; but in another instant (for his mind was made up, and his Highland blood took fire at the coming array of the tartans) his features put on that glow which, seen in men of his race—race known by the kindling grey eye, and the light, stubborn crisping hair—discloses the rapture of instant fight. Although at that moment the 42d was alone, and was confronted by the two columns on the farther side of the hollow, yet Campbell, having a steadfast faith in Colonel Cameron and in the regiment he commanded, resolved to go straight on, and at once, with his forward movement. He allowed the battalion to descend alone into the hollow, marching straight against the two columns.\* Moreover, he suffered it to undertake a manoeuvre

\* 'This flank movement was completely successful. . . . The 42d, being the leading regiment, gained the heights first, and found a large body of Russian troops, which had just quitted the central redoubt, endeavouring to form in its front, with another large body already posted there. The 42d continued to advance, firing, in line.' The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*



Plan shewing the continual action of the second fight on the Kourgané hill the highlanders engaged

The Douglas battalions



The Russian Cavalry then followed strong and was near this part of the field but its exact position is not meant to be represented in this plan.

which (except with troops of great steadiness and highly instructed) can hardly be tried with safety against regiments still unshaken. The 'Black Watch' 'advanced firing.'\* CHAP.  
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But whilst this fight was going on between the 42d and the two Russian columns, grave danger from another quarter seemed to threaten the Highland battalion; for, before it had gone many paces, Campbell saw that the column which had appeared on his left front was boldly marching forward;† and such was the direction it took, and such the nature of the ground, that the column, if it were suffered to go on with this movement, would be able to strike at the flank of the 42d without having first to descend into lower ground.

Halting the 42d in the hollow, Campbell swiftly measured the strength of the approaching column, and he reckoned it so strong that he resolved to prepare for it a front of no less than five companies. He was upon the point of giving the order for effecting this bend in the line of the 42d, when, looking to his left rear, he saw his centre battalion springing up to the outer crest.‡ But almost in the same

\* We saw that Colonel Hood with the Grenadier Guards 'advanced firing,' but at that moment he had already brought the column which he attacked to the verge of its ruin.

† 'On reaching the crest of the hill on the enemy's side, *another mass was met advancing* to support the retiring enemy.' The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ 'As these troops [the Russian column mentioned in the last note] 'came on, the 93d arrived most opportunely.' The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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XVI. moment he saw, or in some way divined, that this battalion, in its exceeding ardour for the fight, was coming up wild and raging. He instantly rode to his left.

The 93d in the Crimea was never quite like other regiments, for it chanced that it had received into its ranks a large proportion of those men of eager spirit who had petitioned to be exchanged from regiments left at home to regiments engaged in the war. The exceeding fire and vehemence, and the ever-ready energies of the battalion, made it an instrument of great might, if only it could be duly held in, but gave it a tendency to be headlong in its desire to hurl itself upon the enemy.

In a minute, this fiery 93d came storming over the crest, and, having now at last an enemy's column before it, it seemed to be almost mad with warlike joy. Its formation, of course, was disturbed by the haste and vehemence of the onset; and Campbell saw that, unless the regiment could be halted and a little calmed down, it would go on rushing forward in disordered fury, at the risk of shattering itself against the strength of the hard, square-built column which was solemnly coming to meet it.

But he who could halt his men on the bank of a cool stream when they were rushing down to quench the rage of their thirst, was able to quiet them in the midst of their warlike fury. Sir Colin got the regiment to halt and dress its ranks. By this time it was under the fire of the approaching column.

Campbell's charger, twice wounded already, but

hitherto not much hurt, was now struck by a shot in the heart. Without a stumble or a plunge the horse sank down gently to the earth, and was dead. Campbell took his aide-de-camp's charger; but he had not been long in Shadwell's saddle when up came Sir Colin's groom with his second horse. The man, perhaps, under some former master, had been used to be charged with the 'second horse' in the hunting-field. At all events, here he was; and if Sir Colin was angered by the apparition, he could not deny that it was opportune. The man touched his cap, and excused himself for being where he was. In the dry, terse way of those Englishmen who are much accustomed to horses, he explained that towards the rear the balls had been dropping about very thick, and that, fearing some harm might come to his master's second horse, he had thought it best to bring him up to the front.

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When the 93d had recovered the perfectness of its array, it again moved forward, but at the steady pace imposed upon it by the chief. The 42d had already resumed its forward movement; it still advanced firing.

There are things in the world which, eluding the resources of the dry narrator, can still be faintly imagined by that subtle power which sometimes enables mankind to picture dim truth by fancy. According to the thought which floated in the mind of the churchman who taught to All the Russias their grand form of prayer for victory, there are 'angels of light' and 'angels of darkness and horror,' who soar over the

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heads of soldiery destined to be engaged in close fight, and attend them into battle.\* When the fight grows hot, the angels hover down near to earth with their bright limbs twined deep in the wreaths of the smoke which divides the combatants. But it is no coarse, bodily help that these Christian angels bring. More purely spiritual than the old Immortals, they strike no blow, they snatch no man's weapon, they lift away no warrior in a cloud. What the Angel of Light can bestow is valour, priceless valour, and light to lighten the path to victory, giving men grace to see the bare truth, and, seeing it, to have the mastery. To regiments which are to be blessed with victory the Angel of Light seems to beckon, and gently draw his men forward. What the Angel of Darkness can inflict is fear, horror, despair ; and it is given him also to be able to plant error and vain fancies in the minds of the doomed soldiery. By false dread he scares them. Whether he who conceived this prayer was soldier or priest, or soldier and priest in one, it seems to me that he knew more of the true nature of the strife of good infantry than he could utter in common prose. For indeed it is no physical power which rules the conflict between two well-formed bodies of foot.

\* This is part of the Russian prayer for victory :—‘ O Lord ! . . . .  
‘ hear us this day praying for these troops that are gathered together.  
‘ Bless and strengthen them, and give them a manly heart against their  
‘ enemies. Send them an Angel of Light, and to the enemies an Angel  
‘ of Darkness and Horror to scatter them, and place a stumbling-block  
‘ before them to weaken their hearts and turn their courage into  
‘ flight.’

The mere killing and wounding which occurs whilst a fight is still hanging in doubt, does not so alter the relative numbers of the combatants as in that way to govern the result. The use of the slaughter which takes place at that time lies mainly in the stress which it puts upon the minds of those who, themselves remaining unhurt, are nevertheless disturbed by the sight of what is befalling their comrades. In that way, a command of the means necessary for inflicting death and wounds is one element of victory. But it is far from being the chief one. Nor is it by perfectness of discipline, nor yet by a contempt of life, that men can assure to themselves the mastery over their foes. More or less all these things are needed ; but the truly governing power is that ascendancy of the stronger over the weaker heart which (because of the mystery of its origin) the churchman was willing to ascribe to angels coming down from on high.

The turning moment of a fight is a moment of trial for the soul, and not for the body ; and it is, therefore, that such courage as men are able to gather from being gross in numbers, can be easily outweighed by the warlike virtue of a few. To the stately ' Black Watch ' and the hot 93d, with Campbell leading them on, there was vouchsafed that stronger heart for which the brave pious Muscovites had prayed. Over the souls of the men in the columns there was spread, first the gloom, then the swarm of vain delusions, and at last the sheer horror which might be the work of the Angel of



CHAP. XVI. Darkness.\* The two lines marched straight on. The three columns shook. They were not yet subdued. They were stubborn ; but every moment the two advancing battalions grew nearer and nearer, and although—dimly masking the scant numbers of the Highlanders—there was still the white curtain of smoke which always rolled on before them, yet, fitfully, and from moment to moment, the signs of them could be traced on the right hand and on the left in a long, shadowy line, and their coming was ceaseless.

But, moreover, the Highlanders being men of great stature, and in strange garb, their plumes being tall, and the view of them being broken and distorted by the wreaths of the smoke, and there being, too, an ominous silence in their ranks, there were men among the Russians who began to conceive a vague terror—the terror of things unearthly ; and some, they say, imagined that they were charged by horsemen strange, silent, monstrous, bestriding giant chargers.† The columns were falling into that plight—we have twice before seen it this day—were falling into that plight, that its officers were moving hither and thither, with their drawn swords, were commanding, were imploring, were threatening, nay, were even laying hands on their soldiery, and striving to hold them fast in their places. This struggle is the last stage but one in the agony of a body of good infantry massed in close column. Unless help should come from elsewhere, the

\* See the next note.

† It was from the poor wounded prisoners that our people gathered the accounts of the impression produced upon their minds by the advance of the Highlanders.

three columns would have to give way ; but help came. From the high ground on our left another heavy column—the column composed of the two right Sousdal battalions—was seen coming down. It moved straight at the flank of the 93d.\*

So now, for the third time that day, a mass of infantry some fifteen hundred strong was descending upon the naked flank of a battalion in English array ; and, coming as it did from the extreme right of the enemy's position, this last attack was aimed almost straight at the file—the file of only two men—which closed the line of the 93d.

But some witchcraft, the doomed men might fancy, was causing the earth to bear giants. Above the crest or swell of ground on the left rear of the 93d, yet another array of the tall, bending plumes began to rise up in a long, ceaseless line, stretching far into the east ; and presently, in all the grace and beauty that marks a Highland regiment when it springs up the side of a hill, the 79th came bounding forward. Without a halt, or with only the halt that was needed for dressing the ranks, it sprang at the flank of the right Sousdal column, and caught it in its sin—caught it daring to march across the front of a battalion advancing in line.† Wrapped in the fire

\* ‘ While the 93d was still engaged, another body of the Russians ‘ from their extreme right *moved down direct on the flank of the 93d.*’ The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† I fear that the form of expression which I have used in the above sentence may be read as indicating a greater swiftness of movement than the actual truth would warrant. It is quite true that the 79th caught the Russian column in the act of marching across its front, and instantly attacked it. This, however, it did—not by a charge with the bayonet,



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XVI.Defeat of  
the four  
Russian  
columns.

thus poured upon its flank, the hapless column could not march, could not live. It broke, and began to fall back in great confusion ;\* and the left Sousdal column being almost at the same time overthrown by the 93d, and the two columns which had engaged the 'Black Watch' being now in full retreat, the spurs of the hill and the winding dale beyond became thronged with the enemy's disordered masses.†

Then again, they say, there was heard the sorrowful wail that bursts from the heart of the brave Russian infantry when they have to suffer defeat; but this time the wail was the wail of eight battalions; and the warlike grief of the soldiery could no longer kindle the fierce intent which, only a little before, had spurred forward the Vladimir column. Hope had fled.

After having been parted from one another by the nature of the ground, and thus thrown for some time into échelon, the battalions of Sir Colin's brigade were now once more close abreast; and since the men looked upon ground where the grey remains of the enemy's broken strength were mournfully rolling away, they could not but see that this, the revoir of the Highlanders, had chanced in a moment of glory.‡

but (as is rightly shown by the next sentence of the text) by pouring its fire into the flank of the advancing column.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* Speaking of the column which the enemy was moving flankwise from his extreme right, Sir Colin Campbell, in the same MS., says :— 'At this moment the 79th arrived, and opened fire upon them, causing 'them to retreat in great confusion.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† 'The 42d continued to advance firing in line, and drove these troops 'before them in confusion, and caused them great loss. *Their resistance 'was stubborn.*' The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ 'Thus the three regiments of the Highland Brigade were formed in

Knowing their hearts, and deeming that the time was one when the voice of his people might fitly enough be heard, the Chief touched or half lifted his hat in the way of a man assenting. Then along the Kourganè slopes, and thence west almost home to the Causeway, the hill-sides were made to resound with that joyous, assuring cry, which is the natural utterance of a northern people so long as it is warlike and free.\*

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Descending into the hollow where the vanquished troops flooded down, the waves of sound lit upon the throng and touched it, some imagined, as a breath of air touches a forest, lightly stirring its numberless leaves. And, in truth, it might be that even in this the hour of turmoil and defeat the long-suffering Muscovites were stirred with a new thought, for they never before that day had heard what our people call 'cheers;' and the sound is of such a kind that it startles men not born to freedom.

The three Highland regiments were now re-formed, and Sir Colin Campbell, careful in the midst of victory, looked to see whether the supports were near enough to warrant him in pressing the enemy's retreat with his Highland Brigade. He judged that, since Cathcart was still a good way off, the High-

'line on the inner crest of the enemy's position, having driven all the large bodies of troops which were posted there down into the valley.' The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* Many of our people who had heard the cheers of the Highlanders were hindered from seeing them by the bend of the ground, and they supposed that the cheers were uttered in charging. It was not so. The Highlanders advanced in silence.

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landers ought to be established on the ground which they had already won; and, never forgetting that, all this while, he was on the extreme left of the whole infantry array of the Allies, he made a bend in his line, which caused it to show a front towards the south-east as well as towards the south.

Stand  
made  
by the  
Ouglitz  
battalions.

The great column of the four Ouglitz battalions was still on the rise of the hill beyond the hollow. It was a force 3000 strong, was as yet untouched, and was glowing with the same fire and zeal as when it had come down in anger to support the attack upon Codrington's brigade. From the high and commanding ground where the column stood posted, its officers had been able to see and understand the numerical proportions of the combatants more clearly than any man could who was toiling in the smoke of the fight. Looking down from the slope, they had had to endure to see the gathered masses of their fellow-countrymen giving way to the slender lines of the red-coats; and not bearing to think that their Czar and his famed infantry were to be coerced by means so small and delicate, they became inflamed with a great indignation against their own people for being defeated; and presently the whole column came down the hill, undertaking nothing less than to stay the ebb of the tide. It thrust itself full against the retreating masses, and angrily strove to drive them back into the fight.\*

\* After speaking (as shown in the former notes) of the defeat of the Russian columns with which his brigade had been fighting, Sir Colin Campbell says that they 'were driven down into the valley upon a mass of troops which were placed in reserve on the heights in their rear,

But the Highland Brigade now again opened fire, and the enemy being left very helpless, and having no guns in battery wherewith to attempt a stand, the Ouglitz column was forced to turn.\* It went part way up to its old ground in order to be able to cover the retreat of the vanquished masses.†

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The enemy's neglect of other measures for covering the retreat.

The enemy's brave and devoted infantry, already abandoned by their ordnance, were now deserted in their great need by the Russian cavalry. Those horsemen, near 3000 strong, had been so palsied by orders or want of orders, or by some failure of spirit or capacity, that, although they were confronted by only a third of their number of horse, they had not only abstained from all challenge, but had twice

‘and an attempt was made by this reserve to move in advance, forcing forward the retiring troops.’ The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* ‘But fire being again opened, this reserve returned to its position, evidently with a view to cover the men who had been driven by the three Highland regiments.’ The MS. quoted at page 474.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† The conductors of the ‘Quarterly Review’ have thought fit to print in their publication the following words:—‘The Coldstreams took their place on the left of the Grenadiers, and shared in the battle. *But the battle was already dying out.* The Grenadiers had carried all before them; the redan was empty, and, stealing away in a direction to their own right, *the Russian columns were in full retreat.* It was at *this juncture* that Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders made their appearance. Pushing past Buller, Sir Colin's battalions, coming up in *échelon, arrived just in time to see the enemy in full flight,* and fired on them as each battalion got within range, *which, however, to the more forward of the three, was never a close range.*’—‘Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 567. In answer to this statement, I only say that I refer people to the extracts which I have given in the foregoing pages from the original report by Sir Colin Campbell, now lying before me. The report is official, and addressed to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Division. It is dated, as I have said, ‘Bivouac on the River Alma, 22d September 1854,’ and is signed ‘C. Campbell, Major-General.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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borne to look upon the open flank of a slender infantry line ascending to carry the heights, they themselves standing still all the while on the pleasant slopes of the hill ; and now, when the faithful soldiery might well look for charges of horsemen to cover the retreat, their cavalry still remained idle, though it lingered for a while on the field.\*

Our cavalry, long impatient of the restraint imposed upon it by the commander of the forces, had crossed the river without Lord Raglan's authority ; and although the nature of the ford and the upset of a gun-carriage had caused a good deal of delay, they reached the top of the hill soon after the Highlanders had crowned it. With Lord Lucan's sanction, three guns of the horse-artillery, under Captain Maude, were placed in battery, and three guns of Captain Brandling's troop, which came up at the time, were established on the right of the 42d. The fire of these six guns told cruelly upon the enemy's retreating masses ; and the like being done by other English batteries on the west of the Kourganè Hill, the slaughter was so great that, of those who fell, very many fell upon their comrades, making in some places small banks of slain or wounded men ; but where the round-shot ploughed into columns still

Slaughter  
of the  
retreating  
masses by  
artillery.

\* At an early period of the action, symptoms of this backwardness of the Russian cavalry had been sagaciously detected by the practised eye of Sir George Cathcart. Being on our extreme left, he had narrowly watched the enemy's horsemen, and even before the deployment of the 1st Division he had found himself able to assure Lord Raglan that nothing serious was likely to be attempted by the enemy's cavalry on the right bank of the river. This message was carried, I think, by Captain Elliot. It was of great value to Lord Raglan.

keeping something of their old coherence, there the men so fell that there were—but I care not to speak any more of the slaughter that is wrought by cannon when the infantry strife is all over.

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Of the four Russian Generals who took part in this fight of the Kourganè Hill three were wounded ; and nearly all the field-officers, together with very many officers of humbler grade who were on duty with the enemy's infantry in this part of the field, were either killed or wounded. The brave Vladimir and the Kazan corps suffered dreadful losses. The loss of the four Kazan battalions alone was put at no less than seventeen hundred.\*

Losses sus-  
tained by  
the enemy  
on the  
Kourganè  
Hill :

This achievement of the Guards and the Highland Brigade was so rapid, and was executed with so steadfast a faith in the prowess of our soldiery and the ascendancy of Line over Column, that in vanquishing great masses of infantry 12,000 strong,† and in going straight through with an onset which tore open the Russian position, the six battalions together did not lose 500 men.‡

by the  
Guards  
and High-  
landers.

Is it then with slight loss—is it thus in a swift

\* Chodasiewicz, p. 76. The estimate was not official, and was made under the influence of the despondency created by the retreat. It seems probable, therefore, that it exaggerated the loss.

† This figure is got at by first taking at their usual strength the 18 battalions which were on the Kourganè Hill, and then deducting 2500 (a very ample deduction) for losses which these troops sustained before the advance of the Guards.

‡ The exact number seems to be 438, and of this loss a large proportion was occasioned by the disaster which befell the Scots Fusilier Guards. Besides the casualties occurring to officers, which have been mentioned elsewhere, Cust of the Coldstream and Abercrombie of the 93d were killed, and Baring of the Coldstream was wounded.



CHAP. march of a few hundred paces on a hill-side, and with  
 XVI. all this seeming ease and grace, that the last of the  
 work is done whereby nation gains the mastery over  
 nation ?

Well, the truth is that, before it comes to a struggle like this, a State waging war may have to bear cruel losses—losses at sea, losses by pestilence and famine ; losses also inflicted by the enemy before he consents to give battle with his infantry upon open ground ; and it might happen to a nation to have to go through a campaign without coming once to the strife for which her people are fitted ; but when at last, after many an obstacle vanquished, after many a tormenting delay, the English array of two deep is suffered to reach open ground, and there measure its strength with gross columns, then the annals of our country have taught us that, unless there be an almost overwhelming disparity of numbers, there ought to be no misgiving about what will be the end of the fight.\*

\* The power which a nation may have of fighting in line depends, perhaps, mainly upon the constitutional temperament of its people, but in some degree also upon the question whether the high quality of its soldiery is fairly spread through the bulk of its army. No nation can expect to be able to fight in line if the prowess of its people is so abundantly gathered into the choice regiments as to leave the rest of the army in a condition of recognised inferiority. In Sir George Cathcart's book there is an interesting statement both of the causes which deprived the French of the power of fighting in line, and of the manner in which the predicament was met by the genius of Dumouriez. The system which Dumouriez contrived as a makeshift was attended with success so brilliant that it was not only acted upon by France herself throughout the revolutionary war, but was adopted by all the Continental Powers which came into conflict with her ; and until the English displayed to them once more the line formation, Bonaparte and the other imitators of Du-

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On the western slopes of the Kourganè Hill, no step, that I know of, was taken for covering the withdrawal of the defeated troops ; and if in the minds of Russian officers in that part of the field there yet remained any notion of trying to govern the retreat, their last hope was blasted by the new and ominous sign which then started full into view. On the fatal knoll, whence evil seemed always to come to the army of the Czar, there took place a sudden change. The horsemen with the white plumes were withdrawn from sight, and in a minute the knoll was surmounted with a scarlet arch. The arch was an arch built of English troops ranged in line across the summit, and thence on either side stretching down the steep

The scar-  
let arch  
on the  
knoll.

mouriez were encountered by nothing but their own system—their own system, worked out with inferior ability, and with means to which the system was ill adapted. Dumouriez's system is the one still used by France, and still rendered necessary by the manner in which the French army is constituted. A French general goes into action probably with a strong proportion of cavalry, but certainly with a very powerful artillery. He also has several Zouave, Chasseur, or other choice regiments, well fitted for skirmishing and for close, bold fighting in villages, enclosures, and broken ground ; but a great part of the rest of his army consists of masses, the fruit of the conscription—masses which may be so displayed as to give an appearance of impending strength, but which, he well knows, must not be placed in any very trying situation. Thus provided and thus clogged, he tries to make such a use of his artillery and of his choice regiments as shall *avert any extended conflict between formed battalions*. If he can do that (he did so in the Italian campaign of 1859, but at the horrible cost of sacrificing his choice regiments), he will have a very good chance of winning the battle. His difficulties, however, are likely to be increased by the progress of modern invention ; for the new artillery is making it hard for him to know where to place the less impetuous part of his army.

C H A P. XVI. shoulders of the knoll. And this arch of formed troops rose up in the heart of what had been the Russian position. Moreover, it faced towards the south-east, plainly showing that it was in the mind of the red-coats to cross the higher part of the Pass, and spring upon the flank of the troops which were retiring along the Great Causeway.

Then, perhaps, if not long before, the most hopeful of the Russian officers who looked from the Pass or from the western slopes of the Kourganè Hill, would be constrained to acknowledge that their army had fallen under the mastery of that gracious-looking horseman long seen on the knoll, who managed his charger and his field-glass with one hand and a half-empty sleeve. And, indeed, the mastery was now so complete that to any poor Muscovite soldier who was simply moving from the field with all the speed he had, his officers could hardly say with truth that they knew any better strategy than his.

It will be remembered that when Lord Raglan, after crossing the river, gained his first joyful glimpse of the knoll, he ordered up Adams's brigade in all haste. The force encountered some trouble in passing the river ; but it was keenly urged forward, and the moment it gained the summit of the knoll, Lord Raglan, with his own eye and voice, caused it to be drawn up in line. In order to make way for it on the top, the Headquarter Staff moved aside, and Lord Raglan so placed the line that it fronted towards the south-east.

If the battle at this time had been hanging in

doubt, Lord Raglan, placed as he was with these two battalions in his hand, could hardly have failed to make them the means of governing the result, for their advance would have threatened to roll up the enemy's line from its centre to its extreme right. As it was, the force became that scarlet bow on the knoll which seemed to present to the enemy the alternative of sheer flight or captivity.

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Lord Raglan, however, perceived that the cogency with which these battalions would act in hurrying the retreat, depended rather upon their mere appearance on this part of the field than upon any real power that they had of intercepting the enemy; for though the enemy might judge them to be very near, they were parted from him by deep hollows, and it was plain, that if they were moved forward before the knowledge of their presence had sufficiently spread, they would in a great measure lose their weight; because in crossing the hollow which divided them from the line of the retreat, they would necessarily drop out of sight. So, in order that the aspect of the force might sink into the enemy's heart, Lord Raglan kept it formed upon the summit of the knoll for two or three minutes. He then moved it towards the south-east.

Nearly at this time the column of the Ouglitz battalions began to fall back. Then there was no part of the Russian army in this part of the field which was not in full retreat.\*

Retreat of  
the last  
Russian  
battalions,  
which had  
hitherto  
stood their  
ground.

\* It was at this time that H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge summoned Colonel Hood to his side in order to have his thanks conveyed to the

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Final  
operations  
of the  
artillery.

Their  
losses.

The guns of Turner's battery were limbered up and pushed forward to a commanding spot further up in the Pass, and thence, at long range, they continued to pour their fire upon the enemy's retreating troops. In the performance of this duty they were aided by a French battery. Afterwards Lord Raglan sent an aide-de-camp with orders to cause the guns to advance to a more commanding ground which he had observed on their left front. The English battery advanced accordingly; but the officers in command of the French battery declined to move forward. It was at this time that Walsham was killed. He was the last officer who fell that day. Besides Walsham, our artillery corps lost two officers killed—namely, Dew and Cockrell; and of the rank and file, nine were killed, and twenty (besides one sergeant) were wounded.

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Lord  
Raglan  
crossing  
the Cause-  
way :

Lord Raglan now descended from the knoll whither Fortune, in her wild and puissant governance of human events, had happily chosen to lead him. Bending his steps towards the ground just won by the Duke of Cambridge's Division, he rode across the main Causeway.

At that very time, as I make it,\* there was riding

Grenadiers. Colonel Hood writes :—‘ The Duke of Cambridge, after the  
‘ Russians were beaten back, came and called me to the front to shake  
‘ me by the hand, and convey his thanks to the gallant Grenadiers.  
‘ This was most gratifying. It is true, I had the honour to command,  
‘ but they commanded themselves !’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

\* The General who describes his meeting with Prince Mentschikoff

towards Lord Raglan, and riding, too, along the same road, though at a distance of some few hundred yards, a man, confounded and troubled, who had helped to bring great woe on his country.

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Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff riding  
down to-  
wards him.

Clearly wanting in many, nay, perhaps, in most, of the qualities which make an able commander, Prince Mentschikoff was still a brave man. It could not but be that his heart was in the cause. A momentous battle had been raging. Of one of the contending armies he was the Commander-in-Chief. He was in full health. He yearned to be acting: yet from the moment when he intrusted to Kiriakoff the great column of the eight battalions, his mind had given no impress to events.

In order to see how this came to be possible, it must be remembered, first, that the tract of ground over which Prince Mentschikoff watched was somewhat broad; and, secondly, that all the decisive fighting of that day was condensed into a narrow period of time. The Allies had been advancing upon a front of five miles; and all the fights in which the combatants had engaged with their ranged battalions took place, as I reckon it, within a period of some thirty-five minutes. Now, if any man used to the saddle, and acquainted also with a country of open downs much divided by hollows and ravines, will fasten his mind upon any two hill-tops or

The part  
which he  
had been  
taking in  
the battle.

shows the stage to which the battle had reached at the time when the meeting took place: and it seems to me that that was just the stage in which the battle was when Lord Raglan crossed the great road. This is my only ground for supposing that the two incidents occurred simultaneously.

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other landmarks which he knows to be five miles asunder, and will then imagine a number of brief events to be happening, first in one part of this extended tract and then in another, but all within little more than half an hour, he will be able to understand how it might be possible for the Russian General to be eagerly riding from east to west and from west to east, yet always being so luckless as never once to strike in upon the ground where the event which he yearned to witness and to control was swiftly passing. It was not, I am sure, from any neglect or delinquency that Prince Mentschikoff came to be annulled during all the heavy stress of the battle.

We left the Prince handing over to Kiriakoff the charge of the great column of the eight battalions, and it is only by conjecture that I can form an idea of what became of him during the critical period of several minutes which then immediately followed. He would not have abandoned the personal command of the column which he had eagerly gathered together for a great enterprise, unless he had been dragged away by tidings of what was happening in the English part of the field. Thither, therefore, he would ride, and he would ride, no doubt, with the knowledge (for that was what his last tidings must have taught him) that the English had stormed and carried the Great Redoubt. But he would have to cross the great road, and before he got thither he would see—and would see, one may imagine, with unspeakable astonishment—that the columns which formed his

‘great reserves’ were no longer in their place. Finding that they were retiring, or had already retired, and knowing nothing of the way in which Lord Raglan had driven them from the field by the use of his two guns on the knoll, the Prince would be likely to ride in the direction which the reserve columns took, very eager to find some man upon whom to vent his anger. The minutes it took him to ride after the reserves to seek out the cause of their retreat, and to come back to the front, would be those very minutes in which the position held by the centre and the right of the Russian army was falling into the hands of the English.

This, I repeat, is only a conjectural mode of filling the chasm which is left open by the Russian narrators ; but the spot where the Prince is found when he reappears in the eye of History, is exactly the one in which those who adopt my surmise would expect to see him riding. For it was by the great road, where his reserves had been posted, that Prince Mentschikoff came back into that part of the field with which the English had dealt. When last he saw it, the position, immensely strong by nature, was held in the gripe of powerful batteries, and battalions standing rigid as granite. Since that time, it is true, some hours had passed, but it was only a few minutes before that he had been the assailant in the other part of the field, placing a mighty column in the hands of Kiriakoff with orders to make an onslaught upon Canrobert’s Division. Now—he gazed, and gazed again, being slow to understand—being slow to let in the belief—

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Prince  
Mentschi-  
koff’s re-  
appear-  
ance in the  
English  
part of  
the field.



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His meet-  
ing with  
Gortscha-  
koff.

that the grey, rolling masses which approached him were the ruins of two-thirds of his army. But presently he came upon a sight hardly less strange, hardly less shocking to him, than his retreating soldiery. He met on the road a lone man—a lone man on foot, walking away from the field. He looked, and came to make out that this lone pedestrian was Prince Gortschakoff—Prince Gortschakoff, the chief to whom he had intrusted the command of the whole centre and the whole right wing of his army. ‘What is this?’ ‘What is the matter?’ ‘Why are you on foot?’ ‘Why are you alone?’ These, as was natural, were the questions hurled at Prince Gortschakoff by his troubled, amazed commander. ‘My horse,’ said Gortschakoff, ‘was killed near the river. I am alone, because all the aides-de-camp and officers of my Staff have been killed or wounded. I have received six shots;’ and then, in a spirit scarce worthy of historic moments, scarce matching with the greatness of the disaster which his overthrow had brought upon a proud and mighty empire, Prince Gortschakoff showed the rents which shot had made in his clothes.\*

He does  
not at this  
time effect  
any opera-  
tion for  
covering  
the re-  
treat.

At this time, so far as I know, Prince Mentschikoff used none of the means by which, though forced to retreat, skilled commanders can make themselves feared. On the very road where he stood, the Czar’s faithful infantry—infantry famous for its heroism in the trying hour of a retreat—was left to extricate

\* It is Prince Gortschakoff himself who gives this account of his meeting with Prince Mentschikoff.

itself from the field by brute flight. It would seem that Prince Mentschikoff's authority—already for some time neutralised by the mischances which, all the day long, had been throwing him into the wrong part of the field—now slipped from out of his hands. He had no longer a grasp of his army. A little later he was seen borne along with the ebb, a dismal unit in the throng. Endued with a high spirit, and having a good deal of the pride which a man may justly take in his country so long as it is warlike and honest, he broke out into a loud, angry cry. 'It is a 'disgrace,' he said, 'for a Russian soldier to retreat!' An officer, hearing his words, and being maddened, partly by the defeat, and partly, as they say, by strong drink, fiercely answered his general, and told him to his face, in the hearing of the soldiery, that if he had ordered the men to stand they would have held their ground.\* To this depth of wretchedness Prince Mentschikoff fell in the nineteenth month from the time when, in the name of a mighty empire, and under the gaze of all Europe, he came down into the Bosphorus with commission to trample upon the Ottoman State.

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He is carried along with the retreating masses.

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Meantime Evans, still on our right front, had been rejoined by the two regiments detached under Adams. The Scots Fusiliers had resumed their place in the centre of the brigade of Guards. The Light Division, re-formed, had followed the advance of the Duke of

The array of the English army on the ground they had won.

\* Chodasiewicz.

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Cambridge. Sir Richard England, pushing forward towards his right front, had taken up ground on one of the eastern spurs of the Telegraph Height. At the opposite extremity of our line, Cathcart had established himself on the left rear of the Highland Brigade. Facing almost due south, pushed forward to the reverse of the slopes which made the strength of the Russian position, and ranged upon a front of two miles, the British infantry looked down upon the enemy's retreating masses.

Opera-  
tions of  
the Eng-  
lish ca-  
valry.

At this time Lord Raglan sent the Adjutant-General with his orders to the cavalry. Those orders, however, did not authorise the operations by which it is usual for horsemen to gather in the fruits of a victory. A commander, even in battle, must not forget the campaign. The Western Powers were invading a province of Russia with forces which had to march through an open country. Their pretension to wage such war as that depended upon their having at their command all the three arms of the service; therefore the strength of the arm in which they were the most weak was the measure of their power as invaders. The French, as we saw, had no cavalry, and the English had rather more than a thousand sabres and lances. With such a force, thrown forward to intercept the enemy's retreating masses, many prisoners, together, perhaps, with some guns, might have been taken; and it was to be expected that blows of this kind would aggravate the despondency of the beaten army. But Lord Raglan judged that no practicable capture of trophies or prisoners

was worth the risk of losing a material part of his small brilliant cavalry force. He therefore declined to let his horsemen push forward without the support of a powerful artillery ; and the orders he sent by the Adjutant-General directed that the cavalry should escort the foot-batteries to the front. In delivering this instruction, Estcourt cautioned Lord Lucan, and told him ‘ that the cavalry were not to ‘ attack.’

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Lord Cardigan, with one-half of the cavalry force, was directed to escort the guns which were to go to the right, whilst Lord Lucan in person went forward with the rest of the cavalry, and escorted the guns advancing on our left. Lord Lucan, riding in advance of the guns with a squadron of the 17th Lancers, came upon many of the enemy’s stragglers in retreat, and he ordered the horsemen who were with him, supported by another squadron, to pursue, and take prisoners. A troop of the 11th Hussars had been ordered (it was said by Lord Raglan himself) to do the same thing, and the 17th had already taken a great many prisoners, when the operation was stopped by special orders from Lord Raglan. What Lord Raglan had meant was, that the troopers employed in taking prisoners should be spread out as skirmishers ; and when he saw that they were acting in serried ranks, and were going on far in advance, he became anxious lest some of the enemy’s guns should be brought to bear upon them, and occasion him a loss in that one description of force with which the Allies were scantily provided. He therefore sent

C H A P. first one and then another Staff officer to the com-  
 XVI. mander of the cavalry, with orders to give up the  
 pursuit of prisoners, and return to the duty of  
 escorting the guns. Thereupon Lord Lucan recalled  
 the troopers in advance, and the prisoners they had  
 taken were set free.

## XXXVII.

Progress of  
 a French  
 artillery-  
 train along  
 the pla-  
 teau from  
 west to  
 east.

It will be remembered that at the time when the  
 head of the first French Division was pushed back by  
 the 'great column of the eight battalions,' Canrobert  
 was still without his artillery. But these batteries,  
 having been sent down to Almatamack, and having  
 there crossed the river, had at last been brought up  
 to the plateau, and (along with some guns belong-  
 ing to Bosquet's Division) they were now travelling  
 eastward. In the part of the field where Bosquet  
 stood, and from which this long train of artillery had  
 commenced its eastward journey, there was no enemy  
 at hand; and even when the guns had come to within  
 a short distance of the ground in front of Canrobert's  
 right wing, there was no Russian battalion which  
 could be seen by the French artillerymen; for the  
 train was moving along a hollow which, so long as a  
 man rode low down, was deep enough to hinder him  
 from seeing far either on his right hand or on his  
 left. But some of the officers who were with the  
 guns now thought it was time to obtain a wider view  
 of the ground, and they therefore rode part way up  
 the slope which overhung the ravine towards their

Officers  
 riding  
 with the  
 train de-  
 scribing the



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right. Before they had yet got quite up to the flat ground above the ravine, they suddenly stopped; for, monstrous, immense, and obtruded before them on the plateau, at a distance of only a few hundred yards, they saw a grey, oblong-cut block—saw what in one moment they knew to be a mass of Russian infantry—a mass of unwonted size—standing rigidly built in close column. This was the great ‘column of the eight battalions’—the dumb, gliding phantasm of the Telegraph Height, whose bare aspect had given strange speed to the breathless French aide-de-camp on the knoll, and had just been constraining the head of Canrobert’s Division to fall back, and drop under the crest. With that warlike swiftness of thought which is natural to the French in the hour of battle, the officers who caught sight of this apparition darted straight upon the perception of what ought to be done. Some of the guns were brought up to a part of the slope from which, without being easily seen, they could throw their fire into the column.\*

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‘column  
of the  
eight bat-  
talions.’

Suddenly Kiriakoff found that his close mass of eight battalions was cruelly rent by shot and shell coming from the west. Without stopping to find out by calm scrutiny the quarter whence the fire really came, Kiriakoff hastily accepted the belief that it came from the sea; and in order to place his troops out of the reach of the ships, he began to move off

The co-  
lumn is  
torn by  
artillery-  
fire.

\* See the Plan. It is taken from a sketch which was made for me by a French officer who was present with the artillery thus brought to bear on the column.



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XVI.

Kiriakoff  
moves it.

his column in an inland or easterly direction, taking nearly the same route as that by which he had advanced.\* Whilst he thus marched, shot and shells continued to cut their way into the midst of his hapless column, inflicting a dreadful slaughter. This trial—the trial of men who have to march under a shattering fire without being able to strike one blow

\* At one time the French stated (see Ducasse, ‘*Precis Historique*’) that the retreat of this great column was the result of a fight with their infantry; but no such representation is now persisted in, for the French official statement (agreeing in that respect with Kiriakoff) says fairly that what forced the column to retreat was—not any sort of combat with the French infantry, but the fire of the batteries mentioned in the text. After describing the advance of the great Russian column, the official French statement says:—‘*Déjà cette colonne était parvenue à 150 mètres de la droite du 7<sup>e</sup> de ligne, et la situation devenait très critique lorsque les deux batteries de la division Canrobert (qui avaient été forcées d’aller passer au gué d’Almatamak), et les deux batteries de la division Bosquet arrivent au galop sur le champ de bataille, ouvrent un feu terrible contre la colonne Russe, lui font éprouver des pertes considérables et la forcent à la retraite.*’—‘*Atlas Historique et Topographique de la Guerre d’Orient.*’ The only words in this official statement which might produce a wrong impression are those which describe the guns as coming up at a gallop. When the train was travelling along the hollow, it no doubt moved as fast as it properly could; but when the guns were brought part way up the slope, and unlimbered and placed in battery, the operation was performed so skilfully, and, so to speak, so stealthily, that Kiriakoff never made out the quarter whence destruction came, and imagined that his column was rent by the gunnery of the ships. My knowledge of the exact way in which these guns were brought to bear upon the hapless column is derived from a French officer who was present with the guns, and who took part in seizing the occasion which was presented by the sudden discovery of the column. When an account of an infantry fight with ‘the column of the eight battalions’ had once gone out to the world, it may seem strange that the story should be afterwards repudiated by any French personages writing or drawing officially; but, besides that there is really a strong, honest leaning towards truth in the ‘*Atlas Historique*,’ it is obvious that the French artillery officers, whose skill and quickness had shattered the great column and driven it from the field, might justly and most cogently call upon the authorities to withdraw the falsehood which gave to French infantry the credit justly due to French gunners.

at their slayers—was borne by the Russian soldiery with a great fortitude. Order was maintained; and, torn as it was from moment to moment, the column marched grandly. Along with the column there were two batteries; but, far from helping to cover its retreat, these guns were suffered to become a burthen; for several of the horses having been wounded or killed, the task of dragging off the cannon was thrown upon soldiers. It would seem, however, that the natural awe with which Canrobert's troops had looked upon the advance of the huge column was not lifted off from their minds when first they saw it withdrawing, for no French infantry moved forward to press the retreat of the eight battalions. 'The French,' says Kiriakoff, 'did not follow us. I am ignorant of the reason why. Maybe they did not want to stand between the fire of their ships and our regiments; maybe the sight of the two bodies of Hussars, headed by Colonel Wailinovich, may have checked them.\* In fact, I cannot explain their conduct.' By pursuing his easterly march for some time, Kiriakoff brought his column out of the artillery-fire which had been tearing it, and he came at last to a halt upon a spot on the right rear of the Telegraph. Although it was the destiny of this 'column of the eight battalions' to be able to put a great stress upon the French army, and afterwards to be cruelly shattered

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Its de-  
meanour.

It is not  
followed  
by the  
French,  
and is  
halted on  
the right  
rear of the  
Telegraph.

The part  
this great  
column  
had taken  
in the  
battle.

\* The translation I have says 'annoyed them,' but I gather from the context that the word I have ventured to substitute more accurately represents the General's meaning.

C H A P. by cannon, yet, from first to last, the body which thus  
 XVI. did and thus suffered was without an occasion for  
 firing a shot.

## XXXVIII.

A flanking  
 fire from  
 the French  
 artillery is  
 poured  
 upon the  
 troops on  
 the Tele-  
 graph  
 Height.

Condition  
 of things  
 in that  
 part of the  
 field.

Moved from west to east along the top of the plateau, the French guns, which had dealt with the column, were now once more in battery, and upon ground from which they threw a flanking fire in the direction of the troops which still remained on the slopes in front of the Telegraph Height. The only infantry forces which had been placed in that part of the field were the four Taroutine and the four 'Militia' battalions; but, supposing that the breaking-up of the 'Militia' battalions was by this time virtually complete, Kiriakoff had no infantry on the whole Telegraph Height except the four Taroutine battalions, and the stricken, the bleeding column which he had just withdrawn from the front. Yet at this time, though Kiriakoff evidently did not know of the proximity of many of the French battalions which were hanging back close under the plateau, there were in reality some thirty thousand Frenchmen and Turks standing on ground from which, in a period of only a few minutes, they might close in both upon his front and his left flank. Without apprehending the extent to which he was encompassed, Kiriakoff came to see that the troops he had in front of the Telegraph must not be left standing under a cross-fire of artillery. He had not in his

own hands the means of repelling or silencing the guns which were pouring their fire from the west along the summit of the plateau ; and being without orders, and even, it seems, without tidings, he tried to find a clue for the guidance of his conduct by learning the course which the battle was taking in the English part of the field. Hitherto his glances in that direction had brought him no comfort. Even so early as the time when he pushed back the head of Canrobert's Division, he had found that the English were gaining the ascendancy over the centre and right wing of the Russians. 'When,' he writes—  
 'when the first success of the enemy had been  
 'stopped on the left wing, in the centre\* and the  
 'right wing\* the turn of affairs was beginning to be  
 'against us. I cannot judge the particulars of that  
 part of the battle, being fully occupied by doing  
 'my own duty, and I could not observe as well the  
 'events on my right ; but thus far I could see, that  
 'the enemy had taken up a strong position on the  
 'left bank of the Alma.' This, at the moment of his success against Canrobert, had been Kiriakoff's perception of the course which events were taking in the English part of the field ; and now, when he looked once more to where the red-coats were moving, he saw that in that part of the field the battle was lost to the Czar. He saw not only that the Causeway batteries had been withdrawn, and that upon their site English regiments were established

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The result of what Kiriakoff had hitherto observed in the English part of the field.

He now sees that in that part of the field the English have won the battle.

\* i. e., those portions of the Russian army which were opposed to the English.

CH A P. (apparently he had seen that before \*), but that Ments-  
 XVI. chikoff's infantry reserves were in retreat ; and that, looking eastward along the Russian side of the river as far as his eye could reach, he was unable to see the end of the slender red line which marked the advance of the English supports. Even if he did not observe or understand the ominous silence of the Great Redoubt, he could not fail to see that the withdrawal of the Causeway batteries, and of the infantry reserves, was not only an abandonment of the great ' position ' on the Alma,' but was also a retreat with which it was his obvious duty to conform. For that reason he first ordered his troops to retire to a part of the Great Post-road which lay on the right rear of his position ; and when he got to that spot, he found that the victory won by Lord Raglan was by that time so well assured as to oblige him to continue his retrograde march, and conform at once to the movements of the seven-and-twenty battalions then yielding to their English assailants.

He conforms to the movement of the troops retreating before the English

' Impossible,' writes Kiriakoff, after speaking of the direction in which French artillery had been brought to bear upon his troops in front of the Telegraph—' impossible to leave the left wing thus ' exposed to a cross-fire, and I could not send or wait ' for orders from the Commander-in-Chief. The right ' wing† having already begun a very decisive movement of retreat, I commanded the march towards

\* When he said that the English ' had taken up a strong position on ' the left ' [*i. e.*, the Russian] ' bank of the river.'

† *i. e.*, troops opposed to the English.

‘ the main road, on either side of which I ranged the  
 ‘ troops. This road was beyond the height where  
 ‘ our principal reserves had stood. Then I became  
 ‘ aware that our right wing\* was indeed retreating;  
 ‘ and, wishing to conform as much as possible with  
 ‘ their movements, I ordered a second march towards  
 ‘ a height beyond the road.† . . . The enemy  
 ‘ did not follow us.’‡

\* *i. e.*, troops opposed to the English.

† If full faith be given to this testimony of Kiriakoff, it is of course conclusive of the question as to where the Russian retreat began; for he speaks as an eyewitness of the retreat which had taken place in front of the English, and he was the actual ordainer of the retrograde movement which he deemed to be the necessary consequence of the defeat which his countrymen had sustained at the hands of the English. It may be said that it was for his interest to make this statement, and that therefore he is not an impartial witness. This is true: but, besides that his character for honour and high spirit places him above the suspicion of gross and intentional misstatement, it happens that his account is corroborated in the most distinct terms by Anitchkoff, an apparently impartial narrator. Anitchkoff, when he wrote, was an officer on the General Staff of the Russian army, writing under circumstances which gave him considerable means of knowing the truth, and which made it his duty to hold the balance evenly between Gortschakoff, Kiriakoff, and Kvetzinski; yet in clear words he corroborates Kiriakoff. After speaking of the centre and right wing of the Russians—the troops with which the English had been dealing—and of their retreat ‘ to the former position two versts to the south,’ he adds immediately these words: ‘ Whither they were’ [remark the word presently coming] ‘ whither they were followed by the left wing, who had withstood and repelled the attack of the whole of the four French Divisions until the moment of the general retreat.’

‡ Kiriakoff does not himself say that he made any of the arrangements commonly resorted to by a general who has to withdraw his troops from the enemy’s presence; but the French authorities say for him that he covered his retreat with a powerful artillery. The whole tenor of Kiriakoff’s memorial leads to the impression that, at the time of his retreating from the Telegraph Height, there was no French infantry near enough to induce him to take the usual means for covering his retreat. It is probable, however, that, without any express orders from their divisional general, officers commanding Russian batteries may have found and seized opportunities of using their guns.

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His retreat  
is not  
molested  
by French  
infantry.

In their retreat the Taroutine battalions — the troops which marched in what was then the rear of Kiriakoff's force—were plied with the fire of cannon, but were not at all vexed by French infantry.\*

## XXXIX.

Great con-  
flux of  
French  
troops to-  
wards the  
Telegraph.

When Kiriakoff's battalions had withdrawn, Canrobert's Division and D'Aurelle's brigade — that brigade followed close by Prince Napoleon—moved straight upon the Telegraph. This took place at the moment when, in the English part of the field, our Grenadier Guards were stepping up from the river's bank to engage the enemy's columns.† The two Zouave Regiments, which stood side by side on the left front of Canrobert's force, and, almost at the same moment, the 39th Regiment of the line—the regiment which formed the head of D'Aurelle's column—pushed swiftly forward towards the Telegraph; and some of the more active men of these soldiery, running on in advance of their comrades, successively planted the colours of their three regiments on the stump of the unfinished pillar, or on the scaffolding which the builders had placed there. It is said that, whilst he was in the very act of thus uplifting the colours of his regiment, Lieutenant Poitevin of the 39th was struck by a shot and killed.

When soldiers in battle break loose from the

\* Chodasiewicz. This writer was a field-officer in the Taroutine corps, and his statements (almost all of them valuable) are an excellent authority in all that relates to the operations of his own regiment.

† See, in the Appendix, the grounds on which I rest this statement.

guidance of their commanders, they so feel the need of a purpose, that a tree, a house, or a windmill—any object, in short, which stands out plain in the landscape—may have power to draw men towards it; and when a conflux like this has once set in, the eddy soon begins to run strong. First three or four eager and venturous men, then clusters, then scores, then hundreds, then thousands of panting soldiers were thronging from several quarters upon a single point. There could not but be a great turmoil. Joy, warlike ardour, the instinctive longing of the young soldier in his first battle to keep on discharging his musket, and perhaps (with some) the sight of the body of Lieutenant Poitevin—all these were causes much more than enough to account for abundance of firing on the part of the French troops; and when the mound of smoke thus generated was once piled up, the soldiers would be likely to continue firing into it for some time. Besides, the French artillery at this period was playing upon the enemy's retreating battalions; and, on the other hand, it may be believed that the Russians were covering their retreat by a more or less diligent use of their ordnance. It is probable that this fire of the Russian artillery took effect at a time when the heads of the French columns had already thronged up to the Telegraph—for it is certain that several of the Zouaves were there struck down; and although it is made plain that no Russian infantry were intentionally placed at the Telegraph with orders to make a stand, there is no difficulty in supposing that a knot of Russian soldiers

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Turmoil  
and sup-  
posed fight  
at the  
Telegraph.



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may have been lingering about near the scaffolding of the turret, and may have remained long enough to have an opportunity of firing into the heads of the great columns which were converging upon the spot and provoking a fire in return. In that way, though the Russian accounts show no trace of it, there was perhaps a farewell interchange of shots.

Be this as it may, it is certain that (from the causes already shown) there was much of the appearance of a real fight at the Telegraph ; and, until the Russian narratives brought other light to bear, it was believed that the French and the Russian infantry had met in fierce strife at this spot. On the other hand, the enemy's accounts represent that Kiriakoff's troops withdrew quietly from the Telegraph Height, without being even annoyed by French infantry, and without making or trying to make a defensive stand either at the pillar of the Telegraph or on any ground near it ; and unless all the Russian narrators, though speaking with very different and even opposite feelings, have united to join in an unaccountable\* perversion of the truth, it must now be held certain that the impetuous Zouaves, no less than their despised and peaceful comrades of the line, were precluded by sheer want of opponents from the means of engaging in that dreadful scene of hand-to-hand fighting and slaughter which, under the

\* I say 'unaccountable,' because, if the French story were true, the stand which must have been made at the Telegraph by Kiriakoff's infantry would have been an achievement so heroic, that, far from disowning, or concealing, or forgetting it, every good Russian would have made it his pride and his boast.

description of 'the combat at the Telegraph,' has found a place in French annals.\*

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At length the state of the smoke allowed men to see that there were no Russians near. Then the close of what resembled a fight was joyfully hailed as a victory.

From the time when the bulk of the French advanced to the banks of the river, Marshal St Arnaud had placed himself in the midst of Prince Napoleon's battalions ; and the Prince's Division having been kept low down in the bottom during the critical period of the battle, it must have been hard for a man who remained jammed down with those troops to get a fair view of what was going on ;† but the Marshal, it seems, now galloped up to the Telegraph, and sharing, no doubt, in the belief that there had been a hot fight there, and inferring also that the fight had been won by the thousands of eager Zouaves whom he saw thronging round the pillar, he turned, it is said, to these his most trusted soldiery, and said to them, 'I thank you, my 'Zouaves !'

Marshal  
St Arnaud.

Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions, with D'Aurelle's brigade betwixt them, were then massed about the Telegraph upon a very small space of ground.

\* The narratives which French historians have given of this supposed fight, together with my reasons for excluding their stories from my text, will be found in the Appendix.—*End of Note to 1st, 2d, and 3d Editions.*

See also now the 'farther note' in the part which forms No. VIII. of the Appendix.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† See the Plan (taken from the 'Atlas Historique'), which shows the Marshal's position.

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XVI.

## XL.

Opportunity of cutting off some of the enemy's retreating masses.

Vain endeavours of Lord Raglan and of Airey to cause the requisite advance of French troops.

At this time, two messengers came in haste from different parts of the English field of battle: they both came with the same object. The first of these was an aide-de-camp sent straight from Lord Raglan to the nearest French troops he could find; the other was Colonel Steele, who came charged with the request which General Airey from another part of the field had taken upon himself to address to Marshal St Arnaud. Whilst the Russian battalions were retreating before the English infantry, Lord Raglan in one part of the field, and Airey in another, had, almost at the same moment, observed the same opportunity, and fastened upon the same mode of seizing it. Each of them had seen that masses of the retreating infantry were moving in such a direction and through a gorge which so straitened their movements, that their retreat could be cut off or turned into a ruinous disaster by the immediate advance of a few battalions pushing forward from the left of the French line, and bearing towards the great road.

When Lord Raglan's aide-de-camp reached the Telegraph, he found that the troops he came upon had just halted two hundred yards in front of the building, and that the column with which he sought to find the Prince was under a good deal of excitement. Used to the silence of English troops, the aide-de-camp was a good deal struck with the effect produced by thousands of soldiers in heavy masses

talking all at the same time. The aide-de-camp was accompanied by Vico, the French Commissioner accredited to the English Headquarters. Vico conveyed Lord Raglan's wishes to the General commanding the brigade, and was told in answer that the troops would advance. This, however, they did not do.

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The similar request which Colonel Steele addressed to St Arnaud was met by a refusal. The Marshal excused himself for declining to advance by saying that his troops had left their knapsacks in the valley below.

Marshal St Arnaud was able to remain all day on horseback; and it does not appear that the state of his health at this time was such as to hinder him from using his intellectual powers; but he did not place himself in a part of the field from which a general could hope to be able to govern events. And from the time when he despatched his ill-devised orders to the 4th Division, I have not been able to perceive that his mind at all touched the battle.

St Arnaud. The extent to which his mind was brought to bear on the battle.

## XLI.

General Forey, perhaps, had hoped that in the presence of the enemy he might be able to cover over the mark which his reputation contracted on the 2d of December—on the day when, along with Maupas's commissaries of police, he suffered himself to be publicly used as the assailant and the jailer of the unarmed legislature of France; but if by

Situation of Forey with Lourmel's brigade.



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XVI.

The rest  
of the  
French  
army  
arrayed  
upon the  
plateau.

chance this man shall be brought some day to his account, it will not be by an appeal to the memory of the Alma that he will be able to avert his punishment. With Lourmel's brigade, as we saw, he had followed the steps of Bouat, marching off to the peaceful sea-shore, and becoming null in the battle. When D'Aurelle was already at the Telegraph, Forey, with Lourmel's brigade, had but just crossed the river at its very mouth, and was more than two miles distant from the nearest of the enemy's forces. But with the exception of this annulled brigade under Forey, and the two Turkish battalions which had been left to guard the baggage, the whole of the French and Ottoman troops were now ranged upon the plateau of the Telegraph Height. Their array was upon ground less advanced than that taken up by the English. It fronted towards the east.

## XLII.

The posi-  
tion taken  
up by  
Kiriakoff.

When Kiriakoff's movement of retreat had brought him to the ridge which lay at a distance of nearly two miles in rear of the Telegraph, he forthwith took up a position, and once more showed a front to the Allies. Having with him not only his own artillery, but that also which Prince Mentschikoff had brought from the centre at the commencement of the action, and being in company at this time with some of the cavalry, he was able to complete the semblance of something like a defensive stand by placing thirty guns in battery, and covering his left front with

several squadrons of hussars. By this wise and soldierly attitude, Kiriakoff masked the confusion into which the rest of the Czar's army had been thrown, and caused the Allied commanders to believe that they had still a formidable enemy in their front.

C H A P.  
XVI.

The effect produced upon the Allies by his soldierly attitude.

Not only did Kiriakoff thus face round, but he even caused the body of cavalry which he had on his left to move forward; and it happened that this advance of the Russian hussars brought them down to a spot which was near the ground where Lord Cardigan rode with his squadrons. It seems, however, that there was an intervening bend or rise in the formation of the ground which prevented these two hostile bodies of cavalry from being visible the one to the other.

He moves forward some cavalry.

Lord Raglan, with some of his Staff, had ridden forward to this part of the field. He met the advance of the enemy's squadrons with an almost cold gaze. The joyous animation with which, from the summit of the knoll, he had watched the changeful battle—this had passed. He wore the look—men came to know it too well before he died—the look which used to show that he was feeling the stress of the French Alliance, and dissembling the pain of his anger.

Lord Raglan's vexation.

### XLIII.

The world was old enough to know that, in order to be made to yield its natural fruits, a victory ought to be followed up; and that, in general, a victorious army is made to press on in pursuit, until nightfall

Question as to the way in which the retreat should be pressed.



C H A P. or other good cause makes it prudent or needful to  
 XVI. halt. But the maps of this Crim Tartary gave no  
 indication of the existence of any fresh water be-  
 tween the Alma and the Katcha—a stream some  
 seven or eight miles distant. It seemed that unless  
 the troops which might be pushed forward could  
 reach the Katcha—and reach it, too, in strength  
 enabling them to establish themselves on its banks—  
 they would have to bivouac on the hills without the  
 means of allaying the rage of thirst. Except at the  
 mouth of the Alma, or at the mouth of the Katcha,  
 the nature of the coast did not allow free communi-  
 cation between the Allied armies and the ships. It  
 was half-past four o'clock. Soon after six the sun  
 would set. Since morning the soldiery of both  
 armies had toiled under a burning sun. They were  
 very weary ; and many of them—indeed almost all  
 the English — were in a weakly state of health.  
 These were reasons which made it needful for the  
 Allies to effect their farther pursuit of the enemy  
 by preconcerted arrangements. They were not, I  
 think, reasons which warranted a protracted halt  
 of the whole of the Allied armies on the heights  
 of the Alma. Lord Raglan had been swift to see  
 what ought to be done by the Allies, and not less  
 swift to determine what he himself could offer to do.  
 He deemed that the Allies ought to push forward  
 instantly with such portions of their force as were  
 the least wearied. We have seen the share which  
 the English soldiery had had in the work of the  
 day ; but, compared with the troops of the 1st, the

Lord  
 Raglan's  
 opinion.

2d, and the Light Divisions, Sir Richard Eng-land's Division was fresh. With that force of infantry, together with the whole of his cavalry and horse-artillery, Lord Raglan desired to press forward ; but he required that a portion of the French army should take part in this movement, for he did not understand that the rout of the enemy's forces was so complete and irremediable as to put them in the power of one English division of infantry and a thousand horsemen. Besides, he well knew that (even though the aid should be given for mere form's sake and not for actual use) there was a political reason which forbade him from pressing forward without making sure that his advance would be accompanied by a portion of the French army ; for it was nearly certain that an English general advancing on the afternoon of a battle, and leaving his sensitive allies in the rear, would so mortify the French people as to put the alliance, and even the ruler who contrived it, in grievous peril.

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XVI.

His plan.

Accordingly, General Airey proposed to General Martimprey, the Chief of the French Staff, that the whole of our cavalry, together with one English division of infantry, and such portion of the French army as the Marshal might think fit, should move forward and press the enemy's retreat.

It is  
proposed  
to the  
French.

The answer was that any further advance of the French on that day was 'impossible ;' and the necessity of returning to where the knapsacks had been laid was once more used as the reason which forbade all forward movement. Men may fairly surmise that

They de-  
cline to  
move.





C H A P.  
XVI.

Question  
whether a  
sterner  
method  
with the  
French  
might  
have  
answered  
better.

a sterner method than that which Lord Raglan took would have served his purpose better, and that if he had simply ordered his cavalry and Sir Richard England's Division to advance, M. St Arnaud would have been compelled to follow. But to act upon such a speculation as that would have been hardly consistent with the duties imposed upon the English General. Lord Raglan, it is true, was a soldier acting against an enemy in the field ; but he was something more : he was a diplomatist specially charged with the care of that fragile structure on which the war was resting ; he was charged with the care of the French alliance. Except on grounds of paramount cogency, he had no right to break loose from the fetters by which his Queen's Government had thought fit to bind their country.

#### XLIV.

The close  
of the  
battle.

Lord Raglan watched the advance of the Russian cavalry until he saw it come to a halt. Then it seemed—he was used of old to read such signs—it seemed that he regarded this movement and this halt of the enemy's horse as a kind of farewell gesture which marked the end of the battle ; for, turning his horse's head, he slowly rode back to the ground where his infantry stood.

The cheers  
which  
greet Lord  
Raglan.

When our soldiers observed the approach of the Headquarter Staff, they looked eagerly into the group that they might see if amongst the plumed horsemen the Chief himself were coming ; and the moment

they got a sure sight of the frock with the half-empty sleeve, it came into their hearts to offer to their General that which is of other worth than vulgar treasures—nay, that which in common times the world cannot give. They brought him the greeting which a proud soldiery can bestow upon their chief in the hour of victory and upon the field of battle. Begun at first by one corps, taken up by the next, and then by the next again, the cheers flew on from regiment to regiment, and tracked the chief in his path, till, all along from the spurs of the Telegraph Height to the easternmost bounds of the crest which had been won by the Highland Brigade, those desolate hills in Crim Tartary were made to sound like England. And the sound travelled back to the plateau on which the French were halted, and descended also the slopes where our dead and wounded lay thick. There many a red-coat, so wounded that the roar of artillery and the tramp of battalions had become to him mere idle sounds, would yet find his heart stirred anew by the English cheers on the heights, and would raise himself on his arm, and strive so to use his last strength that, in the swelling tumult of the voices above, his own faltering ‘hurrah!’ might be one.

But, pensive and intent on sad thoughts, Lord Raglan now rode down into the valley, recrossed the river, and entered the village of Bourliouk. The flames had been extinguished; and in some of the farm-buildings less burnt than the rest, there lay many wounded officers. Amongst the painful scenes

He rides  
back to  
Bourliouk  
and visits  
the  
wounded.

**C H A P.** in those barns and sheds Lord Raglan passed a long  
**XVI.** time, giving tender care to the sufferers. Yet of the  
 sunlight of that day there were nearly two hours  
 remaining. There was a routed enemy in front;  
 and, beyond, there was the mighty prize for which  
 the invaders were come.

Ambition lends strength and momentum to the purposes of a general. Lord Raglan gave his heart to wounded men. A commander wrapped in self, and burning for fame, would have risked a breach of the French alliance, would have hardened his heart, and, killing perhaps some few of his people with cruel fatigue, would have drunk of the Katcha that night. If he had done thus, the reconnoissance of the next morning would have brought him some knowledge of hardly less worth than a victory.

The Allied  
 armies  
 bivouac on  
 the ground  
 they have  
 won.

The Allied forces bivouacked on the ground which they had won. The French were on the Telegraph Height; the English headquarters were established on the left bank of the river near the road leading up from the bridge, and almost on the site of that Causeway battery which, until it was touched by the mastering key, had barred the mouth of the Pass.

Colonel  
 Torrens's  
 force  
 comes up  
 in the  
 evening.  
 Lord  
 Raglan  
 in his  
 marquee.

In the evening our army was joined by Colonel Torrens with the troops which had been left at Kamishlu to clear the beach; and at about nine o'clock, whilst Lord Raglan was dining in his little marquee with only one man for his guest, Torrens came to report his arrival. A third cover was laid for him. He had made a forced march, and was in bitter pain because his great haste had not availed

to bring him up in time for the battle. With kind, frank, thoughtful words Lord Raglan strove to soothe him.

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## XLV.

The position which Kiriakoff had taken up was not held for many minutes. To any calm man who looked from that ridge towards the north it must have been plain that the Allies were making no movement in pursuit. But—for thus powerful and thus wayward is the imagination of man in his fears—the Russians were no sooner in safety than vague terrors came assailing their minds, and panic began to drive them. The brave soldiery who had stood superbly firm when shot were tearing their ranks were scared by phantom thoughts ; and the square-built, hard, rigid battalions which had checkered the hill-sides on the Alma, now dissolved into shapeless masses. Even when, after accomplishing several miles of retreat, the troops at length reached the hill-sides which looked down on the banks of the Katcha, they had no belief that the Allies would suffer them to drink of its waters in peace ; and the army of the Czar, degenerating into a helpless throng—officers, men, horses, guns, tumbrils, carts laden with stores, carts laden with the wounded—all pressed into a gorge leading down to the ford ; and then the disorder was so complete, and the masses which choked the gorge were so dense and helpless, that it seemed as though a small force of cavalry and horse-

Continuation of the Russian retreat.

When the Russian soldiery have no longer an enemy near them, their retreat degenerates into a disorderly flight.

C H A P. artillery would have sufficed to make the whole army  
XVI. prisoners, or bring it to utter ruin.

When they had crossed the Katcha, the bulk of the troops still hurried on, though with no idea of the direction they were to take, except that their course ought to be a prolongation of the line of the retreat already accomplished.

But presently even that poor clue failed them ; for some got to imagine that, instead of falling back upon Sebastopol, they were to make for Baktchi Seräi. Then darkness came ; and there being no landmarks, the army was as a child that has lost its way at night in a trackless moor. Sometimes the masses were bent in their course by a voice shouting out, ‘To the right!’ and then again they would swerve the other way under the impulse of a cry, ‘To the left!’ All idea of bearings was so utterly lost, that even in their flight the fugitives could no longer be sure that they were retreating ; for they did not know but that they might be marching all the while towards an enemy. Afterwards the uselessness of this wild movement in the dark got to be understood ; and, shouts for a halt becoming general, the masses at length stood still.\*

All this while, the Allied armies were quietly

\* One day at Balaclava I had some conversation with Lord Raglan respecting the panic which seized the Russian army on the banks of the Katcha, and he told me that he thought the panic may have been occasioned by the appearance of his patrols ; but I have never heard from any other source that our cavalry patrolled to the neighbourhood of the Katcha on the evening of the battle ; and I imagine that Lord Raglan must have spoken rather from what he inferred than from what he knew.

bivouacking upon the banks of the Alma, at a distance of several miles from the enemy ; and the Staff of the Russian army having ascertained that no pursuit was going on, mounted officers and Cossacks were sent to announce to the wandering battalions that the Katcha was the rendezvous. But some of the messengers having received these directions before they crossed the river, carried on the very words intrusted to them with the servile exactness of a Chinese copyist, and told the troops which had long ago forded the stream, and were thence marching southward, that they were to 'go on to the 'Katcha.' Orders thus conveyed led to a belief that the stream already passed was not the Katcha; and although, in reality, the troops had overstepped the place of rendezvous, they imagined that they had not yet reached it.

Thus confusion was prolonged ; but the halt began after a time to produce good effects. The officers called for men who could undertake to find the way back to the Katcha. Some were found. These acted as guides ; and at midnight the wearied toops regained the river. For about two hours they rested ; but then—by panic, it is believed, in the first instance, and afterwards by orders which the panic engendered—the army was hastily roused, and thrown once more into full retreat. It moved upon Sebastopol.\*

\* My knowledge respecting the enemy's retreat to the Katcha is mainly derived from Chodasiewicz ; but on the 23d of September the peasantry of the village of Eskel, on the banks of the Katcha, described to me the scene of panic which they had witnessed in the night of the 20th.

C H A P.  
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## XLVI.

Losses  
of the  
French.Of the  
English.Of the  
Russians.

In this action the French lost three officers killed ;\* and on grounds which he deemed, and (privately) stated to be, to his mind 'conclusive,' Lord Raglan came to the belief that their whole loss in killed was 60, and their number of wounded 500.† The English army lost 25 officers and 19 sergeants killed, and 81 officers and 102 sergeants wounded ; and of rank and file 318 killed and 1438 wounded ; making, with the 19 who were missing, and who are supposed to have been buried in the ruins of the houses in the village, a total loss of 2002. The loss of the Russians in killed and wounded was officially stated at 5709 ; and it is believed that later and more accurate computations would carry the loss up to a much higher number. Except the Russians left wounded on the

\* St Arnaud's Despatch.

† The French official accounts state the total loss of their army in killed and wounded at 1339 (or, according to M. St Arnaud's despatch, 1343), but those statements have not obtained such credence as to induce me to place the figures in the text. Lord Raglan, I know, believed not only that the French returns were grossly erroneous, but that they were intentionally falsified ; for in the same letter in which he states it to be 'impossible' their accounts could be true, he also speaks of the 'pains' which the French authorities took to make him believe them. On the other hand, I think it right to say that I am acquainted with the grounds on which Lord Raglan based his low estimate of the French losses, and that, not thinking them quite so conclusive as he did, I have abstained from hazarding a positive statement on the subject. The field of battle did not give indication of considerable losses by the French ; and I recollect that the morning after the battle a French soldier told me he estimated the whole loss of his people at fifty (*une cinquantaine*). As an actual estimate of the losses, of course, his statement was of no worth, but it went towards showing what was the first impression of the French army as to the extent of the carnage.

field, there were scarcely any prisoners taken by the Allies ; and by the Russians none. Amongst the wounded Russians left on the field and taken by the English there were two general officers. Great quantities of small-arms were left upon the ground ; but of prouder trophies there were few. The French captured a small four-wheeled open carriage, in which a clerk had been travelling with a quantity of office forms and papers. The English had the gun taken by Captain Bell, and the howitzer abandoned by the enemy in the Great Redoubt.\*

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The trophies of victory were scanty.

## XLVII.

Whether it was wise to assail the enemy on the very ground where he sought to make his stand, is a question depending upon the measure of respect which was due from an Anglo-French army to a Russian force one-third less in numbers. On the inland or eastern flank of the position on the Alma the country was open ; and therefore it was possible for the Allies to avoid all encounter with the enemy


Question whether the attack upon the position of the Alma could have been avoided.

\* On the following day the French quietly came with an artillery-team, and were going to carry off one of the guns taken by the English. An English officer caught them in the act, and prevented them from executing their purpose. This enterprising attempt was the more curious, since it happened that the gun was more than a mile distant from the ground on which the nearest of the French troops had been moving. Apparently it was calculated that any Englishman who chanced to observe the French drivers would assume that they were acting under authority from Lord Raglan, and that when once the gun was in the French lines, the transcendent importance of the alliance, and of a cordial feeling between the two armies, would be relied on as grounds which might prevent the English General from reclaiming it.




C H A P. XVI. on his chosen stronghold by taking ample ground to their left, and boldly marching round him. If a man so resolute as Marshal Pelissier had been then at the head of the French army, this perhaps is what he would have proposed to do. At all events, this is the way in which, under like circumstances, he would now undertake to deal with a Russian army. But then he judges things by the light of what has since passed, and especially by the light of his own great achievement. To have undertaken so daring a flank movement as this, in the presence of an unhumbled and confident foe, would have implied a steadfast faith in the excellence of the whole Allied army, and a somewhat early perception of that want of nimbleness and enterprise on the part of the Russians, which was afterwards found to be characteristic of their field operations. Those who know how heavily—even down to the day of the Alma—the thought of the Moscow campaign still weighed upon the mind of the French, will hardly wonder that Marshal St Arnaud and his advisers should have shrunk from the idea of lending the flank of the French army to the enterprises of a foe who had still a great warlike repute, and whose numbers were imperfectly known. Besides, since the French had taken the right, the success of any such plan, and with it the honour and safety of the whole Allied force, would have been made to depend upon the stability of the French troops alone, rather than upon the prowess of the whole Allied army. Even if Marshal St Arnaud had desired to make the venture, there is no reason

for believing that Lord Raglan would have consented to move into the interior, with a French army marching on his right between him and the enemy.\* To have done so would have implied great confidence in the steadiness of the French army.



But whatever be the worth of a plan for turning instead of attacking the Russian position on the Alma, it is certain that Marshal St Arnaud and his advisers thought it would be more prudent to choose the course which they actually took—to possess themselves of the unoccupied ground which lay between the Russian position and the sea-shore, to pit the rest of the French forces against Prince Mentschikoff's left, and to leave to Lord Raglan the duty of dealing with the enemy's centre, as well as with his right wing.

The course  
actually  
taken.



\* The above diagram will perhaps convey some idea of the nature of the hazard which would have been incurred by venturing upon a flank march.

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## XLVIII.

Summary  
of the  
battle.

Told summarily, the battle of the Alma was this:— The French seized the empty ground which divided the enemy from the sea, and then undertook to assail the enemy's left wing ; but were baffled by the want of a road for Canrobert's artillery, and by the exceeding cogency of the rule which forbids them from engaging their infantry on open ground without the support of cannon. Their failure placed them in jeopardy ; for they had committed so large a proportion of their force to the distant part of the West Cliff and the sea-shore, that for nearly an hour they lay much at the mercy of any Russian general who might have chosen to take advantage of their severed condition. But, instead of turning to his own glory the mistake the French had been making, Prince Mentschikoff hastened to copy it, wasting time and strength in a march towards the sea-shore, and a counter-march back to the Telegraph. Still, the sense the French had of their failure, and the galling fire which Kiriakoff's two batteries were by this time bringing to bear on them, began to create in their army a grave discontent, and sensations scarce short of despondency. Seeing the danger to which this condition of things was leading, and becoming for other reasons impatient, Lord Raglan determined to order the final advance of the English infantry without waiting any longer for the time when Canrobert and Prince Napoleon should be established on the plateau. So the English infantry went

forward, and in a few minutes the battalions which followed Codrington had not only defeated one of the two heavy 'columns of attack' which marched down to assail them, but had stormed and carried the Great Redoubt. From that moment the hill-sides on the Alma were no longer a fortified position; but they were still a battle-field, and a battle-field on which, for a time, the combatants were destined to meet with checkered fortune; for, not having been supported at the right minute, and being encompassed by great organised numbers, Codrington's disordered force was made to fall back under the weight of the Vladimir column; and its retreat involved the centre battalion of the brigade of Guards. Nearly at the same time Kiriakoff, with his great 'column of the 'eight battalions,' pushed Canrobert down from the crest he had got to, obliging or causing him for a time to hang back under the cover of the steep. At that time the prospects of the Allies were overcast. But then the whole face of the battle was suddenly changed by the two guns which Lord Raglan had brought up to the knoll; for not only did their fire extirpate the Causeway batteries, and so lay open the Pass, but it tore through the columns of Prince Mentschikoff's infantry reserves, and drove them at once from the field. This discomfiture of the Russian centre could not but govern the policy of Kiriakoff, obliging him to conform to its movement of retreat; and he must have been the more ready to acknowledge to himself the necessity of the step he was taking, since by this time he had suf-

**C H A P.** fered the disaster which was inflicted upon his great  
**XVI.** 'column of the eight battalions' by the French  
 artillery. He retreated without being molested by  
 the French infantry, and took up a position at a  
 distance of two miles from the Alma. Meanwhile,  
 after a sheer fight of infantry, the whole strength  
 that the enemy had on the Kourganè Hill was  
 broken and turned to ruin by the Guards and the  
 Highlanders. Thenceforth the slaughter that is  
 wrought by artillery upon retreating masses was  
 all that remained to be fulfilled.

### XLIX.

Question  
 how far  
 the Allies  
 were en-  
 titled to  
 take glory  
 to them-  
 selves.

The trophies, we saw, were scanty. But was there  
 a gain of that priceless spoil which one nation takes  
 from another when it proves itself the better in arms?  
 The Western Alliance had the ear of Europe, and it  
 awarded to itself an unstinted measure of glory.  
 Was this glory honestly taken?

The Allies were more than 60,000, and the strength  
 of the Russians fell short of that by one-third. This  
 was a disparity which made it unbecoming for the  
 Great Alliance of the West to indulge in the language  
 of a boisterous triumph. But, besides that the  
 strength of the ground went some way towards  
 making the conflict equal, the very faults and short-  
 comings of the Allies had the effect of putting a  
 heavy stress upon some portions of their united army;  
 for, by sending two-fifths of his army to the sea-  
 shore, and by crowding the remainder of it upon

a narrow front, the French Marshal placed Prince Gortschakoff and General Kvetzinski upon a numerical equality with their English foes ; and the Russian artillery being vastly more powerful than ours, and the ground being intrenched and singularly strong by nature, the Russians were in circumstances which tended to give them a great advantage over their English adversaries. Besides, though our forces were equal in numbers to the part of the Russian army with which they had to deal, yet it happened that in each distinct infantry fight the English battalions were almost always confronted by masses far greater in numerical strength. Justly, therefore, there may be rendered to some of the components of the Allied army a part of the glory which History must refuse to the aggregate host.

At three o'clock, as we saw, the battle had been suffered to lapse into such a condition that there was then bitter need of a general, and of troops so placed in the field, and so inclined towards the practice of close fighting, as to be able to restore—to restore, as it were, by sheer force—the waning fortune of the day. How the occasion was met this History has shown. I narrate, and soldiers will comment. They must judge, and say whether, for simplicity's sake, it be better to pile up a heap of praise, and distribute it, like a cargo of medals, amongst all the French, English, and Turks who heard the sound of the guns ; or, in a harsher and more careful spirit, to part off the troops which fought hard from the troops which scarce fought at

CHAP.  
XVI. all, and to show by whose ordering it was that the course of the battle was governed.

I have been eager to acknowledge the valour and the steadiness of the Russian infantry. If I had caused it to appear that, upon the whole, Marshal St Arnaud and the troops he commanded had done marvels on the day of the Alma, I should have been helping to prolong a belief in that which I know to be false, and should be even running counter to what, with good reason, I hold to be the opinion of the French army ;\* but I have tried to do careful justice to those who were then our allies by marking and commending the warlike quality which was displayed by their artillerymen, as well as by their keen, bold, active skirmishers. Of my own countrymen I have hardly once suffered myself to speak in words of praise. I have only told what they did.

\* I speak in great measure from knowledge acquired long subsequently to the battle, but the conviction of which I speak was not slow to show itself in the French army. Writing three days after the battle, and speaking of the conviction which was produced upon the English army by the fact that Marshal St Arnaud had not 'kept moving on after 'he had turned the enemy's left,' Lord Raglan says, 'I have reason to 'believe that the same feeling is prevalent amongst the officers of the 'French army.' For any one who was not in the Crimea during the month which followed the battle of the Alma, it would be difficult to form a conception of the state into which the repute of the French army had fallen. Later events (and the first of these was the brilliant charge of two squadrons of the Chasseurs d'Afrique at Balaclava) showed that the warlike spirit of France was not extinct in her army.

## L.

C H A P.  
XVI.

Those three sunny hours of the 20th of September were the time, and the only time, when a French and an English army stood abreast in an open pitched battle;\* and therefore it is that, when many generations shall have passed away, mankind will still gaze and gaze upon a barren hill-side in Crim Tartary, comparing the demeanour of the two great rivals of the West whilst they fought side by side on the Alma. Yet if people shall end this comparison without making honest allowance for the ban I am going to speak of, they will do a wrong to the war-like repute of France.

It would be unjust to look upon the action between Marshal St Arnaud and the Russian left wing as a fair sample of what a French army can do. That glance at the things done in Paris which helped us to understand the origin of the Anglo-French alliance, will now serve to teach us the cause of any shortcomings which may be attributed to the army commanded by Marshal St Arnaud.† We saw something of a strange decree which enacted that services rendered by military men in their operations against Frenchmen should hold good as titles to advancement in the same way as though they were deeds done in war against the foreigner.‡

Cause of  
any short-  
comings  
on the part  
of the  
French  
army.

\* The English at Inkerman were valiantly aided by a body of French troops; but that great fight was not one of which it could be said that a 'French and an English army stood abreast in an open pitched battle.'

† *Ante*, vol. i. cap. 14.

‡ *Ibid.* Decree of 5th December 1851.



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Incredible as it may seem, that decree was long observed to the full;\* and the shameful principle which it involved was made to weigh heavily upon France during several of the months which followed the landing at Old Fort. Indeed, the principle, though partly waived for a time in 1855, was found to be still in dire operation long after the close of the Russian war. Just as in a later year the French Emperor intrusted to a scared and bewildered literary man the command of a whole French army in Italy, so now he committed the honour of the flag—committed it almost exclusively—to men who had shared with him in the adventure which put France under his feet. His reckoning was, that whether it were led by honourable and skilled commanders, or were tossed and flung into action by him and his December friends, a French army engaged in a short, brisk war against a Continental State would always be likely to push its way to more or less of success; and that if it should chance to do this under the leadership, or apparent leadership, of him and his friends, he and they would become similar to heroes. If they could attain to be thus thought of for a time, they might hope that for a still longer period they would enjoy the immunity and the thousand rewards which nations are accustomed to lavish upon victorious commanders.

This was the principle which governed the choice

\* It was carried to the length of making Magnan and St Arnaud Marshals of France.

of the man to whose charge, on the day of the Alma, the honour of the French arms was left. He who commanded the army was St Arnaud, formerly Le Roy, the person suborned by Fleury. Under him in the Crimea there were four Divisions of French infantry. He who commanded the first of these Divisions was Canrobert. This officer, as I have said, was not without honest titles to military distinction ; but whilst he had a professional repute which would have earned him the approval of even the most loyal of monarchs, he had also the qualification which entitled him to the favour of the French Emperor. He had commanded one of the brigades which operated against the gay boulevards on the 4th of December. The 2d Division was commanded by Bosquet. Bosquet was a man without a stain ; but he was the only French General of Division at the Alma who could say that he did not owe his command to the December plot ; and since it happened that he was left isolated with only one brigade during the whole time when the issue of the battle was pending, his presence at the Alma was only an imperfect exception to what was, as it were, the general rule. He who commanded the large detached force of some 9000 men\* which first crossed the river at its mouth was General Bouat ; and Bouat, it seems, was an officer who earned his command by exploits against Parisians in the boule-

\* One of Bosquet's brigades and the whole of the Turkish Contingent, except the two battalions left to guard the baggage.

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ward, the Rue St Denis, or the neighbourhood of the Nouvelle France.\* He who commanded the 3d Division was Prince Napoleon. He who commanded the 4th Division was Forey ; and no man could come within the principle of selection more clearly than he did, for it was he of whom I spoke when I said that he had suffered himself to be used as the assailant and the jailer of an unarmed Legislature. There were, besides, the Lourmels, the Espinasses, and numbers of others, no doubt, whose names could be easily found in their Emperor's list of worthies. Therefore it is that the part which was taken by Marshal St Arnaud and his troops in the battle of the Alma was no fair sample of what could be done by a French army. It was only a sample of what a French army could manage to do when it laboured under the weight of a destiny which ordained that all its chiefs should be men chosen for their complicity in a midnight plot, or else for acts of street slaughter.† Because they had perpetrated an extensive massacre of their unarmed fellow-countrymen, there was no certainty, perhaps, that they might not be men firm and able in honest war against the foreigner ; but also there was no such close similarity between what these men had done in Paris and what they were meant to do in the Crimea, as to warrant the notion of intrusting to them almost exclusively the honour of the French flag. There

\* With the 33d Regiment.

† Prince Napoleon's complicity was only, as I am inclined to believe, a complicity after the fact ; but it is, of course, clear enough that he owed his command entirely to the Coup d'Etat.

was a salient point of difference between the boulevards and the hill-sides of the Alma,—the Russians were armed. CHAP.  
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No! The Power which fought that day by the side of England was not, after all, mighty France,—brave, warlike, impetuous France;—it was only that intermittent thing which to-day is, and to-morrow is not;—it was what people call ‘The French Empire.’

## LI.

The battle of the Alma seemed to clear the prospects of the campaign and even of the war. It confirmed to the Allies that military ascendancy over Russia which had been more than half gained already by the valour of the Ottoman soldiery. It lent the current sanction of a victory to the hazardous enterprise of the invasion. It ended the perils of the march from Kamishlu, and made smooth the whole way to the Belbec. It established the Allies as invaders in a province of Russia. It did more: upon condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize, it gave them Sebastopol.

Effect of  
the battle  
upon the  
prospects  
of the  
campaign.



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# APPENDIX.

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## No. I.

*Note respecting the torpor of the English Cabinet on the evening of the 28th of June 1854.*

WHEN a man has been set to sleep by a document, he commonly imagines that he was awake all the time, and that he ‘heard every word.’ A firm impression of that sort is one of the known phenomena of sleep in a chair ; and it is obvious, therefore, that any of those who slept the sleep of which I have spoken may honestly contradict the statement in the text without, however, being entitled to expect that their contradiction will have any weight. But though the accuracy of the statement will be denied—and denied in perfect good faith—by those who slept, it will not, I am sure, be questioned by any of those who remained awake. Of course the deliberations of a Cabinet ought to be kept secret ; but sleep is not deliberation, and there is no rule nor principle which precludes a Minister from describing any natural phenomenon which he may have observed at a Cabinet meeting.

I own that, to me, the assenting disposition of those who remained awake (for they were anxious, careful, laborious men) is harder to account for than the condition of those who were in a complete state of rest ; and I incline to the solution which I have spoken of as likely to be offered by the analytical chemist, because his theory (that of a narcotic substance having been taken by some mischance) would account for a torpor which

affected all more or less, though in different ways and in different degrees.

That I am right in the view I take as to the inexorable stringency of the Despatch, is shown, I think, clearly enough by the effect which it instantly had upon the minds of the two men who first saw it when it reached the camp—namely, Lord Raglan and Sir George Brown. Lord Raglan's letter of the 19th of July (p. 124) shows clearly that he submitted to act with soldierly readiness under instructions which he looked upon as imperative, or, at all events, violently cogent; and Sir George Brown gives his interpretation of the Despatch (p. 118) with a bluntness which precludes all doubt about the light in which he regarded it. The Government, he considered, were resolved that, at all hazards, the expedition should proceed; and if Lord Raglan should not consent to lead it, he thought they would instantly send out some one else who would.

It may be said that this sleep of the Cabinet is one of those things which, however true they may be, it is better not to disclose. Certainly no one is obliged to go and state a thing thoughtlessly, or without a purpose, merely because it happened. But I have to account for a great transaction—the invasion of a Russian province. I ascertain that this invasion was caused, and caused entirely, by the peculiar wording of a despatch. But why was it that a despatch so worded received the approval or the tacit assent of a Cabinet? It would be unfaithful for me to stop short at that point in the chain of causation unless I were brought to a stop by the want of knowledge, or by the want of a right to disclose what I know. It so happens, however, that neither of these excuses is available to me. I know the truth, and I learnt it under circumstances which gave me a full right to disclose it.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

It is now, I believe, declared that, before the opening of the momentous Despatch, some long tiresome papers on other matters were read out to the Cabinet, and that the sound thus produced was the real narcotic.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

## No. II.\*

*Correspondence respecting the placing of the Buoy by the French in the night between the 13th and 14th of September.*

## FIRST LETTER.

*Captain Mends on the subject of the Buoy.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'TIMES.'

SIR,—May I ask the insertion in your columns of the following remarks?

As I have been referred to by many as to the truth of Mr Kinglake's statement, in his 'Invasion of the Crimea,' 'that the landing of our army at Old Fort was materially delayed by the wilful misplacement of a buoy by the French,' I feel called upon, in justice to the French naval service, to state the facts which came under my own observation; and here I desire to observe that, during two years of very close intercourse with that service, their whole conduct, so far from being such as to bring our harmony into grievous jeopardy, was that of chivalrous, loyal allies.

As I am the officer who, by the direction of Sir Edmund Lyons, planned the whole of the details connected with the embarkation, transfer, and landing of the army, *it might suffice for me simply to say that I remember nothing about a buoy*; that Mr Bower, the master of the Agamemnon, who conned the ship under my orders, *remembers nothing about a buoy*; and that Captain Spratt (who then commanded the Spitfire, and, as the senior surveying officer, was usually intrusted with such delicate and important duties) *remembers nothing about a buoy*; but I will not take upon myself to state positively that there was no buoy in question, as it is not impossible that Sir Edmund Lyons may have entered upon a con-

\* The publication of the above correspondence as an 'Addendum' to this second volume takes place with the assent of Captain Mends. For the purpose of indicating passages which seem to me to be among the most important in regard to the question of fact, I have taken the liberty of causing some portions of Captain Mends's letters to be printed in italica.



fidential agreement with the French Admiral that the duty of placing a buoy on the coast selected by the Allied Admirals and Generals during the final reconnaissance on the 10th should be kept in the hands of the French, to be laid by them during the night preceding the landing, in order to prevent so significant a mark of the designed locality becoming known to the enemy; but it is passing strange that Sir Edmund Lyons, in whose confidence I was, and who had intrusted the whole of the arrangements to me, should have given me no instructions relative to it if he attached importance to it.

The Agamemnon, having weighed from Eupatoria at 1 A.M., accompanied by the Sanspareil, Triton, and Spitfire, and followed by all the transports, was the advance ship, by a long way, of the Allied flotilla. Sir Edmund Lyons, in his eager desire to be in the van, pushed on to the southward of the beach, behind which lay Lake Kamishli, the southernmost of the three lakes marked on the maps, until we arrived off the rocky headland lying between two shallow bays, within which lay the beaches, one having Lake Kamishli at the back of it (being that on which the British ultimately landed), the other and more southern beach (on which the French landed) having no lake behind it, and being circumscribed in its limits.

When off the Point, Sir Edmund Lyons, who was anxiously scanning the coast, desired me to stop the engines; while thus hove-to, with the ship's head brought round to the N.E., or in-shore, the French Admiral, heading his fleet, came up, and, passing close to us, hailed to say we were too far to the southward; upon which a conversation ensued between Sir Edmund Lyons and the French Admiral from the poops of their respective ships until the onward movement of the French ship terminated it, whereupon a French naval officer came on board immediately with a message from his Admiral to Sir E. Lyons to say that we were too far to the southward, the Point off which we then were being the line of demarcation between the armies. During this short suspense I called the attention of Sir Edmund to the approach of the transports, and pointed out that they would fall into confusion if he did not quickly decide upon his anchorage.

as the Spitfire and Triton, the two steamers told off to anchor as the points within which our flotilla had been instructed to bring up, were looking to the Agamemnon for position. Sir Edmund instantly gave me orders to steer back to the northward of the Point, and close in with the beach as near as possible. Meanwhile the Agamemnon's boats had been hoisted out and the artillery rafts put together, so that on the moment of anchoring, which we did about half-past six, we were ready to commence the operation of landing, which Sir E. Lyons desired to do at once, but Sir George Brown, who was on board the Agamemnon, wished to await the decision of Lord Raglan, who was approaching on board the Caradoc. The French had by this time many men landed, for seeing no prospect of opposition they began to disembark as fast as their ships got to the anchorage. As soon as the Caradoc closed, Lord Raglan came on board the Agamemnon, and after a short consultation Sir Edmund Lyons desired me to make the signal to land, and we commenced immediately.\* Thus it will be seen that the French were the cause of no serious delay, as British transports had never even arrived at the Point, to the southward of which a buoy is said to have been placed. If the choosing of the beach was left in the hands of the French, they certainly gave us the advantage of position, our landing-place having the lake at the back, and being less circumscribed.


Had it been decided to land both armies in the bay selected by the French, the space on the beach would not have sufficed for the work, and serious confusion would have ensued, while the anchorage would have been too limited for the assembling of so many vessels.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. R. MENDES, Captain, R.N.

UNITED SERVICE CLUB, PALL MALL,  
*March 18.*

\* A careful reader will observe that all the movements backwards and forwards, and the conferences here described, are exactly such as might have been expected to occur upon the supposition that Lord Raglan's account, as given in the next page but one, is strictly accurate.



## SECOND LETTER.

*Mr Kinglake to Captain Mends.*

12 ST JAMES'S PLACE, April 4, 1863.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose an extract from that part of Lord Raglan's private letter to the Secretary of War which relates to the affair of 'the buoy.'

Since the appearance of your letter to the newspaper, you have probably received some communications on the subject; and if there be anything in those communications, or in the enclosed extract from Lord Raglan's letter, which is calculated to modify the impression under which you thought it your duty to come forward and question my statement, I feel certain that you will take the course which your own sense of fairness must dictate.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed) A. W. KINGLAKE

CAPTAIN MENDES, R.N., &c. &c. &c.

*Enclosure accompanying Mr Kinglake's Letter.*

## INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

THE PLACING OF THE BUOY BY THE FRENCH IN THE NIGHT  
BETWEEN THE 13TH AND 14TH OF SEPTEMBER 1854.

CAPTAIN MENDES having stated (in a letter which he thought proper to address to the Editor of a newspaper) that he remembers nothing about a buoy, it may be convenient for readers of the book which was the subject of Captain Mends's remarks, to have before them the words in which Lord Raglan described the transaction.

EXTRACT from LORD RAGLAN'S Narrative of the Landing, addressed as a Private Communication to the DUKE of NEWCASTLE, the Secretary of War, and dated 'Camp above Old Fort Bay, September 18, 1854.'

'The disembarkation of both armies commenced on the morning of the 14th.

‘ It had been settled that the landing should be effected in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed in the centre of it to mark the left of the French and the right of the English ; but when the Agamemnon came upon the buoy at daylight, Sir Edmund Lyons found that the French naval officer had deposited it on the extreme northern end, and had thus engrossed the whole of the bay for the operation of his own army. This occasioned considerable confusion and delay, the English convoy having followed closely upon the steps of their leader, and got mixed with the French transports ; but Sir Edmund Lyons wisely resolved to make the best of it, and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next to the northward.’

## THIRD LETTER.\*

*Captain Mends to Mr Kinglake.*

3 BLOOMFIELD CRESCENT, HARROW ROAD, W.,  
5th April 1863.

SIR,—In reply to your communication of the 4th instant, enclosing an extract from Lord Raglan’s private letter to the Secretary of War, which relates to the affair of the ‘ buoy,’ I have the honour to acquaint you that, since writing my letter to the ‘ Times ’ of the 18th ult., I have heard nothing which is calculated to modify the impression under which I wrote it ; for though *it would seem there was a buoy*, and though I differ from Lord Raglan, whose memory I so highly respect, I aver that not the slightest inconvenience, confusion, nor delay, was occasioned to the disembarkation of the British by any act of the French. I never heard of the buoy until I saw your book ; and I feel satisfied that were Sir Edmund Lyons alive, he would be one of the first to do justice to the chivalrous conduct of his colleague, Admiral Bruat, whose heart and soul were in the success of the undertaking, and whose example was cordially followed by every

\* It seems right to say that this copy has been carefully compared with the original, and found to be strictly correct. In the original, the words ‘ by any act of the French ’ are underscored.

officer under his command ; that, *in my opinion, wherever the buoy was placed, none but the most upright motives prompted the act*, and the most sound practical reasons warranted the selection of the spot.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed) W. R. MENDES.

A. W. KINGLAKE, Esq., M.P., &c. &c. &c.

—*Note to 4th Edition.*

### No. III.

#### *Note respecting the operations of the 7th Fusiliers.*

WRITTEN, it would seem, with the help of information deriving from Sir George Brown,\* the ‘Quarterly Review’ has this statement :—

‘ While this was going on upon the left of Codrington’s brigade, the right, consisting of the 33d and 7th, gallantly attacked the Russian infantry which protected the battery and the Redan. The battle was not fought, however, as Mr Kinglake would have us believe. Lacy Yea and his gallant Fusiliers did just as well, but not one whit better, than Colonel Blake and his equally gallant 33d. The personal exploits of Lacy Yea, Mr Kinglake’s particular protégé, are about as authentic as those of Homer’s heroes, and so is the long fight maintained by him and his men against five or six times their number of Russian troops. The two regiments went forward together, Codrington leading them on.† They drove back the Russians and planted themselves on the brow of the height, from which the enemy retired ; and they remained there, partially engaged, till the

\* The grounds on which I infer this will be found at the commencement of the Note No. V. *post*, p. 562.

† This was a mistake of Sir George’s. Codrington was not with the 7th Fusiliers. He, as we saw, led the 23d and the other troops with them straight into the redoubt.

‘ Russians rallied and advanced to recover the Redan. Symptoms of unsteadiness then began to show themselves, and no wonder. A mass of Russian troops came towards them in front. They saw their comrades driven out of the Redan upon their left ; they distrusted their own ability to keep the advanced position which they had won, and *they wavered*. Sir George Brown observed this from the point where he was, trying to rally the 19th and 23d in their retreat : *he rode over to the height and did his best to stop the 33d and 7th ; but they would not attend to him*. It has been said that a bugle sounding the retreat misled them. For this the evidence is, to say the least of it, very incomplete ; but whether by sound of bugle or not, *they turned round and moved back*, slowly and doggedly, just as the Grenadier Guards came upon the ground and were formed and ready for action.

‘ Having opened *to let the 7th and 33d pass*, the Grenadiers re-formed line and advanced against the Russian columns in their immediate front. Sir George Brown went with the Grenadier Guards.’—‘ Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 566.

Thus, according to Sir George Brown and the ‘ Quarterly,’ the 7th Fusiliers and the 33d Regiment advanced side by side up the slope, attacked ‘ the Russian infantry which protected the battery and the Redan,’ and obtained a temporary success, but then, under pressure of an advancing column, ‘ wavered,’ and fell back,—fell back in such a state that when the divisional General tried to stop them, ‘ they would not attend to him,’ and, continuing to fall back, retreated through the Grenadier Guards.

On the other hand, my statement is that Lacy Yea and his 7th Fusiliers did not move up at all with the rest of the brigade to the line of the Great Redoubt, because, at the very moment of ascending the river’s bank, they encountered a heavy Russian column, with which they remained long engaged ; that, at last, they defeated the column ; and that, when they had done so, Sir Thomas Troubridge was sent to suggest that the enemy’s retreat should be pressed by an advance of the Grenadier Guards.

Now, of these perfectly dissimilar accounts, which is the true one ?

Without recurring to the means by which (as a sagacious reader will infer) I gathered my first impressions of what the battalion did, I must say, in the outset, that at the battle of the Alma Sir Thomas Troubridge was a field-officer, on duty with the right wing of the regiment; that, from the beginning to the end of the engagement between the 7th Fusiliers and the column, he, Sir Thomas Troubridge, was personally present; that he witnessed the defeat of the column with his own eyes; that he himself carried the message which suggested that the Grenadier Guards should advance in pursuit; that he, Sir Thomas Troubridge, is living—is living in London and holding office at the Horse-Guards; and, finally, that he has over and over again assured me of the substantial truth of my narrative so far as it concerns what he saw of the operations of the 7th Fusiliers.

Colonel Yea did not live to hear it imputed to his 7th Fusiliers,—to hear it imputed to them by their divisional General,—that they had given way at the sight of an enemy's column, and had retreated in such a state that they 'would not attend to him;' but some of Lacy Yea's simple, truthful letters have been laid before me.

In a letter addressed to Lord Vivian, and dated the 27th of September 1854, Lacy Yea describes the passage of the river at the Alma, and then writes:—'I had to deal with the 32d Regiment\*—I should suppose of some distinction, as they wore Wellington boots, pulled high up over their trousers, and grand-looking helmets, and had kits which were beautiful, and which my men eagerly put on; there was not one of them who would not have made a front rank for me. One of the men said they had been marched from Moscow, through Odessa, here. . . . There was an unlucky check in the 23d, which caused a similar retrograde in their supporters, the Fusilier Guards, which cost an enormity of lives in both regiments. *I never stopped until we drove our birds clean off the ground, having commenced with them after emerging from the deep banks of the river, within fifteen yards of their skirmishers.*'

\* Two battalions of the Kazan corps. Their accoutrements were marked '32d.'

Shortly afterwards, Colonel Yea wrote to his sister, Mrs Cholmley Dering :—

‘ Jeffries being ordered home suddenly, I take the opportunity  
‘ of sending you, to take care of, a helmet ornament belonging  
‘ to one of the regiments (Russian) to which my regiment was  
‘ opposed at Alma. It was the sharpshooters belonging to that  
‘ regiment, which I found within fifteen yards when I rode up  
‘ the bank out of the river. *We—that is, the 7th—were solely*  
‘ *engaged against this regiment without help, and a pretty*  
‘ *thrashing we gave them.*’

Colonel Aldworth writes the following letter to Sir Thomas Troubridge :—

*May 3, 1863.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR THOMAS,—I write in reply to your inquiry as  
‘ to what occurred on the right of the 7th Royal Fusiliers at the  
‘ battle of the Alma, after crossing the river.

‘ I was, as you know, in command of the right company of the  
‘ regiment, and can confidently state that the right wing of the  
‘ regiment *did not at any time fall back.* We were opposed to a  
‘ heavy Russian column, *which had come down the hill and halted*  
‘ *in our immediate front,* throwing out numerous skirmishers.  
‘ The Guards did not pass us *until this column had turned, and*  
‘ *was in full retreat.* I cannot say much about the left wing,  
‘ having seen but little of it during the engagement, owing to  
‘ the smoke, and my position on the extreme right.—Yours  
‘ sincerely,

(Signed) ‘ R. W. ALDWORTH, Col.,  
‘ Lt.-Col. Commanding 1st Battalion  
‘ 7th Royal Fusiliers.’

Of Colonel Aldworth Sir Thomas Troubridge thus writes :—  
‘ The steadiness with which the men held their ground on the  
‘ right, under a very heavy fire, was in great measure due to the  
‘ example and coolness of this officer.’

Nor is it only from the officers of the 7th Fusiliers that the proof of what the battalion did at the Alma is to be found. The regiment next on the right of Colonel Lacy Yea’s Fusiliers was the 55th. The 55th was commanded at the Alma by Colonel,



now General, Warren. In a memorandum by him, now lying before me, there is this passage :—

‘ Sir John [Pennefather] allowed the 55th Regiment to follow  
 ‘ Colonel Warren, who crossed the river and formed the regiment  
 ‘ in line under the cover of a spur of the heights of the Alma,  
 ‘ up which they advanced in line (Major-General Pennefather  
 ‘ leading in front the battalion which was parallel to the Alma);  
 ‘ then, having ascended this spur, they formed themselves in pre-  
 ‘ sence of a column of Russians who fired into them. This column  
 ‘ of Russians *was at that time engaged with a part of the Light*  
 ‘ *Division under Colonel Yea*, and the 55th were directed by  
 ‘ their Colonel to bring forward their right shoulders and make  
 ‘ a wheel to the left. . . . With this accession to Colonel  
 ‘ Yea’s force, *the Russians in a short time disappeared*, leaving  
 ‘ many on the ground.’

A writer, who seems to have inquired a good deal about what was passing at the time when Sir George Brown imagined that the 7th Fusiliers ‘ would not attend to him,’ has undertaken the somewhat intricate task of showing how Sir George Brown fell into his error. He thus writes :—

‘ But we are not only able to free the 7th Fusiliers from the  
 ‘ effects of Sir George Brown’s wondrous narrative. We can do  
 ‘ more : we can explain to Sir George Brown how it was that  
 ‘ —honestly, quite honestly—he fell into his error. Mr King-  
 ‘ lake states that, when the 7th Fusiliers had defeated the left  
 ‘ Kazan column, it was not thought wise for the victors to ad-  
 ‘ vance in pursuit themselves, but to leave that duty to the  
 ‘ Grenadier Guards. The 7th Fusiliers, therefore, at the moment  
 ‘ of its victory, remained halted. Mr Kinglake also represents  
 ‘ that the defeat of this left Kazan column took place “nearly at  
 ‘ “the very time when disaster befell the centre of the brigade  
 ‘ “of Guards.”—(Page 410, third edition.) Attention to this,  
 ‘ reinforced by information from officers present, soon discloses  
 ‘ the cause of Sir George Brown’s mistake. In their retreat,  
 ‘ some of the Fusilier Guards passed through the left companies  
 ‘ of the 7th, and these companies becoming entangled with the  
 ‘ defeated soldiery, and having on their left front a fresh, a heavy,

‘ and a victorious column of the enemy’s infantry (the Vladimirs),  
‘ were far from being in a state for any aggressive movement,  
‘ and were in great need of the support which they got when the  
‘ Grenadiers passed through them. It was from what he saw  
‘ there—from what he saw at the extreme left of the regiment—  
‘ that Sir George Brown formed the notion which he has im-  
‘ parted to the ‘Quarterly.’ If he had ridden along the line to  
‘ Lacy Yea’s right wing, he would have seen that, notwithstand-  
‘ ing the critical state of its left companies, the regiment (taken  
‘ as a whole) was almost in the very moment of achieving its  
‘ final victory over the left Kazan column. If he had stooped  
‘ to the use of a glass, and had condescended to recognise for a  
‘ moment the existence of one of Evans’s battalions, he would  
‘ have seen the Kazan column slowly retiring, and would have  
‘ been surprised to observe that, on ground where he imagined  
‘ there were none but his own Light Division regiments, Colonel  
‘ Warren with his 55th was not only well in advance, but had  
‘ wheeled on his left, and was pouring his fire into the flank of  
‘ the enemy’s column. Far from doing this, and far from in-  
‘ forming himself of the truth by subsequent inquiry, Sir George  
‘ Brown has remained for nearly nine years under the impres-  
‘ sion produced on his mind by a glance at the extreme left of  
‘ the 7th ; and, because at this time he saw the 33d and the  
‘ 7th close together, and in nearly the same line, he seems to  
‘ have inferred that from first to last they had been acting to-  
‘ gether.’—Pamphlet by an ‘Old Reviewer,’ published by Har-  
rison, Pall Mall.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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## No. IV.

*Note respecting the operations of the Scots Fusilier Guards at the Battle of the Alma.*

**JUST** as in the corner of a sheet containing the delineation of a whole kingdom, some city or district which forms a part of it is often set out upon a scale more extended than the one that is used for the principal map, so here I am going to record what I judge to be the result of the late discussion about the Fusilier Guards, by repeating the narrative of their operations after passing the Alma, but repeating it with rather more minuteness of detail than readers will find in the text.

We saw that, at the time of passing the river, the left-flank company got parted from the rest of the battalion. That separation lasted during the period of the struggle which followed; and when, therefore, in this Note, I speak of the Scots Fusilier Guards in general terms, it must be understood that I mean to designate that body of seven companies which remained together, when the left-flank company had got parted from the rest of the battalion.

At the moment when the troops which had stormed the redoubt began to retreat, the 1st Division had not yet emerged from the cover afforded by the river's bank; but General Codrington's message hurried the advance of the Scots Fusilier Guards. The battalion climbed up the bank, formed line with a good deal of haste, and began to move forward.

At this time, there were numbers of stragglers of the Light Division standing about near the bank of the river; but in front of the left centre of the Fusilier Guards there was a large disordered body (men chiefly, I believe, of the 23d and 95th Regiments), who had just let go their hold of the redoubt. These men had faced about to the front, and were firing in the direction of the great column of the Vladimir corps then halted within the redoubt. The moment the heads of the Fusilier Guards rose clear of the ground which till then had been giving them shelter,

the men found themselves under a flight of the enemy's missiles, and the higher they marched, the more they incurred the fire which seemed to be directed against the light-infantry men in their front. Many of the Fusilier Guards were struck down. Still, their onward movement was maintained.

Suddenly, the parapet of the redoubt became thickly lined with Russian soldiery ; and, in the next instant, the fire of the enemy's musketry came heavily pouring down into the confused body of light-infantry men who had been hitherto making a stand in front of the Fusilier Guards. The crowd of light-infantry men which received this fire gave way ; and in another instant, it was coming down in a mass towards the left centre of the Fusilier Guards. Perhaps the haste with which the Fusilier Guards had been pushed forward was one of the causes which hindered them from meeting the emergency by a fitting manœuvre. It does not appear that any step was taken to make the battalion open out. So presently, the descending crowd came into bodily contact with the Fusilier Guards ; and this so heavily, that the crowd broke through a great part of the left wing of the advancing battalion. The weight of the retreating throng at that one spot was so great and so unwieldy, that a soldier of the Scots Fusilier Guards was thrown, it is said, to the ground with such force as to break his ribs. The part of the Scots Fusilier Guards which had thus been thrust out of line by physical pressure was of course in a state of confusion.

The remnant of the battalion thus maimed was, at the moment, without support ; for, directly in its rear, there were no formed troops coming on ; and of the two battalions on its right hand and its left, neither one nor the other had hitherto come up abreast of it. On the other hand, the force which our Fusilier Guards undertook to attack was that majestic Vladimir column which had just been defeating Sir George Brown. With a strength of no more than perhaps some four or five hundred men, the remnant of what had been the centre battalion of the brigade of Guards was advancing all alone, not merely against a breastwork thick lined with Russian soldiery, but also against a hitherto victorious column which was nearly 3000 strong. Still, the maimed

battalion pushed on ; but by this time it had so far lost its symmetry that it had come to be, as it were, two sides of a triangle—two sides of a triangle whereof the salient pointed straight to the front. At the foremost point or apex thus formed, Lindsay was carrying the Queen's colour ; and it would seem that the swiftness of his onward movement, and the eagerness of those who were near him to keep up with the colour, may have been the cause which refracted the line. There was a good deal of impetuosity at this time, and it would seem that the conception of what was the needful thing to do was—not so much to labour after the restoration of complete order, but rather—to carry the redoubt, and break down the great column by a rush ; for in the midst of such shouts as 'Forward, Guards ! Forward, Guards !'—Hugh Annesley was heard cheering thus—the bent and irregular line pressed on ; and in a few moments it had got so far up the slope as to be within some thirty or forty yards of the work. Then numbers of the Russians burst out over the parapet, and some, it is said, came straight on, with their bayonets down 'at the charge.' The Queen's colour was in danger ; for it was not to be imagined that these few companies of the Fusilier Guards could maintain themselves long against the overwhelming weight of the column in their front. But the immediate cause which brought about the retreat was, after all, the word of command. I believe that the order to retire which was now about to reach the battalion was given by the authority of General Henry Bentinck, the officer commanding the brigade. It was delivered to the line by the Adjutant of the Fusilier Guards. With pistol in hand—for some of the Russian soldiery were coming close down—Drummond, the Adjutant of the battalion, rode up, and gave the order to retire. By these words, as I gather, the battalion was stopped ; but it did not instantly obey the command to retire. There was a reluctance to fall back ; and it would seem that the feeling which caused this reluctance was not altogether a false instinct ; for, however imperative the necessity for retreating may have been, the order had come too late to avert the impending disaster ; and it is likely enough that, being, as they were, in the close presence of a powerful

enemy, our men may have fancied there must needs be some mistake in an order which directed them to go about at a moment when no due arrangements had been made for covering the retreat. Be this as it may, the Adjutant (as it was his duty to do) repeated the order. It seems he repeated it thrice ; and the last time, he was no longer content to say, 'the battalion will retire !' for he told it with force that it 'must.'

I know of no means that were taken for covering the retreat. If any were tried, they failed ; for, the moment the battalion obeyed the word of command, it lapsed into a state of disorder, and then fell back in confusion. Seeing this, the soldiery thrown out by the Russians in advance of their great column pushed forward with increasing boldness, and the Queen's colour was now in greater danger than ever. But borne by a resolute officer, and surrounded by resolute men, it was guarded with care to the last, and kept safe from the enemy's touch.\* At one moment, the foremost of the assailants were so close, that a soldier of the Fusilier Guards received a wound in the hand from a bayonet. It was then that the Fusilier Guards suffered the chief part of their losses.† By its retreat, the battalion seemed, as it were, to draw the enemy forward ; for the great Vladimir column, which had hitherto stood halted within the redoubt, now broke out over the parapet, and began to glide down the slope. For a little while, the column went on in pursuit ; but then (as is shown in the text) it was checked, and brought to a halt by the advance of the Grenadier Guards.

\* It was for his resolute defence of the colour at this juncture, that Lindsay received the Victoria Cross.

† The casualties are given in the text ; but (because the statement tends to confirm, in some points, the account I have given) I will here show the number of casualties which occurred amongst the non-commissioned officers and men of each company :—

No. 1 Company,	.	.	.	.	.	18
No. 2 do.	.	.	.	.	.	25
No. 3 do.	.	.	.	.	.	17
No. 4 do.	.	.	.	.	.	23
No. 5 do.	.	.	.	.	.	33
No. 6 do.	.	.	.	.	.	25
No. 7 do.	.	.	.	.	.	19
No. 8 do.	.	.	.	.	.	6

For some time, a great part of the Fusilier Guards remained in confusion on the lower part of the slope; but Dalrymple's, and also, I think, Jocelyn's companies, were rallied so quickly as to be enabled to partake of the fight which engaged the Grenadier Guards; and, before long, the main part of the battalion had not only been re-formed in advance of the road running parallel with the river, but was briskly resuming its place in the centre of the brigade of Guards.\*—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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No. V.

*Note respecting the theory that it was Sir George Brown who caused the Grenadier Guards to enter the Great Redoubt at the Alma.*

It would be perverse to disturb the wholesome privilege of anonymous publication by saying in print, and on the faith of

\* It would seem as though this were meant to be denied by the journal which follows Sir George Brown's impressions; for the 'Quarterly Review' has these words: 'The Fusilier Guards rushed forward to take the Redan, but failed. Some of them got up to the parapet and clung to it, but not a man entered the work, while the great body, retreating, got intermixed with the 23d Regiment, *along with whom they lay down behind the broken bank, from which it was found impossible for a considerable space of time to move them.*' And also: 'The Cold-streams took their place on the *left of the Grenadiers*' [the place properly belonging to the Scots Fusiliers], 'and shared in the battle. But the battle was already dying out.'—No. 226, p. 567. I can hardly imagine that the statement really intended to be made is such as the words seem to import; and until it is repeated in plainer terms, and supported by the testimony of some officer present at the time, I need not, I think, do more than say that, according to the Report of H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, the Scots Fusilier Guards re-formed 'with *the greatest alacrity*' (Holograph Report by H.R.H., now lying before me); and that, according to the Report of General Henry Bentinck (Holograph Report also before me), the battalion, after having 'retired for a short time, re-formed, and *returned to its post.*'

common rumour, or even of sound external evidence, that such or such a paper was written by such or such a man. But, in order to the enjoyment of the privilege, the writing must not be so worded as to force the reader to perceive its source. It must not show by its tenor that it comes from any given man. The moment it does so, it speaks with all the weight of the informant whose guidance it discloses, and then, of course, the shield being dropped, people may either bend under the authority of the personage thus thrust upon the public attention, or else take leave to deal with him as though he were the avowed author of assertions which are nominally, not really, anonymous.

Now the 'Quarterly Review' has given so minute an account of where Sir George Brown was riding on the day of the Alma, and of what he saw, and of how he reasoned, and of how he conferred, and how he advised, that an uninspired writer could hardly have learnt so much unless he derived his knowledge with more or less directness from Sir George Brown himself. Either, therefore, such an account must be a fiction, or else it must be based upon instructions directly or indirectly obtained from Sir George Brown; and, the notion of treating it as a fiction being forbidden by the respectable character of the publication, it follows that the 'Quarterly's' account of Sir George Brown's actions comes upon the world with all the weight and authority of Sir George Brown himself.

Again, and still without listening to a word of rumour, I can produce a clue which shall very soon trace to Sir George Brown one of the most striking of the assertions put forward by the 'Quarterly Review.' In flat contradiction to the written narratives of Lord Raglan, of General Evans, and of General Pennefather, and setting at nought the belief which I conceive to be unquestioned in the whole English army by any number greater than one, the 'Quarterly Review' has undertaken to say that Sir George Brown, with Codrington's brigade, 'filled the whole 'mouth of the Pass extending on both sides of the Eupatoria 'road,'—in other words, that it filled the whole of that very ground on which the world believed that—not Brown, but—Evans, with Pennefather's brigade, had fought a hard fight.



Now perhaps we might get at the authority which supported the Reviewers in making this strange assertion, if only we could find out the name of the man in the English army who sincerely believed it to be true. I can help the search. It so happens that that very notion of Sir George Brown's having filled the whole mouth of the Pass with his 1st Brigade was entertained by Sir George Brown himself. It was one of the most curious and interesting parts of the dream that was dreamt by Sir George on the day of the Alma. That he did truly believe this (incredible as it may seem) I know from his own official, but hitherto unpublished, report now lying before me, in his own handwriting, and dated the 23d of September 1854. The very belief so strangely entertained by Sir George Brown in September 1854, is not only adopted in its entirety by the writer of April 1863, but is repeated in almost the same words. The two statements shall stand side by side—

## SIR GEORGE BROWN.

'My first brigade itself' [Codrington's brigade] 'completely filled the whole mouth of the gorge or valley through which the road runs.'—*MS. unpublished Report of 23d September 1854, in the handwriting of Sir George Brown.*

## THE 'QUARTERLY REVIEW.'

'General Codrington's brigade (the right brigade of the Light Division) filled the whole mouth of the Pass, extending on both sides of the Eupatoria road.'—*Quarterly Review*, No. 226, p. 560.

Even if that curious statement by Sir George Brown had chanced to be one that can be assented to by mankind in general, the recurrence of it in words so closely similar to his would have warranted a surmise that the two sentences may have had a common origin; but supposing it to appear that the statement first made and afterwards recurring was a sheer mistake, surmise would change into proof. If an author were to state in his book that the Allies at Waterloo were commanded by the Duke of Wellington, no one would be able to detect in such an assertion the guidance of another man's mind, because the similarity of the statement to any older one of the same import is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that both are true; but if we were to find an old number of the 'Quarterly Review' asserting,

and asserting in earnest, that the Allies at Waterloo were commanded by the Prince Regent of England in person, we should instantly see that, whoever might be the nominal propounder of such a statement, its real and virtual author was the late King George the Fourth—the one man who believed it to be true. So, when it is remembered that this statement of Sir George Brown's is very wide of what other people believe, the adoption of the belief in a later writing gives proof, irresistibly cogent, that both statements were the offspring of the same honest, erring mind.

I must add, that even if Sir George Brown had been able to say that he never made any direct communication to anybody at all connected with the 'Quarterly Review,' his assertion, though carrying, of course, the most perfect conviction of its truth, would still fall short of what is needed for disentangling him; because it so happens that, before the publication of the 'Review,' Sir George Brown thought it right to circulate a MS. (authenticated by his initials) in which he gave his version of the part he sincerely believed he had taken in the battle of the Alma. Sir George cannot know, nor even, perhaps, believe, that the MS. thus circulating did not fall into the hands of an admirer, who saw in it a treasure of historic proof, took it straight to the managers of the 'Quarterly Review,' and caused them to fancy it must be accurate by showing that it was really genuine.

Thus, then, I am obliged to connect Sir George Brown with the account which is given of his actions in the 'Quarterly Review.' For some little time, indeed, after the appearance of the Reviewer's narrative, it seemed possible that something might be written or said which would relieve me from the necessity of treating Sir George Brown as the person to be refuted. Sir George, one imagined, might perhaps take some means of declaring that the Reviewers had made an inaccurate use of their instructions. But time has rolled on; and at length it can be said (in defence of the 'Review,' though in aggravation of the responsibility which is attaching upon Sir George Brown), that Sir George has allowed three months to pass away without publicly repudiating the curious statement which his organ lately gave to the world. Of course, a man is not in general to be held

answerable for acquiescing in the accounts which strangers, deriving no information from himself, may choose to give of his actions ; but I have shown, I think, that Sir George and the 'Quarterly' cannot stand thus clear asunder ; and when we find, first, that Sir George Brown has circulated a MS. containing an account of what he imagines he saw, and what he imagines he did, at the battle of the Alma ; next, that one of the mistaken statements adopted by the 'Review' was addressed by Sir George Brown in his own handwriting to the English Headquarters ; next, that the Review (a publication of unimpeached respectability) is so worded as to all but disclose its informant ; next, that having thus displayed its title to be deemed authentic, the 'Review' proceeds to attribute to Sir George Brown a series of striking achievements ; and that, finally, after an interval of three months, Sir George Brown allows a fresh number of the 'Review' to appear without a word of disavowal or modest remonstrance,\* then, I think, we can hardly fail to see that the narrative given by the 'Review' acquires the kind of interest which belongs to autobiography. We recur to the pages ; and whenever we can find the name of 'Sir George Brown,' we put in before it the significant 'Ego,' which gives an interesting, nay, an almost humorous, authenticity to the whole story. Whether the story be true or not, that is another question ; and, to solve it, one may be obliged to compare Sir George Brown's impressions (as indeed shall be presently done) with the impressions of other people ; but until Sir George Brown shall come forward and impute to the journal which reproduces his ideas an erroneous use of the information supplied to it, one is warranted in attributing the kind of authenticity above pointed out to everything concerning Sir George which the 'Quarterly Review' has narrated. Add to this great merit of 'authenticity' the well-known fact that Sir George Brown's honour and truthful intent are above the reach of all cavil, and then we come to understand the kind of interest which attaches to the Reviewer's

\* This circumstance leads me to infer that the Reviewers may have followed Sir George's instructions with a more confiding exactness than I ventured to believe probable when I wrote the foot-note at p. 472.

story. Then, as we light upon each shining deed ascribed to Sir George Brown, we are able to say,—‘ This is indeed curious. ‘ True or not, here is a story which is really believed to be true ‘ by the very officer—a General of Division—who is represented ‘ to have been the principal actor—nay, rather, to have been the ‘ almost sole actor—in these stirring scenes. No doubt this is ‘ all very new. No doubt, there are many who think that Lord ‘ Raglan, the Commander of the Forces, had something to do ‘ with governing the issue of the battle. Perhaps, also, General ‘ Evans may still persist in maintaining that he existed on the ‘ day of the Alma ; nay, that he fought a hard fight on that day, ‘ and lost the fourth of a brigade upon ground which Sir George ‘ Brown declares to have been wholly occupied by himself.\* Again, ‘ the 7th Fusiliers may maintain that, almost at the moment when, ‘ according to the recipient of Sir George Brown’s ideas, they ‘ neglected to “attend to” Sir George,† and, on the contrary, ‘ “turned round and moved back,” ‡ they (the 7th Fusiliers) were ‘ not only standing fast, but were in the very act of defeating a ‘ Russian column. Again, those who knew the worth of Colonel ‘ Hood may imagine that, in the crisis of the fight, he and his ‘ Grenadier Guards must have known how to find the redoubt ‘ without the guidance or “request” § of Sir George Brown. ‘ Yet again, the friends of the Duke of Cambridge may continue

\* ‘ My 1st brigade itself *completely filled the whole mouth of the gorge ‘ or valley through which the road runs.*’—(Holograph Report now before me, by Sir George Brown.) The ground thus described as ‘ *completely ‘ filled*’ by Sir George’s troops was exactly that on which Evans was operating with Pennefather’s brigade. In his holograph report of the 22d of September 1854, Evans says that he operated with four of his regiments and one of his batteries ‘ *to the left of the conflagration, to endeavour to force by that direction the passage of the river and the ‘ bridge ;*’ and Lord Raglan, in his published report, spoke of Pennefather’s brigade as ‘ *connected with the right of the Light Division,*’ an expression which exactly confirms Evans’s statement. General Pennefather writes to the same effect. So does General Warren. I never heard the name of any man except Sir George Brown who imagined that his, Sir George’s, right brigade ‘ filled the whole mouth of the gorge.’

† ‘ Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 566.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid. p. 567.

‘ to think that His Royal Highness brought up the Coldstream  
 ‘ from the river’s bank a good bit before the “dying out” of the  
 ‘ battle,\* and that he did this without waiting to be “briefly  
 ‘ “conferred with” † by Sir George Brown. Yet again, the Scots  
 ‘ Fusilier Guards may deny that “they lay down behind the  
 ‘ “broken bank, from which it was found impossible, for a con-  
 ‘ “siderable space of time, to remove them,” and may maintain  
 ‘ that, even if Sir George Brown did really assume the practical  
 ‘ command of the Guards by “requesting” and “briefly confer-  
 ‘ “ring,” he could not have placed the Coldstream in the interval  
 ‘ “on the left of the Grenadiers,” ‡ because (after the temporary  
 ‘ check which they had undergone) they, the Scots Fusilier Guards,  
 ‘ were swift to resume their place in the centre of the brigade.  
 ‘ Finally, the men of the Highland Brigade may maintain that,  
 ‘ instead of coming up only “just in time” to see the Russians  
 ‘ “in full flight,” § they did really engage in that “stubborn”  
 ‘ contest with the enemy’s columns, which their chief, Sir Colin  
 ‘ Campbell, described and officially reported the second day after  
 ‘ the battle. || People may say all these things. They may labour  
 ‘ to maintain that Sir George Brown must have been mistaken,  
 ‘ and that he could not have really performed the achievements  
 ‘ which his admiring ‘Quarterly’ attributes to him; but whether  
 ‘ Sir George performed them or not, there remains this curious  
 ‘ and interesting fact,—he sincerely believes that he did.’

Such being the kind of interest, if not actual importance, which attaches to the account of the battle as given in the ‘Quarterly Review,’ it would seem that, at worst, I am erring on the safe side when I not only treat it as serious, but quote, and refute its statements.

But now for the passage which is to be the special subject of comment in this Note. After having stated (in a passage before quoted, Appendix No. III.) that two of the regiments of Sir George Brown’s Division persisted in retreating notwithstanding

\* ‘Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 567.

† Ibid. ; and see the next Number (No. VI.) of this Appendix.

‡ ‘Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 567.

§ Ibid.

|| MS. Report now before me, signed ‘C. Campbell.’

Sir George's efforts to prevent them, also that they would not 'attend to him,' and that they 'turned round and moved back' \* —the 'Review' goes on :—'Having opened to let the 7th and 33d pass, the Grenadiers re-formed line, and advanced against the Russian columns in their immediate front. *Sir George Brown went with the Grenadier Guards*; and when they arrived abreast of the Redan, he *requested the commander of the battalion to detach a party from his left and to reoccupy that work.*'

Now, Sir George Brown commanded the Light Division—the Division which, under his guidance, had had the misfortune to be defeated;† and he had no authority over the Grenadiers or any other of the regiments belonging to the 1st Division. Yet the theory is, that Sir George abandoned his troops—troops said to be in such a state that they 'would not attend to him'—and that, joining himself to a regiment with which he had nothing to do, and imagining his judgment to be more sound or more swift than that of Colonel Hood (Colonel Hood was one of the very ablest of the officers then serving with the English army), he took upon himself to 'request' the Colonel to reoccupy the redoubt. This story, of course, supposes that, taken as a body, the battalion of the Grenadier Guards moved up in a direction which brought it clear of the redoubt, and that it continued its advance without marching through the work; for, otherwise, it could not have been said that the recapture of the redoubt was effected by a request 'to *detach* a party' for the purpose. So, if I show that the advancing battalion marched up right through the redoubt, there at once is an end of the story which seeks to mutilate my account of Colonel Hood's achievement by ascribing the recapture of the work to Sir George Brown.

Now, as it happens, I can not only prove that the advancing line of the Grenadier Guards marched bodily through the re-

\* 'Quarterly Review,' No. 226, p. 566.

† The only regiment of Sir George Brown's which did not undergo defeat was the 7th Fusiliers, and Sir George had so little to do with the victorious fight which rendered the fate of that regiment an exception to the fate of the Division, that until this summer he did not even believe in it; and but for me, I imagine, he would have known now.

doubt, but am even enabled to show the exact point in the line of the battalion which impinged upon the howitzer then remaining within the work. Writing on another question, and before this theory about Sir George Brown and the redoubt had been propounded to the world, Colonel Percy (who commanded at the Alma the left-flank company of the Grenadier Guards) addressed to me a letter, of which the following is an extract:—

‘ With regard to the gun in the redoubt, *the right of the 8th company and the left of the 7th company, in advancing, were exactly opposite to the gun.* I halted my men about five paces off the rampart for fear of there being some mine, [and] clambered over, *aiding myself by the gun.* Colonel Pakenham, since killed, clambered over at the same moment, and scratched the number of the company (No. 7) on the carriage with his sword, saying to me afterwards (almost directly) “that he had done so that the gun might not be claimed by others.” I replied, “I wished I had thought of doing so too.” As the Russians had left the gun after the repulse of the first line, the gun was clearly the prize of the Grenadier Guards.’

Again, Sir Charles Russell was another of the officers of the Grenadier Guards who was with the left-flank company of the battalion; and I find that, in the admirably clear private journal which he has been so kind as to intrust to me, there is contained this passage:—‘ The gallant Light Division, quite cut up, were falling back upon us, and impeding our fire, but still we moved steadily towards the battery. The Fusiliers on our left received a partial check, and (the colours and a few men of the 95th having formed on our left) *we entered the battery close to the brass gun, and poor Pakenham made a mark on it as he passed.\** We still pushed on, and it was not till the hurried retreat of the enemy put them beyond the reach of our Miniés, that we halted. Too much cannot be said of Colonel Hood’s gallantry; and by his admirable coolness and unerring judgment he took his regiment through action as few have done.’

These narratives of Colonel Percy and Sir Charles Russell are accounts—not of what happened to any detached ‘party,’ but—of

\* Pakenham, as we before saw, was with the 7th company.

the advance of that superb and unbroken line of the Grenadier Guards, whereof their company formed the left ;\* and unless these two officers were under some delusion,—some delusion strangely common to both—nay, common, I am sure, to every survivor of the battalion,—the notion of Sir George Brown's having recaptured the redoubt, by causing Colonel Hood to 'detach a party' for the purpose, must be looked upon, either as the mistake of Reviewers straying loose from Sir George's guidance, though their words all but purport to follow it, or else as the genuine production of a mind much confused, which refracted the lights it received, and connected its impressions of what went on at the Alma with wrong people, wrong times, and wrong places.

I will add (though, after the proofs I have given, it is hardly worth while to do so), that neither in Colonel Hood's private journal, nor in any of his letters known to his family, is there any the least mention either of his having received any 'request' or other communication from Sir George Brown ; or of his having recaptured the redoubt by detaching 'a party' for the purpose.

Of course, when one sees a man of Sir George Brown's unquestioned honour and truthfulness submitting to have it said of him—and that by what would seem to be his own chosen organ of publicity—that it was he who taught Colonel Hood and his Grenadier Guards the way to retake the redoubt, one strains after some counter-theory that will account for an honest mistake. The very best counter-theory I can frame for the purpose has the fault of being weak and far-fetched ; but, weak and far-fetched as it is, I offer it to the attention of Sir George Brown.

Long after the recapture of the redoubt, and when the Grenadier Guards were far in advance of the work, it occurred to some officers in the regiment (who were anxious that their corps should not lose its fairly-won trophy) to send back a man—not a 'party'—with directions to stand sentry over the brass howitzer then remaining within the redoubt. After a moment's hesita-

\* Sir Charles Russell has been so good as to assure me once again, both orally and in writing, that at the Alma the line of the Grenadier Guards 'was never broken, either in front or in flank, or otherwise.'



tion, Colonel Hood acceded to the suggestion, and a man—he volunteered for the service—went back and stood sentry over the howitzer.

Now, supposing that Sir George Brown imagined the redoubt to be before him instead of behind him ; that, being unacquainted with the actual state of the battle, he believed the already recaptured redoubt to be still awaiting recapture ; and, finally, that he was anxious to put Colonel Hood in the way of effecting an operation which had been performed some minutes before,—then the fact of a man having been really sent back to look after the howitzer, and so, in a sense, to ‘reoccupy’ the empty redoubt, would be enough to supply that small element of truth which is conducive—nay, almost necessary—to the growth of a modern fable.

Be this as it may, I must persist in asking my countrymen to believe that the recapture of the Great Redoubt was effected—not by a ‘party’ detached from Colonel Hood’s regiment at the ‘request’ of Sir George Brown, but—by a self-sufficing chief and an undivided battalion—by Colonel Hood advancing in person at the head of his Grenadier Guards.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

## No. VI.

*Note respecting the statement in the text that ‘the Duke of Cambridge, riding up with the Coldstream, stood master of the Great Redoubt.’*

I CONCEIVED that the above sentence was a fair and not untruthful use of language, partly because H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge commanded the Division to which the Grenadier Guards belonged, but partly also because I believed that the ‘Coldstream’ (with which His Royal Highness was personally present) had marched up to the redoubt—not quite simultaneously with the Grenadiers, yet—so soon after them that the advance

of these two battalions of the Guards might be fairly regarded as one movement. But, armed, as they would make it appear, with information which must needs come from Sir George Brown, and unchecked as yet by any public complaints against their accuracy on the part of Sir George, the conductors of the 'Quarterly Review' are still leaving unretracted the narrative which they gave to the world more than three months ago. In it there is this paragraph:—

' Having opened to let the 7th and 33d pass, the Grenadiers  
' re-formed line and advanced against the Russian columns in  
' their immediate front. Sir George Brown went with the  
' Grenadier Guards; and when they arrived abreast of the  
' Redan, he requested the commander of the battalion to detach  
' a party from his left and to reoccupy that work. There was  
' no risk in this; neither could the flank of the Grenadiers be  
' said at this juncture to be exposed, because the men of the  
' Light Division, who had been driven out of the Redan, were  
' lying in an irregular line with the Fusilier Guards under the  
' bank, and kept up such a heavy fire on the space between  
' themselves and the work as compelled the enemy's masses,  
' which had occupied the work, to halt and finally to withdraw.  
' Protected on the left by this fire the Grenadiers moved for-  
' ward, till, having crossed the swell of ground from which Cod-  
' rington's brigade had retreated, they found themselves con-  
' fronted by the Russian columns. Upon these they opened  
' such an effective and well-sustained fire as soon told. The  
' enemy wavered and gave ground; but in proportion as the  
' Grenadiers pressed upon them, their own flank became exposed,  
' and they were in danger of getting involved in a contest single-  
' handed with a very superior force of the enemy. Seeing this,  
' Sir George Brown *rode back* across the front of the Redan, and,  
' rounding the corner of the hill, *came upon the Coldstream*  
' *Guards* in line and *under the steep ground*, and with their  
' right somewhat thrown forward. *He conferred briefly with*  
' *the Duke of Cambridge and General Bentinck, both of whom*  
' *were beside the Coldstreams, and the whole immediately ad-*  
' *vanced.* The Coldstreams took their place on the left of the

‘ Grenadiers and shared in the battle. *But the battle was already dying out.* The Grenadiers had carried all before them ; ‘ the Redan was empty ; and, *stealing away in a direction to their own right, the Russian columns were in full retreat.*’

Now, if it were really to be proved to me that, after the time when the Grenadier Guards were abreast of the redoubt, the Duke of Cambridge with the Coldstream was still down below, under the steep ground near the river, and that there he and the Coldstream remained until a general officer, who had already been up with the Grenadiers abreast of the redoubt (and who had already provided for the reoccupying of the ‘work’ by a detached party), was able to ride back, to pass ‘across the front of the ‘Redan,’ to ‘round the corner of the hill,’ to come at last to the Coldstream as they stood ranged ‘under the steep ground,’ and there to confer ‘briefly’ with H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge and General Henry Bentinck ; finally, if it were to be proved to me that the advance of the Duke of Cambridge and the Coldstream was the result of the ‘brief’ conference thus held, and that, by that time, the battle was already ‘dying out,’ the redoubt ‘empty,’ and the Russian columns ‘stealing away’ ‘in full retreat,’—then indeed I should be forced to qualify the words by which I ventured to connect the Coldstream and the name of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge with those moments of actual strife and glory which preceded the time of mere triumph.

But happily I conceive that I am not yet brought to this ; and I will say why.

In the first place, the ‘Quarterly’s’ narrative of what Sir George Brown did at the Alma has not been expressly adopted by Sir George ; and although, I fear, I must grant, both that Sir George Brown was the founder of the singular creed which inspired a part of the narrative, and that, after an interval of more than three months, he has not yet publicly disavowed the achievements which it attributes to him, still it is yet possible that when Sir George shall see all the bearings of the account which describes his actions, he will hold it his duty to come forward and correct the story.

But, in the next place, I have to say that, even if Sir George Brown shall do the reverse of this, and shall actually undertake to ratify all that the 'Review' has said of him, he will be ratifying a narrative which I have shown to be wild as a dream in five of its chief assertions, and which therefore is likely enough to prove equally wild in this one.

For the present, however, I do not undertake to refute this curious account of the spot where Sir George Brown (on his return from the re-capture of the redoubt) is represented to have found the Duke of Cambridge, General Henry Bentinck, and the Coldstream Guards. I leave this story to be dealt with by those who can speak from their personal knowledge of the state to which the battle had got when Sir George Brown is stated to have ridden back from abreast of the redoubt, and to have held the brief conference which was followed by the advance of the Coldstream. To what may be addressed to me, whether for or against the story, I shall listen, I hope, with due care ; but in the mean time, and until the account shall be confirmed, I must decline to cut down the words by which I assign to the Duke of Cambridge and the Coldstream—not a mere share in a battle 'already dying out,' but—a real and a timely participation in the 'brilliant advance' of the Guards.\*

This is the last of the Notes elicited by the narrative of the Alma contained in the 'Quarterly Review.' If Sir George Brown shall say that he has made no written nor oral communication about the Alma to anybody connected as a contributor or otherwise with the 'Quarterly Review,' and that he has never circulated a MS. which could have furnished ingredients for the publication, then I will gladly unsay every word which tends to connect him with the narrative contained in the 'Review.' In the mean time, however, the narrative given in the 'Review' is speaking, as it were, with what seems to be the transparent authority of Sir George Brown ; and, this being so, I must for the present permit myself to regard Sir George as an officer who

\* In his published despatch, Lord Raglan calls the movement 'a brilliant advance of the brigade of Foot-Guards under Major-General Bentinck.'

has connected himself (in the way I have indicated) with the periodical press. Sir George Brown has taken part in gainsaying my account of the Alma, and is now in turn doing me the honour to sit and undergo a few comments.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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## No. VII.

*Note respecting the order of time in which certain events occurred at the battle of the Alma.*

It may be remembered that when Sir Thomas Troubridge had just delivered the message which was followed by the immediate advance of the Grenadier Guards, he met Sir George Brown, and from him received his directions as to the course to be taken by the 7th Fusiliers. Now it happened that, whilst Troubridge was still in conversation with Sir George Brown, he observed that a movement was taking effect on the Telegraph Height; and, drawing out his field-glass, he presently saw the left of the French army moving fairly up towards the Telegraph. The fact of his seeing this at the time of his interview with Sir George Brown has happily fixed the exact point which had been reached by the progress of events in the English part of the field at the moment when the French army made good its advance from the cover of the steep hill-sides to the smooth plateau above. It has shown in a summary way—and the conclusion exactly agrees with inferences deducible from other grounds—it has shown that the advance of the French to the smooth plateau leading up to the Telegraph was after the storming and the dismantling of the Great Redoubt; was after the withdrawal of the Causeway batteries; was after the retreat of the enemy's reserves; was after the overthrow of the column long engaged with Lacy Yea's Fusiliers; and was exactly simultaneous with the movement which brought our Grenadier Guards into their final engagement with the enemy's columns.

## No. VIII.

*Note respecting the truth of the accounts which represent that a great and terrible fight took place near the Telegraph on the day of the Alma.*

IN the beginning of the year 1855 the Baron de Bazancourt was sent to the theatre of war by the French 'Minister of Public Instruction,' and the 'Mission' with which the Baron went charged was that of writing a history of the Crimean expedition. He was accredited to the then French Commander-in-Chief by the Minister of War, and he seems to have been freely supplied with all such materials for getting at the truth as could be found in the military journals of the French army, and in the statements voluntarily made to the historian-elect by officers who had themselves directed the operations which they undertook to describe.\* Closely translated, the Baron's account of the supposed fight at the Telegraph runs thus. After speaking of the point where the building of the Telegraph stands, he says:—'It is there that the battle is; it is there that there are the efforts of attack and defence. On all sides we crown the plateau; but the considerable Russian forces massed behind the Telegraph, the sharpshooters sheltered in this partly-built tower, and the batteries placed right and left, decimate our troops. Already the 1st Zouave Regiment and the 1st battalion of the Chasseurs of the 1st Division, and on their left the 2d Zouaves of the 3d Division, shelter themselves behind the undulations of the plateau, and were keeping up a sustained fire against the Russians, when two batteries of the reserve, led by Commandant La Boussinière, came to oppose artillery to artillery. The battery of Captain Toussaint quitted the road in order to arrive more rapidly, by a movement toward its left, just in front of the Telegraph; the Zouaves themselves help to drag the guns up the last acclivities. They are soon placed, and open their fire, to which the Zouaves of the two divisions and the foot Chasseurs add a

\* See his Preface, p. 6.

‘ redoubling of fire. Four Russian guns quickly limber-up  
‘ and withdraw. But the fire of the enemy’s masses, and that  
‘ of the artillery placed in rear of the Telegraph, cause us  
‘ serious losses. This position of expectancy could not long  
‘ be maintained ; an impetuous charge of the Russian cavalry  
‘ on this point was imminent.

‘ Colonel Cler, who knows the war-tried and resolute troops  
‘ which he commands, comprehends that he cannot save them  
‘ from utter destruction but by one of those sacrifices which  
‘ snatch victory. For an instant he hesitates between a charge  
‘ with the bayonet against the great front of the Russian square  
‘ and an attack on the tower of the Telegraph, the centre and cul-  
‘ minating point of the enemy’s line. It is upon this last plan that  
‘ he decides ; and, going forward in advance of the angle formed  
‘ by the regiments, and putting his horse into a gallop, he cries  
‘ out, “ To me, my Zouaves ! To the tower ! to the tower ! ”

‘ All precipitate themselves at the same time—that is, the 2d  
‘ Zouaves, the 1st Zouaves, with Colonel Bourbaki at their head,  
‘ the foot Chasseurs, the 39th Regiment, which comes up with  
‘ Colonel Beuret and General d’Aurelle.

‘ It is a human torrent which nothing stops. Colonel Cler  
‘ comes the first to the tower ; all have followed him ; all arrive  
‘ ardent, impetuous, irresistible. The struggle was short, but it  
‘ was one of those bloody, terrible struggles in which man fights  
‘ body to body with his enemy—in which the looks devour each  
‘ other [*où les regards se dévorent*, whatever that may mean]—  
‘ in which the hands grapple each other—in which arms dashed  
‘ against arms are made to yield sparks of fire.\* Dead and  
‘ dying are heaped together, and the combatants trample upon  
‘ them and smother them.

‘ The Russians received this formidable shock on the points  
‘ of their bayonets ; they ask each other if these are indeed  
‘ but men [*si ce sont des hommes*] who thus dare to rush upon  
‘ death. They fight, but soon they stagger ; and these formidable  
‘ masses, menaced on all sides by the two divisions which advance  
‘ in close columns, become broken, and operate their retreat.

\* I have observed this phenomenon in fights upon the stage.

‘ Colonel Cler seized the eagle of his regiment, which he  
 ‘ plants on the tower to the cry of, “ May the Emperor live ! ”  
 ‘ Sergeant-major Fleury of the 1st Zouaves rushes upon the  
 ‘ upper scaffolding of this partly-built building and balances  
 ‘ the flag, which sinks with the intrepid non-commissioned  
 ‘ officer struck in the forehead by a ball. The flag of the  
 ‘ 1st Zouaves also floats on this glorious trophy, which a frag-  
 ‘ ment of a shell breaks at the staff [flotte aussi sur ce  
 ‘ glorieux trophée qu’un éclat d’obus brise à la hampe].  
 ‘ Lieutenant Poitevin, ensign-bearer of the 39th, precipitates  
 ‘ himself in his turn outside his battalion, and comes, in the  
 ‘ midst of a rain of projectiles, to plant on the tower of the Tele-  
 ‘ graph the eagle of his regiment ; a bullet strikes him full in the  
 ‘ breast, and stretches him lifeless. Every one amongst all these  
 ‘ intrepids seemed to have in himself the enthusiasm of death.’

That is the account which M. de Bazancourt gives, and he does not seem to have found himself cramped by the officially-admitted fact that in the whole battle the French only lost three officers killed. One of these, Lieutenant Poitevin, was struck, as we saw, after the Telegraph was carried, and when the Russians were operating their retreat ; but in the actual fight, terrific and murderous as M. de Bazancourt represents it to have been, it does not appear that any French officer was either killed, wounded, or hurt.

It would seem that in 1856 the feeling of the French army respecting the story of the supposed fight at the Telegraph was not in such a state as to favour anything like a repetition of M. de Bazancourt’s description, for in that year M. du Casse published his ‘ Précis Historique ; ’ and although he describes some portions of the battle at considerable length, he disposes of the capture of the Telegraph in terms which do not necessarily denote any kind of infantry fight, and in only eight words.\* ‘ The Telegraph, the key of the position, is carried.’ ‘ Le Télégraphe clef de la position est enlevé.’

\* He adds an account of the planting of the flags on the Telegraph ; but his narrative of the *taking* of the Telegraph is, as I have said, in eight words.



If the accounts given by the French had ended there, it might have been inferred that they wished quietly to repudiate the bloody narrative of M. de Bazancourt, and to drop the notion of saying that there was really a great fight at the Telegraph: but the official atlas of the French Government renews the story; for in the plan which illustrates this period of the battle, it places the Taroutine and the 'Militia' battalions close in front of the Telegraph and around it; and the letterpress narrative accompanying the plans has these words:—'Le Général Canrobert lance sa division sur les 'défenseurs du Télégraphe; après un combat opiniâtre 'auquel prend part le 39<sup>e</sup> de ligne de la brigade d'Aurelle 'de la 4<sup>e</sup> division, les Russes sont chassés de leur position, et 'les drapeaux des 1<sup>er</sup> et 2<sup>e</sup> de Zouaves et du 39<sup>e</sup> de ligne 'flottent successivement sur le Télégraphe.'

That the three flags were hoisted on the Telegraph no one doubts; but the question is, whether those triumphant demonstrations were preceded by anything like a serious fight. The difficulty of believing this is occasioned by the tenor of the Russian accounts. General Kiriakoff was naturally anxious to show that he had made an obstinate stand; and it may be imagined that if the heroic struggle described by M. de Bazancourt had really occurred, General Kiriakoff's narrative would have put it in full relief. He, however, says not a word of any such struggle. In one part of his narrative he speaks of the Taroutine and the 'Militia' battalions as being so far in advance, and so low down, that the batteries near the Telegraph fired over their heads: and at a later period of his narrative, without having said a word about any intermediate operation, he says that these battalions were under a cross-fire of artillery; and that, for that reason, and because the troops opposed to the English were already in full retreat, he 'commanded the march towards 'the main road.' He does not say a word of the bloody struggle with infantry in which the French represent his troops to have been engaged.

At first sight, it does not seem highly probable that, upon

the very summit of a smooth hill-top, where there was nothing to offer cover for the body of even one man, a few battalions (already dispirited by the passive endurance of artillery-fire to which they had been condemned) should be ordered to make a stand against the 30,000 Frenchmen and Turks who were converging upon that very point from the west as well as from the north; and if Kiriakoff had resorted to such a measure, it is all but incredible that his careful and almost minute narrative of his operations should have omitted all mention of an exploit strange in itself, and, if only it were true, redounding very much to the glory of his troops. Not only, however, does Kiriakoff appear to have been ignorant of any such fight, but the whole tenor of the narrative in which he describes what he did is inconsistent with the notion that anything of the kind could have passed. According to his statement, he was a divisional general left without orders; he saw his troops suffering under a cross-fire of artillery; he knew (though apparently in an imperfect way) that overwhelming masses of French troops were more or less near to the verge of the plateau, and being thus circumstanced, and seeing, moreover, that the English had already carried the position, he thought it time to withdraw his battalions from the line of the artillery-fire; but from first to last he never was challenged or vexed by the near approach of any French infantry. Such is his account. But this is not all. Both Kiriakoff and the official French statement of the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient' agree in representing that, after the check which it had given to Canrobert's Division, the great 'column of the eight battalions' had been kept together, and moved a good way in the right rear of the Telegraph, without ever engaging in any kind of struggle with infantry. Now, except the troops composing that column, the only battalions of Russian infantry which were at any time in this part of the field were the Taroutine and the 'Militia' battalions; and accordingly, these are the troops which the French official 'Atlas' places in array at the Telegraph. Now the 'Militia' battalions, we saw, were inferior troops, and had dissolved.

There remained the Taroutine battalions; and if any stand had been really made at the Telegraph, these must have been the troops which made it. It happens, however, that an intelligent and highly-instructed field-officer of that corps has written an apparently complete account of every part of the battle of which he was competent to speak; and if any of Kiriakoff's forces, but still more if any of the Taroutine battalions, had made the stand alleged, it is quite incredible either that Major Chodasiewicz, who was present with the Taroutine corps, should have remained ignorant of the fact, or that, knowing it, he should have omitted to state the truth. If any of the Taroutine battalions had been engaged in a fight of this sort, it would have been for them the grand, the all-absorbing event of the day; for it certainly was not their fate to be brought into conflict with French infantry in any other part of the field, and they would not have failed to remember an obstinate and bloody fight of the kind described by the French. But Chodasiewicz, though he minutely describes the way in which the Taroutine battalions were galled in their retreat by the fire of artillery, does not say a word of any kind of fight at the Telegraph between French and Russian infantry. Yet his was the very regiment which, if the French story were true, must have borne the brunt of the alleged fight.

Upon the whole, I have conceived that these authentic and trustworthy narratives of General Kiriakoff and Major Chodasiewicz\* forbid me to admit into my text any statement similar to the account given by M. de Bazancourt, or even to that contained in the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient;' but those who are so constituted as to wish to incline the ear to a teacher duly prepared for them by the French Emperor's 'Minister of 'Public Instruction,' will find, in the above quotation from M. de Bazancourt, the sort of guidance they like.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

\* Anitchkoff was an officer of the Staff, whose narrative is based on accounts taken from various Russian sources, and he says not a word of any fight at the Telegraph, or of any other combat which could have been confounded with it.

In dealing with this question of the supposed fight at the 'Telegraph,' I did not affect to conceal the leaning of my own opinion ; but still, I avoided the language of actual assertion, and was content to speak in terms which were fitted—not so much to demand assent, but rather—to provoke inquiry. Accordingly the subject underwent discussion ; and by-and-by (though not at this moment, nor in this Appendix) I shall try to show the state of the dispute which my narrative served to invite.

Meantime, I will only say that, concerning the whole notion of a great fight with organised masses of Russian troops at the Telegraph, inquiry has hitherto strengthened the opinion disclosed in the text ; and if I have done a wrong to the French, it is in imputing it to them too generally that they warranted M. Bazancourt's story. Marshal St Arnaud's despatch not only says nothing of any such a fight at the Telegraph, but virtually confirms that narrative of the Russian retreat on which I relied ; and the story, as we before saw, is substantially rejected by the 'Précis Historique.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

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## No. IX.

*Note containing an Extract from a Letter addressed by Colonel Napier, the Historian of the Peninsular War, to Lord Fitzroy Somerset.*

IF the foregoing volume has begun to disclose to its readers the entireness of Lord Raglan's devotion to the public service, his more than common swiftness of action, his subtle understanding of the feelings of other men, and his tenderness for their honest pride, it may be interesting to hear, that some thirty years before the time I write of, these very qualities had been ascribed to Lord Fitzroy Somerset by the Historian of the Peninsular War. In a letter of October 1824, which is now before me (but which I never saw until long after the publication of this book), Napier wrote :—

‘MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,—The rapidity with which you  
‘ have fulfilled ——’s desires would be extraordinary coming  
‘ from any other quarter, but your accurate knowledge of every-  
‘ thing that does or has belonged to the army enables you to *do*  
‘ before others can *think*. You are well aware from the long  
‘ acquaintance you have had with my opinions that I am no  
‘ flatterer, and that I am not disposed to express sentiments  
‘ which I do not feel. I would certainly rather have my feelings  
‘ judged of by my actions than by my words, but I should be  
‘ wanting both to you and myself if I failed to express my ad-  
‘ miration of the unabated warmth with which you assist real  
‘ merit uninfluenced by any consideration but the services of the  
‘ individual. Neither has the delicacy with which you have  
‘ upon several occasions kept back all appearance of personal  
‘ protection been unobserved by myself or those numerous  
‘ claimants who have at different times found a sure friend in  
‘ you when they could find none elsewhere.’

When I see Napier writing that Lord Fitzroy Somerset could *do* before others could *think*, I am reminded of a singular instance of the uncommon swiftness with which his mind worked. One day in the Peninsula, and at a time when the Headquarters Staff were moving along the road, there was brought an intercepted despatch, but it was in cipher—in a cipher unknown. Lord Fitzroy Somerset took up the paper, and, still riding on with the rest of the Staff, began to bend his mind to the letters and signs. Before he quitted his saddle, he had pierced the secret, had found out the key, and had read the despatch.—  
*Note to 4th Edition.*

END OF VOL. II.

*Note respecting the following Plans of the Battle of  
the Alma.*

THE plan of the country, as shown by these Maps, is taken from the French official 'Atlas Historique,' but with some slight changes exaggerating in some degree the natural features of the ground, in order to make some of the slopes and hollows more easily apparent. The signs purporting to indicate the positions of the troops have been made by myself; but it is not intended that anything seen in the Plans should be regarded as varying, or in any way qualifying, the description contained in the foregoing chapters; and it must not be understood that the positions of the troops are asserted to have been at any two moments such as they are represented to be in these two Plans. The object of the Plans is not to assert any one of the facts thereby appearing to be indicated, but merely to aid the reader in his endeavours to follow the statements contained in the text.

A. W. K.







